United States vs. Aviado

A peace officer who kills a person lawfully arrested, in order to defend a companion officer whom the prisoner is actively attacking, is exempt from criminal liability under Article 8, paragraph 6 of the Penal Code, provided that unlawful aggression exists, the means employed are reasonably necessary, and the defender is not actuated by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.

Sabino Aviado was an officially appointed agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue stationed in Dagupan, Pangasinan. Under the Administrative Code of 1917, internal-revenue agents possessed authority to make arrests and seizures for violations of penal laws or regulations administered by the Bureau, including the suppression of unlicensed distilleries. The case arose from the performance of that official duty.

Sabino Aviado, a 29-year-old married man residing in Dagupan, Pangasinan, was an officially appointed agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. At about ten o'clock on the night of March 15, he received information from a spy that certain persons in Alitaya were distilling vino without a license. He proceeded with his companions—Rufino S. Cruz, Fernando Soriano, and Juan Canlas—first by carromata toward Santa Barbara and then on foot to the distillery. Upon arriving approximately fifty meters from the site, Aviado divided his force, directing three men along one side of a canal while he and two companions went directly to the distillery.

Aviado entered the distillery with Cruz and Fernando Soriano and found six persons inside, including Leoncio Cariño and Juan Soriano. He immediately seized Juan Soriano, while Cariño fled and was pursued. Holding Soriano by the front of his camisa, Aviado announced in Spanish that he was an internal-revenue agent and was placing him under arrest. Soriano responded in Pangasinan, which Aviado did not understand, so Aviado called Fernando Soriano to interpret. Fernando relayed that Soriano promised to do nothing wrong, and Aviado instructed Fernando to ask Soriano whether he acknowledged his offense of operating the distillery without a license.

As Aviado released Soriano, Soriano raised his bolo overhead and struck Aviado on the left forearm, leaving an oblique scar near the elbow. Soriano fled, and Aviado and Fernando Soriano gave chase. Aviado, running faster, overtook Fernando and heard Juan Canlas call out, "Who is this?" Aviado then saw Soriano raise his bolo-bearing hand to strike Canlas. Soriano had already delivered one blow, which Canlas warded off, and was attacking a second time. To save Canlas's life, Aviado pushed Fernando aside, ran toward Soriano, and fired a shot. Only afterward, when Canlas told him, did Aviado learn that he had wounded Soriano.

The record contained three conflicting accounts: a purported dying declaration of the deceased reduced to a memorandum by the justice of the peace, the testimony of prosecution witness Cariño (the owner of the illicit still), and the testimony of the accused. The Court found the dying declaration of doubtful genuineness and Cariño's testimony "absolutely unworthy of belief," while the accused's account was corroborated in all essential features by at least two other witnesses and in many details by the prosecution's own witnesses. The Court accepted the accused's testimony as disclosing the true facts.

• Justification of Homicide: Whether a peace officer (an internal-revenue agent) is justified in killing an escaping prisoner in order to protect another peace officer whom the prisoner is attacking.

• Justification of Homicide: Yes. The homicide was justifiable as defense of a stranger under Article 8, paragraph 6 of the Penal Code, all requisites being present: unlawful aggression by the deceased, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and absence of any evil motive on the part of the accused.

• Justification of Homicide: The Administrative Code of 1917 (Section 1434) vested internal-revenue agents with authority to make arrests and seizures for violations of penal laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and Section 2722 in connection with Section 1464(a) penalized the operation of a distillery without a license. It was therefore the accused's official duty to suppress the illicit distillery and arrest those responsible. The common-law rule permits a person to take life not only in self-defense but in defense of another, even a stranger; what one may do in his own defense, another may do for him. This principle was recognized in In re Neagle (135 U.S. 1 [1889]), where a deputy marshal was justified in killing an assailant to protect a Justice of the United States Supreme Court. Under Article 8, paragraph 6 of the Penal Code, a person acting in defense of the person or rights of a stranger is exempt from criminal liability, provided the first and second circumstances of paragraph 4 are present—namely, unlawful aggression and reasonable necessity of the means employed—and the defender is not actuated by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive. The Court found no intimation of any evil motive; unlawful aggression was present in Soriano's bolo attack on Canlas; and the means employed—firing a shot to stop a second bolo strike—was reasonably necessary. The Court relied on The United States vs. Salazar and Villanueva (15 Phil. 315 [1910]), where two officers who shot a notorious criminal attempting to seize their revolver were acquitted, the shooting being justifiable because no other means of self-protection existed. Given the imminence of the danger to Canlas, the accused did what any person would do under the circumstances, and the homicide was justifiable.

• Defense of a Stranger — Under Article 8, paragraph 6 of the Penal Code, a person who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger is exempt from criminal liability, provided that (1) unlawful aggression exists on the part of the person attacked (the first circumstance of paragraph 4), (2) there is reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression (the second circumstance of paragraph 4), and (3) the person defending is not actuated by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive. The doctrine rests on the principle that what one may do in his own defense, another may do for him; persons acting in defense of others stand on the same plane as those acting in defense of themselves. The Court applied this doctrine to a peace officer who killed an arrested person attacking a fellow officer, finding all three requisites present.

• "Whether a peace officer (an-internal revenue agent) is justified in killing an escaping prisoner in order to protect another peace officer, whom the prisoner is attacking." — This is the Court's formulation of the legal issue, framing the case as one of first impression on the scope of a peace officer's justifying authority in defense of a companion.

• "The rule then is that what one may do in his own defense, another may do for him. In other words, persons acting in defense of others are in the same condition and upon the same plane as those who act in defense of themselves." — This passage articulates the doctrinal foundation equating defense of others with self-defense, the ratio decidendi underlying the acquittal.

• "If in a faithful attempt to perform the duty explicitly imposed by law, the internal-revenue agent was under the necessity of killing a person arrested in order to defend the person of a companion, the homicide was justifiable." — This statement ties the justifying circumstance to the officer's lawful performance of official duty, defining the operative standard for peace officers.

• In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1889) — Cited as the historic and sensational American authority establishing that a law officer may justifiably take the life of an assailant to protect another person in imminent danger of death. The Court relied on it to support the common-law principle that defense of others is coextensive with self-defense.

• The United States vs. Salazar and Villanueva, 15 Phil. 315 (1910) — Cited as controlling Philippine precedent directly in point. Two officers who shot a prisoner attempting to seize their revolver were acquitted, the shooting being justifiable because no other means of protection existed. The Court applied the same reasoning to Aviado's situation.

• Section 1434, Administrative Code of 1917 — Confers on internal-revenue agents the authority to make arrests and seizures for violations of any penal law or regulation administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, establishing the lawful basis for Aviado's arrest of Soriano.

• Sections 2722 and 1464(a), Administrative Code of 1917 — Provide the penalty for persons who operate a distillery without a license, confirming that Soriano's activity was a penal offense that Aviado had a duty to suppress.

• Article 8, paragraph 6, Penal Code — Exempts from criminal liability anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided the first and second circumstances of paragraph 4 (unlawful aggression and reasonable necessity of the means employed) are present and the defender is not actuated by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive. This was the decisive provision under which the Court acquitted the accused.

• Article 8, paragraph 4, Penal Code — Defines the circumstances of legitimate self-defense—unlawful aggression and reasonable necessity of the means employed—which are incorporated by reference into paragraph 6 for defense of a stranger.

Arellano, C.J.; Torres, J.; Carson, J.; Araullo, J.; Street, J.; Avanceña, J.; Fisher, J.