United States vs. Maharaja Alim, et al.

The uncorroborated testimony of a confederate or accomplice, if it satisfies the court as to the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to sustain a conviction, and one who induces the commission of a murder through a promise and payment of reward is liable as principal by inducement even though he was absent from the scene and did not share in the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and treachery.

The accused belonged to the settlement of Daap, barrio of Bolong, in the municipality and Province of Zamboanga, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, where the Moro Panglima Salani was chief and Maharaja Alim his assistant. Salatung was married to a niece of Maharaja Alim; the deceased Tantung and his wife Baa were Salatung's nephew and niece; Munagil was married to Cubulan, a sister of Baa; and Lahaman was the husband of another of Baa's sisters. The case was governed by the Penal Code then in force, including article 11 thereof as amended by Act No. 2142, which supplied the extenuating circumstance invoked on behalf of the accused belonging to non-Christian tribes, and by Act No. 2726, which conditioned the imposition of the death penalty upon a unanimous vote of the Court.

The complaint alleged that in or about the month of March, 1917, and prior thereto, in the settlement of Daap, barrio of Bolong, in the municipality and Province of Zamboanga, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, Maharaja Alim, being a person who had influence and exercised authority over his co-accused Lahaman, Munagil, and Salatung, conspired with and induced them, through pay and promise of reward, to kill the Moro Tantung; that in view of the inducement the three conspired among themselves and, acting mutually on the night of March 16, 1917, on the sea within the jurisdictional limits of the municipality, with treachery and premeditation, taking advantage of the darkness of the night, one of them armed with a lance and the others with bolos, attacked and assaulted Tantung, inflicting several fatal wounds from which he immediately died.

About a year before the killing, Maharaja Alim proposed to Munagil, Lahaman, and Salatung that they kill Tantung, and about a month before it he repeated the proposal, offered them P100, and advanced P10, which Munagil received. The proposal was accepted by all three. On the morning of March 16, 1917, while Munagil, Lahaman, and Salatung were on a piece of land belonging to the first of them, Maharaja Alim appeared, again spoke to them of the proposal, and advised them that Tantung would go fishing on the afternoon of that day. At noon the defendants separated and withdrew to their respective homes. That afternoon Maharaja Alim again saw Lahaman in the latter's house for the purpose of talking about the killing. On the same afternoon Salatung saw Munagil in a coconut grove and told him that they should hasten because Maharaja Alim had told him that Tantung was already out on the sea, and Salatung likewise went to see Lahaman to tell him that at nightfall they would go in search of Tantung.

When night came, Munagil, Lahaman, and Salatung met on the seashore, Salatung carrying a lance belonging to Maharaja Alim which he had taken from the house of Pancalan. The three embarked in a vinta and went out to sea in the direction of the vinta in which Tantung was fishing. On the way Salatung suggested that, upon drawing up alongside Tantung's vinta, he would ask the latter for some bait and that when Tantung was in the act of giving it Munagil should thrust him with the lance; Salatung steered. When the boats were alongside, Salatung took hold of the edge of Tantung's vinta to keep the two together and asked for bait; as Tantung stretched out his arm to give it, Munagil pierced him with the lance below the armpit, after which Lahaman took the same lance and gave the wounded man another thrust in the breast. Tantung fell into the water; Salatung rowed toward the place where he was and, when the latter was near the vinta, Munagil struck him on the back with a bolo, and Tantung disappeared.

Munagil, Lahaman, and Salatung returned to the shore and, after disembarking, dispersed, whereupon Munagil went to seek Maharaja Alim to report that they had already killed Tantung. After Maharaja Alim had learned of the killing, he looked for and found Lahaman that same night, and the two went out to sea in search of Tantung's body for the purpose, as Maharaja Alim testified, of preventing the discovery of the crime. Tantung's body, bearing several wounds, was later found floating on the water, and the authorities proceeded to investigate the cause of his death, aided by the Moro Barahama, to whom Munagil and Lahaman had confessed that they, accompanied by Salatung and acting under Maharaja Alim's orders, had killed Tantung.

The evidence against Maharaja Alim and Salatung consisted solely of the testimony of Munagil and Lahaman, who related in full detail how the crime was committed. As regards Maharaja Alim, that testimony was not in any way controverted. Salatung's only evidence in his defense was his own testimony denying his participation in the crime, although he admitted that on the morning of the day in question he was on Munagil's land working in company with Munagil, Lahaman, and Maharaja Alim, and that in the evening he accompanied those men when they killed Tantung; he claimed, however, that he had been invited only to fish and was entirely ignorant of their purpose to kill Tantung until he saw that the latter had been assaulted.

• Denial of Participation and Ignorance of the Criminal Design: Salatung denied participation in the crime and testified that he had been invited only to fish and was entirely ignorant of the purpose to kill Tantung until he saw that the deceased had been assaulted by his companions.

• Sufficiency of Accomplice Testimony: Whether the uncorroborated testimony of the accomplices Munagil and Lahaman suffices to establish the guilt of Maharaja Alim and Salatung beyond reasonable doubt.
• Liability of Maharaja Alim: Whether Maharaja Alim is liable as author of the crime by inducement for the killing of Tantung.
• Liability of Salatung: Whether Salatung, who did not himself assault or wound the deceased, is equally liable as a principal in the murder.
• Price or Reward: Whether the offer of a price and reward to the other defendants classifies the crime as murder and whether it affects all of the accused.
• Premeditation: Whether premeditation attended the commission of the crime and which of the accused it affects.
• Despoblado: Whether the commission of the crime at sea constitutes the aggravating circumstance of despoblado and whether it affects the inducer as well as the actual perpetrators.
• Nocturnity: Whether nocturnity should be considered an aggravating circumstance and whether it affects Maharaja Alim.
• Treachery: Whether treachery should be counted as an aggravating circumstance and whether it affects Maharaja Alim.
• Extenuating Circumstance under Article 11, Penal Code: Whether the circumstance provided in article 11 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 2142, should be considered in favor of the defendants.
• Penalty: Whether the death penalty may be imposed upon the accused.

• Sufficiency of Accomplice Testimony: Yes. If the uncorroborated testimony of a confederate or accomplice satisfies the court as to the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, it is sufficient, as held in United States vs. Ocampo.
• Liability of Maharaja Alim: Yes. He is liable as the author of the crime by inducement, the inducement having been completely efficacious by reason of his assurances of protection and, above all, the price he promised and delivered.
• Liability of Salatung: Yes. Although he did not assault the deceased, he is equally liable as principal, his acts having tended directly to the execution of the crime and formed an integral part of the assault.
• Price or Reward: Yes. The offer of a price and reward classifies the crime as murder, and because all the defendants contributed toward the attendance of this circumstance, it affects each and all of them.
• Premeditation: Yes. Premeditation attended the commission of the crime and likewise affects all the defendants.
• Despoblado: Yes. The crime having been committed at sea, despoblado attended it and affects not only the actual perpetrators but also the inducer, who advised that the deceased intended to fish in the sea that afternoon.
• Nocturnity: Yes as to Munagil, Lahaman, and Salatung, who awaited the coming of the night to commit the crime with a better chance of success and less danger of punishment; No as to Maharaja Alim, the record not showing that he shared in or had knowledge of the determination to kill precisely at night.
• Treachery: Yes as to Munagil, Lahaman, and Salatung, considering the evidently treacherous manner employed; No as to Maharaja Alim, it not having been shown that he induced the crime in that particular way or was present at its commission.
• Extenuating Circumstance under Article 11, Penal Code: No controlling effect. The circumstance has not always been taken into account in similar cases and, even if considered, is not of such special importance as to counterbalance the aggravating circumstances against each accused.
• Penalty: Cadena perpetua for each accused. Although the death penalty would have been proper, the Court did not arrive at a unanimous decision on its imposition, so cadena perpetua must be imposed under Act No. 2726.

• Sufficiency of Accomplice Testimony: The evidence against Maharaja Alim and Salatung consisted solely of the testimony of their accomplices Munagil and Lahaman, who related the commission of the crime in full detail. Relying on United States vs. Ocampo (5 Phil. Rep., 339), the Court held that the uncorroborated testimony of a confederate or accomplice, if it satisfies the court as to the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient. As to Maharaja Alim, that testimony was not controverted in any way. As to Salatung, the only evidence for the defense was his own denial.

• Liability of Maharaja Alim: The facts established his liability as the author of the crime by inducement. The inducement was completely efficacious, not so much on account of the influence of the authority he exercised over his co-defendants as because of the assurances he made that he would take care of them should the crime be discovered, and above all because of the price he promised and delivered, which caused them to decide upon the killing. The Court noted that the three were relatives of the deceased and had no reason of their own to kill him; they killed him only because they had been induced to do so by Maharaja Alim.

• Liability of Salatung: Although Salatung did not assault the deceased, he is equally liable as principal. He plotted the commission of the crime with his co-defendants; he carried the lance with which the deceased was to be wounded; he suggested the treacherous manner in which the assault was to be effected; he steered the vinta to the place where the deceased's boat was, in accordance with the plan he himself suggested; he asked the deceased for bait so that the latter might be assaulted when he stretched out his arm to give it; and when the deceased, after being struck twice with the lance, fell into the water and was swimming, Salatung steered the vinta to him, enabling Munagil to strike him on the back with the bolo and causing him to disappear. All those acts tended directly to the execution of the crime, were as effective as the assault itself, and formed an integral part of the assault. The Court also rejected his claim of ignorance, finding it repugnant to sound judgment to suppose that Munagil and Lahaman would take Salatung along without his being associated in the plan, since they had feared discovery from the outset and had accepted the proposal only after Maharaja Alim assured them of protection; moreover, Salatung was a relative of the deceased and could have taken up the latter's defense.

• Price or Reward: As a price and reward were offered by Maharaja Alim to the other defendants, this circumstance classifies the crime as murder. Because all the defendants contributed toward the attendance of this circumstance, it affects each and all of them.

• Premeditation: Premeditation, as an aggravating circumstance, attended the commission of the crime, and it likewise affects all the defendants.

• Despoblado: Because the crime was committed at sea, the additional aggravating circumstance of despoblado attended its commission, as held in United States vs. Angeles (6 Phil. Rep., 480). This circumstance affects not only the actual perpetrators Munagil, Lahaman, and Salatung but also the inducer Maharaja Alim, because he was the one who had advised in the morning that the deceased intended to fish in the sea that afternoon, thereby virtually inducing the commission of the crime precisely at that place.

• Nocturnity: The advice received by Munagil, Lahaman, and Salatung was that the deceased intended to fish in the sea that afternoon, yet they awaited the coming of the night to commit the crime, indicating that they precisely chose nighttime so that it might be committed with a better chance of success and with less danger of punishment. Because the record does not show that Maharaja Alim shared in the determination to kill the deceased precisely at night, nor that he had knowledge thereof, this circumstance should not affect him, pursuant to article 79, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code.

• Treachery: The aggravating circumstance of treachery should be counted against Munagil, Lahaman, and Salatung, considering the evidently treacherous manner employed in the commission of the crime. It should not affect Maharaja Alim, inasmuch as it was not shown that he induced the commission of the crime in that particular way, nor that he was even present at its commission.

• Extenuating Circumstance under Article 11, Penal Code: The only extenuating circumstance that may be considered in favor of the defendants is that of article 11 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 2142. That circumstance, however, has not always been taken into account in similar cases; it was not considered in United States vs. Panglima Indanan (24 Phil. Rep., 203), where the defendant, as in this case, was also a Moro. Even if taken into account, it is not of such special importance as to counterbalance the weight of the two aggravating circumstances against Maharaja Alim and the four against the other defendants, all of which are very clear and well-defined. Maharaja Alim, as second chief of the settlement, was relatively fairly intelligent; and although the other defendants were of a lower intellectual level, their scant intelligence was not sufficient to show that they were unconscious instruments in the hands of Maharaja Alim whose will they could not resist. The proposal to kill had been made to them about a year before, yet they refrained from committing the deed and decided to do it only when Maharaja Alim assured them he would take care of them if the crime were discovered and after he offered the reward and advanced P10 in partial payment. The Court noted that in several cases prosecuted against Moros and members of non-Christian tribes it had not held this circumstance as compensated by more than one aggravating circumstance, citing United States vs. Ancheta (15 Phil. Rep., 470), United States vs. Laoyan Dolinen (14 Phil. Rep., 747), and United States vs. Liwakas (Manobo) (17 Phil. Rep., 234).

• Penalty: All four defendants were held guilty of the crime of murder with the qualifying circumstances mentioned. Although the Court was of the opinion that it would be proper to impose the death penalty upon all of them, it had not arrived at a unanimous decision in respect to the imposition of that penalty; accordingly, cadena perpetua had to be imposed in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 2726.

• Accomplice Testimony as Sufficient Evidence — The uncorroborated testimony of a confederate or accomplice, if it satisfies the court as to the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to sustain a conviction. The Court applied the rule to the testimony of Munagil and Lahaman, which was the sole evidence against Maharaja Alim and Salatung, noting that it was uncontroverted as to Maharaja Alim and met only by Salatung's bare denial.

• Principal by Inducement — One who induces another to commit a crime through pay and promise of reward is liable as a principal by inducement. The inducement must be efficacious; in this case it was rendered completely efficacious by the assurances of protection given by Maharaja Alim and, above all, by the price he promised and delivered, which caused the actual perpetrators — themselves relatives of the victim with no motive of their own — to decide upon the killing.

• Principal by Participation in the Execution of the Crime — One who does not himself inflict the fatal wounds is equally liable as a principal where his acts tend directly to the execution of the crime, are as effective as the assault itself, and form an integral part of it. Salatung's plotting, his carrying of the lance, his suggestion of the treacherous mode of assault, his steering of the vinta, his request for bait to expose the victim, and his steering toward the wounded man were held to constitute such acts.

• Price or Reward as a Circumstance Classifying the Killing as Murder — The offer of a price or reward classifies the killing as murder, and where all the accused contributed toward the attendance of this circumstance, it affects each and all of them.

• Aggravating Circumstances Not Shared by the Inducer Do Not Affect Him — Aggravating circumstances that the inducer neither shared in nor had knowledge of do not affect him. Nocturnity and treachery were counted only against Munagil, Lahaman, and Salatung because the record did not show that Maharaja Alim shared in the determination to kill at night, had knowledge thereof, induced the crime in that particular manner, or was present at its commission.

• Despoblado — The commission of the crime at sea constitutes the aggravating circumstance of despoblado. It affects not only the actual perpetrators but also the inducer where he advised that the victim would be at sea at the time the crime was committed, thereby virtually inducing its commission at that place.

• Article 11, Penal Code, as Amended by Act No. 2142 — The circumstance of belonging to non-Christian tribes is extenuating but has not always been taken into account in similar cases and is not of such special importance as to counterbalance the weight of multiple aggravating circumstances. It was not considered in United States vs. Panglima Indanan, where the defendant was likewise a Moro, and in several other cases against Moros and members of non-Christian tribes it was not held compensated by more than one aggravating circumstance.

• Act No. 2726 — Unanimity Required for the Death Penalty — The death penalty may not be imposed unless the Court arrives at a unanimous decision on its imposition; where unanimity is lacking, cadena perpetua must be imposed. The Court applied this rule notwithstanding its opinion that death would have been proper for all four accused.

• "In the case of The United States vs. Ocampo (5 Phil., Rep., 339), this court has said that if the uncorroborated testimony of a confederate or accomplice satisfies the court as to the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, it is sufficient." — This is the ratio of the ruling on evidence, sustaining the convictions of Maharaja Alim and Salatung on the sole testimony of their accomplices Munagil and Lahaman; it states the canonical formulation of the accomplice-testimony rule applied in this case.

• "The foregoing facts determine Maharaja Alim's liability as the author of the crime by inducement, and this inducement was completely efficacious, not so much on account of the influence of the authority he exercised over his co-defendants, as it was of the assurances he made to them that he would take care of them, should the crime be discovered, and above all, because of the price that he promised and delivered to them and which caused them to decide upon the killing of their victim." — This passage supplies the test of efficacious inducement and explains why Maharaja Alim was held liable as principal by inducement despite his absence from the scene of the killing.

• "All those acts tended directly to the execution of the crime, were as effective as the assault itself, and, it may properly be said that they formed an integral part of the assault." — This is the controlling formulation of the basis for holding Salatung equally liable as a principal although he inflicted no wound, and it is the passage commonly cited for the principle that acts forming an integral part of the assault render the actor a principal.

• "Although we are of the opinion that it would be proper to impose the death penalty upon all the defendants, yet, inasmuch as the court has not arrived at a unanimous decision in respect to the imposition of this penalty, that of cadena perpetua should be imposed, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 2726." — This states the reason for the reduction of the penalty and the operation of the statutory unanimity requirement for the death penalty.

• United States vs. Ocampo, 5 Phil. Rep., 339 — Controlling precedent on the sufficiency of accomplice testimony; cited for the rule that the uncorroborated testimony of a confederate or accomplice, if it satisfies the court beyond reasonable doubt, suffices for conviction.
• United States vs. Angeles, 6 Phil. Rep., 480 — Authority for the aggravating circumstance of despoblado, cited for the rule that the commission of the crime at sea gives rise to that circumstance.
• United States vs. Panglima Indanan, 24 Phil. Rep., 203 — Cited for the proposition that the extenuating circumstance of article 11 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 2142, was not taken into consideration where the defendant was likewise a Moro.
• United States vs. Ancheta, 15 Phil. Rep., 470 — Cited, together with the two succeeding cases, for the Court's practice in prosecutions against Moros and members of non-Christian tribes of not holding the article 11 circumstance as compensated by more than one aggravating circumstance.
• United States vs. Laoyan Dolinen, 14 Phil. Rep., 747 — Cited for the same proposition regarding the limited weight of the article 11 extenuating circumstance.
• United States vs. Liwakas (Manobo), 17 Phil. Rep., 234 — Cited for the same proposition regarding the limited weight of the article 11 extenuating circumstance.

• Article 11, Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 2142 — The extenuating circumstance invoked in favor of the accused belonging to non-Christian tribes. The Court considered it the only extenuating circumstance available to the defendants but declined to give it controlling weight, holding that it is not of such special importance as to counterbalance the aggravating circumstances against each accused.
• Article 79, paragraph 2, Penal Code — Cited in connection with the ruling that nocturnity should not affect Maharaja Alim, because the record did not show that he shared in the determination to kill the deceased precisely at night or had knowledge thereof.
• Act No. 2726 — The statute requiring a unanimous decision of the Court for the imposition of the death penalty. Because unanimity was not reached, the Court imposed cadena perpetua upon each of the four accused instead of death.
• Penal Code provisions on qualifying and aggravating circumstances — Applied to classify the killing as murder by reason of the price and reward offered by Maharaja Alim, and to appreciate premeditation, despoblado, nocturnity, and treachery as aggravating circumstances, the last two only against Munagil, Lahaman, and Salatung.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson, Street, and Fisher, JJ.

• Justice Malcolm — Dissented on the ground that Maharaja Alim should be acquitted and that Salatung should receive the penalty of life imprisonment.
• Justice Araullo — Concurred and dissented: he concurred with Justice Malcolm that Maharaja Alim should be acquitted, and agreed with the majority as to the rest.