United States vs. Carrero

Unlawful aggression is the primary and most essential element of self-defense; a mere belief or apprehension of an impending attack, unaccompanied by external acts showing the commencement of actual and material aggression, does not justify the infliction of a deadly blow. Insulting words or a threatening gesture, without more, cannot constitute unlawful aggression, though they may be appreciated as provocation constituting a mitigating circumstance.

Emilio Carrero was a foreman employed by a street-railway company in Manila, tasked with maintaining order among laborers during wage distribution. The case arose under the old Penal Code then in force in the Philippines, which defined homicide in article 404 and enumerated exempting and mitigating circumstances in articles 8 and 9. The accused was under 18 years of age at the time of the incident, a fact relevant to the application of the mitigating circumstance of minority under article 9, No. 2 of the Penal Code.

On the afternoon of November 24, 1906, in the district of Santa Ana, Manila, laborers of a street-railway company assembled to receive their wages. They were directed to form a single file and approach a small house where the paymaster had his office. Emilio Carrero, a foreman in the company's service, was charged with preserving order and had armed himself with a pick or spade handle, one end of which he daubed with mud, threatening to push it against the clothing of any laborer who left the line or caused trouble.

Benedicto Dio Pito left his place and forced his way into the file. Carrero ordered him out, but Dio Pito persisted. Carrero then struck him a blow with the stick on the right side of the head, above the ear. Dio Pito fell to the ground, holding his head with his hands. Carrero and another laborer promptly rendered assistance and took him to the interior of a nearby warehouse. The injured man asked for water but was unable to drink, became unconscious, and upon being taken to St. Paul's Hospital died a few hours later.

An information was thereafter filed charging Carrero with homicide. The fact that the deceased received a heavy blow with a stick on the right side of the head, above the ear, and died shortly thereafter was fully proven at trial. The accused pleaded not guilty, though he confessed to having struck the deceased. He alleged that he acted in self-defense, claiming that Dio Pito, after insulting him, thrust his hand into his pocket as if to draw a dagger or pocketknife, and that Carrero, believing an attack was imminent, struck the blow in defense. He further claimed that the death was caused not by the blow but by the deceased's head striking the ground when he was being moved to the warehouse.

The trial court found that death resulted from the blow and convicted Carrero of homicide, sentencing him to six years and one day of presidio mayor. The Supreme Court found the accused's version of events lacking in truth and not supported by the evidence, noting that no weapon was found on the deceased and that his attitude and insulting words did not constitute unlawful aggression. The Court also rejected the claim that death was caused by the fall, the warehouse floor being of pine wood and the evidence unrebutted on the causal link between the blow and the cerebral hemorrhage.

• Self-Defense: The accused argued that when he struck the blow he acted in self-defense, because the deceased, after insulting him, thrust his hand into his pocket as if to draw a dagger or pocketknife, and that he believed an attack was imminent and struck to defend himself.
• Causation: The accused alleged that the serious injury causing death was not due to the blow but to the deceased's head striking the ground when he was being moved to the warehouse by two men.

• Self-Defense: Whether the accused's claim of self-defense is valid given the absence of actual unlawful aggression by the deceased.
• Causation: Whether the death of the deceased was caused by the blow inflicted by the accused or by the shock of his fall when he was moved to the warehouse.
• Mitigating Circumstances and Penalty: Whether the mitigating circumstances of minority, lack of intent to cause so serious a harm, and provocation should be appreciated to reduce the penalty imposed by the trial court.

• Self-Defense: No. Self-defense was not established because unlawful aggression — the main and most essential element — was absent; the deceased's insulting words and gesture of thrusting his hand into his pocket, without any weapon being found, did not constitute actual or imminent aggression as required by article 8, No. 4 of the Penal Code.
• Causation: No. Death was caused by the blow on the head, not by the fall; the warehouse floor was of pine wood, and the evidence on the causal link between the blow and the cerebral hemorrhage was unrebutted.
• Mitigating Circumstances and Penalty: Yes. The mitigating circumstances of minority (under 18 years), lack of intent to cause so serious a harm as death, and provocation immediately preceding the act were all appreciated, and with no aggravating circumstance present, the penalty was reduced to two years four months and one day of prision correccional pursuant to article 81, rule 5 of the Penal Code.

• Self-Defense: Unlawful aggression is the main and most essential element to support a claim of self-defense and the corresponding exemption from criminal liability under article 8, No. 4 of the Penal Code. Without this primal requisite, self-defense cannot be maintained. The Court rejected the theory that a mere belief of imminent attack justifies a deadly blow, citing the uniform doctrine of the Supreme Court of Spain (decisions of October 31, 1889; October 30, 1884; March 19, 1885; and November 15, 1889) that a threat, even if made with a weapon, or a belief that one is about to be attacked, is insufficient; the intent must be ostensibly revealed by an act of aggression or by external acts showing the commencement of actual and material unlawful aggression. In this case, the deceased's attitude and behavior — insulting words and thrusting his hand into his pocket — did not constitute unlawful aggression, especially since no weapon was found on him. Insulting words, no matter how objectionable, cannot supply this requisite. At most, provocation may be considered a mitigating circumstance, but never a reason for exemption.

• Causation: The record did not show that the serious injury causing death was attributable to the deceased's head striking the ground when he was moved to the warehouse. The warehouse floor was of pine wood, not stone, and even if a shock was received, it was not credible that it was heavy enough to produce cerebral hemorrhage and death. The lower court's conclusion that death was caused by the blow was supported by evidence that the accused's counsel neither rebutted nor contested on appeal.

• Mitigating Circumstances and Penalty: The accused was under 18 years of age, which under article 9, No. 2 of the Penal Code, in connection with paragraph 2 of article 85, required the application of the penalty next lower to that imposed by article 404. Additionally, mitigating circumstances 3 and 4 of article 9 were present: the accused never intended to cause so serious a harm as the death of Dio Pito, and provocation on the part of the deceased immediately preceded the attack. With no aggravating circumstance present, and under rule 5 of article 81, the appropriate penalty was the next lower than prision mayor, namely prision correccional in its medium degree, resulting in a sentence of two years four months and one day.

• Unlawful Aggression as Indispensable Element of Self-Defense — Unlawful aggression is the primary and most essential element of self-defense; without it, the defense cannot be maintained. The other two conditions in article 8, No. 4 of the Penal Code are subordinate to it. A mere belief or apprehension of attack, even if sincerely held, is insufficient; there must be external acts showing the commencement of actual and material aggression. Insulting words or threatening gestures, without more, do not constitute unlawful aggression but may be appreciated as provocation, a mitigating circumstance. The Court applied this doctrine to reject Carrero's claim, as the deceased's insulting words and gesture of putting his hand into his pocket, with no weapon found, did not amount to unlawful aggression.

• Mitigating Circumstances and Penalty Reduction — When mitigating circumstances are present and no aggravating circumstance attends the crime, the penalty is reduced by degrees pursuant to article 81, rule 5 of the Penal Code. Minority (under 18 years) under article 9, No. 2, in connection with article 85, paragraph 2, requires the penalty next lower than that prescribed for the offense. The Court applied the mitigating circumstances of minority, lack of intent to cause so serious a harm (article 9, No. 3), and provocation immediately preceding the act (article 9, No. 4), reducing the penalty from presidio mayor to prision correccional in its medium degree.

• "Unlawful aggression is the main and most essential element to support the theory of self-defense and the complete or incomplete exemption from criminal liability; without such primal requisite it is not possible to maintain that a person acted in self-defense within the terms under which unlawful aggression is subordinate to the other two conditions named in article 8, No. 4, of the Penal Code." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on self-defense, establishing unlawful aggression as the indispensable element without which the defense fails.

• "The theory that by the simple belief of a person that he would be attacked, a deadly blow may be inflicted on the ground of self-defense, even though it be with a stick, is not authorized by the law nor is it a doctrine established by the decisions of courts." — This passage rejects the defense of "apparent peril" as a standalone justification, requiring instead external acts manifesting actual aggression.

• "When an act of aggression is in response to an insult, affront, or threat, it can not be considered as a defense but as the punishment which the injured party inflicts on the author of the provocation, and in such a case the court can at most consider it as a mitigating circumstance, but never as a reason for exemption, except in violation of the provisions of the Penal Code." — This passage distinguishes between self-defense (exempting) and retaliation for provocation (mitigating only), a distinction central to the Court's disposition.

• Supreme Court of Spain, Decision dated October 31, 1889 — Cited for the proposition that both the belief of the person defending himself and hostile attitude and other acts constituting real and ostensible acts of aggression must be considered.
• Supreme Court of Spain, Decisions dated October 30, 1884; March 19, 1885; and November 15, 1889 — Cited for the uniform doctrine that a threat, even if made with a weapon, or a belief of imminent attack, is insufficient for self-defense; external acts showing commencement of actual and material unlawful aggression are required.

• Article 404, Penal Code — Defines the crime of homicide. The Court found that the blow causing death constituted homicide under this article, with no characteristics of murder (article 403) present.
• Article 403, Penal Code — Defines the crime of murder. The Court noted that none of the characteristics of murder were present in the commission of the homicide.
• Article 8, No. 4, Penal Code — Provides for exemption from criminal liability on the ground of self-defense, requiring unlawful aggression as the primal requisite. The Court held this element was absent.
• Article 9, No. 2, Penal Code — Provides the mitigating circumstance of minority (under 18 years of age), requiring in connection with article 85, paragraph 2, the application of the penalty next lower than that prescribed for the offense.
• Article 9, Nos. 3 and 4, Penal Code — Provide the mitigating circumstances of lack of intent to cause so serious a harm and provocation immediately preceding the act, both of which the Court appreciated.
• Article 81, Rule 5, Penal Code — Governs the application of mitigating and aggravating circumstances in imposing penalties; where mitigating circumstances are present and no aggravating circumstance attends, the penalty next lower than that prescribed shall be imposed.
• Article 85, Paragraph 2, Penal Code — Read in connection with article 9, No. 2, requires the penalty next lower to that imposed by article 404 when the accused is under 18 years of age.
• Article 61, Penal Code — Prescribes the accessory penalties attached to the principal penalty, which the Court ordered the accused to suffer.

• Chief Justice Arellano — concurred in the majority opinion.
• Justice Mapa — concurred in the majority opinion.
• Justice Tracey — concurred fully, adding the observation that the laws of America and Spain are in substantial accord as to the requisites of self-defense in homicide cases. He noted that the unqualified doctrine that a person is justified in acting on facts as they appear to him, whether his belief is well founded or not, is not established in the United States; there must be reasonable ground for belief. He cited several American cases (People vs. Johnson, 139 N.Y. 358; People vs. Kerigan, 147 N.Y. 210; People vs. Constantino, 153 N.Y. 24; People vs. Kennedy, 159 N.Y. 346; People vs. Miles, 55 Cal. 209; People vs. Herbert, 61 Cal. 544; People vs. Lynch, 101 Cal. 229; People vs. Hecker, 109 Cal. 451) and federal cases (U.S. vs. Outerbridge, Fed. Case 15978; U.S. vs. Wiltberger, Fed. Case 16738). He observed, however, that Philippine courts had not been disposed to recognize the obligation of retreating to avoid an attack to the extent laid down in American cases (citing U.S. vs. Mack, 8 Phil. Rep. 701; U.S. vs. Grafton, 6 Phil. Rep. 55; U.S. vs. Dimitillo, 7 Phil. Rep. 475). He concluded that the accused was not without fault, his mistaken appreciation of personal danger possibly due to youth and inexperience, for which the law makes liberal allowance in adjusting the penalty.

• Justice Johnson — Dissented, adopting the accused's statement of facts as true and correct. Under the dissent's version, the accused was a 16-year-old boy left alone to maintain order among hundreds of laborers; the deceased, Dio Pito, forced his way into the line, advanced toward the accused with insulting language, and thrust his hand into his pocket; bystanders shouted threats; and the accused had witnessed a prior violent assault by the same gang of laborers, including Dio Pito, two weeks earlier, when knives and bolos were used. The dissent argued that under these facts the defendant should have been discharged, citing the doctrine that a person undertaking self-defense is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him, and that actual danger is not necessary — apparent necessity, if real to the defendant acting without fault or carelessness, is sufficient (citing People vs. Miles, 55 Cal. 209; People vs. Herbert, 61 Cal. 544; Bishop's Criminal Law, sec. 305; Viada, Vol. I, pp. 98, 136; U.S. vs. Dimitillo, 7 Phil. Rep. 475; U.S. vs. Mack, 8 Phil. Rep. 701).

• Justice Carson — Joined Justice Johnson's dissent, adopting the same reasoning and factual findings.

• Justice Willard — Dissented, though no separate written opinion was provided beyond the notation of dissent.