United States vs. Chan Toco

An information for violating a statute that generally prohibits opium smoking need not allege that the opium was not prescribed as medicine by a duly licensed and practicing physician, where the exception is not so incorporated into the definition of the offense as to constitute a material ingredient; the exception is a matter of defense.

Act No. 1461 of the Philippine Commission regulated opium use by generally prohibiting smoking, chewing, swallowing, injecting, or otherwise consuming or using opium unless the person was duly registered and had secured a certificate, while excepting opium prescribed as medicine by a duly licensed and practicing physician. Section 4 defined the prohibited acts and prescribed the penalty.

On October 23, 1906, Chan Toco smoked opium in the store of a Chinaman named Liangco in the municipality of Santo Niño, province of Samar. He was not duly registered and had not secured the certificate required by section 4 of Act No. 1461. He was charged with an infraction of that section for smoking opium without being duly registered and without having secured a certificate to that effect. The evidence of record sustained the trial court's findings and established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

• Sufficiency of Information: Chan Toco argued that the information was fatally defective because it failed to allege that the opium he smoked had not been prescribed as a medicine by a duly licensed and practicing physician. He maintained that where the enacting clause of a statute describes an offense with certain exceptions, the exceptions must be negatived in the indictment, complaint, or information.
• Remaining Procedural Errors: Chan Toco assigned additional errors in procedure, but the decision does not identify them and declined to discuss them because they were not raised in the trial court.

• Sufficiency of Information: Whether an information charging a violation of section 4 of Act No. 1461 must allege that the opium smoked was not prescribed as a medicine by a duly licensed and practicing physician.
• Procedural Errors on Appeal: Whether alleged procedural errors not raised in the trial court may be considered for the first time on appeal.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the evidence sustained the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.

• Sufficiency of Information: No. The physician-prescription exception is not an ingredient of the offense and need not be negatived in the information; it is a matter of defense.
• Procedural Errors on Appeal: No. Objections not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Yes. The evidence of record sustained the trial court's findings and established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

• Sufficiency of Information: The Court adopted the rule that an information must negative an exception only when the exception is so incorporated with the language defining the offense that the ingredients of the offense cannot be accurately and clearly described without it. If the exception is separable and merely withdraws certain persons or acts from the operation of the general prohibition, it is not part of the offense and need not be alleged. Section 4 of Act No. 1461 generally prohibited opium smoking; the exception for opium prescribed by a licensed physician withdrew a limited class of smokers from that general prohibition. The exception was not a material part of the offense's definition. The Court also reasoned that requiring the prosecution to prove the absence of a physician's prescription would be practically impossible because no public record of such prescriptions was required, while the accused could readily prove that he acted under prescription. Thus the demurrer was properly overruled.
• Procedural Errors on Appeal: The remaining assigned procedural errors were not discussed because they were not raised or objected to in the trial court; accused persons cannot raise such objections for the first time on appeal.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: The evidence of record fully sustained the trial court's findings and established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; no prejudicial error appeared in the proceedings.

• Negativing Exceptions in an Information — When a statute defines an offense with an exception, the information must negative the exception only if the exception is so incorporated with the language defining the offense that the ingredients of the offense cannot be accurately and clearly described without it. If the exception is separable and merely withdraws certain persons or acts from the operation of the general prohibition, it is not an element of the offense and need not be alleged; it is a matter of defense. The Court applied this to section 4 of Act No. 1461, holding that the physician-prescription exception need not be negatived in the information for smoking opium without registration or certificate.
• Exception as Matter of Defense — Where the exception is not an ingredient of the offense, the accused bears the burden of showing that he falls within it. The prosecution need not anticipate and disprove the defense. The Court reasoned that requiring the prosecution to prove the absence of a physician's prescription would be practically impossible, while the accused could easily establish the prescription if it existed.
• Objections Not Raised Below Cannot Be Raised on Appeal — Procedural objections not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. The Court declined to discuss the remaining assigned procedural errors on this ground.
• Prima Facie Evidence of Use Without Prescription — Under Act No. 1761, which repealed Act No. 1461, possession of opium, opium pipes, and other instruments for its use is prima facie evidence that the person in possession used a prohibited drug without the prescription of a duly licensed and practicing physician, unless the prescription is produced. The Court noted this as supporting the treatment of prescription as a defense.

• "Where a statute defining an offense contains an exception in the enacting clause of the statute which is so incorporated with the language defining the offense that the ingredients of the offense can not be accurately and clearly described if the exception is omitted, the rules of good pleading require that an indictment founded upon the statute must allege enough to show that the accused is not within the exception; but if the language of the section defining the offense is so entirely separable from the exception that the ingredients constituting the offense may be accurately and clearly defined without any reference to the exception, the pleader may safely omit any such reference, as the matter contained in the exception is matter of defense and must be shown by the accused." — This passage states the controlling test for when an exception in a criminal statute must be negatived in the information.
• "So in the case at bar, the evident intent and purpose of the statute is to prohibit and to penalize generally the smoking of opium in these Islands. But the legislator desired to withdraw from the operation of the statute a limited class of smokers, to wit, those who smoked under the advise and by prescription of a licensed and practicing physician, and we do not think that it makes the slightest practical difference, whether the excepting proviso as to such persons is found in the enacting clause of the statute in a separate provision thereof or in a separate Act." — This passage applies the test to section 4 of Act No. 1461 and explains that the physician-prescription exception is separable from the general prohibition.
• "It is worthy of consideration in this connection that in Act No. 1761, which repeals Act No. 1461, reenacting most of its provision with certain amendments and additions, it is expressly provided that the possession of opium, opium pipes, and other instruments for its use, shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in possession thereof has used one of the prohibited drugs without prescription of a duly licensed and practicing physician, unless such prescription is produced by such person." — This passage supports the Court's view that the absence of a physician's prescription is a matter for the accused to raise and prove.

• United States vs. Cook, 84 U.S. Rep., 168, 173 — The Court cited this decision for the modified rule on negativing exceptions: if the exception is so incorporated with the offense that the ingredients cannot be accurately and clearly described without it, the information must allege the accused is not within the exception; if separable, the pleader may omit it as matter of defense.
• Nelson vs. U.S., 30 Fed. Rep., 112 — The Court accepted and approved this rule that an exception withdrawing certain particulars from the enacting clause defining a crime concerning a class or species constitutes no part of the definition of the crime, regardless of its placement relative to the enacting clause. It applied the rule to hold that the physician-prescription exception in the opium law was a matter of defense.

• Section 4, Act No. 1461 of the Philippine Commission — The provision generally made it unlawful to smoke, chew, swallow, inject, or otherwise consume or use opium unless the person was duly registered and had secured the required certificate, except when prescribed as a medicine by a duly licensed and practicing physician. It also prohibited a registered confirmed user from using opium outside his own residence except when prescribed. Violation was punishable by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos, imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both. The Court construed the physician-prescription exception as not an ingredient of the offense that had to be negatived in the information.
• Act No. 1761 — This Act repealed Act No. 1461 and reenacted most of its provisions with amendments and additions. It expressly provided that possession of opium, opium pipes, and other instruments for its use is prima facie evidence that the possessor used a prohibited drug without the prescription of a duly licensed and practicing physician, unless the prescription is produced. The Court cited this as supporting the view that prescription is a matter of defense.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concurred.