United States vs. Gregorio and Balistoy

In a criminal prosecution for falsification of a document, the prosecution must produce the original document alleged to have been simulated, counterfeited, or falsified; conviction cannot rest on an unauthenticated copy, and the failure to present the original leaves reasonable doubt requiring acquittal.

Pedro Salazar was a judgment creditor of Eustaquio Balistoy, having obtained a money judgment against him in the justice of the peace court of Libog. Bernardo Gregorio claimed to have acquired from Balistoy a parcel of land in Tambogon, Bacacay, by purchase in 1905. The criminal case concerned the authenticity and date of the private memorandum evidencing that alleged sale, which was used in the execution of Salazar's judgment.

Pedro Salazar was a creditor of Eustaquio Balistoy. In the justice of the peace court of Libog, Salazar sued Balistoy for payment of a certain sum of money. On April 4, 1908, judgment was rendered sentencing Balistoy to pay Salazar P275.92, with interest thereon, and the costs. To execute that judgment, two rural properties belonging to Balistoy were attached, and May 27, 1908, was set as the date for the sale and adjudication of the attached properties to the highest bidder.

On May 18, 1908, Bernardo Gregorio requested the deputy sheriff to exclude from the attachment the land situated in Tambogon, one of the properties levied upon, 400 brazas in circumference, in the pueblo of Bacacay. Gregorio claimed that he was the owner of the land because he had acquired it by purchase from the judgment debtor, Balistoy, in 1905, prior to the filing of the complaint. By reason of this claim and petition, the judgment creditor, Salazar, had to give a bond; the sheriff then proceeded with the sale of the said property and of another also attached for the sum of P300, and both were adjudicated to the judgment creditor, according to certificate Exhibit C.

In order that his claim of intervention presented to the sheriff might prosper, Gregorio attached thereto the document Exhibit D. At the end of Exhibit D, among other particulars, appears a memorandum dated in Libog as of February 22, 1905, and signed by Eustaquio Balistoy, Lorenzo Gregorio, and Cirilo Valla. In that memorandum Balistoy stated that he bought the land referred to in the document from Luis Balistoy and sold it to Bernardo Gregorio for P300, and he signed as such vendor.

The charge was that Balistoy, with intent to injure his creditor Pedro Salazar and for the purpose of avoiding the attachment and sale of one of his properties to secure payment of the judgment obtained by his creditor, did, with disregard of the truth in the narration of the facts, execute or write the said memorandum whereby, on February 25, 1905, he made or simulated a conveyance of one of the attached properties in favor of Bernardo Gregorio, according to the aforesaid copy, when in fact the said memorandum was written in April, 1908. Complaints were filed in the Court of First Instance of Albay charging each defendant with the crime of falsification of a private document, and the two causes were consolidated by agreement of the parties.

At trial, the original document containing the memorandum was not presented; only a copy, Exhibit D, was before the court. It could not be ascertained who had the original of the document containing the memorandum in question, nor the exact date when the memorandum was written. The sheriff who carried out the attachment and sale testified that he had seen the original of the document, or at least the original memorandum of conveyance, for but a few moments; no officer authorized by law to certify documents and proceedings such as are recorded in notarial instruments compared the copy, nor did two witnesses testify that the copy exhibited was in exact agreement with its original.

• Necessity of the Original Document: Whether a conviction for falsification of a private document may be sustained where the prosecution presented only a copy of the alleged falsified document and failed to produce the original.
• Authenticity of the Copy: Whether an unauthenticated copy of a private document is sufficient proof of the falsification charged or of the right it purports to establish.
• Proof of Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether the evidence established the guilt of the accused as coprincipals beyond reasonable doubt, given the absence of the original and the uncertainty as to its existence, custody, and exact date.

• Necessity of the Original Document: No. In criminal proceedings for falsification, the court must have before it the document alleged to have been simulated, counterfeited, or falsified; conviction cannot rest on a mere copy.
• Authenticity of the Copy: No. A mere copy of an unauthenticated private document is not sufficient proof of the right it purports to establish or of the falsification charged.
• Proof of Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: No. The lack of the original and the inability to ascertain its existence, custody, or exact date left reasonable doubt; the accused are presumed innocent and entitled to acquittal.

• Necessity of the Original Document: The Court reasoned that in criminal proceedings for the falsification of a document, it is indispensable that the judges and courts have before them the document alleged to have been simulated, counterfeited, or falsified, so that they may find, pursuant to the evidence, whether the crime of falsification was committed and determine the degree of each defendant's liability. The original document containing the memorandum was not presented; only a copy, Exhibit D, was available. It could not be ascertained who had the original or the exact date when the memorandum was written. The sheriff had seen the original only for a few moments, no authorized certifying officer compared the copy, and no two witnesses testified that the copy exactly agreed with the original. These deficiencies created doubt whether the original existed at all and whether the memorandum at the foot of Exhibit D was an exact copy. Without the original, it was improper to hold that the crime prosecuted was committed.
• Authenticity of the Copy: The mere exhibition of a copy of an unauthenticated private document could not legally produce the effect of suspending the sale of the land, because such copy is not sufficient proof of the right of the intervener and opponent. The copy of the private document whose legality had not been proven could not support the charge of falsification.
• Proof of Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Although the testimony of the witnesses examined in the two consolidated causes gave reason to entertain much doubt as to the defendants' innocence, the case did not furnish decisive and conclusive proof of their respective guilt as coprincipals of the crime charged. Defendants in a criminal cause are always presumed innocent until their guilt is fully proven, and in case of reasonable doubt and when their guilt is not satisfactorily shown, they are entitled to a judgment of acquittal. The evidence produced in both criminal causes could only terminate in such a finding.

• Necessity of the Original Falsified Document — In criminal proceedings for falsification of a document, it is indispensable that the judges and courts have before them the document alleged to have been simulated, counterfeited, or falsified. This requirement enables the court to determine from the evidence whether the crime of falsification was committed and to fix the degree of each defendant's liability. The Court applied this doctrine by reversing the convictions because only a copy of the alleged falsified memorandum was presented and the original was not produced.
• Insufficiency of an Unauthenticated Copy of a Private Document — A mere copy of an unauthenticated private document is not sufficient proof of the right it purports to establish, nor can it sustain a conviction for falsification. The Court relied on this principle in holding that Exhibit D, an unauthenticated copy, could not legally suspend the sale of the attached land or prove the falsification charged.
• Presumption of Innocence and Reasonable Doubt — Defendants in a criminal cause are presumed innocent until their guilt is fully proven; where reasonable doubt exists and guilt is not satisfactorily shown, they are entitled to acquittal. The Court applied this doctrine because the absence of the original document and the uncertainty surrounding its existence, custody, and date left reasonable doubt as to the guilt of Balistoy and Gregorio.

• "In criminal proceedings for the falsification of a document, it is indispensable that the judges and courts have before them the document alleged to have been simulated, counterfeited, or falsified, in order that they may find, pursuant to the evidence produced in the cause, whether or not the crime of falsification was committed, and also, at the same time, to enable them to determine the degree of each defendant's liability in the falsification under prosecution." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the original alleged falsified document must be before the court in a falsification prosecution.
• "Through the lack of the original document containing the memorandum alleged to be false, it is improper to hold, with only a copy of the said original in view, that the crime prosecuted was committed; and although, judging from the testimony of the witnesses who were examined in the two consolidated causes, there is reason to entertain much doubt as to the defendants' innocence, yet, withal, this case does not furnish decisive and conclusive proof of their respective guilt as coprincipals of the crime charged." — This passage applies the rule to the facts and explains why the convictions could not stand despite doubts about the accused.
• "Defendants in a criminal cause are always presumed to be innocent until their guilt be fully proven, and, in case of reasonable doubt and when their guilt is not satisfactorily shown, they are entitled to a judgment of acquittal." — This passage states the constitutional and evidentiary principle that controlled the disposition.

Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concurred.