United States vs. Bundal et al.

All members of a conspiracy are equally responsible for the crime committed by the band or party they formed, regardless of the specific role each played in the execution, where they acted by common agreement and with a common purpose. The crime of assassination requires evident premeditation, which is established when the authors convened and held several meetings prior to the commission to discuss the means and manner of executing the crime.

The accused were inhabitants of the northern part of the island of Cagayancillo, while Marcos Buncag, the victim, had held the offices of gobernadorcillo and municipal captain under the Spanish regime for twenty successive years, and was the presidente municipal under the American regime. The accused claimed to be victims of outrages, abuses, and illegal executions committed by Buncag, and hatred and vengeance were the motives for the crime. The case arose during the period of the Philippine revolutions, and the defendants sought the benefits of the amnesty proclamation issued by the President of the United States on July 4, 1902.

On the night of April 14, 1902, at about 7 o'clock, Tomas Mamega and Ignacio Bundal entered the house of Marcos Buncag, municipal president of the pueblo of Cagayancillo, under the pretext of buying aniseed wine, while fourteen of their companions remained outside, some in the street and others in hiding close to the staircase. Buncag went down to the bodega where the wine was kept, accompanied by Antonio Trinidad, who carried a lighted lamp. As Buncag handed the bottle to Mamega and replied that the wine cost 1 real, Mamega struck Buncag with a bolo, inflicting a serious wound on the left cheek and jaw. Buncag, crying out "I am done for," ran into the street, where Santiago Madiong pursued him and struck him on the neck, causing him to fall in the middle of the street, after which the other defendants threw themselves on the victim and inflicted innumerable wounds from head to foot.

The killing was the result of a conspiracy hatched during several meetings held in Bundal's storehouse in the barrio of Jilaga during the four days preceding the crime. On the Thursday before the murder, Bundal called a meeting attended by Dionisio Conde, Pedro Elijan, Santiago Madiong, and Domingo Cardeño, to consider grievances against President Buncag. Further meetings were held on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, at which the conspirators agreed to kill Buncag on Monday night, with Bundal and Tomas to call on the deceased under the pretext of buying wine, Tomas to strike the first blow, and the others to stay near the premises ready to fight. They bound themselves not to run away, and agreed that anyone attempting to flee would be attacked by his companions.

While the attack on Buncag was taking place, Ignacio Bundal reentered the house and, seeing Ciriaco Garrion, the municipal secretary, trying to escape, attacked him with a bolo, inflicting a wound on the left shoulder and neck, in consequence of which Garrion died nine days later. After the murders, the wife and family of the president fled, and the premises were abandoned to the criminals, some of whom kept watch for nine days. The conspirators went about the town informing people of the president's death, defying those who resented it, and inviting all to view the corpse in the municipal building, where they asked whether the people approved of what had been done.

On the morning of April 15, a party commanded by Bundal overpowered the townspeople and induced them through fear to attend meetings in the municipal building, where it was resolved that the vice-president should replace the deceased and address a false report to the governor stating that the town had been attacked by unknown bandits. The report was signed by Vice-President Francisco Magbanua in obedience to the demand of Bundal and his followers. No robbery was committed in the house or the municipal building; the premises and the municipal treasury funds were turned over intact. The accused pleaded not guilty, except for Bundal, Mamega, Madiong, and Conde, who pleaded guilty to the murder of Buncag, though Bundal denied guilt for the killing of Garrion, alleging he had wounded him involuntarily.

• Amnesty Coverage: The defendants petitioned to be included among those to whom amnesty was given by the proclamation of the President issued July 4, 1902, arguing that the crime was political in nature.
• Involuntary Wounding: Ignacio Bundal alleged that he had wounded Ciriaco Garrion involuntarily, denying guilt for the killing.

• Criminal Liability: The prosecution maintained that all sixteen accused were guilty of assassination, having conspired to kill President Buncag and having carried out the plan with evident premeditation.
• Rejection of Amnesty: The prosecution argued that the crime was not a political offense covered by the amnesty proclamation, as it did not appear that the residents seconded any revolution or that the hatred arose from political motives connected with the past insurrection.

• Characterization of the Crime: Whether the killing of President Marcos Buncag constituted assassination under article 403 of the Penal Code.
• Conspiracy and Liability: Whether all sixteen accused, including those who did not directly strike the victim, were equally liable as principals in the crime.
• Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances: Whether the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, deceit, and the mitigating circumstance of ignorance should be considered in determining the penalty.
• Applicability of Amnesty: Whether the crime was a political offense covered by the amnesty proclamation of July 4, 1902.
• Liability of Francisco Magbanua: Whether the vice-president, who signed a false report under threat and intimidation, was criminally liable as an accessory.

• Characterization of the Crime: Yes. The violent death of President Buncag constituted assassination because it was concerted, meditated, and prepared by the authors, who convened and held several meetings during the four days preceding the crime, establishing the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation.
• Conspiracy and Liability: Yes. All sixteen accused were equally responsible for the murder, as they acted by common agreement with the common purpose of killing Buncag, and the crime must be regarded as the act of the band or party they created.
• Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances: The aggravating circumstances of nighttime (No. 8), deceit (No. 15), and the circumstance of the crime being committed by an uprising (No. 20) under article 10 of the Penal Code concurred, but were compensated by the mitigating circumstance of ignorance under article 11, resulting in the medium degree of the penalty.
• Applicability of Amnesty: No. The crime was not a political offense covered by the amnesty of July 4, 1902, as it did not appear that the residents seconded a revolution or that the hatred arose from political motives connected with the past insurrection.
• Liability of Francisco Magbanua: No. Magbanua was not criminally liable because he acted under the impulse of insuperable fear of a greater evil, consisting of the serious and imminent threats and intimidations made by Bundal and his followers.

• Characterization of the Crime: The Court found that the killing of Buncag was fully proven and constituted assassination because it was concerted, meditated, and prepared by the authors, who held several meetings during the four days preceding the commission of the crime to discuss the means and manner of executing it. The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, which characterizes murder under article 403 of the Penal Code, was therefore present. The killing of Garrion was likewise assassination, as he was wounded in the back by treachery and by unexpected and sudden attack, though that crime was not the subject of the present decision.

• Conspiracy and Liability: The Court applied article 13 of the Penal Code, which defines principals as those who take direct part in the execution of the crime, those who compel or induce others to execute it, and those who cooperate by acts without which the crime could not have been committed. Bundal, although he did not take material part in the murder, was the author by direct inducement, having conceived the crime, convened the meetings, presided over them, and led the conspirators during and after the execution. The other fifteen defendants were equally liable because, although only two entered the house and only four actually attacked the victim, all sixteen conspirators, impelled by the same motive, were prepared to commit the crime or cooperate in its commission. The Court cited the judgment of the supreme court of Spain of September 29, 1883, Bishop's New Criminal Law, and the ruling in United States vs. Pedro Teodoro for the proposition that the crime must be regarded as the act of the band, with all members equally responsible.

• Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances: The Court found that the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, deceit, and the crime being committed by an uprising concurred, as the accused took advantage of darkness, used a false pretext to attack the deceased unawares, and committed the murder by means of sedition or an uprising. However, these were compensated by the mitigating circumstance of the personal conditions of race and ignorance of the accused under article 11. The Court gave great weight to this circumstance because the accused were impelled by hatred and ill will toward the victim due to abuses committed during nearly twenty years, and their ignorance and lack of means for obtaining justice led them to resort to violence. The sixteen defendants were therefore condemned to the medium degree of the penalty prescribed in article 403.

• Applicability of Amnesty: The Court held that although the assault affected public order and the principle of authority and was of a political character in a general sense, it was not a political offense covered by the amnesty of July 4, 1902. The defendants acted under provocation of abusive acts by Buncag, but it did not appear that the residents seconded a revolution against the Government of Spain or took part in resistance against the sovereignty of the United States, nor that the hatred arose from political motives or strife connected with the past revolution. The crime therefore did not fall within the letter or spirit of the proclamation, especially paragraph 3 thereof.

• Liability of Francisco Magbanua: The Court found that Magbanua acted under the impulse of insuperable fear of a greater evil when he signed the minutes and the false report, given the serious and imminent threats and intimidations made by Bundal and his followers, which caused even the sons of the deceased to submit. The Court noted, however, that Magbanua allowed considerable time to pass without rectifying the false report and issued a passport to Bundal, facts which might warrant prosecution for other offenses not charged in the information.

• Conspiracy — Equal Liability of All Conspirators — When a crime is committed by a band or party acting by common agreement and with a common purpose, the crime must be regarded as the act of the band, and all members are equally responsible, regardless of the specific role each played in the execution. The Court applied this doctrine to hold all sixteen accused equally liable for the murder of Buncag, even though only two entered the house and only four actually attacked the victim, because all were prepared to commit the crime or cooperate in its commission.

• Evident Premeditation — The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation exists when the commission of a crime is concerted, meditated, and prepared by the authors, who convene and hold meetings prior to the commission to discuss the means and manner of executing it. The Court found this circumstance present because the conspirators held several meetings during the four days preceding the crime to plan the killing.

• Insuperable Fear as Exempting Circumstance — A person who acts under the impulse of insuperable fear of a greater evil is not criminally liable. The Court applied this doctrine to acquit Magbanua, who signed a false report under serious and imminent threats and intimidations that caused even the sons of the deceased to submit.

• "The violent death of President Marcos Buncag has been fully proven in this case and constitutes the crime of assassination, because prior to its execution it was concerted, meditated, and prepared by the authors, who to that end convened and held several meetings during the four days preceding that of the commission of the crime." — This passage establishes the Court's finding that the killing constituted assassination due to evident premeditation, the central holding of the case.

• "It is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each without taking into consideration the close and inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the commission of which they all acted by common agreement, their common purpose being the murder of Marcos Buncag. The crime must, therefore, in view of the solidarity of act and intent which existed between the sixteen accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally responsible for the murder in question." — This passage articulates the doctrine of equal liability of all conspirators, the most significant legal principle established in the case.

• "It would, therefore, be error to hold that the defendants are covered by the amnesty." — This passage states the Court's conclusion that the crime was not a political offense covered by the amnesty proclamation of July 4, 1902.

• United States vs. Pedro Teodoro — Cited as a ruling of this court supporting the doctrine that a crime committed by a band or party is the act of all its members, who are equally responsible. The citation is noted as unpublished.

• Judgment of the Supreme Court of Spain, September 29, 1883 — Cited as establishing a doctrine similar to the American rule on the equal liability of conspirators, relied upon by the Court in holding all sixteen accused equally responsible.

• Bishop, New Criminal Law, vol. 1, par. 630, and vol. 2, par. 629 — Cited as authority for the American rule on the liability of all members of a conspiracy, supporting the Court's conclusion that the crime must be regarded as the act of the band.

• Article 403, Penal Code — The provision defining and punishing the crime of assassination. The Court applied this provision in finding that the killing of Buncag constituted assassination due to evident premeditation, and in determining the penalty of cadena perpetua for the sixteen accused.

• Article 13, Penal Code — The provision defining principals in a crime. The Court applied this provision in determining that Bundal was the author by direct inducement and that the other fifteen accused were principals who took direct part in the execution or cooperated in the commission of the crime.

• Article 10, Nos. 8, 15, and 20, Penal Code — The provisions defining the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, deceit, and the crime being committed by an uprising. The Court found these circumstances concurred in the commission of the crime.

• Article 11, Penal Code — The provision establishing the mitigating circumstance of the personal conditions of race and ignorance of the accused. The Court applied this provision to compensate the three aggravating circumstances, resulting in the medium degree of the penalty.

• Section 11, General Orders, No. 58 — The provision pursuant to which the trial court set aside the proceedings as regards the assassination of Garrion, as this crime should be the object of another information and a separate trial.

• Amnesty Proclamation of July 4, 1902 — The presidential proclamation granting amnesty for political offenses. The Court held that the crime committed by the defendants was not a political offense covered by the proclamation, particularly paragraph 3 thereof.

Arellano, C.J., Cooper, Willard, Mapa and Johnson, JJ., concurred.

• Justice McDonough — Dissented on the ground that the object of the uprising and the killing of the president was of a political nature. The people of the town were divided into two parties, one supporting the president and his policy, the other against him, claiming he had oppressed and wronged the people. The motive of the accused was not robbery or personal revenge, but rather to rid the people of what they deemed the tyranny of an obnoxious official, as evidenced by their guarding the treasure of the town and the house of the deceased and turning them over intact. Justice McDonough opined that the defendants were entitled to the benefits of the amnesty proclamation of July 4, 1902, which granted pardon for all offenses political in their character that resulted from internal political feuds or dissensions among the Filipinos during the insurrections, and that the crime grew out of such political feuds or dissensions.