United States vs. Elviña

A public officer who pays out public funds in good faith pursuant to authorizing municipal resolutions, even without furnishing the auditor with the required vouchers, is not criminally liable for malversation, because the absence of criminal intent and personal conversion negates the essential elements of the crime and prevents the statutory prima facie presumption from arising.

Alfredo Elviña served as municipal treasurer of San Juan de Guimba, Nueva Ecija, from July 1, 1909 to January 31, 1910. The crime of misappropriation of public funds was defined and penalized under Act No. 1740, which also established a prima facie presumption that missing public funds had been put to personal uses when a person charged with their custody failed to produce them on demand of an authorized officer. The prosecution was initiated on the basis of the accused's failure to furnish the District Auditor with vouchers and proofs of payments he had made from municipal funds, notwithstanding that such payments were concededly authorized by municipal board resolutions.

Alfredo Elviña was the municipal treasurer of San Juan de Guimba, Nueva Ecija, serving from July 1, 1909 to January 31, 1910. During that period, he had custody of various properties and sums of money pertaining to his office. An information was subsequently filed charging him with the crime of misappropriation of public funds, alleging that he had maliciously and criminally disposed of municipal properties and money totaling P2,505.61 and had refused to render an account thereof despite being required by the District Auditor to do so.

It was undisputed in the record that the sum of P2,505.61 had actually been paid out by the accused and that such payments were made under resolutions of the municipal board authorizing him to make them. The sole basis for the prosecution was that the accused did not furnish the auditor with the vouchers and proofs of the conceded payments that the auditor believed were required by law. The accused was thereafter convicted by the lower court.

On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the disbursements were made in good faith for the benefit of the municipality, under the honest belief that the accused had the right and the duty to make them. While he may have erred in paying out the funds upon insufficient vouchers or in failing to furnish the precise kind of proof required by law, such mistakes did not amount to criminal conduct. The prosecution's own information and proofs affirmatively showed that the money had been paid out in the interest of the municipality and had not been put to personal uses, thus negating the prima facie presumption that would otherwise arise from the absence of the funds.

• Sufficiency of Evidence for Malversation: Whether the accused can be convicted of misappropriation of public funds when the funds were actually paid out in good faith under authorizing municipal board resolutions, albeit without furnishing the auditor with the required vouchers and proofs of payment.
• Prima Facie Presumption Under Act No. 1740: Whether the statutory presumption that missing public funds have been put to personal uses arises when the prosecution's own allegations and proofs demonstrate that the funds were disbursed for the municipality's benefit and not converted to personal use.

• Sufficiency of Evidence for Malversation: No. The accused was acquitted because the funds were paid out in good faith under authorizing municipal board resolutions, negating the criminal intent and personal conversion essential to malversation under Act No. 1740.

• Prima Facie Presumption Under Act No. 1740: No. The presumption was never created, the prosecution's own pleading and proofs having affirmatively shown that the absence of the funds was not due to personal use by the accused, thus completely negativing the presumption at its inception.

• Sufficiency of Evidence for Malversation: The essential elements of malversation of public funds include criminal intent and conversion of the money to the use of the accused or another person. Here, the accused paid out the funds to persons who had rendered services to the municipality, under and in accordance with resolutions of the municipal council authorizing such payments. There was no criminal intent, no conversion to personal use, and no felonious deprivation of the municipality of its funds. The maxim actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea — a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act be innocent — was held controlling. An honest mistake as to the law or facts regarding the expenditure of public funds may give rise to civil liability but not criminal liability. The act was not criminal; it may have been erroneous or illegal in the sense that it could have been set aside on appeal, but it was not accompanied by the intent to feloniously deprive the municipality of its property.

• Prima Facie Presumption Under Act No. 1740: Section 2 of Act No. 1740 provides that the absence of public funds and the failure or inability of the custodian to produce them on demand shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the missing funds have been put to personal uses. However, this presumption is rebuttable and constitutes only a prima facie case. In the present case, it was unnecessary for the accused to offer rebutting evidence, because the prosecution's own information and proofs — presented along with the criminal charge — demonstrated that the money had been paid out in the interest and for the benefit of the municipality in good faith. The facts presented to create the presumption were accompanied by other facts that absolutely prevented its creation. The presumption was thus never born and never existed, having been affirmatively and completely negatived by the prosecution's own evidence.

• Actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea — A crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act be innocent. To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or consequences as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent. Applied in this case to hold that a municipal treasurer who disbursed public funds in good faith under authorizing resolutions, even upon insufficient vouchers, committed at most an honest mistake giving rise to civil liability but not criminal malversation.

• Prima facie presumption of personal use from absence of public funds — Under Section 2 of Act No. 1740, the absence of public funds and the failure of the custodian to produce them on demand constitute prima facie evidence that the missing funds have been put to personal uses. This presumption is rebuttable and stands only until the accused presents evidence showing the contrary. Critically, the presumption never arises when the prosecution's own allegations and proofs affirmatively show that the funds were not put to personal uses — the facts presented for the purpose of creating the presumption being accompanied by other facts that absolutely prevent its creation.

• "To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequences, as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is, actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea — a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of be innocent." — This passage articulates the controlling principle of criminal intent that underpins the acquittal, establishing that good-faith disbursement of public funds under authorizing resolutions lacks the mens rea essential to malversation.

• "If he honestly erred in the payment of said moneys, if he paid them out upon insufficient vouchers, if he did not furnish precisely the kind of proof required by law, that does not necessarily mean that he is a criminal. If he made an honest mistake as to the law or the facts as to his duties relative to the expenditure of the public funds, although he might be liable civilly he is not criminally." — This passage draws the critical distinction between civil and criminal liability for erroneous disbursement of public funds, defining the boundary that protects good-faith officers from criminal prosecution for accounting deficiencies.

• "The presumption was never born. It never existed. The facts which were presented for the purpose of creating such presumption were accompanied by other facts which absolutely prevented its creation." — This formulation establishes that the statutory prima facie presumption of personal use is not merely rebuttable but can be prevented from arising altogether when the prosecution's own evidence negates personal conversion.

• United States vs. Saberon, 19 Phil. Rep. 391 — Cited for the proposition that an information may be insufficient to charge misappropriation of public funds if it merely alleges a failure to render an account rather than actual conversion. The Court noted this question without resolving it, proceeding to acquit on either ground.

• United States vs. Catolico, 18 Phil. Rep. 504, 506 — Followed as controlling precedent. A justice of the peace who delivered deposited sums to a judgment creditor after dismissing appeals, believing he was acting judicially and legally, was held not guilty of malversation because his acts were done in good faith without intent to embezzle. The Court applied the same reasoning to the municipal treasurer's good-faith disbursements.

• United States vs. Acebedo, 18 Phil. Rep. 428 — Followed. An accused whose secretary converted collected sums to personal use was held not guilty of malversation because the accused himself did not convert the funds. The case reinforced the principle that the prima facie presumption from absence of funds is rebuttable and does not apply when evidence shows the funds were not put to the accused's personal use.

• Section 2, Act No. 1740 — Defines the crime of misappropriation of public funds and establishes the prima facie presumption that the absence of public funds, or the failure or inability of the custodian to produce them on demand of an authorized officer, shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the missing funds have been put to personal uses. The Court held this presumption rebuttable and, in this case, never created, because the prosecution's own evidence showed the funds were disbursed for the municipality's benefit and not converted to personal use.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, and Trent, JJ., concurred.