United States vs. Baluyot

A killing committed by sudden attack on an unarmed victim unable to defend himself, consummated by shooting through a closed door behind which the victim had fled for refuge, is murder qualified by treachery (alevosia). The means deliberately chosen insured execution without risk from any defense the victim could make, both at inception and at consummation, warranting the penalty for murder in its maximum degree when attended by the generic aggravating circumstance of commission where public authority was engaged in duty.

Conrado Lerma and Jose I. Baluyot were rival candidates for governor of Bataan at the general election of June 6, 1916, in which Lerma won and Baluyot finished third, engendering lasting personal rancor in Baluyot. Baluyot attributed to Lerma's machinations his 1918 prosecution for estafa in the Court of First Instance of Manila over a Philippine National Bank loan, then pending decision, and his being asked to resign as captain in the National Guard and being temporarily relieved pending investigation.

On August 2, 1918, Baluyot left Manila for Orion, Bataan, carrying a revolver. Early the next morning he shipped his wife's piano from Orion to Manila, then at 8 a.m. proceeded to Balanga, arriving at the recorder's office in the provincial building at about 9 a.m. where he inquired for Governor Lerma. Told the governor had not arrived but was expected, he waited in the recorder's office, which served as anteroom to the governor's office. While waiting he observed Paulo Venegas, a provincial jail guard, emerge from the governor's office with an unloaded revolver and cartridges to have it cleaned, from which he could infer the office would be without that weapon.

At about 11 a.m. Lerma arrived and the two greeted each other in a friendly manner by shaking hands. Upon being informed Baluyot sought a conference, Lerma invited him into his office first, ahead of another caller, Antonino Aranjuez. After remaining alone 3 or 4 minutes, Lerma asked Baluyot to withdraw briefly so he could confer with Aranjuez about the latter's appointment as chief of police of Limay. Baluyot withdrew, told Aranjuez the governor wished to see him, and upon Aranjuez's exit reentered the governor's office, where Lerma sat behind his desk in an ordinary chair hemmed in by the desk in a corner, walls, and a small book stand.

Within seconds of reaching a position directly in front of the desk, after speaking words heard indistinctly in the recorder's office as a reference to the governor's revolver, Baluyot drew his weapon and fired. According to Baluyot the exchange concerned the calibre of their revolvers and a warning to prepare because one must die, but the interval was scarcely more than sufficient to reach the desk. The first bullet entered the frontal region of the right shoulder blade, passed through the body and the back of the chair, struck the office wall and rebounded to the floor, indicating a somewhat downward direction at a reclining victim. Lerma arose and fled to his left toward a passageway into a corridor, the only convenient escape. After clearing the desk by a few feet, with Baluyot turning and advancing, Baluyot fired a second shot striking the right shoulder blade an inch or two from the first wound, witnessed by Aranjuez from beside a screen near the door. Lerma continued down the corridor, bypassed the recorder's office to avoid open exposure, and took refuge in a closet at the end, shutting the door and bracing it against entry.

Thereafter Lerma called aloud for help, Baluyot judged the position of his head from the sound, and fired through the panel of the door. The bullet struck the forward part of the head near and above the right temple, passed downward and out through the left eye, loosening the eyeball. The wound was necessarily fatal though not instant; consciousness was lost at once, the door was then opened without resistance as the body pitched forward and fell prone, and death ensued in about two or three hours. Immediately afterward Baluyot went to a window overlooking the public square, called to an approaching Constabulary squad to come up, threw his revolver to the ground with three empty and other undischarged shells, and surrendered without resistance upon their arrival.

• Mitigation – Passion and Lesser Intent: Petitioner maintained that the killing was committed under an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation, and that he had no intention to commit so great a wrong as that committed, relying on his account of insulting words about his estafa conviction and cheating in Cebu and on his claim that the third shot was accidental while pushing the closet door.
• Continuance – Opportunity to Defend: Petitioner argued that ample opportunity to defend was denied when the last request for continuance was refused and the case was tried on August 16, seeking reversal or new trial.
• Disqualification of Judge: Petitioner argued that Hon. Carlos Imperial was biased and could not try the case with rectitude and impartiality because he had attended Lerma's funeral obsequies marked by public grief and sympathy.
• Withdrawal of Plea for Demurrer: Petitioner argued that refusal to allow withdrawal of the not-guilty plea to file a demurrer to the information was erroneous.
• Production of Fiscal's Statements: Petitioner argued that the provincial fiscal should have been compelled to produce written statements made by Pedro Gonzales, Gregorio de Guzman and Antonio Aranjuez in the fiscal's preliminary inquiry for use by the defense.
• Failure to Hear Assessors: Petitioner argued that decision without hearing the two assessors appointed at his request vitiated the proceedings.

• Complex of Murder and Assault on Authority: Respondent countered that the same act resulted in two crimes, murder and assault upon a person in authority while exercising duties of office, so that under Article 89 of the Penal Code the penalty for murder should be imposed in its maximum degree.
• Speedy Trial and Production: Respondent opposed further postponement after the Aug. 15 setting and objected to production of the fiscal's investigation papers on the ground that one party cannot be compelled to produce evidence in favor of the other.

• Treachery – Initial Attack: Whether treachery qualified the killing where access was gained by pretext of friendly interview and the unarmed seated governor was shot within seconds of reentry.
• Treachery – Consummating Shot: Whether treachery was present in the fatal third shot fired through the closed closet door at a victim unable to see or resist.
• Aggravation – Place of Public Authority: Whether the generic aggravating circumstance of commission where public authority was engaged in discharge of duty attended the offense.
• Premeditation: Whether evident premeditation characterized the offense in light of prior threats, remarks, and conduct.
• Mitigation – Passion and Praeter Intentionem: Whether passion and obfuscation and lack of intent to commit so great a wrong mitigated liability.
• Complex Crime: Whether the single act constituted both murder and assault upon a person in authority under Article 89.
• Continuance: Whether denial of further continuance deprived the accused of ample opportunity to defend.
• Judicial Disqualification: Whether attendance at the victim's funeral disqualified the trial judge.
• Plea Withdrawal and Demurrer: Whether refusal to permit withdrawal of not-guilty plea to file demurrer was error.
• Fiscal's Papers and Impeachment: Whether the fiscal's administrative investigation statements were compellable without laying a predicate for contradiction.
• Assessors: Whether failure to record consultation with assessors invalidated the decision.

• Treachery – Initial Attack: Yes. Treachery qualified the killing, the means deliberately selected insuring execution without risk from any defense by the unarmed, seated, cornered victim taken off guard.
• Treachery – Consummating Shot: Yes. Treachery patently attended the third shot, the victim behind a closed door being unable to see or defend, as if bound, blindfolded, or attacked from behind in darkness.
• Aggravation – Place of Public Authority: Yes. The offense was aggravated as committed where public authority was engaged in discharge of duty, indistinguishable from United States vs. Gil.
• Premeditation: No express finding made. The evidence tended to support premeditation, but benefit of possible doubt was conceded as unnecessary to disposition.
• Mitigation – Passion and Praeter Intentionem: No. Neither mitigating circumstance was present, the alleged provoking conversation being disproved by timing and improbability and the accidental-discharge claim being refuted by admission and circumstances.
• Complex Crime: Yes. The same act perpetrated both murder and assault upon a person in authority exercising office, supplying an additional basis for murder in its maximum degree under Article 89.
• Continuance: No. No prejudice was shown, no affidavit of unpreparedness or showing of needed witnesses was made, and competent counsel tried the case.
• Judicial Disqualification: No. No actual bias was shown and the ground was not among the exclusive disqualifications in Section 8 of Act No. 190.
• Plea Withdrawal and Demurrer: No. The information was sufficient, no demurrer ground was disclosed, the motion was dilatory, and the ruling was within discretion absent abuse.
• Fiscal's Papers and Impeachment: No. The Section 1687 administrative statements were privileged prosecution work product, not Section 13 General Orders No. 58 depositions, and no predicate for contradiction was laid on cross-examination.
• Assessors: No. The functions were purely advisory, consultation is presumed in silence of the record, and the assessors later certified concurrence.

• Treachery – Initial Attack: The rule applied requires means, methods or forms tending directly and specially to insure execution without risk from the defense the victim might make. Applied here, entry on pretext of friendly interview, prior withdrawal for Aranjuez calculated to put the governor off guard, knowledge from the removed revolver that Lerma would likely be unarmed, and firing within seconds at a reclining, unarmed man hemmed in by desk, walls and bookstand left no effectual defense against a revolver, satisfying treachery at inception.
• Treachery – Consummating Shot: Even if inception had been free of treachery, fatal consummation on a helpless victim suffices under repeated holdings. Here the entire assault was continuous, the second shot being fired at a fleeing unarmed man seeking safety, and the third through a closed door deprived the victim of sight and defense, directly insuring death without risk to the assailant.
• Aggravation – Place of Public Authority: Subsection 19, Article 10 punishes commission where public authority is engaged in discharge of duty. The governor was killed in his office in the provincial building while receiving callers on official business, materially identical to the provincial building killing in United States vs. Gil.
• Premeditation: Known premeditation requires determination formed long enough for cool reflection, with execution left to suitable opportunity, without prefiguring every detail. The July 14 statement to Pedro Magajes that Lerma would pay, the August remark to Domingo Lintag suggesting a last handshake, fixation on Lerma as author of Bilibid rumors and misfortunes, unexplained travel to Balanga, and gratified post-crime demeanor tended to show such resolution formed days before and probably entertained on the morning of August 3 and fixed when Lerma was found unarmed, though no express finding was made.
• Mitigation – Passion and Praeter Intentionem: Passion requires powerful impulse naturally producing obfuscation, and praeter intentionem requires absence of intent for the greater wrong. The lengthy dialogue alleged by Baluyot could not have occurred in the 9-10 seconds before the first shot established by Gonzales, Aranjuez and De Guzman; Lerma could not have known of a Manila judgment not yet pronounced in Baluyot's presence under Section 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; and the accidental third-shot claim was contradicted by Baluyot's August 5 admission to reporter Eusebio Reyes that he judged Lerma's seated position from cries and fired directionally.
• Complex Crime: Article 249 defines a provincial governor as an authority, and Article 89 imposes the penalty for the more serious crime in its maximum degree when one act constitutes two crimes. The homicidal act simultaneously attacked Lerma as person in authority exercising office as charged, mandating murder in its maximum degree, i.e., death as imposed below.
• Continuance: Refusal is reversible only on shown prejudice and ordinarily requires affidavit of specific unpreparedness and diligent exertion. From August 3 information before the justice of the peace, August 9 arraignment with counsel Banzon, setting first to the 15th on defense request then to the 16th for Sotto, continuous representation, mere protest by telegram without statement of need, no request to subpoena witnesses despite invitation, and no showing even on appeal of essential absent witnesses, no prejudice appeared, unlike United States vs. Lao Chueco where subpoena opportunity was denied.
• Judicial Disqualification: Disqualification under Section 8, Act No. 190 is exclusive, as construed in Perfecto vs. Contreras and Joaquin vs. Barretto where even extreme delicacy did not disqualify. Mere attendance at funeral obsequies without proof of actual bias, unborne out by the record, falls outside the enumeration.
• Plea Withdrawal and Demurrer: Leave to withdraw a plea to demur is largely discretionary and unreviewable absent abuse. Without disclosure of demurrer grounds and with a sufficient information, denial as dilatory was proper.
• Fiscal's Papers and Impeachment: Statements taken by the fiscal under Section 1687 of the Administrative Code for prosecutorial use are administrative and privileged, unlike Section 13, General Orders No. 58 examinations before the committing magistrate attached to the expediente, here waived. Contradictory statements are admissible for impeachment only after laying a predicate on cross-examination by confronting the witness with the alleged discrepancy and, on denial and due notice and refusal to produce, proving contents secondarily; random angling without affidavit of material variance does not compel production, though the court retains power to order it in interests of justice on proper showing.
• Assessors: Under Sections 153-161, Act No. 190 as extended by Act No. 2369, assessors are advisory only, responsibility resting exclusively with the judge, with opinions recorded only when two or more deem factual findings wrong. Proper performance and agreement are presumed, here confirmed by later certifications that the assessors read and concurred in the findings.

• Treachery (alevosia) as qualifying circumstance — Treachery exists when means, methods or forms in execution tend directly and specially to insure execution without risk to the offender from the defense the victim might make. Applied to find murder where an unarmed governor was shot at close range while seated and cornered after a friendly pretext, and finally shot through a closed closet door where sight and defense were impossible.
• Continuing assault and treachery at consummation — Even though the beginning of an attack resulting in death is free from treachery, treachery will be found present if at the time the fatal blow is struck the deceased is helpless and unable to defend himself. Applied to hold the third shot through the closet door treacherous and to treat the three shots as one continuous assault.
• Known premeditation — Known premeditation does not require prefiguring all details or the exact moment; it is enough that determination to take life was formed for a period sufficient for cool reflection on character and consequences, execution being left to suitable opportunity of chance or design. The evidence was deemed to tend toward this element, though expressly left undecided with benefit of doubt to the accused.
• Laying a predicate for impeachment by prior contradictory statements — A witness must on cross-examination be confronted with the alleged prior statement and asked if it was made or differed from trial testimony; admission gives benefit with opportunity to explain, denial permits proof of the statement and, on due notice and refusal to produce, secondary evidence. Applied to reject compulsion of the fiscal's Section 1687 statements where no predicate was laid and only random discovery was sought.
• Disqualification of judges is statutory and exclusive — Section 8, Act No. 190 expressly enumerates disqualifications, excluding others; extreme delicacy is not a ground. Applied to reject bias based solely on attendance at the victim's funeral, following Perfecto vs. Contreras and Joaquin vs. Barretto.
• Function of assessors — Assessors under Act No. 190 are purely advisory; decision responsibility rests exclusively with the judge and consultation is presumed absent contrary showing. Applied to sustain judgment despite absence of recorded consultation, corroborated by subsequent concurrence certifications.
• Continuance for want of preparation — Prejudice must be shown, ordinarily by affidavit of specific unreadiness and diligent exertion or good reason for its absence. Applied to sustain trial on August 16 where only a bare protest was noted and no needed witnesses were identified, distinguishing United States vs. Lao Chueco.

• "It was as if the victim had been bound or blindfolded, or had been treacherously attacked from behind in a path obscured by the darkness of night." — Characterizes the fatal third shot through the closed closet door as patently treacherous because defense and perception were impossible.
• "This court has held repeatedly that, even though the beginning of an attack resulting in the death of the deceased is free from treachery of any sort, nevertheless it will be found present if, at the time the fatal blow is struck, the deceased is helpless and unable to defend himself." — States the rule, quoted from United States vs. Elicanal, justifying murder even if only consummation was treacherous.
• "It is enough that the determination to take life should have been formed for a period sufficiently long to allow the actor time to reflect coolly upon the character and the consequences of the act, the accomplishment of the crime being left to some suitable opportunity such as chance or design may present." — Defines the temporal and reflective minimum for known premeditation.
• "Where a continuance is sought on the ground of want of preparation, an affidavit should ordinarily be filed showing in what respect the applicant is not ready and that he has made reasonable exertions to prepare for trial without success, or some good reasons for not making such exertions." — States the procedural requirement whose absence defeated the claim of denial of opportunity to defend.

• United States vs. Gil, 13 Phil. Rep., 530 — Controlling precedent for both treachery in a governor's office killing and the generic aggravation of commission where public authority was engaged in duty; followed as markedly similar.
• United States vs. Elicanal, 35 Phil. Rep., 209 — Controlling precedent for treachery at consummation despite treachery-free inception; followed through Justice Moreland's formulation on helplessness at the fatal blow.
• United States vs. Lao Chueco, 37 Phil. Rep., 53 — Precedent ordering new trial where accused was deprived of subpoenaing witnesses; distinguished because no witness was identified or sought here.
• Perfecto vs. Contreras, 28 Phil. Rep., 538 — Precedent that Section 8, Act No. 190 enumeration is exclusive; followed to reject non-statutory disqualification.
• Joaquin vs. Barretto, 25 Phil. Rep., 281 — Precedent that extreme delicacy does not disqualify; followed by analogy from civil to criminal in absence of Code of Criminal Procedure provision.

• Subsection 19, Article 10, Penal Code — Generic aggravating circumstance that offense was committed where public authority was engaged in discharge of duty; applied because the governor was killed in his office while transacting official interviews.
• Subsection 7, Article 9, Penal Code — Mitigating circumstance of powerful impulse naturally producing passion and obfuscation; held inapplicable as the alleged insulting dialogue was disproved and insufficient.
• Subsection 3, Article 9, Penal Code — Mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so great a wrong; held inapplicable as the aimed third shot was intentional, not accidental.
• Article 403, Penal Code — Defines murder by qualifying circumstances including treachery; applied to qualify the killing as murder.
• Article 89, Penal Code — Penalty for complex crime where one act constitutes two crimes is that for the more serious in maximum degree; applied to impose murder in maximum where murder concurred with assault on authority.
• Article 249, Penal Code — Defines persons in authority including provincial governor; applied to establish assault on authority as second crime.
• Article 54, Penal Code — Accessory penalties of cadena perpetua; imposed upon reduction of death penalty.
• Section 8, Act No. 190 — Exclusive enumeration of judicial disqualifications; applied to reject funeral-attendance bias claim.
• Sections 153-161, Act No. 190, as extended by Act No. 2369 — Appointment and advisory role of assessors in criminal cases; applied to sustain judgment without recorded consultation.
• Section 1687, Administrative Code — Authorizes fiscal's administrative investigation for prosecution, not as justice of the peace; applied to hold statements privileged prosecution file.
• Section 13, General Orders No. 58 — Sworn declarations before committing magistrate attached to expediente; held inapplicable because preliminary examination was waived.
• Section 41, Code of Criminal Procedure — Sentence in such prosecution must be pronounced in presence of condemned; used to discredit claim Lerma knew of Manila estafa judgment unknown to Baluyot.
• Act No. 2726, Philippine Legislature — Requires unanimity for death penalty; applied to reduce death to cadena perpetua where one Justice dissented on death penalty.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Avanceña, JJ., concur. Moir, J., voted with the majority for affirmance but was absent at promulgation so his name does not appear signed. Malcolm, J., was not present at argument and took no part.

• Araullo, J. — Dissented on qualification and penalty, maintaining the death of Governor Lerma was homicide, not murder, for want of proof beyond reasonable doubt of treachery throughout the continuous assault. The dissent stressed inconsistencies among Gonzales, Aranjuez and De Guzman on timing and words before the first shot, the warning to defend and opportunity to use a brass knuckle and cris on the governor's desk and bookcase, absence of proven premeditation, inapplicability of United States vs. Gil for lack of dying declaration and of United States vs. Elicanal which involved bound victims, and applicability of United States vs. Balagtas and Jaime and Spanish doctrine that treachery must embrace the entire assault; the proper penalty was thus reclusion temporal in medium of maximum, or in maximum under Article 89 if assault on authority concurred.