United States vs. Antonio Navarro

Qualifying and aggravating circumstances, such as treachery and known premeditation, must be proven during trial with the same certainty and clearness as the criminal act itself; where the evidence admits only of deductions and no certain conclusion can be arrived at, such circumstances cannot be considered. The acceptance of a mutual fight excludes self-defense, and the crime is homicide when death results from a wound inflicted by another, regardless of whether death was the precise consequence of the injury.

The accused Antonio Navarro and the deceased Ricardo Garces were two men who, after an altercation in a bar or saloon of the Paz Theater in the district of Binondo, Manila, agreed to fight each other in another place. The case arose under the Penal Code as applied in the Philippines, with the Court drawing heavily on interpretive Spanish jurisprudence concerning dueling, self-defense, and the requisites of qualifying and aggravating circumstances. The trial court had convicted Navarro of murder with treachery and premeditation, sentencing him to death by hanging.

On November 19, 1903, during the early hours of the morning, Ricardo Garces and Antonio Navarro had an altercation in the bar or saloon of the Paz Theater in the district of Binondo, Manila, in the presence of other persons. After the altercation, the two men left the saloon together for the purpose of fighting in another place, as proven by the testimony of various witnesses. According to the accused's own testimony, he and Garces left the theater together and took a carromata as far as Calle Rosario, where they stopped to purchase two knives, one for each, known as "marineros," with blades about one foot in length. After making the purchase, they paid for the carromata and separated, each taking a conveyance, both going in the direction of Santa Mesa at the extreme end of the district of Sampaloc. When about halfway on the road, the accused stopped at a store to ask for a piece of ice, but without losing sight of Garces's vehicle, which had taken the lead; the accused, not being able to maintain the ice, followed to the place of meeting.

The fight took place at the designated location, during which the accused was slightly wounded on the upper lip, while Ricardo Garces received a large and deep wound on his right arm. After the fight, they left the place and proceeded to a small house where Ambrosio del Rosario and Hilaria Bernardo, husband and wife, lived. At this house, the accused requested and obtained from Hilaria Bernardo a piece of an old skirt with which he bound the wounded arm of Garces, which was then bleeding profusely. Immediately thereafter, they left the house, Garces being assisted to some extent by the accused. Upon arriving at the Santa Mesa road, the accused was detained by a policeman who had been called by Ambrosio del Rosario. The policeman rang up from the alarm box for the police ambulance, which arrived a half hour later, and conducted the accused to the police station and Garces to the Civil Hospital. At about 1:30 in the afternoon, Garces was operated on by the hospital surgeons, but notwithstanding their assistance, he died at 5 o'clock in the morning of the following day.

Ambrosio del Rosario testified that he heard the taller man, Garces, cry out, and saw him with a doubled arm that was bleeding, and a shorter man, Navarro, with raised arm holding high an instrument which he could not distinguish as a knife, but which he saw was one foot in length and white. When he saw blood flowing, he left to call the police. Police officer Benford Warren testified that he saw the wounded man assisted to the ambulance, with his right arm doubled up and bandaged at the elbow, his coat and clothing covered with blood. When taken from the ambulance, the wounded man was in a faint and weak condition, and his arm fell, causing another flow of blood from the wound, which continued profusely while ascending the stairs and on the way to the operating room. Secret-service police officer Joseph J. Keith, who investigated the scene, found one knife, closed, which belonged to Garces, with a pool of blood running from the spot where the fight evidently took place to where the knife was found, and spots of blood running from that place to the Santa Mesa road.

The wound of Garces was, as testified by Dr. G. B. Cook, a cut or incision about one inch in length, made above the elbow on the inner part of the arm, extending in depth to the bone, cutting or severing the main artery. Dr. Stafford, physician in charge of the Civil Hospital, testified that the wound was an incision reaching to the bone, about one inch in length, just above the elbow joint, inflicted by a sharp instrument, and that the wounded man was almost dead when received at the hospital by reason of having lost so much blood. Dr. William J. Mallory described the wounded man as pallid, unconscious, with a wide wound on the right arm of an inch or an inch and a half approximately above the bend of the elbow. These three doctors gave as the immediate cause of death hemorrhage and nervous convulsion, corroborated by three other doctors who testified for the defense on a hypothetical case.

The trial court concluded that Navarro took the life of the deceased willfully, unlawfully, criminally, and with malice aforethought and deliberate premeditation and treachery, fighting a duel without seconds in a retired and isolated place, with no mitigating circumstances but aggravating circumstances present. The trial court found that after the arrival of the accused on the ground, and at the moment the deceased was in the act of taking off his coat to prepare for the fight, the accused availed himself of that occasion and attacked the deceased with the knife, wounding him in the right arm, and that the deceased never succeeded in taking his coat off of his left arm. The Supreme Court noted, however, that there was no proof whatever as to how or in what manner the deceased was wounded, and that no certain conclusion could be arrived at from the proofs referred to in the judgment below.

• Known Premeditation: The prosecuting attorney argued that the accused having provoked the quarrel, challenged the deceased to a fight, purchased a dangerous and fatal instrument, proceeded a long distance to a chosen place for the purpose of fighting, and there insisted that the deceased proceed with the fight, was direct and positive proof of the existence of known premeditation.
• Persistence of Criminal Intent: The Solicitor-General argued that if premeditation be characterized and shown not so much by the lapse of time from the moment of conceiving the idea of a crime to the moment of its accomplishment, but by the persistency of the idea and the voluntary and firm intention of carrying it out, then premeditation was shown by the accused first challenging the deceased, the election and acquisition of arms, the designation of a place of combat, and the selection of a spot retired and secluded for such combat.

• Self-Defense: The defense alleged that Navarro repeatedly expressed his desire and wish that Garces not fight, that he begged the deceased that there be no fight between them, and that Garces paid no heed to such request and attacked and assaulted the accused.
• Cause of Death: The defense presented expert evidence and testimony bearing on a hypothetical case, questioning whether the death or the convulsion could have been caused by improper medical treatment or the doses of strychnine administered to the wounded man.

• Treachery: Whether treachery was proven as a qualifying or aggravating circumstance.
• Known Premeditation: Whether known premeditation was proven as a qualifying or aggravating circumstance.
• Dueling: Whether the crime committed was that of dueling.
• Self-Defense: Whether the accused could invoke self-defense notwithstanding the accepted fight.

• Treachery: No. Treachery was not established, the evidence admitting only of deductions more or less logical, with no certain conclusion that the accused attacked the deceased while the latter was taking off his coat.
• Known Premeditation: No. Known premeditation was not proven by acts clearly showing such aggravating circumstance, the intervening acts being nothing more than acts carried out for the realization of a design caused by the passion of a moment.
• Dueling: No. The crime was not dueling because a duel implies an agreement to fight under determined conditions with the participation and intervention of seconds, which were not present in this case.
• Self-Defense: No. The acceptance of a personal encounter or fight excludes the application of self-defense, as the first aggression is an accident or incident of the fight without judicial effects modifying imputability.

• Treachery: The Court applied the established doctrine that qualifying and aggravating circumstances should appear proven during the progress of the trial with equal certainty and clearness as the act itself, citing United States vs. Candido Ulat and United States vs. Barbosa. The trial court's finding of treachery was based on its belief that the accused attacked the deceased while the latter was in the act of taking off his coat, but the Supreme Court found no proof as to how or in what manner the deceased was wounded, and the doctor who examined the wound could not testify positively with regard thereto. Because no certain conclusion could be arrived at, the Court could not accept the conclusion of the court below with respect to treachery.

• Known Premeditation: The Court reasoned that Navarro and Garces left the theater, each with the deliberate intention to fight outside of such place, and both had criminal intent from that time and moment to carry out their purpose. Both agreed to do this and immediately thereafter, without loss of more time, went to an isolated place designated for the encounter, which took place one hour thereafter. During this time, nothing occurred to induce them to desist from carrying out their original purpose. However, the Court held that the acts that intervened from the time of the quarrel to the time of the wounding were nothing more than acts carried out for the realization of a design or intent caused by the passion of a moment, while excited and rash, and during the fever of such moment. Citing the judgment of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 6, 1888, the Court held that known premeditation should not be taken into consideration when the proven facts do not show the same with connection and relation bearing directly on the criminal act itself, and where the execution was not carried out with meditation or cool and serious reflection. Since known premeditation, like any other aggravating circumstance, should not be inferred but proven, and it was not proven by acts clearly showing such circumstance, the Court could not find that such circumstance was either qualifying or aggravating.

• Dueling: The Court cited the judgment of the Supreme Court of Spain of October 9, 1890, holding that a duel implies an agreement to fight under determined conditions and with the participation and intervention of seconds who fix such conditions. Even though the act could be qualified as dueling, if there was no participation of seconds, the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 446 of the Code (art. 431 of the Philippine Code) should be taken into consideration, according to which the general penalties should be applied in the event of death or injuries, with limitations as to aggravating circumstances but restrictive in that the punishment not be less than prision correccional.

• Self-Defense: The Court cited the judgment of the Supreme Court of Spain of July 11, 1871, holding that in a fight arranged under agreement, the result of provocation and an accepted challenge, the aggression is reciprocal and legitimate as between two contending parties, although the same cannot be qualified as a duel for the reason that the conditions and elements necessary to constitute this crime are not present. Citing the judgment of May 30, 1892, the Court held that the acceptance of a personal encounter or fight excludes the application of paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, for the reason that the fight once accepted, the first aggression or attack is an accident or incident of the fight and without judicial effects modifying the imputability resulting from the accepted act.

• Homicide: The Court cited the judgment of the Supreme Court of Spain of May 8, 1890, holding that the crime of homicide is committed when death ensues or follows as the result of a wound inflicted by another, whether the death be the precise and necessary consequence of the injuries or wound, or whether death resulted from accidents caused by reason of such wounds or injuries. The Court also cited the judgment of May 30, 1892, holding that the aggressor is responsible for all the natural consequences of the aggression when these consequences do not owe their origin to acts or malicious omissions imputable to the assaulted party. The Court found no proven fact that the death was the immediate consequence of the intervention of a third party or due to improper medical treatment, and the expert evidence presented by the defense did not establish as the cause of death any improper treatment. The Court could not arrive at a finding with respect to the effect or influence of the doses of strychnine administered to the wounded man.

• Proof of Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances — Qualifying and aggravating circumstances should appear proven during the progress of the trial with equal certainty and clearness as the act itself. In this case, treachery was not proven because the evidence admitted only of deductions, and no certain conclusion could be arrived at as to how the deceased was wounded.

• Known Premeditation — Known premeditation should not be taken into consideration when the proven facts do not show the same with connection and relation bearing directly on the criminal act itself, and where the execution was not carried out with meditation or cool and serious reflection. The acts intervening from the quarrel to the wounding were acts carried out for the realization of a design caused by the passion of a moment, while excited and rash, and during the fever of such moment.

• Dueling — A duel implies an agreement to fight under determined conditions and with the participation and intervention of seconds who fix such conditions. Where there is no participation of seconds, the act cannot be qualified as dueling, and the general penalties should be applied in the event of death or injuries, with the punishment not less than prision correccional.

• Self-Defense in Accepted Fights — The acceptance of a personal encounter or fight excludes the application of self-defense under paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, for the reason that the fight once accepted, the first aggression or attack is an accident or incident of the fight and without judicial effects modifying the imputability resulting from the accepted act.

• Homicide — The crime of homicide is committed when death ensues or follows as the result of a wound inflicted by another, whether the death be the precise and necessary consequence of the injuries or wound, or whether death resulted from accidents caused by reason of such wounds or injuries. The aggressor is responsible for all the natural consequences of the aggression when these consequences do not owe their origin to acts or malicious omissions imputable to the assaulted party.

• "It is an established doctrine of jurisprudence, again and again reiterated by this court, that qualifying and aggravating circumstances should appear proven during the progress of the trial, with equal certainty and clearness as the act, itself." — This passage states the controlling rule for the Court's rejection of treachery as a qualifying or aggravating circumstance, requiring proof of aggravating circumstances with the same certainty as the criminal act itself.

• "Known premeditation should not be taken into consideration when the proven facts do not show the same with connection and relation bearing directly on the criminal act itself, which proven facts and the execution of the same were carried out meditation, or cools and serious reflection, all of which, if proven constitute the essence of aggravating circumstances." — This quotation from the Spanish Supreme Court's judgment of November 6, 1888, defines the essence of known premeditation and was the basis for the Court's rejection of this aggravating circumstance.

• "The acceptance of a personal encounter or fight excludes the application of paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, for the reason that the fight, once accepted, the first aggression or attack is an accident or incident of the fight and without judicial effects modifying the imputability resulting from the accepted act." — This passage from the Spanish Supreme Court's judgment of May 30, 1892, establishes the doctrine that self-defense cannot be invoked in an accepted fight, which the Court applied to reject the defense's claim.

• United States vs. Candido Ulat, 1 No. 3255, February 27, 1907 — Cited as established doctrine that qualifying and aggravating circumstances should appear proven during the trial with equal certainty and clearness as the act itself.
• United States vs. Barbosa, 1 Phil. Rep., 741 — Cited for the same doctrine requiring proof of qualifying and aggravating circumstances with the same certainty as the criminal act.
• Judgment of the Supreme Court of Spain, November 6, 1888 — Controlling interpretive authority defining when known premeditation should not be taken into consideration, requiring meditation or cool and serious reflection.
• Judgment of the Supreme Court of Spain, October 9, 1890 — Controlling authority defining dueling as requiring seconds who fix conditions, and providing the applicable penalty framework where no seconds participate.
• Judgment of the Supreme Court of Spain, July 11, 1871 — Controlling authority holding that in a fight arranged under agreement, the aggression is reciprocal and legitimate as between two contending parties.
• Judgment of the Supreme Court of Spain, May 30, 1892 — Controlling authority holding that acceptance of a personal fight excludes self-defense, and that the aggressor is responsible for all natural consequences of the aggression.
• Judgment of the Supreme Court of Spain, May 8, 1890 — Controlling authority defining the crime of homicide as committed when death ensues as the result of a wound inflicted by another.

• Article 404, Penal Code — The provision defining the crime of homicide, under which the accused was convicted and sentenced to reclusion temporal.
• Article 8, paragraph 4, Penal Code — The provision on self-defense, which the Court held was excluded by the acceptance of a personal encounter or fight.
• Article 10, paragraph 7, Penal Code — The provision on known premeditation as an aggravating circumstance, which the Court held was not proven in this case.
• Article 59, Penal Code — The provision on accessory penalties, which the Court imposed as prescribed.
• Article 431, Philippine Code — The provision referenced in the Spanish jurisprudence on dueling, concerning the application of general penalties in the event of death or injuries where no seconds participate.

Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson, and Willard, JJ., concurred.