United States vs. Garing

A municipal ordinance that designates the seasons of the year when fishing may be exercised and prescribes the form of fishing weirs or devices is a valid regulation of the right to fish, not an unconstitutional prohibition, where the ordinance's implied prohibition of fishing outside the designated seasons demonstrates that the right is granted through necessary regulation for the protection and improvement of the common property of the municipality.

The township of Naujan, a municipal corporation organized under Act No. 1397 (The Township Government Act), enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 9, amended by No. 14, series of 1900, to preserve the fisheries of the Butas and San Agustin Rivers, which the ordinance's preamble described as a continuous source of revenue for the township. The ordinance was enacted against the statutory backdrop of section 29(r) of Act No. 1397, empowering township councils to make ordinances to promote prosperity and protect property, and section 43(a) of the same Act, as amended by Act No. 1689, allowing townships to collect fees for the granting of fishery privileges. The defendant was charged with violating the ordinance by placing a fish weir in the Butas River.

Bonifacio Garing was charged before the ex officio justice of the peace of the subprovince of Mindoro with violating Municipal Ordinance No. 9, amended by No. 14, series of 1900, of the township of Naujan, and was sentenced to pay a fine of P100, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs. He appealed, and the provincial fiscal of Batangas and Mindoro filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance of Mindoro charging Garing with having placed, maliciously and criminally, on or about November 4, 1911, a fish weir in the Butas River of the township of Naujan, which device, though it faced the sea, was arranged in such wise that it caught fish coming from the Naujan Lake, all in violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 14.

The ordinance, quoted in full in the decision, recited that the practice of catching fish in large numbers on their way from Lake Naujan to their spawning ground in the sea had led to a marked decrease in the number of fish taken annually in the Butas and San Agustin Rivers. Article 1 prohibited, on and after August 1, 1909, the construction of fish weirs, traps, or other devices opening upstream or designed to catch fish running from Naujan Lake to deposit their eggs in the sea, on the Butas and San Agustin Rivers between October 16 and February 15, while permitting traps with mouths opening downstream provided their openings were at least 1 inch in diameter. Article 2 allowed weirs between February 16 and October 15 with mouths opening upstream, again subject to the 1-inch opening requirement. Article 3 prohibited the taking of fish known as banacs from the sea within the jurisdiction of the township of Naujan between October 16 and February 15, and required that nets and other devices used from February 16 to October 15 have openings at least 1 inch in diameter. Article 4 prescribed a fine of P50 for the first offense and P10 for each subsequent offense, with subsidiary imprisonment at hard labor at the rate of one day's imprisonment for each peso of the fine.

Garing filed a demurrer to the complaint on the ground that the ordinance was unconstitutional and therefore null and void. The Court of First Instance sustained the demurrer, holding that the prohibited district was the sea coast, that no law empowered municipal councils to prohibit fisheries though they were authorized to grant fishery licenses and privileges, that fishing in the sea is absolutely free, and that the ordinance was illegal and unconstitutional. The fiscal appealed, and after the Court of First Instance refused to allow the appeal, the Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus compelling the appeal to proceed.

N/A — the decision does not recount the appellant's specific arguments beyond the taking of the appeal from the order sustaining the demurrer.

• Unconstitutionality of the Ordinance: The defendant filed a demurrer to the complaint on the ground that Municipal Ordinance No. 14 was unconstitutional and therefore null and void, and the Court of First Instance sustained the demurrer on that basis.

• Validity of the Ordinance: Whether Municipal Ordinance No. 14, series of 1900, of the township of Naujan is unconstitutional and void.
• Power to Regulate Fisheries: Whether the township of Naujan had the power to enact an ordinance regulating the exercise of the right to fish within its jurisdiction.

• Validity of the Ordinance: No. The ordinance is valid and legal; it did nothing more than regulate the use and enjoyment of the right to fish by designating the seasons of the year when the right might be exercised and the manner of doing so, and the alleged prohibited district was not the seacoast but the rivers and the sea within the township's jurisdiction.
• Power to Regulate Fisheries: Yes. The township had the power to enact the ordinance under section 29(r) of Act No. 1397, which empowers township councils to make ordinances to promote prosperity and protect property, and under section 43(a) of the same Act, as amended by Act No. 1689, which allows townships to collect fees for the granting of fishery privileges, thereby implying the power to regulate fisheries.

• Validity of the Ordinance: The ordinance did not prohibit the right to fish but regulated its exercise. By designating the seasons when fishing might be exercised and prescribing the form of fishing weirs or devices that might be constructed in each season, the ordinance impliedly prohibited fishing outside those seasons, but this very implication showed that the right was not prohibited but rather granted through necessary regulation for the protection and improvement of the common property of the municipality. The Court further rejected the lower court's characterization of the prohibited district as the seacoast: articles 1 and 2 referred to the Butas and San Agustin Rivers, and article 3, though speaking of the taking of banacs from the sea, limited such fishing to the territory within the jurisdiction of the township of Naujan — the area within which the municipal council could exercise its jurisdictional powers.
• Power to Regulate Fisheries: Section 29(r) of Act No. 1397 prescribes, among other duties of the township council, the making of ordinances and regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary to promote prosperity and protect property. Section 43(a) of the same Act, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 1689, provides that townships may collect fees for the granting of fishery privileges, which clearly and explicitly implies that townships also have the power to pass ordinances regulating fisheries or the exercise of the right to fish within their jurisdictions, for the granting of such privileges must necessarily be the subject matter of proper regulations. The Court further reasoned that, under section 2 of Act No. 1459 (the Corporation Law), corporations, both public and private, have the powers incident to their existence — all such as have for their aim the realization of the purposes for which they were created. Since the purposes of municipal councils include securing the greatest sum of material good for the inhabitants through the improvement of sources of wealth and production, the township of Naujan had the power to pass the ordinance, and the ordinance was valid and legal.

• Regulation vs. Prohibition of the Right to Fish — An ordinance that designates the seasons of the year when fishing may be exercised and prescribes the form of fishing weirs or devices regulates the exercise of the right to fish rather than prohibiting it. The implied prohibition of fishing outside the designated seasons demonstrates that the right is not prohibited but granted through necessary regulation for the protection and improvement of the common property of the municipality. Applied here to uphold the validity of the Naujan ordinance.
• Incidental Powers of Municipal Corporations — Under section 2 of Act No. 1459 (the Corporation Law), corporations, including public corporations such as townships, possess the powers incident to their existence — all such as have for their aim the realization, fulfillment, and carrying out of the purposes for which they were created. Applied here to support the township's power to regulate fisheries as a means of securing the material good of its inhabitants through the improvement of sources of wealth and production.

• "From the text of the ordinance above quoted it is seen that by means thereof, the municipal council of Naujan did nothing more than regulate the use and enjoyment of the right to fish in the Butas, San Agustin, and Nag-iba Rivers, by designating the seasons of the year when this right might be exercised and the manner of so doing, in such wise that no detriment should thereby result to the development of the said industry and occasion a decrease in the number of fish ascending the said rivers from the sea to Naujan and Pola Lakes or descending them again." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the ordinance regulated rather than prohibited the right to fish.
• "It is logical that the regulations so established should imply the prohibition to exercise such a right in the seasons of the year not included among those specified in the ordinance, and this very implication shows that right is not prohibited by them, but, on the contrary, is granted through means of the necessary regulation for the protection and improvement of the said common property of the municipality of Naujan." — This passage explains why the ordinance's implied prohibition of fishing outside designated seasons does not render it unconstitutional.
• "This provision clearly and explicitly gives it to be understood that the townships also have the proper to pass ordinances regulating fisheries or the exercise or enjoyment of the right to fish within their respective jurisdictions, for the granting of such privileges or of the licenses required for those purposes must necessarily be the subject matter of proper regulations." — This passage identifies the statutory basis for the township's power to regulate fisheries under section 43(a) of Act No. 1397, as amended by Act No. 1689.

N/A — the decision cites no case law.

• Section 29(r), Act No. 1397 (The Township Government Act) — Empowers township councils to make ordinances and regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary to promote prosperity and protect property. Applied to uphold the Naujan ordinance as a valid exercise of this delegated power.
• Section 43(a), Act No. 1397, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 1689 — Provides that townships may collect fees for the granting of fishery privileges. Applied to imply the township's power to pass ordinances regulating fisheries, since the granting of such privileges must necessarily be the subject of proper regulations.
• Section 2, Act No. 1459 (the Corporation Law) — Grants corporations the powers incident to their existence. Applied to municipal corporations to support their power to regulate fisheries as a means of furthering the prosperity and protecting the interests and property of the municipality and its inhabitants.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concurred.