United States vs. Aligan

A rate of speed exceeding twenty miles per hour within city or poblacion limits is only prima facie evidence of operating a motor vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and proper; the presumption may be rebutted by a showing that, under all the particular circumstances—including the width of the road, traffic, grades, weather, and the absence of danger to persons or property—the speed was neither reckless nor greater than reasonable and proper. The statute does not impose a fixed maximum speed, and what is reasonable and proper is intrinsically relative to the conditions existing at the specific time and place.

Ciriaco Aligan, a chauffeur, drove automobile No. 3322 along Cavite Boulevard in the City of Manila on 22 February 1921. He maintained a speed that never exceeded 27 miles per hour. The boulevard was wide and unobstructed; no other vehicles or pedestrians were in front of the automobile. These facts were undisputed. Based solely on that operation, a complaint was filed charging Aligan with a violation of Section 4 of Act No. 2389, which prohibited reckless driving and speeds greater than reasonable and proper, and declared that a speed above 20 miles per hour in city or poblacion limits constituted prima facie evidence of a violation.

• The complaint alleged that on or about 22 February 1921, in Manila, Aligan, as chauffeur of automobile No. 3322, wilfully and unlawfully operated the vehicle along Cavite Boulevard at a speed of 27 miles per hour—greater than was reasonable and proper—in violation of Section 4 of Act No. 2389.
• The parties stipulated three undisputed facts: (a) the speed of the automobile at no time exceeded 27 miles per hour; (b) the vehicle was driven on Cavite Boulevard, a wide and unobstructed road; and (c) neither vehicles of any description nor pedestrians were in front of the automobile.
• The sole question submitted for determination was whether those admitted facts constituted the crime charged.

• Violation of Section 4 — Recklessness and Unreasonable Speed: Whether, on the admitted facts—a speed of 27 miles per hour on a wide, unobstructed boulevard with no other vehicles or pedestrians—the operation of the automobile constituted reckless driving or a speed greater than is reasonable and proper, in violation of Section 4 of Act No. 2389.

• Violation of Section 4 — Recklessness and Unreasonable Speed: The conviction was reversed. The speed did not amount to recklessness because, under Section 4, recklessness exists only when the operation might endanger property, the safety or rights of persons, or cause excessive or unreasonable damage to the highway. At the time and place in question, no property or persons were present or endangered, and there was no possibility of damage to the road. Recklessness—defined as an indifference whether wrong is done, a heedless disregard of obvious consequences, and a wantonness stronger than ordinary negligence—was entirely absent. The speed was likewise not greater than reasonable and proper. Section 4 does not set a maximum speed but makes a speed above 20 miles per hour merely prima facie evidence of unreasonableness. What is reasonable and proper is always relative to the specific conditions: the width of the street, traffic, grades, crossings, curvatures, atmospheric and weather conditions, and the potential for damage. Given the wide, empty boulevard, the presumption created by the speed exceeding 20 mph was thoroughly overcome; the rate of 27 mph was reasonable and proper under those circumstances. The statute leaves the ultimate determination to the particular facts, and the record contained no evidence that the speed was unsafe.

• Doctrine of Prima Facie Speed Evidence — A speed in excess of 20 miles per hour within city or poblacion limits is not a per se violation of Act No. 2389. It creates only a prima facie inference that the speed is greater than reasonable and proper. The inference is rebuttable and may be overcome by evidence that the rate of speed, under all the surrounding conditions, was neither reckless nor unreasonable. The statute fixes no absolute maximum speed.

• Definition of Recklessness — Recklessness, in the context of motor vehicle operation, means an indifference whether wrong is done or not; a heedless disregard of obvious consequences; an indifference to the rights of others. It is synonymous with wantonness and is a higher degree of culpability than mere or ordinary negligence. Recklessness is not inferred unless there is a danger to property, the safety or rights of persons, or a likelihood of excessive or unreasonable damage to the highway.

• Reasonable and Proper Speed — Relative Standard — What constitutes a reasonable and proper speed is inherently relative and can only be determined by examining the particular facts and circumstances of the case, including the width of the road, traffic, grades, crossings, curvatures, atmospheric and weather conditions, and the risk of damage. A speed that is reasonable at one time and place may be unreasonable at the same location at a different time. The operator must keep the vehicle under complete control, having regard to the existing conditions at that precise moment.

• “The law does not fix a maximum rate of speed at which motor vehicles may be operated, and that while a rate of speed of more than 20 miles constitutes prima facie evidence that the person operating the same is operating it at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable and proper, that presumption may be overcome by showing that at the particular time and place the rate of speed was neither reckless nor greater than is reasonable and proper.” This passage encapsulates the core ratio decidendi and was later reiterated in Philippine traffic jurisprudence.

• “Recklessness is an indifference whether wrong is done or not; an indifference to the rights of others. It is a heedless disregard of obvious consequences.” The Court adopted this formulation from American case law as the working definition for the criminal statute, distinguishing recklessness from simple negligence.

• “An attempt to give a specific meaning to the words reasonable and proper is trying to count what is not number and measure what is not space.” Quoting Altschuler vs. Coburn, the Court emphasized the factual, flexible nature of the standard.

• Lake Shore etc. Railway Co. vs. Bodemer, 139 Ill. 596; 32 Am. St. Rep. 218 — Cited for the proposition that recklessness and wantonness are stronger terms than mere or ordinary negligence; used to calibrate the threshold for criminal liability.
• Kansas Pacific Railway Co. vs. Whipple, 39 Kansas 531 — Cited for the definition of recklessness as an indifference whether wrong is done and indifference to the rights of others.
• Altschuler vs. Coburn, 38 Nebraska 881 — Quoted for the observation that “reasonable and proper” cannot be given a rigid, fixed meaning.
• In re Nice & Schreiber, 123 Fed. Rep. 987 — Relied on to support the relativist principle that what constitutes reasonable and proper speed depends on the facts of the particular controversy.
• Hendricks vs. Western Union Telegraph Co., 126 N.C. 304 — Cited for the view that reasonable and proper speed is nearly always a mixed question of law and fact, especially within the province of the court.

• Section 4, Act No. 2389 (Motor Vehicle Law) — Prohibited any person from operating a motor vehicle on any public highway recklessly or at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable and proper, having regard to the width, traffic, grades, crossings, curvatures, other conditions of the highway, atmospheric conditions, and weather, or so as to endanger property or the safety or rights of persons, or to cause excessive or unreasonable damage to the highway. It further provided that a rate of speed exceeding twenty miles per hour within a city or the poblacion limits of any municipality constituted prima facie evidence that the operator was driving at a speed greater than reasonable and proper. The Supreme Court construed the numerical threshold as a rebuttable evidentiary device rather than a flat speed limit, and applied the general reasonableness standard to acquit the appellant.

Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concurred.

• N/A — The decision was unanimous; no dissenting opinion was registered.