United States vs. Juanillo

An automobile driver who sees pedestrians ahead on a public highway and continues at a speed that leaves him unable to stop or avert a collision is guilty of reckless negligence under Article 568 of the Penal Code when death results, notwithstanding the victim's attempt to cross the road. The driver must use a degree of care proportionate to the danger, including a high degree of care when the persons endangered are simple country people unfamiliar with automobiles.

Teodoro Juanillo was the chauffeur of an automobile carrying Henry J. Becker, Charles C. Dean, W.H. Rimmer, Garret A. Harwood, and Joseph Miller. Ponciano Leal was among the rural folk traveling on the public highway between Pavia and Santa Barbara, Iloilo. The prosecution was brought by the United States under Article 568 of the Penal Code, which punishes reckless imprudence resulting in a grave or less grave felony. The appeal required the Supreme Court to assess the standard of care owed by automobile drivers to pedestrians on public highways.

On April 23, 1911, at about 4:00 p.m., Ponciano Leal was killed on the public highway while going from Pavia to Santa Barbara, Province of Iloilo, when he was struck by an automobile driven by Teodoro Juanillo. The prosecution contended that Leal's death was caused by reckless negligence, while the defense insisted that it was purely an accident. The prosecution presented four witnesses and the defense six, including Juanillo.

Pedro Latoja, 18 years old, an ordinary laborer from Lambunao, testified that he, Juan Labrila, and Ponciano Leal were walking abreast toward Santa Barbara, with Latoja in the middle, Leal on his right, and Labrila on his left. While they were conversing, Latoja heard a noise behind him and, turning around, saw an automobile approaching. He immediately called out that an automobile was coming and jumped to the left, colliding with Labrila. When he looked for Leal, the latter was lying on the ground, having been knocked down by the automobile. The road at that place was higher than the adjacent land for a considerable distance each way. Juan Labrila corroborated Latoja in every particular and added that he was knocked into the ditch on the left of the road by Latoja and that, when he got up, he saw Leal lying on the ground after the automobile had passed. Nicolas Agraviado testified that he had just passed the deceased and his companions going in the opposite direction when the automobile passed him; on account of its speed he started to turn around to watch it, but by then the machine had passed Leal and his companions and he saw Leal lying on the ground. Petronio Leal, the deceased's son, was walking a little ahead of his father when the latter was struck; he did not see the machine strike the deceased, and neither did the other three prosecution witnesses see Leal at the precise moment he was struck.

The defense presented the passengers Henry J. Becker, Charles C. Dean, W.H. Rimmer, Garret A. Harwood, and Joseph Miller, as well as Juanillo. Becker testified that he saw men in the road about 300 yards ahead; the chauffeur put on his brakes, used his exhaust, and blew his horn; when they came within about 30 feet of the men, some went to the right and some to the left, and the deceased, who was on the right, started to run across to the left side to join his companions; he did not clear the machine and was struck by some part of the left side, knocked down, and died soon thereafter. Becker said the machine was going at a "pretty fair speed" and that the impact raised him from his seat; he also stated that ordinary speed was about twenty miles an hour. Dean testified that he was sitting in the front seat, partly turned around, talking to the three men in the back; when they were about 300 yards from the deceased and his companions, the chauffeur blew his horn, turned on his exhaust, and shut off the power; he looked ahead and saw natives in the road, who stepped to each side; when he looked again they were about 25 feet ahead; the chauffeur then put on the brakes very strongly, causing a shock, and at the same moment the deceased started to cross to the other side and was hit; before the machine struck the deceased it had been running under its own momentum for about 150 or 200 yards. Dean also testified that the road at the place where the deceased was killed was full of people at the time. Rimmer testified that when he saw the deceased he was running and made a dash from about the center of the road when the automobile was about ten to twenty feet away; the chauffeur stopped as fast as he could, nearly throwing the passengers out of their seats, and the machine was going over 15 miles an hour, about 20. Harwood testified that he was sitting in the rear seat on the left; four or five natives were about 30 feet away; the one who was hit looked back and went across the road, and the left front wheel or fender struck him. Miller testified that Juanillo was a good chauffeur and had never had an accident before this one.

Juanillo testified that the road to Santa Barbara was straight; he noticed about 80 or 100 brazas ahead some men walking in the road; when he got within about 40 or 50 brazas of them he closed off his gasoline, kept tooting his horn, and put his foot on the exhaust to make a noise; when he got within about 30 brazas some of the men turned around and looked back; they were then going about 10 miles an hour; when within about 2 or 3 brazas the man on the right started to run across the road; he put on his brakes but could not stop on the spot; some part of the automobile hit him; at the time of the hit they were going about 6 or 8 miles an hour; and the automobile ran about 3 or 4 brazas more before it stopped. In response to questions, he stated that the deceased was alone on the right while his companions were on the left; that he saw the deceased between 80 and 100 brazas away while going between 15 and 20 miles an hour; that he closed down the power about 40 or 50 brazas away; that when they were within 30 brazas the deceased and his companions separated; that he ran between 3 and 4 brazas after knocking the man down; and that he did not know why he ran 3 or 4 brazas if he could stop going at 8 miles an hour within 2 brazas.

There was no dispute that the deceased was struck on or near the left hip by the lamp or fender over the left front wheel of the automobile; that the blow knocked him to the side of the machine; that the machine did not pass over his body; and that he died very soon thereafter on the same day. The position of the deceased after the car had passed accorded with both the prosecution's and the defense's theories, so those admitted facts favored neither side. The prosecution witnesses Latoja, Labrila, and Agraviado were country people with no personal experience in handling automobiles; Latoja had not been in Iloilo for ten years; and Latoja and Labrila told a plain, simple story. Becker's statement that he saw a man in the ditch on the right side was contradicted by the absence of any other evidence of another person in either ditch and by the fact that Labrila was in the ditch on the left; his account of being raised from his seat when the brakes were applied 300 yards away, and again when the collision occurred, was inconsistent. Dean said the brakes were applied with force 25 feet away and that the machine had been running under its own momentum for about 150 or 200 yards when the deceased was struck. Juanillo said the machine had been running without gasoline for about 100 yards, with the brakes applied when he was about 18 feet from the deceased, and that it continued for some 25 feet before stopping. The Supreme Court found it highly improbable, if not impossible, that such fatal results could have been accomplished without the automobile passing over the deceased's body under those circumstances. In view of the admitted facts and circumstances, the trial court was justified in accepting the testimony of Latoja, Labrila, and Agraviado as to how the collision took place. The deceased was killed just a little to the left of the center of the road, and the machine was so close that Latoja and Labrila barely had time to escape, while the deceased, being on the left, did not have sufficient time. The road at the place of the collision was about 24 feet wide, a little higher than the adjacent country, and clear of obstacles that might obstruct the view for quite a long distance each way.

• Judicial Notice: Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the stopping power of automobiles, specifically its statement that first-class cars have appliances that will stop a machine going 15 miles an hour within 5 feet, because there was nothing in the evidence to warrant that statement or deduction.
• Reckless Negligence and Highway Rights: Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in its conception of reckless negligence as applied to the rights of vehicles and parties on foot on public highways, particularly its view that a footman has the right of way and that people in vehicles have no right to ride him down.
• Victim's Conduct and Accident: Petitioner maintained that the occurrence was purely an accident; he argued that the deceased and his companions were simple native farmers with no experience of automobiles, that they naturally rushed to the sides of the road, and that the deceased, finding himself alone on the right, naturally decided suddenly to cross to join his companions and miscalculated the time necessary for the automobile to cover the intervening distance.

• Reckless Negligence: The prosecution contended that the death of Ponciano Leal was due to reckless negligence, not a mere accident.

• Judicial Notice: Whether the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the stopping power of automobiles, particularly that first-class cars have appliances that can stop a machine going 15 miles an hour within 5 feet.
• Reckless Negligence and Highway Rights: Whether the trial court erred in its conception of reckless negligence as applied to the rights of vehicles and parties on foot on public highways.
• Criminal Liability under Article 568: Whether the facts established a violation of Article 568 of the Penal Code for negligent homicide through reckless imprudence.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction for negligent homicide under Article 568 of the Penal Code.

• Judicial Notice: No reversible error. The trial court's statement about stopping appliances had no evidentiary support and was a casual observation not forming the basis of the judgment; courts may nonetheless take judicial notice that an automobile makes an unusual noise, can be driven at great velocity, and is highly dangerous on country roads.
• Reckless Negligence and Highway Rights: No reversible error. The correct rule is that pedestrians and vehicles have equal rights on the highway, each owing care and prudence according to the circumstances; an automobile driver must exercise care proportionate to the danger, and the facts showed Juanillo failed that duty.
• Criminal Liability under Article 568: Yes. The killing of Ponciano Leal through Juanillo's failure to check his speed when he saw the deceased ahead constituted reckless negligence under Article 568 of the Penal Code.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Yes. The trial court was justified in accepting the prosecution witnesses' account, and the conviction was supported by the admitted facts and the inconsistencies in the defense evidence.

• Judicial Notice: The trial court observed that "Everybody knows that all first-class cars turned out at the shops have appliances that will stop a machine going at 15 miles an hour within 5 feet." There was nothing in the evidence to warrant that statement. It was, however, a casual observation and did not form the basis upon which the judgment rested; if material, it might have constituted reversible error. Courts may take judicial notice that an automobile makes an unusual noise, can be driven at great velocity many times greater than ordinary animal-drawn vehicles, and is highly dangerous when used on country roads, as held in Brazier vs. Philadelphia, 215 Pa. 297, and Ex parte Berry, 147 Cal. 523. No reversible error therefore resulted.
• Reckless Negligence and Highway Rights: The trial court stated that an automobile has no right to run at a greater speed along the public highway in passing people afoot or in vehicles than it can stop when danger arises, and that a footman has the right of way. The correct rule is that the rights and duties of pedestrians and vehicles are equal; each may use the highway, and each must exercise such care and prudence as the circumstances demand. Owners of automobiles have the same rights as pedestrians and drivers of horses, but use cannot be lawfully countenanced unless accompanied by prudence in management and consideration for safety. Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of another person's interests, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. It is relative or comparative, not absolute, and depends upon the situation and the degree of care and vigilance reasonably imposed. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and failure to observe it is want of ordinary care under the circumstances. The operator of an automobile is bound to exercise care in proportion to the varying danger and risks of the highway and commensurate with the dangers incident to the vehicle; he must take notice of conditions before him and, if a particular method is liable to cause injury, adopt another or safer method if within reasonable care and prudence. In determining the degree of care, consideration must be given to the place, presence or absence of other travelers, speed, size, appearance, manner of movement, amount of noise, and anything indicating unusual or peculiar danger. The quantum of care is estimated by the exigencies of the particular situation, including the place, presence or absence of other vehicles and travelers, and whether the conveyance and power used are common or new to the road (Indiana Springs Co. vs. Brown, 165 Ind. 465). The degree of care also varies with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself; thus, it is not negligence per se for a boy of six to play on the highway where an automobile came up under circumstances producing fright and terror and caused an error of judgment (Thies vs. Thomas, 77 N.Y. Supp. 276), and where an automobile approached an infirm person from the rear at a high rate of speed and startled him so that he jumped aside and was struck, the conduct of the operator was an unreasonable abridgment of the pedestrian's right to the road (Apperson vs. Lazaro, 87 N.E. 97). In this case, the road was dotted with simple rural folk; it was Sunday afternoon and the road connected two rather populous towns close together. Juanillo, in charge of a powerful machine capable of doing great damage if not skillfully manipulated, was bound to use a high degree of care to avoid injuring these native farmers, who had a common right to the highway. A driver of an automobile under such circumstances is required to use a greater degree of care than drivers of animals because the machine is capable of greater destruction and is absolutely under the driver's power and control, whereas a horse or other animal can and does to some extent aid in averting an accident. Juanillo was aware of and chargeable with knowledge that the deceased and his companions were simple country people lacking the capacity to appreciate and guard against the dangers of an automobile driven at a high rate of speed, and he was bound to enlarge commensurately the degree of vigilance and care necessary to avoid injuries. The trial court's conception did not require reversal; the correct standard still supported conviction.
• Criminal Liability under Article 568: Article 568 provides that any person who by reckless imprudence shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony shall suffer a penalty ranging from arresto mayor in its maximum degree to prision correccional in its minimum degree; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium degree shall be imposed. The negligence of Juanillo consisted in his failure to recognize the great injury that would accrue to the deceased from the collision. He had no right, after seeing the deceased and his companions walking in the road ahead of him, to continue at so great a speed at the imminent hazard of colliding with the deceased. Great care was due because of the deadliness of the machine he was propelling along the highway. When one comes through the highways with a machine of such power as an automobile, it is incumbent upon the driver to use great care not to drive against or over pedestrians. An automobile is more dangerous than a street car or railway car because those are propelled along fixed rails and the traveling public need only keep off the track, while the automobile can be turned as easily as an individual and is therefore far more dangerous to the traveling public. Under the evidence, Juanillo was not free from reckless negligence. In failing to so check the speed of his machine when he saw the deceased in front of him to give him sufficient control to avert the injury or to stop it entirely, when he knew that if he continued at the same speed at which he was going he would collide with the deceased, he showed negligence and reckless negligence in a marked degree. Spanish Supreme Court decisions also supported conviction for reckless negligence in analogous cases: a driver turning right instead of left and colliding (53 Criminal Jurisprudence 157, October 1, 1894); horseback riders spurring into a hard gallop and colliding (22 Criminal Jurisprudence 34, January 20, 1880); an unlicensed public vehicle driver at a short trot running over a boy without warning (73 Criminal Jurisprudence 305, November 12, 1905); and a tramcar driver at unusual speed colliding with an omnibus (33 Criminal Jurisprudence 545, December 4, 1884). The facts thus constituted a violation of Article 568.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: The trial court was justified in accepting the testimony of Latoja, Labrila, and Agraviado as to how the collision took place. The prosecution witnesses were country people with no automobile experience, but they told a plain, simple story. Becker's claim of a man in the ditch on the right was contradicted; Labrila was in the ditch on the left. Becker's account of being raised from his seat when brakes were applied 300 yards away and again at impact was inconsistent. Dean said brakes were applied 25 feet away and the machine had been running under its own momentum for 150 or 200 yards; Juanillo said the machine ran without gasoline for about 100 yards, with brakes applied about 18 feet from the deceased, and continued 25 feet before stopping. The Court found it highly improbable, if not impossible, that such fatal results could have been accomplished without the automobile passing over the body under those circumstances. The admitted facts and circumstances supported the trial court's acceptance of the prosecution version. The deceased was killed just a little to the left of the center of the road; the road was about 24 feet wide, higher than the adjacent country, and clear of obstacles for a long distance each way. The machine was so close that Latoja and Labrila barely had time to escape, while the deceased, being on the left, did not have sufficient time. The conviction was therefore supported.

• Reckless Negligence under Article 568 of the Penal Code — Reckless negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of another's interests, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, resulting in injury. In the operation of an automobile, it consists in failing to check speed when pedestrians are seen ahead, thereby leaving the driver unable to avert a collision. The Court applied this to Juanillo, who saw Leal and his companions on the road but continued at a speed that prevented him from stopping or avoiding the fatal impact.
• Equal Rights and Duties of Pedestrians and Vehicles on Public Highways — Pedestrians and vehicles have equal rights to use the highway, and each must exercise such care and prudence as the circumstances demand. An automobile is a lawful means of conveyance with equal rights on the roads, but its use cannot be lawfully countenanced unless accompanied by prudence in management and consideration for the safety of others. The Court corrected the trial court's broad statement that a footman has the right of way, yet still found Juanillo liable because he failed the required care.
• Degree of Care Proportionate to Danger and the High Degree of Care for Automobiles — The operator of an automobile must exercise care in proportion to the varying danger and risks of the highway and commensurate with the dangers incident to the vehicle. Where danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary; the driver must consider the place, presence or absence of other travelers, speed, size, appearance, manner of movement, noise, and any unusual or peculiar danger. Because Juanillo knew the deceased and his companions were simple country people unfamiliar with automobiles, he was bound to enlarge his vigilance and care accordingly.
• Judicial Notice of Automobile Characteristics — Courts may take judicial notice that an automobile makes an unusual noise, can be driven at great velocity many times greater than ordinary animal-drawn vehicles, and is highly dangerous when used on country roads. The trial court's unsupported remark about stopping appliances did not form the basis of the judgment, so no reversible error resulted.
• Appellate Deference to Trial Court's Credibility Findings — The trial court's acceptance of witnesses' testimony will be sustained where supported by admitted facts and circumstances and the reasonableness of the accounts. The trial court was justified in accepting the prosecution witnesses' version of how the collision occurred.

• "The negligence of the defendant in the case at bar consisted in his failure to recognize the great injury that would accrue to the deceased from the collision. He had no right, it seems to us, after he saw the deceased and his companions walking in the road ahead of him to continue at so great a speed, at the eminent hazard of colliding with the deceased." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on criminal liability: the driver's failure to reduce speed after seeing pedestrians ahead made the resulting death reckless negligence.
• "It is generally held that the rights and duties of pedestrians and vehicles are equal. Each may use the highway, and each must exercise such care and prudence as the circumstances demand." — This is the Court's canonical formulation of the equal-rights rule governing pedestrians and vehicles on public highways.
• "When one comes through the highways with a machine of such power as an automobile, it is incumbent upon the driver to use great care not to drive against or over pedestrians." — This excerpt defines the high degree of care required of automobile drivers because of the destructive power of the machine.
• "In failing to so check the speed of his machine when he saw the deceased in front of him to give him sufficient control to avert the injury or to stop it entirely, when he knew that if he continued at the same speed at which he was going he would collide with the deceased, not only shows negligence but reckless negligence in a marked degree." — This passage is the Court's conclusion that the facts amounted to reckless negligence rather than ordinary negligence or mere accident.

• Brazier vs. Philadelphia, 215 Pa. 297 — Cited for judicial notice that an automobile makes an unusual noise, can be driven at great velocity, and is highly dangerous on country roads.
• Ex parte Berry, 147 Cal. 523 — Quoted for the same judicial-notice principle, including that courts may assume common and current knowledge about an automobile and its characteristics.
• Ahern vs. Oregon Tel. Co., 24 Ore. 276 — Cited for the rule that negligence is relative and comparative, and that where danger is great a high degree of care is necessary.
• Indiana Springs Co. vs. Brown, 165 Ind. 465 — Cited for the rule that the quantum of care required is estimated by the exigencies of the particular situation, including the place, presence or absence of other vehicles and travelers, and whether the conveyance and power used are common or new to the road.
• Thies vs. Thomas, 77 N.Y. Supp. 276 — Cited to illustrate that the degree of care varies with the capacity of the person endangered, and that it is not negligence per se for a boy of six to play on the highway where an automobile produced fright and terror causing an error of judgment.
• Apperson vs. Lazaro (Ind. App.), 87 N.E. 97 — Cited for the principle that an automobile approaching an infirm person from the rear at high speed and startling him so that he jumped aside and was struck constituted an unreasonable abridgment of the pedestrian's right to the road.
• State vs. Watson, 216 Mo. 420 — Cited for the rule that individuals and corporations using dangerous machines must have due regard for the public's rights and for the protection of persons using public streets.
• Spanish Supreme Court decisions, 53 Criminal Jurisprudence 157 (Oct. 1, 1894); 22 Criminal Jurisprudence 34 (Jan. 20, 1880); 73 Criminal Jurisprudence 305 (Nov. 12, 1905); 33 Criminal Jurisprudence 545 (Dec. 4, 1884) — Cited as analogous rulings sustaining convictions for reckless negligence in vehicle- or animal-related collisions.

• Article 568, Penal Code — Provides that any person who by reckless imprudence commits an act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony shall suffer a penalty ranging from arresto mayor in its maximum degree to prision correccional in its minimum degree; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium degree shall be imposed. The Court applied this provision because Juanillo's reckless driving caused the death of Ponciano Leal, a grave felony if intentional, and affirmed his conviction and sentence under it.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Carson, JJ., concur.