United States vs. Knight

A chauffeur cannot be convicted of reckless negligence resulting in homicide where the accident was caused by the victim's own negligence and the driver operated his vehicle carefully, prudently, and skillfully, having regard to all the surrounding circumstances. The mere occurrence of a fatal automobile accident does not give rise to a presumption of negligence on the part of the driver, and drivers of motor vehicles are not required to exercise extraordinary precautions to avoid injuries resulting from the negligence of others or from unforeseen contingencies that a prudent and skillful driver could not be expected to anticipate.

The defendant, E. M. Knight, was a chauffeur employed by the quartermaster's department of the United States Army, driving a heavily loaded automobile truck along Calle Isaac Peral in Manila. The applicable law at the time was Act No. 2159, which prescribed the duties of motor vehicle operators on public highways, including provisions on reckless operation, overtaking and passing, and the sounding of horns as timely notice of approach. The case arose under article 568 of the Penal Code, which defined and penalized reckless imprudence and negligence not amounting to reckless imprudence.

On September 13, 1912, at about 3:30 in the afternoon, the defendant, E. M. Knight, a chauffeur in the employ of the quartermaster's department of the United States Army, was proceeding in charge of a heavily loaded automobile truck along Calle Isaac Peral toward the bay. Except for a steam road roller slowly making its way in the same direction in advance of the truck, the street was wholly unoccupied at that time. Just as the truck was passing the slow-moving road roller, a boy about 10 or 12 years of age jumped from the step or sideboard of the road roller directly in front of the truck, was knocked down, run over, and instantly killed.

Giving the accused the benefit of any doubt arising from a review of all the testimony, the evidence showed that while the truck was still a considerable way behind the road roller, the boy, who had been running alongside the road roller, jumped on the step or sideboard to take a ride. The truck was running at about 8 miles an hour as it came up with the road roller. At a distance of about 45 or 50 feet from the road roller, and while on or approaching a small bridge near the Columbia Club, the defendant sounded his horn twice and then began to turn to the right in order to pass the road roller, which was on the left side of the street. At that point, the street was about 14 meters wide, and except for the road roller and those riding upon it, the street was wholly unoccupied and clear of all obstruction.

The Solicitor-General recommended that the judgment be reversed but that the appellant be convicted of the offense defined and penalized in the second paragraph of article 568 of the Penal Code, arguing that the defendant had violated section 24 of Act No. 2159 by operating his motor vehicle in such a way as to endanger life. The Solicitor-General contended that the defendant was negligent in passing a playing boy at a speed that, however slow, was still too fast to avoid the accident, and in not continuing to sound the horn until he had passed the child.

The trial court found the defendant guilty of reckless negligence resulting in homicide as defined and penalized in article 568 of the Penal Code, and sentenced him to one year and one day of prision correccional, to pay an indemnity of P500 to the heirs of the deceased, and to pay the costs.

• Failure to Establish Reckless Negligence: The appellant argued that the charge of reckless negligence could not be sustained unless the evidence established either that the accident was due to the defendant being on the wrong side of the street, that he was running at an excessive speed, or that he had failed to give timely notice of his approach by sounding his horn.

• Violation of Section 24 of Act No. 2159: The Solicitor-General argued that proof that a fatal automobile accident occurred was conclusive proof of a violation of section 24 of Act No. 2159, which prohibited operating a motor vehicle so as to endanger life, and that while the defendant was not shown to be guilty of reckless negligence, he was guilty of negligence not amounting to reckless negligence.
• Negligence in Speed and Warning: The Solicitor-General contended that the defendant was negligent in passing a playing boy at a speed that, however slow, was still too fast to avoid the accident, and in not continuing to sound the horn until he had passed the child.
• Duty to Take Extraordinary Precautions: The Solicitor-General argued that while a prudent man under the same conditions might not have taken greater precautions than the defendant did, the defendant was nevertheless negligent in not taking extraordinary precautions when he saw the boy riding on the road roller, insisting that he should have reduced his speed lower than 8 miles an hour and should have continued to sound his horn from the moment he saw the boy until he passed him.

• Reckless Negligence: Whether the prosecution established that the defendant was guilty of reckless negligence resulting in homicide.
• Violation of Act No. 2159: Whether the defendant's operation of the motor vehicle violated section 24 of Act No. 2159 so as to render him liable under the second paragraph of article 568 of the Penal Code.

• Reckless Negligence: No. The prosecution failed to establish its charge of reckless negligence, as the evidence did not show that the defendant was on the wrong side of the street, was running at an excessive speed, or had failed to give timely notice of his approach by sounding his horn.
• Violation of Act No. 2159: No. The defendant did not violate section 24 of Act No. 2159, as the machine was being operated carefully, prudently, and skillfully at the time of the accident, having regard to all the surrounding circumstances, and the death was due to the boy's own negligence in jumping from the road roller directly in front of the truck.

• Reckless Negligence: The Court found that the defendant was clearly within his rights in attempting to pass to the right on a broad unobstructed street, wholly unoccupied except for the slow-moving road roller, and that in doing so he was proceeding strictly in conformity with section 25 of Act No. 2159. The Court held that one person is not compelled to travel behind another on the highway, and the traveler may pass to the front when he can do so in safety. As to speed, the Court held that a speed of 8 miles an hour maintained by an automobile truck on a wide, unobstructed, and unoccupied street in broad daylight could not be said to be excessive in the absence of some exceptional circumstance. The Court further held that the accused, having sounded his horn twice before he came up with the road roller and before he turned out to pass, complied with the regulations in that regard. The Court noted that there was some conflict in the record on these points, but the clear weight of the evidence sustained the findings in favor of the defendant, and being a criminal prosecution, the benefit of any doubts should be given to the accused.

• Violation of Act No. 2159: The Court rejected the Solicitor-General's theory that when one is injured or killed by an automobile, it may always be presumed that there was some negligence on the part of the chauffeur and a violation of section 24 of Act No. 2159. The Court held that automobile accidents may happen for which the persons operating the machines are in no wise responsible. Citing United States vs. Tayongtong (21 Phil. Rep., 476), the Court stated that where death is due to the negligence of the decedent himself and not to the negligence of the driver of the automobile, the latter cannot be held for homicide. The Court also cited United States vs. Bacho (10 Phil. Rep., 574) for the proposition that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove by competent evidence not only the existence of criminal negligence but that the accused was guilty thereof.

• Standard of Care: The Court held that drivers of motor vehicles should not be required to exercise such extraordinary precautions as would be necessary to avoid all possibility that others may be injured as a result of their own negligence or of unforeseen contingencies which a prudent and skillful driver could not be expected to anticipate and provide against. The employment of an automobile on the highway as a means of transportation is a lawful use of the road, and if it results in an injury to one traveling by another mode, the driver cannot be held liable unless it appears that he used the machine at a time, or in a manner, or under circumstances inconsistent with a proper regard for the rights of others.

• Age of the Victim: The Court distinguished the case from United States vs. Clemente (24 Phil. Rep., 178), which imposed a higher duty on drivers when they see a child below the age of understanding in the street. The Court held that boys 10 or 12 years of age, who are permitted to go about unattended, may fairly be presumed to have sense enough to take care of themselves from the ordinary and usual dangers of street traffic. The accused could not be said to have been negligent merely because he did not anticipate that the boy would jump down directly in front of him at the moment when he turned his machine out into the open street in an effort to pass.

• Criminal Negligence Must Be Proved, Not Presumed — The mere occurrence of an accident does not create a presumption of negligence on the part of the driver of a motor vehicle. The prosecution must prove by competent evidence not only the existence of criminal negligence but that the accused was guilty thereof. The Court applied this doctrine in acquitting the defendant, holding that the death was due entirely to the boy's own negligence and that there was no reliable proof of negligence on the part of the accused.

• Duty of Care Owed by Drivers of Motor Vehicles — Drivers of motor vehicles are required to exercise great care and skill in the management and control of their machines so as to avoid inflicting injury upon others, but they are not required to exercise extraordinary precautions that would be necessary to avoid all possibility that others may be injured as a result of their own negligence or of unforeseen contingencies. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the defendant, who was running at 8 miles an hour and had sounded his horn twice, operated his machine carefully, prudently, and skillfully.

• Duty of Care Toward Children of Different Ages — A driver of a vehicle seeing a boy 10 or 12 years of age on the street or side path may fairly assume that he has sufficient intelligence to direct himself under ordinary conditions. However, when a driver sees a child below the age of understanding in such a place that it can by any reasonable chance place itself in a dangerous position, the vehicle must be under such control that it can be stopped in time to avert injury. The Court applied this distinction in holding that the defendant was not negligent for failing to anticipate that the boy, who was 10 or 12 years old, would jump from the road roller directly in front of the truck.

• "Where death is due to the negligence of the decedent himself and not to the negligence of the driver of automobile, the latter cannot be held for homicide. In this case the death of the deceased was due entirely to his own negligence. There is not sufficient reliable proof in the record to establish negligence on the part of the accused. There being no negligence, he is not responsible, no matter what the result of the accident may have been." — This passage, quoted from United States vs. Tayongtong, states the controlling principle that a driver cannot be held criminally liable where the victim's own negligence caused the accident.

• "In the general experience of mankind, accidents apparently unavoidable and often inexplicable are unfortunately too frequent to permit us to conclude that some one must be criminally liable for negligence in every case where an accident occurs. It is the duty of the prosecution in each case to prove by competent evidence not only the existence of criminal negligence, but that the accused was guilty thereof." — This passage, quoted from United States vs. Bacho, establishes that criminal negligence must be proved by the prosecution and cannot be presumed from the mere occurrence of an accident.

• "So long as motor vehicles are not used at a time or in a manner or under circumstances inconsistent with the rights of others, or in violation of the regulations, their owners are entitled to all the advantages afforded by a commodious and speedy means or transportation." — This passage articulates the standard of care for motor vehicle operators, holding that they are not required to exercise extraordinary precautions against the negligence of others.

• "If it appears that the machine was being operated carefully, prudently, and skillfully at the time when the accident occurred, having regard to all the surrounding circumstances, it cannot fairly be said to have been operated 'so as to endanger the property, safety, or rights of any person.' Whatever may have been the cause of the accident, if it cannot be attributed to the misconduct or the negligence of the operator in the management of the machine, he cannot be held liable either civilly or criminally." — This passage states the Court's interpretation of section 24 of Act No. 2159, holding that a careful and prudent operation of a motor vehicle does not violate the statute merely because an accident occurs.

• United States vs. Tayongtong, 21 Phil. Rep., 476 — Cited as controlling precedent for the principle that where death is due to the negligence of the decedent himself and not to the negligence of the driver, the latter cannot be held for homicide.
• United States vs. Bacho, 10 Phil. Rep., 574 — Cited as controlling precedent for the principle that the prosecution must prove by competent evidence not only the existence of criminal negligence but that the accused was guilty thereof, and that accidents do not necessarily give rise to criminal liability.
• United States vs. Clemente, 24 Phil. Rep., 178 — Distinguished from the present case; this case imposed a higher duty on drivers of vehicles when they see a child below the age of understanding in the street, requiring the vehicle to be under such control that it can be stopped in time to avert injury. The Court distinguished it because the victim in the present case was 10 or 12 years old, not below the age of understanding.
• Clifford vs. Tyman, 61 N. H., 508, 510 — Cited for the principle that one person is not compelled to travel behind another on the highway, and the traveler may pass to the front when he can do so in safety.
• McIntyre vs. Ames (Ind.), 8-1087 — Cited for the principle that the employment of an automobile on the highway is a lawful use of the road, and the driver cannot be held liable for injury unless he used the machine at a time, or in a manner, or under circumstances inconsistent with a proper regard for the rights of others.

• Article 568, Penal Code — The provision defining and penalizing reckless imprudence and negligence not amounting to reckless imprudence. The Court held that the defendant was not guilty of reckless imprudence under the first paragraph, and rejected the Solicitor-General's argument that he should be convicted under the second paragraph for negligence not amounting to reckless imprudence.
• Section 24, Act No. 2159 — The provision prohibiting the operation of a motor vehicle recklessly or at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable and proper, or so as to endanger the property or safety or rights of any person. The Court held that this provision does not mean that in any case where an accident occurs it can be presumed that there was a violation, and that a machine operated carefully, prudently, and skillfully cannot be said to have been operated so as to endanger the safety or rights of any person.
• Section 25, Act No. 2159 — The provision requiring operators of motor vehicles to turn to the left when meeting persons or vehicles coming toward them, and to the right when overtaking persons or vehicles going in the same direction. The Court held that the defendant, in passing to the right of the road roller, was proceeding strictly in conformity with this provision.
• Section 31, Act No. 2159 — The provision requiring operators of motor vehicles to give timely notice and warning of their proximity by sounding their horn when meeting or overtaking persons or vehicles. The Court held that the defendant, having sounded his horn twice at a distance of between 45 and 50 feet from the road roller, complied with this regulation.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concurred.