United States vs. Gloria

An offer of money to a public official for the purpose of bribery constitutes an attempt to commit bribery under Article 3 of the Penal Code, not a mere proposal under Article 4, because the tender of money is itself a direct overt act and non-consummation results from the official's refusal rather than the giver's voluntary desistance.

Julio Gloria was a candidate for the presidency of the town of Bayambang, Pangasinan, at the municipal elections held on December 1, 1903. After losing the election, he filed a protest with the provincial board of Pangasinan against the confirmation of the successful candidate's election. The provincial board, which had jurisdiction over the protest, included the provincial treasurer among its members. The case arose under the Penal Code then in force in the Philippines during the American colonial period.

Julio Gloria was an unsuccessful candidate for the position of president of the town of Bayambang, Pangasinan, in the municipal elections held on December 1, 1903. Alleging irregularities in the election, he filed a protest with the provincial board of Pangasinan against the confirmation of the election of the successful candidate.

While the protest was pending and under consideration by the provincial board, Gloria approached the provincial treasurer, who was a member of that board, and offered and promised to give him the sum of 200 pesos if he would "lend his aid and support to the said protest." The provincial treasurer did not accept the offer.

There was no dispute as to the facts, which were admitted at the trial. Gloria was charged in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan with an attempt to commit the crime of bribery and was convicted. He appealed, raising solely the legal question of whether his offer to the treasurer constituted a punishable attempt under the Penal Code or was merely a proposal to commit a crime for which no specific penalty was provided.

• Mere Proposal, Not Attempt: Gloria argued that his offer was a mere proposal to commit a crime and that under Article 4 of the Penal Code, proposals can be punished only in cases where specific authority therefor is found in the code. He maintained that nothing in the Penal Code penalized a proposal to commit the crime of bribery, and therefore his conduct was not punishable.

• Attempt vs. Proposal: Whether Gloria's offer of 200 pesos to the provincial treasurer constituted an attempt to commit bribery punishable under Article 3 of the Penal Code, or a mere proposal not punishable under Article 4.

• Attempt vs. Proposal: Yes. The offer constituted an attempt to commit bribery under Article 3 of the Penal Code, because the offer of money is an overt act in a crime of this nature, and the official's refusal alone prevented consummation.

• Attempt vs. Proposal: Article 3 of the Penal Code defines an attempt as occurring when the guilty person makes a beginning in the commission of a crime by direct, overt acts and does not perform all acts of execution by reason of some cause or action other than his own voluntary desistance. Gloria's offer of 200 pesos to the provincial treasurer was not a mere proposition but a direct overt act toward the commission of bribery, because the offer of money is intrinsic to the nature of that offense. The crime was not consummated solely because the treasurer refused the bribe—a cause independent of Gloria's own voluntary desistance. Article 4, which limits the punishment of proposals to cases specifically authorized by the code, was therefore inapplicable, because Gloria's conduct went beyond a proposal and constituted the beginning of commission by direct overt acts. The sentence appealed from was accordingly confirmed.

• Attempt vs. Proposal Under the Penal Code — Under Article 3 of the Penal Code, there is an attempt when the offender begins the commission of a crime by direct, overt acts and fails to complete all acts of execution due to a cause other than his own voluntary desistance. A proposal to commit a crime, by contrast, is punishable only when the code specifically so provides (Article 4). The decisive distinction is whether the conduct constitutes a direct overt act toward commission. In the crime of bribery, the offer of money is itself the overt act; it is not reducible to a mere proposal because the tender of the bribe is an essential element of the offense. Where consummation is prevented by the refusal of the person to be bribed rather than by the giver's voluntary desistance, the offense is attempted bribery, not an unpunishable proposal.

• "there is an attempt when the guilty person makes a beginning in the commission of a crime by direct, overt acts and does not perform all of the acts of execution which constitute the crime, by reason of some cause or action other than his own voluntary desistance" — This is the Court's verbatim quotation of Article 3 of the Penal Code, defining attempt and serving as the textual basis for the ratio decidendi.
• "the offer of money is an overt act in a crime of this nature, and its refusal on the part of the official whom it was proposed to bribe alone prevented the consummation of the crime." — This passage articulates the core reasoning: in bribery, the offer itself is the overt act, and non-consummation due to the official's refusal establishes attempt rather than mere proposal.

• Article 3, Penal Code — Defines attempt as the beginning of commission of a crime by direct, overt acts without completion of all acts of execution due to a cause other than the offender's voluntary desistance. Applied to hold that Gloria's offer of money to the provincial treasurer was a direct overt act constituting attempted bribery.
• Article 4, Penal Code — Limits punishment of proposals to commit crimes to cases where the code specifically provides authority. The Court found this provision inapplicable because Gloria's conduct constituted an attempt, not a mere proposal.

Arellano, C.J., and Torres, Mapa, and Johnson, JJ., concurred.