United States vs. De la Cruz

The extenuating circumstance of passion and obfuscation under subsection 7 of Article 9 of the Penal Code is present when the accused kills upon discovering his concubine in flagrante in carnal communication with another man, as the sudden revelation of infidelity constitutes a sufficient impulse naturally producing passion and obfuscation, distinguishable from cases where the passion arises from the woman's legitimate refusal to continue an illicit relationship.

The defendant, Hilario de la Cruz, had been living in concubinage with the deceased woman, who was his querida. The case arose under the Penal Code then in force, specifically subsection 7 of Article 9, which recognized as extenuating the circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation. Prior jurisprudence, notably U.S. vs. Hicks, had limited this mitigating circumstance to passions originating from legitimate feelings, excluding those arising from vicious, unworthy, and immoral motives.

The defendant and appellant, Hilario de la Cruz, had been living in concubinage with the deceased woman, who was his querida. The evidence of record conclusively established his guilt for the crime of homicide. The killing occurred when the defendant, in the heat of passion, discovered the deceased in flagrante in carnal communication with a mutual acquaintance. Upon this sudden revelation of her infidelity, he killed her.

The trial court found that the commission of the offense was not marked by either aggravating or extenuating circumstances, and accordingly sentenced the convict to fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusion temporal — the medium degree of the penalty prescribed by the code. The defendant appealed, seeking recognition of the extenuating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.

• Mitigating Circumstance of Passion and Obfuscation: Whether the commission of the homicide was marked with the extenuating circumstance defined in subsection 7 of Article 9 of the Penal Code, such that the prescribed penalty should have been imposed in its minimum degree.

• Mitigating Circumstance of Passion and Obfuscation: Yes. The commission of the crime was marked with the extenuating circumstance set out in subsection 7 of Article 9, as the defendant acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation upon discovering his querida in flagrante with another man, warranting imposition of the penalty in its minimum degree.

• Mitigating Circumstance of Passion and Obfuscation: The evidence disclosed that the defendant killed the deceased in the heat of passion upon discovering her in flagrante in carnal communication with a mutual acquaintance. Subsection 7 of Article 9 of the Penal Code recognizes as extenuating the circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation. The sudden revelation of the woman's infidelity constituted a sufficient impulse in the ordinary and natural course to produce the passion and obfuscation the law regards as a special reason for extenuation. This was supported by the Supreme Court of Spain's sentence of July 4, 1892, which reversed a judgment that failed to recognize the extenuating circumstance where a man killed his concubine upon catching her in her underclothes with another party, holding that the facts were a sufficient impulse to produce violent passion and obfuscation. The case was distinguished from U.S. vs. Hicks, where the passion arose from the woman's refusal to continue illicit relations — a right she was entitled to exercise — and where the killing was deliberate and premeditated, the accused having resolved to kill after due reflection and disguising his intention with courteous behavior. In the present case, the impulse was not the woman's decline to have illicit relations, but the sudden revelation of her unfaithfulness, which naturally produced passion and obfuscation.

• Passion and Obfuscation as an Extenuating Circumstance — Under subsection 7 of Article 9 of the Penal Code, an extenuating circumstance exists when the accused acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation. The causes which mitigate criminal responsibility for loss of self-control are such as originate from legitimate feelings, not those which arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions. The sudden discovery of a concubine's infidelity — catching her in flagrante in carnal communication with another — constitutes a sufficient impulse naturally producing passion and obfuscation, even though the relationship itself is illicit. This is distinguished from situations where the passion arises from the woman's exercise of her right to terminate an illicit relationship, which does not qualify, as the aggressor's vexation and disappointment in such cases originate from unworthy motives rather than legitimate feelings.

• "The evidence clearly discloses that the convict, in the heat of passion, killed the deceased, who had theretofore been his querida (concubine or lover) upon discovering her in flagrante in carnal communication with a mutual acquaintance." — This factual finding forms the evidentiary basis for applying the extenuating circumstance of passion and obfuscation under subsection 7 of Article 9.

• "In the present case however, the impulse upon which defendant acted and which naturally 'produced passion and obfuscation' was not that the woman declined to have illicit relations with him, but the sudden revelation that she was untrue to him, and his discovery of her in flagrante in the arms of another." — This passage articulates the critical distinction between legitimate passion arising from sudden discovery of infidelity and illegitimate passion arising from a woman's exercise of her right to leave an illicit relationship, drawing the line between this case and U.S. vs. Hicks.

• U.S. vs. Hicks, 14 Phil. Rep. 217 — Distinguished. In Hicks, the defendant was denied the benefit of the extenuating circumstance because his passion arose from the woman's refusal to continue illicit relations with him, which she had a right to do, and because the killing was deliberate and premeditated — the accused having resolved to kill after due reflection, carrying a prepared weapon, and disguising his intention with courteous behavior. The present case was distinguished on the ground that the impulse here was the sudden revelation of infidelity, not the woman's exercise of her right to terminate the relationship.

• Supreme Court of Spain, Sentence of July 4, 1892 — Followed. The Spanish Supreme Court reversed a judgment of the Audiencia of Santiago de Cuba that failed to recognize the extenuating circumstance where a man killed his concubine upon catching her in her underclothes with another party, holding that the facts were a sufficient impulse in the natural and ordinary course to produce violent passion and obfuscation, and that the trial court's failure to consider the extenuating circumstance violated the legal provision.

• Subsection 7, Article 9, Penal Code — Defines as extenuating the circumstance "of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation." Applied to reduce the penalty from the medium degree (fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusion temporal) to the minimum degree (twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal), the Supreme Court finding that the defendant's discovery of his querida in flagrante with another man constituted a sufficient impulse naturally producing passion and obfuscation.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, and Trent, JJ. concurred. Moreland, J. concurred in the result but disagreed with the application of the extenuating circumstance under paragraph 7, Article 9 of the Penal Code, stating in his separate opinion that it was not warranted by the facts or the law.