United Restauror's Employees & Labor Union-PAFLU vs. Torres

A union's right to picket ceases once it loses a consent election and a rival union is certified as the exclusive bargaining representative; a minority union may not picket to compel collective bargaining, and a pending certiorari challenging an anti-picketing injunction becomes moot and academic.

Delta Development Corporation owns the Makati Commercial Center in Makati, Rizal, and leases portions to tenants; Sulo Restaurant is one such lessee. United Restauror's Employees & Labor Union-PAFLU is an association of some Sulo Restaurant employees, and no employer-employee relationship exists between Delta and the Union members. The dispute is set against Republic Act No. 875, which governs labor disputes and vests the right to be the exclusive bargaining representative in the labor union designated or selected by the majority of employees in the appropriate bargaining unit.

Delta Development Corporation owned the Makati Commercial Center in Makati, Rizal and leased portions of it; Sulo Restaurant was one of its lessees, and the Union was an association of some Sulo Restaurant employees. On January 8, 1965, the Union sought permission from Delta to conduct picketing activities "on the private property of plaintiff surrounding Sulo Restaurant." On January 11, Delta denied the request because it "may be held liable for any incident that may happen in the picket lines, since the picketing would be conducted on the private property owned by plaintiff." Despite the denial, the Union picketed on Delta's property surrounding Sulo Restaurant on January 16 and continued to conduct the activity.

Delta filed a verified complaint for injunction with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Union on January 16, 1965 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Civil Case No. 8524. Delta alleged that it owned the Makati Commercial Center; that the center had its own thoroughfares, pedestrian lanes, and parking areas for the benefit of customers and clients of its lessees; that the Union was an association of some employees of Sulo Restaurant, a lessee of Delta; that no employer-employee relationship existed between Delta and the Union members; that the Union had sought permission to picket on Delta's private property surrounding Sulo Restaurant; that Delta denied the request; and that despite the denial, the Union picketed on Delta's property on January 16 and continued to do so, violating Delta's property rights and causing great and irreparable injury. Respondent Judge Guillermo E. Torres issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the Union, its attorneys, representatives, agents, and any person assisting it to "REFRAIN from picketing on the property of plaintiff Delta Development Corporation within the Makati Commercial Center." The Union's motion for reconsideration was denied on January 26, 1965.

On January 19, 1965, the Union filed a motion to dismiss on the ground, inter alia, that the court had no jurisdiction to try the case. Without awaiting resolution of its motion to dismiss, the Union commenced the present original petition for certiorari in the SC on September 18, 1965. On September 29, 1965, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon the Union's P1,000.00-bond. On October 12, 1965, Delta answered, alleging among others that respondent judge validly issued the injunctive writ because it never enjoined petitioner from picketing against Sulo-D & E, Inc. but only from doing picketing on Delta's private property; that Republic Act 875 was not applicable because the case involved an action to protect Delta's property rights; that Delta had no labor relation or dispute of any kind with the Union; and that the injunctive writ was issued after due hearing on January 19, 1965.

After the submission of the parties' memoranda in lieu of oral argument, Delta moved to dismiss the proceeding at bar on the ground that it had become moot and academic. Delta averred that the Union lost in the consent election conducted by the Department of Labor on October 4, 1965 in CIR Cases 1455-MC and 1464-MC, and thereby also lost its right to picket; and that in said election cases, rival union Sulo Employees Labor Union was certified by the CIR as the exclusive bargaining representative of all the employees of Sulo Restaurant pursuant to the CIR's order of December 23, 1965. The Union opposed, arguing that the picketing was conducted on or about January 16, 1965, around eight months before the consent election on October 4, 1965, and that the issues that triggered the Union's labor strike of January 16, 1965 were entirely distinct and foreign to the issues in Cases 1455-MC and 1464-MC.

The consent election was ordered by the CIR pursuant to the Union's petition for direct certification docketed as Case 1455-MC and a similar petition for certification filed by SELU docketed as Case 1464-MC. In that consent election, SELU defeated the Union. SELU was certified to the Sulo management as the "collective bargaining representative of the employees ... for collective bargaining purposes as regards wages, hours of work, rates of pay and/or such other terms and conditions of employment allowed them by law."

• Jurisdiction: Petitioner argued that jurisdiction over the case rests with the Court of Industrial Relations because the same involves acts of unfair labor practice under Section 4(a) of Republic Act 875 in connection with Section 5(a) thereof.
• Right to Picket/Free Speech: Petitioner argued that respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction in issuing the injunctive writ, as no restraining order could be validly issued against the right to picket as part of freedom of speech.
• Hearing: Petitioner argued that respondent judge issued the questioned writ without the benefit of a previous hearing.
• Violation of Republic Act 875: Petitioner argued that the writ was issued in violation of Section 9(d) of Republic Act 875.
• No Adequate Remedy: Petitioner claimed that there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
• Mootness: Petitioner opposed Delta's motion to dismiss, arguing that the picketing was conducted on or about January 16, 1965, around eight months before the consent election on October 4, 1965, and that the issues that triggered the Union's labor strike of January 16, 1965 are entirely distinct and foreign to the issues in Cases 1455-MC and 1464-MC.

• Property Rights/Scope of Injunction: Respondent Delta countered that respondent judge validly issued the injunctive writ because the same never enjoined petitioner from picketing against Sulo-D & E, Inc. but only from doing its picketing on the private property of Delta, who is not in any way privy to the relationship between Sulo-D & E, Inc. and petitioner.
• Applicability of Republic Act 875: Respondent argued that Republic Act 875 is not applicable to the case, which involves an action to protect Delta's property rights.
• No Labor Relation/Dispute: Respondent argued that it has no labor relation or dispute of any kind with the Union.
• Due Hearing: Respondent argued that the injunctive writ was issued after due hearing on January 19, 1965.
• Mootness: Respondent moved to dismiss on the ground that the proceeding had become moot and academic because the Union lost in the consent election conducted by the Department of Labor on October 4, 1965 in CIR Cases 1455-MC and 1464-MC, thereby also losing its right to picket, and because rival SELU was certified by the CIR as the exclusive bargaining representative of all Sulo Restaurant employees pursuant to the CIR's order of December 23, 1965.

• Mootness: Whether the petition for certiorari became moot and academic after the Union lost the consent election and SELU was certified as the exclusive bargaining representative, such that the Union's right to picket ceased.

• Mootness: Yes. The Union's defeat in the consent election and SELU's certification as exclusive bargaining representative made the Union a minority that could no longer demand collective bargaining; its picketing had no legitimate objective, so the petition became moot and academic.

• Mootness: The SC reasoned that when the Union struck and picketed on January 16, 1965, it might have been true that it commanded a majority of Sulo's employees and could, without need of certification, conclude a collective bargaining agreement. But it was not disputed that on October 4, 1965, shortly after the case was filed on September 18, 1965, a consent election was held, and SELU defeated the Union. Because of this, SELU was certified to the Sulo management as the collective bargaining representative of the employees for collective bargaining purposes as regards wages, hours of work, rates of pay and/or such other terms and conditions of employment allowed them by law. The consent election was ordered by the CIR pursuant to the Union's petition for direct certification in Case 1455-MC and SELU's similar petition in Case 1464-MC. The Union could no longer demand collective bargaining because it became the minority union; the right to be the exclusive representative of all employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit is vested by law in the labor union designated or selected by the majority of the employees in the unit concerned. SELU, which commanded the majority, had the right as well as the obligation to hear, voice out, and seek remedies for the grievances of all Sulo employees, including employees who were members of petitioner Union, regarding rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment. Petitioner Union's concerted activities designed to be recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent of Sulo employees had to come to a halt. Collective bargaining could not be the appropriate objective of the Union's continuation of its concerted activities, and the record did not reveal any other legitimate purpose. To allow the Union to continue picketing for the purpose of drawing the employer to the collective bargaining table would disregard the results of the consent election and flaunt the will of the majority. The outcome of a consent election cannot be rendered meaningless by a minority group of employees who had themselves invoked the procedure to settle the dispute; those who voted in the consent election against the labor union that was eventually certified are bound to the results, and by their very act of participating in the election they are deemed to have acquiesced to whatever is the consequence of the election. As to those who did not participate, the accepted theory is that they are presumed to assent to the expressed will of the majority of those voting. Adherence to the methods laid down by statute for the settlement of industrial strife is one way of achieving industrial peace, and one such method is certification election; it is the intent and purpose of the law that this procedure, when adopted and availed of by parties to labor controversies, should end industrial disputes, not continue them. The SC adopted the observation that before an election is held to determine which of two rival unions represents a majority of the employees, one of the unions may call a strike and demand that the employer bargain with it, and a labor dispute will then exist; nothing in the statute makes it illegal for a minority to strike and thereby seek to obtain sufficient strength so as to become the sole bargaining agent. But after the Board certifies the bargaining representative, a strike by a minority union to compel an employer to bargain with it is unlawful, and no labor dispute can exist between a minority union and an employer in such a case. Upon the law, the Union's right to strike and consequently to picket ceased by its defeat in the consent election. That election occurred during the pendency before the SC of the original petition for certiorari challenging the power of the Court of First Instance to enjoin its picketing activities. The Union may not continue to picket, and the object of the case before the SC was lost.

• Moot and Academic Principle in Labor Picketing Cases — A petition challenging an injunction against picketing becomes moot and academic when, during its pendency, the union loses a consent election and a rival union is certified as the exclusive bargaining representative; the union's right to strike and picket ceases because it can no longer demand collective bargaining. The SC applied this to dismiss the Union's certiorari petition and dissolve its preliminary injunction.
• Exclusive Bargaining Representative and Minority Union Picketing — The right to be the exclusive representative of all employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit is vested in the labor union designated or selected by the majority of the employees in the unit. After certification of the bargaining representative, a strike by a minority union to compel the employer to bargain with it is unlawful, and no labor dispute can exist between a minority union and the employer. The SC applied this after SELU was certified and the Union became a minority.
• Binding Effect of Consent Election — The outcome of a consent election cannot be rendered meaningless by a minority group of employees who had themselves invoked the procedure to settle the dispute; those who voted against the union eventually certified are bound by the results, participants are deemed to have acquiesced, and nonparticipants are presumed to assent to the expressed will of the majority of those voting. The SC applied this to hold the Union bound by SELU's victory.
• Certification Election as Statutory Method of Settling Industrial Disputes — Adherence to the methods laid down by statute for the settlement of industrial strife is one way of achieving industrial peace; one such method is certification election, and the law intends that this procedure, when adopted and availed of by parties to labor controversies, should end industrial disputes, not continue them. The SC applied this to hold that the consent election ended the Union's claim to representation.

• "The outcome of a consent election cannot be rendered meaningless by a minority group of employees who had themselves invoked the procedure to settle the dispute." — The SC uses this to bind the Union to the result of the consent election it had invoked, despite its subsequent defeat.
• "Upon the law then, the Union's right to strike and consequently to picket ceased by its defeat in the consent election." — This is the SC's direct application of the rule to the Union, making its continued picketing legally baseless.
• "But after the Board certifies the bargaining representative, a strike by a minority union to compel an employer to bargain with it is unlawful. No labor dispute can exist between a minority union and an employer in such a case." — The SC adopts this observation to explain why a minority union's picketing after certification cannot be justified as a labor dispute.
• "It is the intent and purpose of the law that this procedure, when adopted and availed of by parties to labor controversies, should end industrial disputes, not continue them." — The SC uses this to emphasize that certification election is a statutory method for ending, not prolonging, industrial disputes.

• Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co., Inc. (BISCOM) vs. Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), L-18782, August 29, 1963 — Cited for the proposition that a union commanding a majority may, without need of certification, conclude a collective bargaining agreement.
• Allied Workers' Association vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 20 SCRA 364, 367 — Cited for the rule that nonparticipants in a consent election are presumed to assent to the expressed will of the majority of those voting.
• Floresheim Shoe Store Co. vs. Retail Shoe Salesmen's Union, 42 N.E. 2d 480, 484 — Cited for the intent and purpose of the law that certification procedure, when adopted, should end industrial disputes, not continue them.

• Section 12(a), Republic Act No. 875, as amended — Vests the right to be the exclusive representative of all employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit in the labor union designated or selected by the majority of the employees in the unit. The SC applied it to hold that after SELU's certification, the Union became a minority and could no longer demand collective bargaining.
• Section 12, Republic Act No. 875, as amended — Cited as the statutory basis for certification election as a method of settling industrial disputes. The SC applied the policy that certification election, when adopted, should end industrial disputes, not continue them.

• Justice Fernando (Concurring) — Separate opinion; its text is not included.