Ty-Delgado vs. HRET

Libel is a crime involving moral turpitude that disqualifies a convicted person from being a candidate and holding public office under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, and a candidate convicted by final judgment of such crime who nonetheless represents himself as eligible in his certificate of candidacy makes a false material representation rendering the certificate void ab initio, such that all votes cast for him are stray votes and the qualified candidate with the highest number of valid votes shall be declared winner.

Petitioner Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado and respondent Philip A. Pichay were rival candidates for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur in the 13 May 2013 elections. Pichay had previously been convicted by final judgment of four counts of libel in Tulfo vs. People of the Philippines (G.R. Nos. 161032 and 161176), a decision promulgated on 16 September 2008 that became final and executory on 1 June 2009. The disqualification of candidates convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude is governed by Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, which bars such persons from being candidates and holding office for five years from service of sentence. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) is constitutionally empowered as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, subject to the Supreme Court's power of review for grave abuse of discretion.

On 16 September 2008, the Supreme Court promulgated its Decision in G.R. Nos. 161032 and 161176, entitled Tulfo vs. People of the Philippines, convicting Philip A. Pichay by final judgment of four counts of libel. In lieu of imprisonment, he was sentenced to pay a fine of ₱6,000 for each count of libel and ₱1,000,000 as moral damages. The Decision became final and executory on 1 June 2009. On 17 February 2011, Pichay paid the ₱1,000,000 in moral damages and the ₱6,000 fine for each count of libel.

On 9 October 2012, Pichay filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur for the 13 May 2013 elections. On 18 February 2013, Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado filed a petition for disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code against Pichay before the Commission on Elections (Comelec), on the ground that Pichay was convicted of libel, a crime involving moral turpitude, and that the five-year period barring him from being a candidate had not yet lapsed when he paid the fine on 17 February 2011. In his Answer dated 4 March 2013, Pichay admitted his conviction by final judgment for four counts of libel but claimed that libel does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. He argued that he did not personally perform the acts prohibited and that his conviction was only by reason of his presumed responsibility as president of the publishing company. He also contended that the petition was actually one to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code and was filed out of time.

On 14 May 2013, Ty-Delgado filed a motion to suspend the proclamation of Pichay before the Comelec. On 16 May 2013, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Surigao del Sur proclaimed Pichay as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur, he having obtained 76,870 votes. Ty-Delgado garnered 55,489 votes, while the third candidate, Victor T. Murillo, obtained 1,777 votes. On 31 May 2013, Ty-Delgado filed an ad cautelam petition for quo warranto before the HRET, reiterating that Pichay was ineligible because he was convicted by final judgment of four counts of libel, a crime involving moral turpitude, and only two years had passed since he served his sentence on 17 February 2011. In his Answer, Pichay claimed that his conviction for libel did not make him ineligible because ineligibility pertained only to lack of qualifications under the Constitution.

On 4 June 2013, the Comelec First Division dismissed the petition for disqualification for lack of jurisdiction. On 16 July 2013, Ty-Delgado manifested her amenability to convert the ad cautelam petition into a regular petition for quo warranto. On 22 October 2013, the preliminary conference took place, and the parties waived the presentation of evidence upon agreement that the case involved only legal issues. The HRET, in its Decision dated 18 March 2015, held that it had jurisdiction over the quo warranto petition but concluded that the circumstances surrounding Pichay's conviction showed that the crime did not involve moral turpitude, since nothing in Tulfo vs. People of the Philippines found that Pichay directly participated in writing the libelous articles aside from being president of the publishing company. The HRET accordingly dismissed the petition and declared Pichay eligible. Ty-Delgado's motion for reconsideration was denied by the HRET in Resolution No. 15-031 dated 3 August 2015.

• Moral Turpitude of Libel: Petitioner argued that the HRET gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the circumstances surrounding Pichay's conviction for libel did not involve moral turpitude, contrary to the factual and legal findings of the Supreme Court in Tulfo vs. People of the Philippines.
• Disqualification Under Section 12: Petitioner maintained that Pichay was ineligible or disqualified from holding the position of Member of the House of Representatives by reason of his conviction for libel, a crime involving moral turpitude, under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code.
• False Material Representation: Petitioner contended that Pichay falsely represented in his certificate of candidacy that he was eligible to run for congressman, because his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude rendered him ineligible or disqualified.
• Void Certificate of Candidacy: Petitioner argued that Pichay should be deemed to have never become a candidate since his certificate of candidacy was void ab initio.
• Second-Placer Doctrine: Petitioner asserted that since the petition for quo warranto questioned the validity of Pichay's candidacy, the jurisprudence on a "second placer" being proclaimed as winner when the certificate of candidacy of the "first placer" is cancelled should apply.
• Declaration as Winner: Petitioner maintained that she was the sole legitimate candidate for the position and must be declared the rightful winner in the 2013 elections and made to assume the said position.

• Nature of Petition and Timeliness: Pichay argued before the Comelec that the petition for disqualification was actually a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code, and was filed out of time.
• Libel Not Necessarily Involving Moral Turpitude: Pichay admitted his conviction by final judgment for four counts of libel but claimed that libel does not necessarily involve moral turpitude.
• No Personal Participation: Pichay insisted that he did not personally perform the acts prohibited and that his conviction for libel was only because of his presumed responsibility as president of the publishing company, and that since he was only the publisher and the penalty was reduced to payment of fine, the circumstances of his conviction did not amount to moral turpitude.
• Ineligibility vs. Disqualification: Pichay claimed before the HRET that his conviction for libel did not make him ineligible because ineligibility pertained only to lack of the qualifications under the Constitution.

• Moral Turpitude: Whether the HRET gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the circumstances surrounding Pichay's conviction for libel did not show that moral turpitude was involved, contrary to the Supreme Court's findings in Tulfo vs. People of the Philippines.
• Disqualification Under Section 12: Whether Pichay was disqualified from holding the position of Member of the House of Representatives by reason of his conviction for libel, a crime involving moral turpitude, under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code.
• False Material Representation: Whether Pichay falsely represented in his certificate of candidacy that he was eligible to run for congressman, rendering his certificate of candidacy subject to cancellation under Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
• Void Ab Initio Certificate of Candidacy: Whether Pichay should be deemed to have never become a candidate since his certificate of candidacy was void ab initio.
• Second-Placer Doctrine: Whether the jurisprudence on a "second placer" being proclaimed as winner should apply, such that Ty-Delgado must be declared the rightful winner and made to assume the position.

• Moral Turpitude: Yes. The HRET gravely abused its discretion in ruling that Pichay's conviction for libel did not involve moral turpitude. Libel has been listed as a crime involving moral turpitude in Zari vs. Flores, and the Supreme Court's own findings in Tulfo vs. People of the Philippines established that Pichay acted with actual malice and reckless disregard of whether the defamatory articles were false.
• Disqualification Under Section 12: Yes. Pichay was disqualified under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code because he was convicted by final judgment of libel, a crime involving moral turpitude. The five-year disqualification period from service of sentence ended only on 16 February 2016, and thus had not lapsed when he filed his certificate of candidacy on 9 October 2012.
• False Material Representation: Yes. Pichay made a false material representation as to his eligibility when he filed his certificate of candidacy, because he knew he had been convicted by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude and was disqualified under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, which is a material fact involving eligibility under Sections 74 and 78.
• Void Ab Initio Certificate of Candidacy: Yes. Pichay's certificate of candidacy was void ab initio, and he was deemed never to have been a candidate at all, because his false material representation of eligibility warranted cancellation under Section 78.
• Second-Placer Doctrine: Yes. Since Pichay was never a valid candidate, all votes cast for him were stray votes, and the qualified candidate who received the highest number of valid votes — Ty-Delgado — was declared the winner.

• Moral Turpitude: Moral turpitude is defined as everything contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals — an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties a person owes to fellowmen or society in general. While not every criminal act involves moral turpitude, crimes mala in se generally involve moral turpitude while crimes mala prohibita do not. In Zari vs. Flores, libel was listed among crimes involving moral turpitude. Libel, as defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, is a public and malicious imputation tending to cause dishonor, discredit, or contempt. Its elements are: (a) allegation of a discreditable act or condition; (b) publication; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice. Malice is the essence of the crime of libel, connoting ill will or spite and an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. In Tulfo vs. People of the Philippines, the Court found that Pichay published four defamatory articles, libelous per se, with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not, and that the publication of another libelous article after the filing of the complaint constituted further evidence of malice. Pichay thus acted with actual malice and intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm, committing an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals. The HRET erred in distinguishing Pichay's criminal liability from that of the other accused merely because he was president of the publishing company rather than the author, because Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code holds the editor or business manager of a newspaper responsible for defamations to the same extent as the author, and the law does not distinguish or graduate the penalty according to the nature or degree of participation. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. The crime of libel would not have been consummated without Pichay's participation as publisher. Furthermore, the imposition of a fine instead of imprisonment does not determine whether the crime involves moral turpitude, as held in Villaber vs. Commission on Elections, where a crime still involved moral turpitude even when imprisonment was reduced to a fine.

• Disqualification Under Section 12: Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code disqualifies any person sentenced by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude from being a candidate and holding any office, unless given plenary pardon or amnesty. The disqualification is removed after the expiration of five years from service of sentence. In Teves vs. Commission on Elections, the five-year period was computed from the date the petitioner paid the fine. Since Pichay served his sentence when he paid the fine on 17 February 2011, the five-year period ended only on 16 February 2016. Pichay was therefore disqualified to become a Member of the House of Representatives when he filed his certificate of candidacy on 9 October 2012 and when he was proclaimed on 16 May 2013.

• False Material Representation: Under Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, a certificate of candidacy must state that the filer is eligible for the office sought, and a verified petition may be filed to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy on the ground that any material representation contained therein is false. In Jalosjos vs. Commission on Elections, the Court held that if a candidate is not actually eligible because he is barred by final judgment in a criminal case from running for public office and still states under oath that he is eligible, the candidate makes a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. Pichay's disqualification under Section 12, which became final on 1 June 2009, was a material fact involving eligibility. When he filed his certificate of candidacy on 9 October 2012, he knew he had been convicted by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude, yet represented himself as eligible. This constituted false material representation as to his qualification or eligibility for the office.

• Void Ab Initio Certificate of Candidacy: A person whose certificate of candidacy has been denied due course and/or cancelled under Section 78 is deemed not to have been a candidate at all, because the certificate is considered void ab initio and cannot give rise to a valid candidacy or valid votes. Since Pichay's ineligibility existed on the day he filed his certificate of candidacy, he was never a valid candidate, and all votes cast for him were stray votes.

• Second-Placer Doctrine: In Jalosjos, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and Aratea vs. Commission on Elections, the Court proclaimed the second placer — the only qualified candidate who actually garnered the highest number of votes — for the position of Mayor, because the certificate of candidacy of the candidate with the highest number of votes was void ab initio, making him never a candidate and rendering all his votes stray. Applying the same doctrine, since Pichay's votes were stray, the qualified candidate who received the highest number of valid votes was Ty-Delgado, who garnered 55,489 votes. The HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it failed to disqualify Pichay, utterly disregarding the law and settled precedents. While the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, the Supreme Court maintains jurisdiction to check whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion.

• Moral Turpitude — Moral turpitude is defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a person owes to fellowmen or to society in general. As a general rule, crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude while crimes mala prohibita do not. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that libel, a crime mala in se whose essence is malice, involves moral turpitude, and that Pichay's conviction for four counts of libel with actual malice and reckless disregard for the truth constituted an act of baseness and depravity contrary to justice, honesty, and good morals.

• Where the Law Does Not Distinguish, Courts Should Not Distinguish — Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code holds the editor or business manager of a newspaper responsible for defamations to the same extent as the author, without distinguishing or graduating the penalty according to the nature or degree of participation. The Court applied this principle to reject Pichay's argument that his liability was lessened because he was merely president of the publishing company and not the author of the libelous articles.

• Reduction of Penalty to Fine Does Not Negate Moral Turpitude — A crime still involves moral turpitude even if the penalty of imprisonment is reduced to a fine, as held in Villaber vs. Commission on Elections. The Court applied this to reject Pichay's contention that the imposition of a fine instead of imprisonment meant his conviction did not involve moral turpitude.

• Five-Year Disqualification Period from Service of Sentence — Under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, the disqualification for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is removed after the expiration of five years from service of sentence. In Teves vs. Commission on Elections, the period was computed from the date the fine was paid. The Court applied this to hold that Pichay's five-year disqualification ended on 16 February 2016, five years from 17 February 2011 when he paid the fine.

• False Material Representation Rendering Certificate of Candidacy Void Ab Initio — A candidate who is barred by final judgment from running for public office and who nonetheless states under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible makes a false material representation under Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The certificate of candidacy is deemed void ab initio, the person is deemed never to have been a candidate, and all votes cast for him are stray votes. The Court applied this to nullify Pichay's candidacy and declare his votes stray.

• Second-Placer Doctrine — When the certificate of candidacy of the candidate with the highest number of votes is void ab initio, that candidate was never a candidate at all, all votes cast for him are stray votes, and the qualified candidate who actually garnered the highest number of valid votes shall be proclaimed winner. The Court applied this to declare Ty-Delgado, who received 55,489 valid votes, the rightful winner.

• Supreme Court's Power to Review HRET for Grave Abuse of Discretion — While the HRET is constitutionally empowered as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, the Supreme Court maintains jurisdiction to check whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion arises when the tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law, or existing jurisprudence.

• "Although not every criminal act involves moral turpitude, the Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude while crimes mala prohibita do not." — This passage articulates the general rule the Court uses to determine whether a crime involves moral turpitude, a principle frequently invoked in disqualification cases.

• "The provision did not distinguish or graduate the penalty according to the nature or degree of the participation of the persons involved in the crime of libel. It is basic in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish." — This passage explains why Pichay's role as publisher rather than author did not diminish his criminal liability or negate moral turpitude, applying the elementary canon of statutory construction.

• "A person whose certificate of candidacy had been denied due course and/or cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all, because his certificate of candidacy is considered void ab initio and thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily to valid votes." — This passage states the canonical formulation of the void ab initio doctrine as applied to certificates of candidacy containing false material representations, a principle central to the second-placer doctrine.

• "While it is well-recognized that the HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the 'sole judge' of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives, the Court maintains jurisdiction over it to check 'whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction' on the part of the latter." — This passage defines the boundary between the HRET's constitutional mandate and the Supreme Court's certiorari jurisdiction, a recurring issue in electoral contests.

• Tulfo vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 161032 and 161176, 587 Phil. 64 (2008) — The controlling conviction establishing Pichay's criminal liability for four counts of libel with actual malice and reckless disregard for truth. The Court relied on its own factual findings in this case to conclude that Pichay's libel conviction involved moral turpitude, directly contradicting the HRET's conclusion.

• Zari vs. Flores, 183 Phil. 27 (1979) — Cited as authority listing libel among crimes involving moral turpitude. Followed as controlling precedent on the classification of libel as a crime of moral turpitude.

• Villaber vs. Commission on Elections, 420 Phil. 930 (2001) — Held that violation of B.P. 22 is a crime involving moral turpitude and, critically, that a crime still involves moral turpitude even when the penalty of imprisonment is reduced to a fine. Followed to reject Pichay's argument that the reduction of his penalty to a fine negated moral turpitude.

• Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections, 327 Phil. 1144 (1996) — Held that the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude. Cited as illustrative authority on the application of the moral turpitude doctrine to specific crimes.

• Magno vs. Commission on Elections, 439 Phil. 339 (2002) — Held that direct bribery involves moral turpitude. Cited as illustrative authority on the moral turpitude doctrine.

• Teves vs. Commission on Elections, 604 Phil. 717 (2009) — Held that the five-year disqualification period under Section 12 is computed from the date the fine was paid. Followed as controlling precedent for computing Pichay's disqualification period from 17 February 2011, the date he paid the fine.

• Jalosjos vs. Commission on Elections, 696 Phil. 601 (2012) — Held that a candidate barred by final judgment from running for public office who states under oath that he is eligible makes a false material representation under Section 78. Followed as controlling precedent for nullifying Pichay's certificate of candidacy.

• Jalosjos, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections — Applied the second-placer doctrine, proclaiming the second placer when the first placer's certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. Followed as controlling precedent for declaring Ty-Delgado the winner.

• Aratea vs. Commission on Elections, 696 Phil. 700 (2012) — Applied the second-placer doctrine, proclaiming the second placer as mayor when the first placer's certificate of candidacy was void ab initio and all his votes were stray. Followed as controlling precedent.

• Fermin vs. Comelec, 595 Phil. 449 (2008) — Likened a Section 78 proceeding to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253, both dealing with eligibility or qualification of a candidate, distinguished by timing relative to proclamation. Followed to support the HRET's jurisdiction over the quo warranto petition and the application of Section 78 principles.

• Tagolino vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 706 Phil. 534 (2013) — Cited for the principle that a Section 78 proceeding is premised on misrepresentation of material qualifications and for the principle that the Supreme Court may review the HRET for grave abuse of discretion. Followed.

• Section 12, Omnibus Election Code — Disqualifies any person sentenced by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude from being a candidate and holding any office, unless granted plenary pardon or amnesty. The disqualification is removed after five years from service of sentence. Applied to disqualify Pichay, whose five-year period from payment of fine on 17 February 2011 had not lapsed when he filed his certificate of candidacy on 9 October 2012.

• Section 74, Omnibus Election Code — Requires the certificate of candidacy to state that the person filing it is eligible for the office sought. Applied to find that Pichay's representation of eligibility was false, given his disqualification under Section 12.

• Section 78, Omnibus Election Code — Provides the remedy to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy on the ground that any material representation required under Section 74 is false. Applied to nullify Pichay's certificate of candidacy as void ab initio for his false material representation of eligibility.

• Article 353, Revised Penal Code — Defines libel as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, vice, defect, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person. Applied to characterize Pichay's conviction as one for a crime whose essence is malice, thus involving moral turpitude.

• Article 360, Revised Penal Code — Provides that any person who publishes, exhibits, or causes the publication or exhibition of any defamation shall be responsible therefor, and that the editor or business manager of a newspaper shall be responsible for defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author. Applied to reject Pichay's argument that his role as publisher rather than author diminished his criminal liability or negated moral turpitude.

• Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Governs the special civil action for certiorari. Invoked as the procedural vehicle for assailing the HRET's decision and resolution for grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

• Rule 17, 2011 HRET Rules — Governs petitions for quo warranto contesting the election of a Member of the House of Representatives on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty, to be filed within fifteen days from proclamation. Cited to confirm the HRET's jurisdiction over Ty-Delgado's quo warranto petition.

Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, and Jardeleza concurred. Chief Justice Sereno and Justices Velasco, Brion, Peralta, and Bersamin took no part.

N/A — No dissenting opinions were filed in the Supreme Court. However, at the HRET level, Justice Lucas P. Bersamin penned the dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, which considered it significant that Pichay raised no issue against libel being a crime involving moral turpitude but took issue only with ascribing moral turpitude to him despite his being only the president of the publishing company.