Umandap vs. Sabio, Jr.

A substituted service of summons is valid where the process server’s return shows the impossibility of personal service within a reasonable time, the efforts exerted to locate the defendant, and delivery of the summons to a competent person in charge of the defendant’s office, and the presumption of regularity attaching to the return is overcome only by clear and convincing evidence. Such valid service brings the defendant within the court’s jurisdiction over his person.

Private respondent Domingo F. Estomo and petitioner Joel R. Umandap were parties to a contract involving a project and collections from MORESCO/NEA. Respondent Judge Jose L. Sabio, Jr. presided over the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 23, which issued the challenged resolutions in Civil Case No. 97-559. The Rules of Court govern personal and substituted service of summons, particularly Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14, and the return required by Section 4, Rule 14.

In August 1997, Domingo F. Estomo filed against Joel R. Umandap an action for damages based on breach of contract in the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 23, docketed as Civil Case No. 97-559. The claim concerned, among other things, unremitted collections from MORESCO/NEA and reimbursement of interest paid to finish a contracted project.

On February 3, 1998, Process Server Rucio C. Marmolejo effected substituted service of the summons and a copy of the complaint upon Umandap. The Officer’s Return stated that service was made at No. 14-3rd St., New Manila, Quezon City, by leaving or tendering the copy to Joseph David, “receiving of said office,” who refused to sign in receipt. The return further stated that despite efforts to serve the process personally upon Umandap on several occasions, such efforts proved futile because Umandap was not around, prompting substituted service.

Umandap did not file an Answer. On Estomo’s motion, the trial court declared Umandap in default and allowed Estomo to adduce evidence ex parte. On May 8, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment in Estomo’s favor, ordering Umandap to pay P304,393.25 as unremitted collections from MORESCO/NEA; P200,000.00 as reimbursement of interest incurred and paid by Estomo to finish the contracted project; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P75,000.00 as attorney’s fees; P5,547.00 as litigation expenses; and costs.

On July 8, 1998, a Writ of Execution was issued and Umandap’s deposit and receivables were garnished. On August 3, 1998, Umandap filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment by Default and Quash Writ of Execution. The trial court denied the motion on October 2, 1998, and denied reconsideration on January 18, 1999.

Umandap then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals found the process server’s Return valid and regular on its face, revealing that earnest efforts were exerted to find Umandap personally but failed. It held that the return was clothed with the presumption of regularity and that Umandap’s assertion that the process server went to his home and office only once was unsubstantiated and self-serving. The trial court also observed that Umandap received the March 18, 1998 default order on March 27, 1998 and the May 8, 1998 judgment on May 29, 1998, as evidenced by registry return receipts, and that he acted only after garnishment.

• Invalid Substituted Service: Petitioner argued that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over his person because there was no valid service of summons; the substituted service was improper and invalid since the process server’s return failed to show on its face the impossibility of personal service.
• Defects in the Return: Petitioner pointed to alleged defects: (1) it did not state the efforts exerted or the occasions on which attempts were made to personally serve the summons; (2) it did not state that Joseph David was a person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein or a competent person in charge of petitioner’s residence or office; and (3) it was not entitled to the presumption of regularity because there was no compliance with the rules on substituted service.
• Setting Aside Default Judgment: Petitioner maintained that, assuming valid service, the Court of Appeals should have set aside the default judgment and given him a chance to present evidence to rebut or defeat private respondent’s claim, invoking liberal construction of the rules.

• Validity and Regularity of Substituted Service: Whether the substituted service of summons made on petitioner through Joseph David on February 3, 1998 was valid and regular, thereby bringing him within the trial court’s jurisdiction.
• Setting Aside Default Judgment: Whether, assuming valid service, the Court of Appeals acted in accord with law and applicable decisions in refusing to set aside the default judgment and give petitioner a chance to present evidence.

• Validity and Regularity of Substituted Service: Yes. The process server’s return complied with the requirements for substituted service, and the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties was not overcome by clear and convincing evidence.
• Setting Aside Default Judgment: No. The default judgment was properly left undisturbed because petitioner failed to overcome the presumption of regularity and did not avail himself of the remedies under Section 3(b), Rule 9 or Section 2(a), Rule 41; liberal construction cannot excuse disregard of the rules.

• Validity and Regularity of Substituted Service: Service of summons upon the defendant is necessary for the court to acquire jurisdiction over his person; any judgment without such service, absent a valid waiver, is null and void. Section 6, Rule 14 requires personal service whenever practicable. Section 7, Rule 14 permits substituted service if, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time, by leaving copies at the defendant’s residence with a person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein or at the defendant’s office or regular place of business with a competent person in charge. The process server may choose the mode likely to insure effectiveness. Under Venturanza vs. Court of Appeals, impossibility of prompt service must be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the failure of such efforts in the proof of service; substituted service is extraordinary and must be strictly followed. The return required by Section 4, Rule 14 is the proof of service. The return in this case stated service on February 3, 1998 at No. 14-3rd St., New Manila, Quezon City, by leaving or tendering copies to Joseph David, “receiving of said office,” who refused to sign; that despite efforts to serve personally on several occasions, the same proved futile because defendant was not around; and that substituted service was made. The Court found compliance with Laus vs. Court of Appeals requirements: (a) impossibility of service within a reasonable time, (b) efforts exerted to locate defendant, and (c) service on a person of sufficient age and discretion residing therein. The return indicated the address, prior attempts, and delivery to Joseph David as receiving for the office. Petitioner’s claim that the process server went only once was unsubstantiated and self-serving. The address was both residence and office, and the place of service was not in issue. Petitioner admitted Joseph David, his wife’s nephew, received the summons and complaint, but claimed he misplaced them and failed to inform petitioner. The return’s description of Joseph David as “receiving of said office” sufficiently conveyed that he was a person of sufficient age and discretion residing therein, tasked to receive for the office. Petitioner never alleged that Joseph David was incompetent or not a resident. The presumption that the process server left or tendered the summons upon a person of sufficient age and discretion stood unrebutted. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions applied; to overcome the sheriff’s certificate, evidence must be clear and convincing, and no proof of irregularity was presented. Thus, substituted service was valid.
• Setting Aside Default Judgment: The Court rejected the argument that liberal construction required setting aside the default judgment. Liberal construction may be invoked for excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided it does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. Here, the trial court observed that petitioner resorted to technicalities to frustrate the ends of justice. Petitioner received the March 18, 1998 order declaring him in default on March 27, 1998, and the May 8, 1998 judgment on May 29, 1998, as evidenced by registry return receipts. He could have filed a motion to set aside the order of default under Section 3(b), Rule 9, or taken an ordinary appeal under Section 2(a), Rule 41. He did neither and acted only after his receivables were garnished. The trial court found him guilty of laches. Under these circumstances, no reversible error attended the denial of his motion to set aside the default judgment.

• Substituted Service of Summons — Substituted service is extraordinary and may be availed only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time after efforts to locate him have failed. The two modes are (a) leaving copies at the defendant’s residence with a person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) leaving copies at the defendant’s office or regular place of business with a competent person in charge. The process server may choose the mode more likely to insure effectiveness. The proof of service must show the impossibility of prompt personal service by stating the efforts made to find the defendant and their failure. The Court applied these requirements and found the return sufficient because it stated the address, prior attempts, and delivery to Joseph David as “receiving of said office.”
• Presumption of Regularity in the Performance of Official Functions — A sheriff or process server is presumed to have regularly performed official duty, and the presumption arising from the sheriff’s certificate or return may be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence. The Court applied this doctrine because petitioner offered only an unsubstantiated and self-serving assertion that the process server went to his home and office only once; no proof of irregularity was presented, so the presumption stood.
• Jurisdiction over the Person — Service of summons upon the defendant is necessary for the court to acquire jurisdiction over his person; absent valid service or waiver, any judgment is null and void. Because the substituted service was valid, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over petitioner’s person.
• Liberal Construction of the Rules — Liberal construction may be invoked for an excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided it does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. The Court applied this doctrine to reject petitioner’s attempt to set aside the default judgment, since he did not make a reasonable attempt to comply and instead resorted to technicalities after receiving the default order and judgment.

• "The substituted service should be availed only when the defendant cannot be served promptly in person. Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the failure of such efforts. The statement should be made in the proof of service. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. Substituted service is a method extraordinary in character, and hence may be used only as prescribed in the circumstances authorized by statute. Thus, the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by the statute is considered ineffective." — This passage states the strict standard for substituted service, emphasizing that impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown in the proof of service.
• "In the absence of contrary evidence, a presumption exists that a sheriff has regularly performed his official duty. To overcome the presumption arising from the sheriff’s certificate, the evidence must be clear and convincing." — This passage establishes the presumption of regularity and the clear-and-convincing standard needed to rebut it.
• "The return indicates that Joseph David was the "receiving of said office", which sufficiently conveys that he was a person of sufficient age and discretion residing therein, tasked as he is to receive for the office." — This passage applies the substituted-service requirement to the facts, treating the return’s description of Joseph David as sufficient to show he was a competent person in charge.
• "Liberal construction of the Rules may be invoked in situations wherein there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules." — This passage defines the limits of liberal construction, which the Court used to reject petitioner’s attempt to set aside the default judgment.

• Venturanza vs. Court of Appeals, 156 SCRA 305 (1987) — Cited for the rule that impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant and the failure of such efforts in the proof of service; substituted service is extraordinary and statutory requirements must be strictly followed.
• Laus vs. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 688 (1993) — Cited for the requirements of valid substituted service: (a) impossibility of service within a reasonable time, (b) specification of efforts exerted to locate the defendant, and (c) service on a person of sufficient age and discretion residing therein. The Court found the return complied with these requirements.
• Arevalo vs. Quilatan, 116 SCRA 700 (1982) — Cited for the rule that among the two modes of substituted service, the sheriff or process server may choose the mode that will more likely insure the effectiveness of the service.
• Navale vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 705 (1996) — Cited for the presumption that a sheriff has regularly performed official duty and for the requirement that evidence to overcome the sheriff’s certificate must be clear and convincing.
• Republic vs. Hernandez, 253 SCRA 234 (1996) — Cited for the rule on liberal construction of the Rules, which may be invoked for excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading provided it does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance.
• Ramon Orosa, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118698, September 3, 1996 — Cited in the trial court’s observations for the rule that a certificate of service of summons by the sheriff is prima facie evidence of the facts set out therein and must be overcome by clear and convincing evidence.

• Section 6, Rule 14, Revised Rules of Court — General rule: summons shall be served by handing a copy to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. Applied: personal service is preferred; substituted service is only for justifiable causes.
• Section 7, Rule 14, Revised Rules of Court — Substituted service: if, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time, service may be effected by leaving copies at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or at the defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge. Applied: the Court assessed the process server’s return under this provision and found compliance.
• Section 4, Rule 14, Revised Rules of Court — Return: when service has been completed, the server shall, within five days, serve a copy of the return to the plaintiff’s counsel and return the summons to the clerk with proof of service. Applied: the process server’s return served as the proof of service and basis for the presumption of regularity.
• Section 3(m), Rule 131, New Rules on Evidence — Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. Applied: the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court relied on this presumption in upholding the substituted service; petitioner failed to overcome it.
• Section 3(b), Rule 9, Rules of Court — Motion to set aside order of default. Applied: petitioner could have availed of this remedy after receiving the default order but did not.
• Section 2(a), Rule 41, Rules of Court — Ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals. Applied: petitioner could have appealed the trial court’s judgment but did not.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Petition for Review on Certiorari. Applied: this was the procedural vehicle for petitioner’s recourse to the Supreme Court.
• Rule 65, Rules of Court — Petition for Certiorari. Applied: petitioner filed such a petition with the Court of Appeals assailing the trial court’s resolutions.

Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur.