United States vs. Elicanal

The exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear under Article 8(10) of the Penal Code requires that the threat promise an evil greater than, or at least equal to, that which the threatened person is compelled to commit, and that the threatened evil be of such gravity and imminence that the ordinary person would have succumbed to it; treachery is present where the deceased is helpless and defenseless at the time the fatal blow is struck, even if the initial attack was not treacherous.

Eduardo Elicanal, approximately 22 years of age, without education or instruction, and somewhat weak physically, served as a member of the crew of the lorcha Cataluña, which cruised in Philippine waters off Iloilo under the captaincy of Juan Nomo, with Guillermo Guiloresa as first mate. The Penal Code in force at the time was the Spanish Penal Code, as amended by Philippine legislation, which defined exempting circumstances under Article 8 and allowed discretionary application of extenuating or aggravating circumstances under Article 11 (as amended by Act No. 2142).

Eduardo Elicanal was a crew member of the lorcha Cataluña, which sailed under the captaincy of Juan Nomo, with Guillermo Guiloresa serving as first mate. The lorcha departed from the mouth of the Iloilo river early in the morning of December 11, 1914. Scarcely had the vessel cleared the river when Guiloresa, the chief mate, suddenly and without prior mention told Elicanal that he was going to kill the captain because he was very angry with him, and asked Elicanal to assist him. Elicanal regarded the statement as a joke, the chief mate being known as a great joker and smiling at the time, and paid it no further attention. Neither Elicanal nor the other crew members held any resentment against the captain, and Elicanal had no idea at that time that he would take part in any acts directed against him.

The following morning, while the crew were engaged in their daily occupations, Guiloresa found the captain in his cabin and assaulted him, attempting to seize and hold his hands while calling to the crew to come forward and help. Drawn by the cries, the crew hastened to where Guiloresa was engaged in hand-to-hand combat with the captain. At Guiloresa's request, the crew—with the exception of Elicanal—seized the captain and tied him with rope. After the captain had been rendered helpless, Guiloresa struck him in the back of the neck with an iron bar and then, delivering the weapon to Elicanal, ordered him to come forward and assist in disposing of the captain. Elicanal seized the bar and, while the captain was still struggling, struck him a blow on the head which caused his death.

The sole defense advanced by Elicanal was that in killing the captain he acted under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a great injury induced by the threat of Guiloresa, and that he was so absolutely overwhelmed thereby that he acted without volition of his own, reduced to a mere instrument in the hands of the chief mate. The trial court refused to accept this defense, holding that Guiloresa did not exercise such influence over Elicanal as amounted to an uncontrollable fear or as deprived him of his volition. The trial court convicted Elicanal of murder and sentenced him to death, finding the qualifying circumstances of premeditation and treachery present.

• Uncontrollable Fear: Elicanal maintained that in striking the fatal blow he acted under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear induced by the threat of the chief mate, and that he was so overwhelmed by that fear that he acted without volition, reduced to a mere instrument in the hands of Guiloresa.
• Absence of Qualifying Circumstances: Counsel for the appellant argued that the evidence did not sustain the finding of any qualifying circumstances that would raise the crime from homicide to murder, specifically challenging the existence of both premeditation and treachery.
• Application of Article 11: Counsel contended that the trial court erred in refusing to apply Article 11 of the Penal Code in favor of the accused, invoking his youth, lack of education, weak physical condition, and general personal qualities as extenuating circumstances.
• Modification of Treachery Doctrine: Counsel maintained that the doctrine regarding treachery had been modified in United States vs. Balagtas and Jaime, such that treachery must be present at the commencement of the attack and cannot be found where the attack is continuous and the treacherous act occurs only during its course.

• Exempting Circumstance of Uncontrollable Fear: Whether the defense of acting under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury, under Article 8(10) of the Penal Code, was sustained by the evidence.
• Qualifying Circumstance of Premeditation: Whether the evidence sufficiently established premeditation as a qualifying circumstance to raise the crime from homicide to murder.
• Qualifying Circumstance of Treachery: Whether treachery (alevosia) was present where the initial attack was open and without treachery but the deceased was bound and helpless at the time the fatal blow was struck.
• Application of Article 11: Whether the trial court erred in refusing to apply Article 11 of the Penal Code as an extenuating circumstance in favor of the accused.

• Exempting Circumstance of Uncontrollable Fear: No. The threat, if any, was not of such gravity and imminence that the ordinary person would have succumbed to it, nor was the evil threatened greater than or equal to that which Elicanal was compelled to commit.
• Qualifying Circumstance of Premeditation: No. The evidence failed to show sustained reflection, deliberation, or persistent criminal purpose on the part of the accused; the matter was never discussed except casually the day before, and Elicanal had not even thought of taking part in the killing until the iron bar was handed to him.
• Qualifying Circumstance of Treachery: Yes. The deceased was bound hand and foot and helpless at the time the fatal blow was struck; the established doctrine holds that treachery is present where the person killed is in a helpless and defenseless condition at that moment, even if the initial attack was not treacherous.
• Application of Article 11: No. The personal qualities and characteristics of the accused are matters peculiarly cognizable by the trial court, and the application of Article 11 is peculiarly within its discretion.

• Exempting Circumstance of Uncontrollable Fear: Article 8(10) of the Penal Code exempts from criminal liability any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. For this exemption to apply, the threat causing the fear must promise an evil greater than, or at least equal to, that which the threatened person is compelled to commit, and the threatened evil must be of such gravity and imminence that the ordinary person would have succumbed. The Supreme Court of Spain, in decisions of November 5, 1880 and April 14, 1871, established that the inducement must precede the act induced and must be so influential that without it the act would not have been performed. The evidence failed to show that any threat directed at Elicanal by Guiloresa was of such character as to deprive him of all volition or to make him a mere instrument. It was doubtful whether any threat in the true sense was made at all, and certainly none of such serious nature as would justify an illegal act. The fear was not insuperable.

• Qualifying Circumstance of Premeditation: Qualifying circumstances must be as clearly proved as the criminal act itself. In United States vs. Bañagale, the Court held that premeditation requires proof that the accused had resolved upon the killing through deliberation, meditation, and reflection, and had performed acts revealing a persistent criminal purpose some days or even hours prior to carrying out the determination. In the present case, the matter of killing the captain was never mentioned except casually the day before, and in such a way as not to show any fixed purpose even on the part of the chief mate, much less on that of Elicanal. Elicanal had not even thought of taking part in the killing until the moment the iron bar was handed to him. The finding of premeditation was therefore error.

• Qualifying Circumstance of Treachery: Although the initial attack by Guiloresa on the captain was open and fair—a man-to-man struggle between two unarmed persons—the Court's established doctrine holds that treachery is present if, at the time the fatal blow is struck, the deceased is helpless and unable to defend himself. The deceased was bound hand and foot and helpless when Elicanal struck him with the iron bar. While the writer of the opinion personally held the view that treachery cannot qualify a crime as murder where there was no treachery at the beginning of the attack, the Court had so frequently held the contrary that the writer accepted the established doctrine. Counsel's contention that United States vs. Balagtas and Jaime had modified this doctrine was rejected, the majority being of the opinion that the Court in that case had not intended to reverse prior decisions. An almost unbroken line of decisions—including United States vs. De Leon, United States vs. Ricafor, United States vs. Santos, United States vs. Jamino, and many others—confirmed that the fact that the deceased was bound while killed constitutes alevosia and raises the crime to murder.

• Application of Article 11: The education, instruction, enlightenment, mental and moral condition, and general qualities and characteristics of the accused are peculiarly within the cognizance of the trial court, which has the best opportunity to observe the defendant. The application of Article 11 is peculiarly within the discretion of that court. The Supreme Court hesitates to reverse the trial court's application or refusal to apply Article 11 on this ground.

• Exempting Circumstance of Uncontrollable Fear (Article 8(10), Penal Code) — A person acting under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury is exempt from criminal liability, provided the threat which caused the fear (a) promised an evil greater than, or at least equal to, that which the person was required to commit, and (b) was of such gravity and imminence that the ordinary person would have succumbed to it. The inducement must precede the act induced and must be so influential that, without it, the act would not have been performed. The force or fear must reduce the person to a mere instrument, acting not only without will but against will. In this case, the defense failed because no threat of sufficient gravity or imminence was proved, and it was doubtful whether any true threat was made at all.

• Treachery (Alevosia) Where Deceased Is Helpless at Moment of Killing — Where the person killed was in a helpless and defenseless condition at the time the fatal blow was given, the homicide was committed with alevosia, notwithstanding that the initial attack, which was continuous and finally resulted in death, was not treacherous. This doctrine was affirmed through an almost unbroken line of decisions and was held not to have been modified by United States vs. Balagtas and Jaime, which the majority interpreted as not intending to reverse prior holdings.

• Proof of Qualifying Circumstances — Qualifying circumstances must be as clearly proved as the criminal act itself; unless the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was committed with one or more qualifying circumstances, it must be denominated homicide and not murder.

• Discretionary Application of Article 11, Penal Code — The personal qualities and characteristics of the accused are matters peculiarly cognizable by the trial court, and the application or refusal to apply Article 11 is peculiarly within its discretion; the Supreme Court hesitates to reverse the trial court on this ground.

• "A threat, in order to induce insuperable fear, must promise such grave results, and such results must be so imminent, that the common run of men would succumb. The crime threatened must be greater than, or at least equal to, that which we are compelled to commit." — This passage, quoting the Supreme Court of Spain, articulates the canonical formulation of the standard for the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear under Article 8(10) of the Penal Code.

• "It is the doctrine of this court that where the person killed was in a helpless and defenseless condition at the time the fatal blow was given, the homicide was committed with alevosia notwithstanding that in the attack, which was continuous, and which finally resulted in the death there was no alevosia." — This passage states the established doctrine on treachery that controls the case, notwithstanding the ponente's personal disagreement with it.

• "In order that treachery may be considered as a qualifying circumstance to raise the classification of the crime, or as an aggravating circumstance to augment the penalty, it must be shown that the treacherous acts were present at and preceded the commencement of the attack which caused the injury complained of." — This quotation from United States vs. Balagtas and Jaime was cited by counsel for the appellant as modifying the treachery doctrine; the majority held it did not reverse prior decisions.

• United States vs. Beecham, 15 Phil. Rep. 272 — Cited for the proposition that qualifying circumstances must be as clearly proved as the crime itself, and that premeditation was not established under the facts.
• United States vs. Bañagale, 24 Phil. Rep. 69 — Cited for the requisites of premeditation: deliberation, meditation, reflection, and acts revealing persistent criminal purpose prior to the killing.
• United States vs. Balagtas and Jaime, 19 Phil. Rep. 164 — Cited by counsel for the appellant as modifying the treachery doctrine; the majority held it did not reverse prior decisions and that the doctrine requiring treachery at the commencement of the attack was not intended as a new rule.
• United States vs. De Leon, 1 Phil. Rep. 163 — Leading case establishing that the fact the deceased was bound at the time of killing constitutes alevosia and raises the crime to murder, even without treachery at the beginning of the assault.
• United States vs. Ricafor, 1 Phil. Rep. 173; United States vs. Santos, 1 Phil. Rep. 222; United States vs. Jamino, 3 Phil. Rep. 102; United States vs. Gloria, 3 Phil. Rep. 333; United States vs. Gabriel, 4 Phil. Rep. 165 — Part of the almost unbroken line of decisions affirming that a helpless and defenseless condition of the deceased at the time of the fatal blow constitutes treachery.

• Article 8(10), Penal Code — Exempts from criminal liability any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. Applied to test Elicanal's defense; the defense failed because the threat was not of sufficient gravity or imminence.
• Article 8(9), Penal Code — Exempts from criminal liability any person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force. Discussed as related to the concept of uncontrollable fear, requiring that the force reduce the person to a mere instrument acting without will and against will.
• Article 11, Penal Code (as amended by Act No. 2142) — Authorizes the court to consider extenuating or aggravating circumstances based on the education, instruction, enlightenment, and moral condition of the accused. Held to be peculiarly within the discretion of the trial court.
• Article 10, circumstance 7, Penal Code — Defines deliberate premeditation as a qualifying circumstance, requiring that the accused acted with meditated resolution and performed outward acts denoting persistent criminal purpose. Found not proved in this case.

• Justice Torres — Concurred with the exception of the portion of the decision referring to the application of Article 11 of the Penal Code.
• Justice Johnson — Concurred in the result.
• Justice Trent, with whom concurred Justice Carson — Concurred in the disposition but observed that counsel's briefs did not contend that United States vs. Balagtas was opposed to prior holdings, and that the rule in this case was not in conflict with the other cases cited. Justice Trent further observed that if the Court intended to hold that it had no power to apply Article 11 where the trial court had declined to do so, or vice versa, he could not consent to such a holding.
• Justice Araullo — Concurred with the observation that, although the trial judge has better opportunity to determine whether Article 11 should apply, the Supreme Court should decide whether the trial judge committed the error attributed to him when an assignment of error is raised on that basis. Araullo concluded that Article 11 should not be applied in this case to increase or diminish the penalty.