United States vs. Hicks

Where the killing of a woman is already qualified by treachery (alevosia), premeditation may only be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance; and the mitigating circumstance of loss of reason and self-control under paragraph 7 of Article 9 of the Penal Code cannot be appreciated where the passion invoked arises from vicious, unworthy, and immoral sentiments such as jealousy over an illicit relationship.

Augustus Hicks, an Afro-American, and Agustina Sola, a Christian Moro woman, lived together illicitly in the municipality of Parang, Cotabato, in the Moro Province from September 1902 until November 1907. The case was prosecuted under the old Penal Code (Spanish Penal Code as extended to the Philippines), specifically Article 403 defining and punishing murder, with the qualifying circumstance of treachery (alevosia) and the aggravating circumstances of premeditation and dwelling. The automatic review before the Supreme Court was mandated by the imposition of the death penalty by the Court of First Instance.

From September 1902 until November 1907, Augustus Hicks, an Afro-American, and Agustina Sola, a Christian Moro woman, lived together illicitly in the municipality of Parang, Cotabato, in the Moro Province. Trouble arose between them in November 1907, prompting Agustina to leave Hicks's house and move in with her brother-in-law, Luez Corrales. A few days later, she began a new relationship with Wallace Current, a corporal in the Army, who took up residence with her in Corrales's house.

On the morning of December 21, 1907, Hicks asked leave from Charles Gatchey, his supervisor at the canteen where he worked, alleging that his mind was unsettled and that he feared getting into trouble. Around noon that same day, Eugenio R. Whited visited Hicks's house at the latter's invitation. While both were drinking gin, with the revolver — the instrument of the crime — lying on the table alongside several loaded cartridges, Hicks repeatedly said, referring to Agustina, that her time had come, adding that he would rather see her dead than in the arms of another man. When Hicks went to bed apparently very much worried and refused to answer when called, Whited left. The following day, after the crime, the police found on a table in Hicks's house several loaded cartridges, a bottle of oil, and a piece of cloth used for cleaning the revolver.

At about 7:30 p.m. on December 21, 1907, Hicks, accompanied by a soldier named Lloyd Nickens, called at the house where Agustina was living. From the sala, Hicks called out to his former mistress, who was in her room with Corporal Current. After conversing with her in the Moro dialect for a few minutes, Hicks asked the corporal to come out. Current appeared at the door of the room, and after a short conversation, the two men approached each other and shook hands. Hicks then asked: "Did I not tell you to leave this woman alone?" Current replied: "That is all right, she told me that she did not want to live with you any longer, but if she wishes, she may quit me, and you can live with her." Hicks responded: "God damn, I have made up my mind." As he said this, Current saw Hicks drawing a revolver from his trousers' pocket and caught him by the hand. Hicks snatched his hand roughly away and said: "Don't do that," whereupon Current jumped into the room and hid himself behind the partition. Hicks then drew his revolver and fired at Agustina Sola, who was close by in the sala. The bullet struck her in the left side of the breast; she fell to the ground and died a little more than an hour later.

Upon hearing the shot, Edward Robinson, who was also in the house, went to render assistance and wrested the weapon from Hicks's hand after a brief struggle. Hicks immediately fled the house and surrendered himself to the chief of police of the town, H. L. Martin, asking to be locked up in jail. When a policeman arrived moments later reporting that Hicks had fired a shot at Agustina, the chief of police formally caused his arrest. Once in jail, Hicks threw eight revolver cartridges out of the window, which were picked up by a policeman and delivered to the chief.

Hicks pleaded not guilty and offered an exculpatory account: he claimed that when he withdrew his hand from Current's grasp, he fell backward but managed to support himself on his two hands, and when he got up, Current threatened him with a revolver thrust into his face; he then drew his own revolver, and as Robinson caught him from behind, the weapon went off accidentally, the bullet striking the deceased. This account was contradicted by the testimony of witnesses Wallace Current, Edward Robinson, Luez Corrales, and Lloyd Nickens, particularly the second and third, who witnessed the actual firing of the shot by Hicks at the deceased. Robinson's immediate approach to disarm Hicks and the latter's subsequent flight corroborated the prosecution's version that the shot was willful and premeditated, not accidental.

• Accidental Discharge: Hicks maintained that the fatal shot was not willfully fired but resulted from an accident — that when he withdrew his hand from Current's grasp, he fell backward, and upon getting up, Current threatened him with a revolver, prompting him to draw his own weapon, which went off when Robinson caught him from behind.
• Mitigating Circumstance of Loss of Self-Control: The defense alleged that paragraph 7 of Article 9 of the Penal Code should be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, arguing that loss of reason and self-control produced by jealousy should lessen criminal responsibility.

• Qualification of the Crime: Whether the killing of Agustina Sola constitutes murder qualified by treachery (alevosia) under Article 403 of the Penal Code.
• Premeditation as Generic Aggravating Circumstance: Whether premeditation, though present, can only be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance given that treachery already qualifies the crime.
• Mitigating Circumstance of Loss of Self-Control: Whether the mitigating circumstance of loss of reason and self-control under paragraph 7 of Article 9 of the Penal Code is applicable where the passion invoked arises from jealousy over an illicit relationship.

• Qualification of the Crime: Yes. The killing constitutes murder under Article 403 of the Penal Code, qualified by treachery, the victim having been suddenly and unexpectedly fired upon at close range while unarmed and unprepared.
• Premeditation as Generic Aggravating Circumstance: Yes. Premeditation was appreciated only as a generic aggravating circumstance, the crime having already been qualified by treachery; together with the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, it warranted imposition of the penalty in its maximum degree.
• Mitigating Circumstance of Loss of Self-Control: No. The mitigating circumstance under paragraph 7 of Article 9 of the Penal Code was not appreciated, because only loss of self-control originating from lawful sentiments can mitigate criminal responsibility, not jealousy arising from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions.

• Qualification of the Crime: The facts fully established the crime of murder as defined and punished by Article 403 of the Penal Code. The qualifying circumstance of treachery (alevosia) was present because Agustina Sola was suddenly and roughly attacked and unexpectedly fired upon with a .45-caliber revolver at close, if not point-blank, range while she was unarmed and unprepared. She was listening to a conversation between her aggressor and a third person, and only usual and customary words had passed between her and Hicks before the attack. From these circumstances, it was logically inferred that means, manners, and forms were employed that directly and specially insured the consummation of the crime without risk to the author, the victim being unable to flee or defend herself owing to the suddenness of the attack. The accused's exculpatory allegations — that the shot was accidental — were conclusively refuted by the testimony of multiple witnesses who saw Hicks fire at the deceased, and by Robinson's immediate action of disarming Hicks and the latter's flight from the house.

• Premeditation as Generic Aggravating Circumstance: Because the crime had already been qualified by treachery, premeditation could only produce the effect of a generic aggravating circumstance. Premeditation was nevertheless manifest and evident through the accused's overt acts. On the morning of the killing, Hicks asked leave from his supervisor at the canteen, alleging his mind was unsettled and he feared getting into trouble. At noon, while drinking gin with Whited, with the revolver and loaded cartridges on the table, Hicks repeatedly declared that the deceased's time had come and that he would rather see her dead than in the arms of another man. The following day, police found loaded cartridges, oil, and a cleaning cloth on his table. These circumstances conclusively proved that Hicks had deliberately and after due reflection resolved to kill the woman who had left him for another man, and that he entered the house, greeted everyone courteously, and conversed with his victim in an apparently proper manner in order to disguise his intention and calm her, thus ensuring the successful accomplishment of his criminal design. The aggravating circumstance of dwelling was likewise proven, the crime having been committed in the dwelling of the deceased.

• Mitigating Circumstance of Loss of Self-Control: No mitigating circumstance was present to offset the two aggravating circumstances. The defense invoked paragraph 7 of Article 9 of the Penal Code, alleging loss of reason and self-control produced by jealousy. This was rejected because the causes that produce loss of reason and self-control and thereby lessen criminal responsibility are those which originate from lawful sentiments, not such as arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions. Jealousy over an illicit relationship falls within the latter category and cannot serve as a mitigating circumstance.

• Treachery (Alevosia) as Qualifying Circumstance — Treachery qualifies a killing as murder where means, manners, and forms are employed that directly and specially insure the consummation of the crime without risk to the offender arising from the defense the victim might make. In this case, the victim was suddenly fired upon at close range while unarmed, unprepared, and engaged in conversation, rendering her unable to flee or defend herself.

• Premeditation as Generic Aggravating Circumstance When Treachery Already Qualifies the Crime — Where the violent death has already been qualified by treachery, premeditation, if present, can only produce the effect of a generic aggravating circumstance. Together with another aggravating circumstance of the same class, it requires the imposition of the penalty in the maximum degree fixed by law for the crime.

• Mitigating Circumstance of Loss of Reason and Self-Control (Paragraph 7, Article 9, Penal Code) — The causes that produce loss of reason and self-control, and which lessen criminal responsibility, are those which originate from lawful sentiments, not such as arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions. Jealousy stemming from an illicit relationship does not qualify as a mitigating circumstance under this provision.

• "The causes which produce in the mind loss of reason and self-control, and which lessen criminal responsibility, are those which originate from lawful sentiments, not such as arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions; therefore, in the present case it is not proper to consider that mitigating circumstance 7 of article 9 of the Penal Code was present." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi for rejecting the mitigating circumstance of loss of self-control based on jealousy, establishing the principle that only lawful sentiments can ground such mitigation.

• "Where the act of causing the violent death of a woman has already been qualified by the specific circumstance of treachery (alevosia), if premeditation is also present therein it can only produce the effect of a generic aggravation circumstance which, together with another of the same class, required the imposition in the maximum degree of the penalty which the law fixes for the crime." — This passage states the rule on the relationship between treachery as a qualifying circumstance and premeditation as a generic aggravating circumstance, clarifying that premeditation cannot independently qualify the crime when treachery already does so.

• Article 403, Penal Code (Spanish Penal Code as extended to the Philippines) — Defines and punishes the crime of murder. Applied to qualify the killing of Agustina Sola as murder, given the presence of treachery (alevosia) as a qualifying circumstance.
• Paragraph 7, Article 9, Penal Code — Provides for the mitigating circumstance of loss of reason and self-control upon the immediate provocation of a lawful sentiment. The Court declined to apply this provision, holding that jealousy arising from an illicit relationship originates from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions rather than lawful sentiments.
• Article 53, Penal Code — Prescribes the accessory penalties attached to the death penalty. The Court directed that in the event of a pardon, the culprit shall suffer the accessory penalties under this article unless expressly remitted in the pardon.

Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concurred.