Union of Filipro Employees (UFE) vs. Nestlé Philippines, Inc.

A strike undertaken despite the Secretary of Labor's assumption or certification order is a prohibited activity and is illegal; the order is executory, and the automatic return-to-work directive must be complied with regardless of the workers' motives or the validity of their claims. Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code also remain valid under the 1987 Constitution.

UFE was the labor union representing employees at Nestle Philippines, Inc. (formerly Filipro, Inc.), with existing collective bargaining agreements containing no-strike/no-lockout and grievance machinery provisions. The Labor Code, as amended, authorizes the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes affecting national interest or certify them for compulsory arbitration, with automatic injunction and return-to-work consequences. The dispute concerned the legality of strikes and work stoppages staged by UFE and its officers across Nestle's facilities.

UFE filed a notice of strike on November 14, 1985 (BLR-NS-11-344-85) with the Bureau of Labor Relations against Filipro (now Nestle Philippines, Inc.). On December 4, 1988, as stated in the decision, UFE filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against Nestle and its officials for violation of the Labor Code (Art. 94) on holiday pay, non-implementation of the CBA provisions (Labor Management Corporation scheme), financial assistance, and other unfair labor practice. Acting on Nestle's petition seeking assumption of jurisdiction or certification to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, then Minister of Labor and Employment Blas F. Ople assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and issued an order on December 11, 1985 pursuant to Article 264(g) of the Labor Code, strictly enjoining a strike, lockout, or any other form of concerted action. On December 20, 1985, UFE filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order with the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 73129), assailing the assumption of jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the automatic injunction and the absence of a restraining order, union members, at the instigation of its leaders, staged a strike and continued to man picket lines at the Makati Administrative Office and all of Nestle's factories and warehouses at Alabang, Muntinlupa, Cabuyao, Laguna, and Cagayan de Oro City, and distributed leaflets advocating a boycott of company products.

On January 23, 1986, Nestle filed a petition to declare the strike illegal (NCR-1-295-86), premised on violation of the CBA provisions on the no-strike/no-lockout clause and the grievance machinery. On January 30, 1986, Minister Ople ordered all striking workers to report for work and the company to accept them under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the work stoppage within forty-eight hours. Despite receipt of the order and knowledge of a notice published by Nestle on February 1, 1986 advising all workers to report not later than February 3, 1986, UFE officers and members continued the strike. On February 4, 1986, Minister Ople denied their motion for reconsideration of the return-to-work order and enjoined acts that would disrupt peaceful and productive relations, including coercion, harassment, blocking of public thoroughfares, and ingress and egress to company premises. UFE defied the Minister and continued the strike, and Nestle filed criminal charges against those involved. On March 13, 1986, new Minister Augusto B. Sanchez issued a resolution enjoining all striking workers to return to work immediately and directing Nestle to grant special assistance equivalent to the weighted average monthly basic salary plus the cash conversion value of vacation leave credits for 1986. The strikers returned to work on March 17, 1986. On March 31, 1986, the Supreme Court granted UFE's motion to withdraw its petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 73129). On April 23, 1986, Minister Sanchez dismissed the union's unfair labor practice charge for want of merit and directed Nestle to grant an additional bonus equivalent to one month's gross compensation; on June 6, 1986, he modified the decision to require an anniversary bonus equivalent to one month's basic salary in lieu of the one month gross compensation. On November 13, 1987, Labor Arbiter Eduardo G. Magno declared the strike illegal, declared the listed union officers to have lost their employment status, declared the union guilty of unfair labor practice, and dismissed the union's complaint for unfair labor practice.

In RAB-X-2-0047-86, Filipro (Nestle) and the Cagayan de Oro Filipro Workers Union-WATU renewed a three-year CBA effective from December 1, 1984 to June 30, 1987, with petitioners signing as the duly elected officers of the union. On January 19, 1985, the union officers and other members sent a letter to WATU advising that they would administer the CBA by themselves with the help of UFE, to which they had allied themselves; WATU disregarded the advice and claimed to be the contracting party. UFE filed a petition (Case No. CRD-M-88-326-85) for administration of the existing CBAs at the Cebu, Davao, and Cagayan de Oro bargaining units against TUPAS and WATU. From January 22, 1986 to March 14, 1986, rank-and-file employees staged a strike at the instigation of UFE officers who had represented themselves as officers. Nestle filed a petition to declare the strike illegal; the strikers countered that the strike was legal because it was staged pursuant to the notice of strike filed by UFE on November 14, 1985, of which they claimed to be members after disaffiliating from CDO-FWU-WATU. On November 24, 1987, Executive Labor Arbiter Zosimo Vasallo declared the strike illegal, declared the union guilty of unfair labor practice, and declared the listed individual union officers to have lost their employment status.

In NCR-00-09-03285-87, UFE, its officers, and members staged a walkout on August 13, 1986 and participated in the Welga ng Bayan; on September 21, 1986, they did not proceed to work but joined a picket line in sympathy with striking workers of Southern Textile Mills; and on November 12, 1986, they left their work premises and marched toward Calamba in a demonstration over the slaying of a labor leader. On December 4, 1986, UFE filed a notice of strike (BLR-NS-12-531-86) to protest Nestle's alleged unfair labor practices, including hiring contractual workers to perform regular jobs and wage discrimination. On December 23, 1986, Minister Sanchez certified the labor dispute to the Commission for compulsory arbitration, strictly enjoining any intended or actual strike or lockout. On August 18, 1987, UFE officers and members at the Cabuyao factory abandoned their jobs and walked out, leaving unfinished products and raw materials that led to spoilage and economic losses; on August 21, 1987, UFE officers and members at the Alabang factory left their jobs in sympathy with the Cabuyao walkout. On August 27, 1987, UFE members at the Alabang and Cabuyao factories, in disregard of a Memorandum of Agreement entered into on August 21, 1987, participated in indignation rallies in Cabuyao and Alabang. On September 4, 1987, all sections at the Alabang factory went on a simultaneous twenty-minute meal break contrary to agreement, resulting in complete stoppage of production lines; responsible officials Eugenio San Pedro, Carlos Jose, and Cesar Ponce were suspended for six days without pay. From September 5 to 8, 1987, at the instigation of UFE officers, all workers staged a sitdown strike, and on September 7, 1987, Cabuyao's culinary section union members sympathized with the Alabang sitdown strike, followed by the whole personnel of the production line and certain areas in the Engineering Department. On September 8, 1987, Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon ordered all workers to return to work immediately and to refrain from any further slowdown, sitdown strike, walkout, or other disruptive activities, and directed the company to accept all employees and resume normal operations. Despite the order, UFE staged a strike on September 11, 1987 without a notice of strike or strike vote and in defiance of Minister Sanchez's certification order dated November 23, 1986 and Secretary Drilon's return-to-work order dated September 8, 1987. On September 14, 1987, Nestle sent individual letters of termination dismissing them effective immediately for knowingly instigating and participating in an illegal strike, defying the Secretary of Labor's order, and other illegal acts. On September 22, 1987, UFE filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, and damages. Labor Arbiter Evangeline Lubaton ruled on January 12, 1988, dismissing the complaint for lack of merit and confirming the dismissal of all individual complainants as valid and legally justified.

UFE appealed the three decisions, except that rendered in NLRC-NCR-12-4007-85, which it claimed had been rendered moot and academic by the return-to-work agreement and order dated March 10 and 13, 1986. The three appeals were consolidated and elevated to the NLRC en banc. The NLRC affirmed the unanimous decisions of the three labor arbiters declaring the strikes illegal, finding that the core of the controversy rested on the legality of the strikes. The NLRC found that the strikes violated the CBA's no-strike/no-lockout clause and grievance machinery; that UFE failed to exhaust the grievance steps and to comply with the mandatory cooling-off period, the seven-day strike requirement, and the strike-vote report; that no notice of strike was filed for the Cagayan de Oro strike; and that coercion, force, intimidation, violence with physical injuries, sabotage, and the use of unnecessary and obscene language or epithets were committed by union officials and members, leading to criminal cases before the Makati Fiscal's Office.

• Constitutionality of Articles 263 and 264: Petitioner argued that Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code are no longer good laws because compulsory arbitration has been curtailed under the present Constitution; they were based on Section 9, Article II of the 1973 Constitution, which allowed the State to provide for compulsory arbitration, and that provision is no longer found in the 1987 Constitution, making the articles unconstitutional and subject to being ignored.
• Mootness of Strike Legality: Petitioner maintained that the question of the legality of the strike was rendered moot and academic when Nestle management accepted the striking workers in compliance with the return-to-work order of Minister Sanchez dated March 13, 1986, citing Bisayan Land Transportation Co. vs. CIR and Feati University Faculty Club (PAFLU) vs. Feati University.
• No-Strike/No-Lockout Clause: Petitioner argued that the union did not violate the no-strike/no-lockout clause because the prohibition applies only to economic strikes, pursuant to Philippine Metal Foundries vs. CIR; the strike was premised on a violation of labor standard laws or non-payment of holiday pay, which is in effect a violation of the CBA.
• Specific Findings and Vicarious Liability: Petitioner claimed that there were no findings of specific acts and identities of those participating in illegal and prohibited acts to render them liable, citing ESSO Phils. vs. Malayang Manggagawa sa ESSO and Shell Oil Workers Union vs. CIR; by holding officers liable for illegal acts of coercion or denial of free ingress and egress without specifying and finding their specific participation, the Labor Arbiter resorted to vicarious liability, which has been discarded in Benguet Consolidated vs. CIR.
• Power of the Secretary of Labor: Petitioner questioned the power of the Secretary of Labor under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute tainted with national interest or to certify the same for compulsory arbitration.
• Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiter Lubaton: Petitioner alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of Labor Arbiter Lubaton to resolve the question of the legality of the strike.

• Constitutionality of Articles 263 and 264: The Solicitor General argued that both provisions remain applicable; no law has expressly repealed them, the 1987 Constitution did not impliedly repeal them because no inconsistency was shown, no court had declared them inconsistent, and Congress recognized their continued validity by enacting R.A. 6715, Section 27 of which amended paragraphs (g) and (i) of Article 263; they were also enacted pursuant to the State's police power.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The Solicitor General argued that the petition failed to show that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decisions of the labor arbiters.

• Validity of Articles 263 and 264: Whether Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code remain valid and applicable despite the 1987 Constitution's omission of the 1973 Constitution's compulsory arbitration provision.
• Power to Assume Jurisdiction/Certify: Whether the Secretary of Labor had authority under Article 263(g) to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute or certify it for compulsory arbitration.
• Mootness of Strike Legality: Whether the question of the strike's legality was rendered moot and academic by Nestle's acceptance of striking workers pursuant to the return-to-work order.
• Violation of No-Strike/No-Lockout Clause: Whether UFE violated the CBA's no-strike/no-lockout clause and grievance machinery, and whether the prohibition applies only to economic strikes.
• Specific Findings and Vicarious Liability: Whether the strike could be declared illegal and union officers held liable without specific findings of their participation in illegal acts.
• Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiter: Whether Labor Arbiter Lubaton had jurisdiction to resolve the legality of the strike.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the labor arbiters.

• Validity of Articles 263 and 264: Yes. They remain valid and applicable; no express or implied repeal occurred, and Congress recognized their validity through R.A. 6715.
• Power to Assume Jurisdiction/Certify: Yes. Article 263(g) authorizes the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction or certify for compulsory arbitration, and such orders are executory.
• Mootness of Strike Legality: No. The return-to-work order maintains the status quo pending determination of legality; acceptance of workers did not moot the issue.
• Violation of No-Strike/No-Lockout Clause: Yes. The strike was illegal; it violated the CBA's no-strike/no-lockout and grievance machinery, and the union failed to comply with notice, cooling-off, and strike-vote requirements.
• Specific Findings and Vicarious Liability: Yes. The strike could be declared illegal and the officers held liable even without specific findings, because the strike was prohibited by the assumption/certification order and return-to-work directive, and the NLRC found illegal acts.
• Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiter: Yes. The Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction over the strike's legality, which was a prejudicial question to the illegal dismissal issue.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion; its decision and resolution are affirmed.

• Validity of Articles 263 and 264: The Court rejected the argument that the omission of the 1973 Constitution's compulsory arbitration provision impliedly repealed Articles 263 and 264. Under Article 7 of the New Civil Code, laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and disuse or custom cannot excuse non-observance. No law expressly repealed the articles; the 1987 Constitution did not impliedly repeal them because no inconsistency was shown; and no court had declared them inconsistent. Congress itself recognized their continued validity by enacting R.A. 6715, which amended Article 263(g) and (i). The provisions were also enacted pursuant to the State's police power, an inherent power that need not be expressly conferred by the Constitution. Thus, the articles remained valid and applicable.
• Power to Assume Jurisdiction/Certify: Article 263(g) authorizes the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting national interest, or to certify it to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification automatically enjoins the intended or impending strike or lockout; if a strike has already taken place, all striking employees must immediately return to work and the employer must resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. The Court held that assumption and certification orders are executory in character and must be strictly complied with even during the pendency of a petition questioning their validity. This extraordinary authority is aimed at arriving at a peaceful and speedy solution to labor disputes without jeopardizing national interests.
• Mootness of Strike Legality: The return-to-work order is issued pending the determination of the legality or illegality of the strike; it is not correct to say that it may be enforced only if the strike is legal and may be disregarded if the strike is illegal, because the purpose is to maintain the status quo while the determination is being made. Otherwise, workers who contend that their strike is legal could refuse to return to work and cause a standstill in company operations while retaining their positions and claiming payment for work not done, an unfair situation that cannot be justified under social justice or due process. The return-to-work order imposes a duty, not merely a right; while a right may be waived, the duty must be discharged even against the worker's will. Returning to work is not a matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation. An assumption or certification order automatically results in a return-to-work of all striking workers, whether or not a separate return-to-work order has been issued. Thus, Nestle's acceptance of returning workers did not moot the question of the strike's legality.
• Violation of No-Strike/No-Lockout Clause: The NLRC correctly upheld the illegality of the strikes. The strikes violated the CBA's no-strike/no-lockout clause and grievance machinery; UFE failed to exhaust the grievance steps; it failed to comply with the mandatory cooling-off period, the seven-day strike requirement, and the strike-vote report; and no notice of strike was filed for the Cagayan de Oro strike. The Court emphasized that regardless of the workers' motives or the validity of their claims, once an assumption or certification order is issued, the striking workers must cease and desist from any and all acts that tend to or undermine the Secretary of Labor's authority. They cannot ignore return-to-work orders by citing unfair labor practices to justify their actions. A strike undertaken despite the issuance of an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity and is illegal under Article 264 of the Labor Code. The union officers and members are deemed to have lost their employment status for having knowingly participated in an illegal act.
• Specific Findings and Vicarious Liability: The argument that specific findings of participation were required did not absolve the union. UFE's points on motives, good faith, absence of specific findings on participation, and limiting the no-strike provision to economic strikes missed the underlying principle that assumption and certification orders are executory and must be strictly complied with. The NLRC also found that coercion, force, intimidation, violence with physical injuries, sabotage, and the use of unnecessary and obscene language or epithets were committed by the respondent officials and members, and criminal cases were filed. A strike conducted in that manner is illegal. Thus, the absence of specific findings did not absolve the union or its officers.
• Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiter: The NLRC clarified that the question of the legality of the strike was properly resolved by the Labor Arbiter because it is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter to adjudicate, and the issue was not subsumed by the order of Labor Minister Sanchez dated December 23, 1986 certifying the notice of strike dated December 4, 1986 for compulsory arbitration. The issue of whether the strike staged on September 11, 1987 by UFE and its officials and members was illegal is a prejudicial question to the issue of whether the complainants were illegally dismissed. The Court did not belabor the issue further.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The petition failed to show that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decisions of the labor arbiters. The NLRC correctly upheld the illegality of the strikes and the corresponding dismissal of the individual complainants because of their brazen disregard of successive lawful orders of Labor Ministers Ople, Sanchez, and Secretary Drilon dated December 11, 1985, January 30, 1986, and February 4, 1986, respectively, and their cavalier treatment of the Labor Code and the return-to-work orders. The NLRC's decision and resolution were therefore affirmed.

• Assumption and Certification Orders Are Executory — When the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute or certifies it for compulsory arbitration, the order automatically enjoins the intended or impending strike or lockout and, if a strike has already taken place, requires all striking employees to return to work immediately. The order must be strictly complied with even during the pendency of a petition questioning its validity. In this case, the Court applied the doctrine to hold that UFE's strikes were illegal despite its challenge to the Secretary's authority.
• Return-to-Work Order Imposes a Duty, Not a Right — A return-to-work order does not merely confer a right that may be waived; it imposes a duty that must be discharged even against the worker's will. Returning to work is a matter of obligation, not option or voluntariness. The Court used this doctrine to reject UFE's claim that Nestle's acceptance of returning workers mooted the legality of the strike.
• Strike Despite Assumption/Certification Is Prohibited and Illegal — A strike undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity and is illegal under the second paragraph of Article 264 of the Labor Code. Union officers and members who knowingly participate in the illegal act are deemed to have lost their employment status. The Court applied this to uphold the dismissal of the individual complainants.
• No Implied Repeal by Constitutional Omission — A statute is not repealed by a subsequent Constitution unless there is an express repeal or a clear inconsistency between the statute and the Constitution. Article 7 of the New Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and disuse or custom cannot excuse non-observance. The Court applied this to hold that Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code remain valid despite the omission of the 1973 Constitution's compulsory arbitration provision from the 1987 Constitution.
• Police Power as Basis for Labor Legislation — Police power is the inherent power of government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society. It need not be expressly conferred by the Constitution. The Court cited this to support the validity of Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code.
• Labor Arbiter Jurisdiction Over Strike Legality — The question of the legality of a strike is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter to adjudicate. It is not subsumed by a certification order for compulsory arbitration and is a prejudicial question to the issue of illegal dismissal. The Court accepted this clarification in upholding Labor Arbiter Lubaton's jurisdiction.
• Violation of No-Strike/No-Lockout Clause and Grievance Machinery — A strike that violates the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, especially a no-strike/no-lockout clause and grievance machinery provisions, is illegal. The Court upheld the NLRC's finding that UFE violated these CBA provisions and failed to exhaust the grievance procedure.

• "A strike that is undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity and thus illegal, pursuant to the second paragraph of Art. 264 of the Labor Code as amended (Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. 82088, October 13, 1989; 178 SCRA 482). The Union officers and members, as a result, are deemed to have lost their employment status for having knowingly participated in an illegal act." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the illegality of strikes staged in defiance of an assumption or certification order and the consequent loss of employment status.
• "The return to work order does not so much confer a right as it imposes a duty; and while as a right it may be waived, it must be discharged as a duty even against the worker's will. Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation." — This passage defines the nature of a return-to-work order and supports the rejection of UFE's mootness argument.
• "Regardless therefore of their motives, or the validity of their claims, the striking workers must cease and/or desist from any and all acts that tend to, or undermine this authority of the Secretary of Labor, once an assumption and/or certification order is issued." — This passage articulates the controlling principle that motives and claims do not justify defiance of the Secretary of Labor's assumption or certification order.
• "Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary." — This passage, quoted in the decision, anchors the ruling that Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code were not repealed by the 1987 Constitution.

• Sarmiento vs. Judge Tuico, G.R. No. 75271-73; Asian Transmission Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 77567, June 27, 1988, 162 SCRA 676 — Cited by the Court for the rule that a return-to-work order imposes a duty, not a right, and must be discharged even against the worker's will.
• Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 82088, October 13, 1989, 178 SCRA 482 — Cited by the Court as controlling precedent that a strike undertaken despite an assumption or certification order is a prohibited activity and illegal.
• People vs. Vera Reyes, 67 Phil. 190 — Cited by the Court for the definition of police power as the inherent power of government to enact laws for the general welfare.
• Liberal Labor Union vs. Phil. Can Co., 91 Phil. 72; Philippine Airlines vs. PAL Employees Association, L-8197, October 31, 1958 — Cited by the NLRC, and upheld by the Court, for the rule that a strike violating the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, especially a no-strike/no-lockout clause, is illegal.
• National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW) vs. Ovejera, et al., 114 SCRA 354 — Cited by the NLRC for the mandatory character of the cooling-off period under the Labor Code.
• United Seamen's Union vs. Davao Shipowners Association, 20 SCRA 1226 — Cited by the NLRC for the rule that a strike conducted with coercion, force, intimidation, violence, sabotage, and obscene language is illegal.
• ESSO Phils. vs. Malayang Manggagawa sa ESSO, G.R. No. L-36545, January 26, 1977, 75 SCRA 72; Shell Oil Workers Union vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-28607, February 12, 1972, 43 SCRA 224 — Cited by petitioner for its argument that specific findings of participation are required; the Court did not adopt the argument because the controlling principle was the executory nature of the assumption/certification order.
• Benguet Consolidated vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-24711, April 30, 1968, 23 SCRA 465 — Cited by petitioner for its claim that vicarious liability has been discarded; the Court did not rely on it to absolve the union officers.
• Bisayan Land Transportation Co. vs. CIR, 102 Phil. 439; Feati University Faculty Club (PAFLU) vs. Feati University, G.R. No. L-31503, August 15, 1974, 58 SCRA 395 — Cited by petitioner for its mootness argument; the Court rejected the argument and did not apply these cases.
• Philippine Metal Foundries vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-34948-49, May 15, 1979, 90 SCRA 135 — Cited by petitioner for its claim that the no-strike clause applies only to economic strikes; the Court did not adopt the argument.

• Article 263(g), Labor Code — Authorizes the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute adversely affecting national interest or certify it to the Commission for compulsory arbitration; such assumption or certification automatically enjoins the intended or impending strike or lockout and requires striking employees to return to work immediately. The Court applied this provision to uphold the Secretary's orders and the illegality of the strikes.
• Article 264, Labor Code — Prohibits strikes or lockouts without collective bargaining, notice, or strike vote; prohibits strikes after assumption of jurisdiction or certification for compulsory arbitration; and makes a strike undertaken despite such an order a prohibited activity. The Court applied this provision to declare the strikes illegal and the participants to have lost employment status.
• Article 7, New Civil Code — Provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and that violation or non-observance is not excused by disuse, custom, or practice to the contrary. The Court applied this provision to reject the claim that the 1987 Constitution impliedly repealed Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code.
• Section 27, R.A. 6715 (Herrera Law) — Amended paragraphs (g) and (i) of Article 263 of the Labor Code. The Court cited this amendment as evidence that Congress recognized the continued validity and operation of Articles 263 and 264.
• 1973 Constitution, Article II, Section 9 — Provided that the State may provide for compulsory arbitration. Petitioner argued that Articles 263 and 264 were based on this provision and became unconstitutional when it was omitted from the 1987 Constitution; the Court rejected the argument.
• 1987 Constitution — Petitioner argued that the omission of the compulsory arbitration provision impliedly repealed Articles 263 and 264; the Court held that no implied repeal occurred because no inconsistency was shown.
• Article 94, Labor Code — On holiday pay. UFE's unfair labor practice complaint against Nestle included an alleged violation of this provision; the labor arbiter dismissed the union's complaint, and the NLRC and the Supreme Court affirmed.
• BP Nos. 130 and 227 — Cited in the decision as amendments to Article 264(g) concerning the return-to-work order within the context of the Labor Code. The Court referenced these amendments in discussing the nature of a return-to-work order.

Narvasa, Gancayco, and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concurred. Cruz, J., took no part because he is related to one of the counsel.