Tumbaga vs. Atty. Teoxon

A lawyer who maintains an extramarital affair, as established by substantial evidence in administrative proceedings, is guilty of gross immorality warranting suspension from the practice of law, with the duration of suspension depending on the circumstances of the case, including aggravating factors such as deceptive conduct before the courts and disciplinary authorities.

Complainant Gizale O. Tumbaga initially consulted respondent Atty. Manuel P. Teoxon, then the City Legal Officer of Naga City, for legal advice. Respondent was married to Luzviminda Balang, also referred to as Minda B. Teoxon. The administrative complaint was premised on Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the Code of Professional Responsibility, which require that lawyers maintain good moral character from admission to the Bar until retirement and prohibit unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.

Complainant Gizale O. Tumbaga met respondent Atty. Manuel P. Teoxon in September 1999, when he was the City Legal Officer of Naga City and she sought legal advice from him. After several consultations, respondent began visiting complainant's residence frequently, bringing gifts for her son Al Greg Tumbaga, and eventually volunteered to be the child's godfather. During one of these visits, respondent assured complainant's mother that although he was married to Luzviminda Balang, the marriage was a sham because the marriage contract was not registered. Relying on this representation and persuaded by his persistence and generosity toward her son, complainant believed respondent was eligible to marry her.

On December 19, 1999, complainant moved in with respondent at the Puncia Apartment in Naga City. She became pregnant in April 2000; respondent allegedly urged her to abort the baby, but she refused. After their son Billy John was born, respondent spent more time with them, using the apartment as a temporary law office and staying there for two to three days at a time. After Billy John's baptism, complainant secured a Certificate of Live Birth and asked respondent to sign it. He hesitantly signed and volunteered to file it, but failed to do so. Complainant secured another form, had respondent sign it twice, and the Certificate of Live Birth was registered on February 15, 2001. Thereafter, respondent rarely visited. Complainant sought work at a law office in Naga City, but respondent compelled her to resign, promising to provide for her financial needs — a promise he failed to keep.

In the second week of March 2001, complainant sought assistance from the Office of the City Fiscal in Naga City. On the morning of the conference set by that office, respondent gave complainant an affidavit of support and told her there was no need for him to appear. Fiscal Elsa Mampo, who was familiar with respondent's signature, was unsure of the signature on the affidavit and advised complainant to have respondent sign it again. When confronted, respondent half-heartedly affixed his true signature. In May 2001, complainant went to respondent's office after he again reneged on his promise of support; respondent executed a promissory note to appease her, which he also failed to honor. In June 2001, complainant moved out of the Puncia Apartment because respondent stopped paying the rent. On the evening of September 9, 2001, respondent, accompanied by three SWAT members and his wife, raided complainant's new residence. Visibly drunk and carrying a bolo and a lead pipe, he threatened to hurt complainant if she would not return the personal belongings he had left in their previous apartment. One of the SWAT members pacified respondent, and respondent's wife, who also tried to attack complainant, was similarly restrained. The incident was recorded in the police blotter.

Respondent denied the allegations, asserting that complainant merely wanted to extort money from him. He acknowledged being a godfather to Al Greg but denied fathering Billy John, claiming complainant had several live-in partners. He denied cohabiting with complainant, explaining that he merely passed by her house when visiting Representative Sulpicio S. Roco, Jr., for whom he worked as legislative staff, and sometimes left bags of clothing there to save fare money for trips to Quezon City. He claimed complainant refused to return one of his bags, prompting him to file a replevin case, which the MTCC of Naga City decided in his favor. He alleged that complainant forged his signature on the Certificate of Live Birth, the affidavit of support, and the promissory note, and he attached photocopies of his credit card and ATM card to demonstrate his customary signature. He further claimed that politics motivated the complaint, as complainant worked for then-Representative Luis Villafuerte, the political opponent of Representative Roco.

The MTCC decision in the replevin case, which respondent himself attached to his answer, proved pivotal. Although the MTCC ruled in respondent's favor on the issue of ownership, it expressly disbelieved his explanation for leaving his bag of clothing at complainant's residence, noting that he had three residences in Naga City and had no reason to leave his shirts and underwear with a woman he claimed to have visited "only twice." The MTCC further found that the furniture respondent sought to recover — a brass bed with foam mattress, a plastic dining table with six chairs, a brass sala set with center table, and a plastic drawer — were bought by respondent but given to complainant as gifts of love, not as items for which reimbursement was expected. The MTCC observed that respondent "could deny all the way up to high heaven" that he had a child with complainant, but questioned why she would refuse to part with his shirts and pants unless she were an extortionist — which the court did not find her to be.

• Gross Immorality: Complainant maintained that respondent carried on an extramarital affair with her, representing himself as eligible to marry her by claiming his existing marriage was a sham due to non-registration of the marriage contract.
• Cohabitation: Complainant asserted that she and respondent lived together as husband and wife at the Puncia Apartment from December 1999 until June 2001, and that respondent used the apartment as a temporary law office.
• Paternity and Support: Complainant alleged that respondent fathered her second son Billy John, as evidenced by the Certificate of Live Birth bearing his signature, an affidavit of support, and a promissory note — all of which respondent failed to honor.
• Deceitful and Fraudulent Conduct: Complainant charged respondent with deceitful and fraudulent conduct, pointing to his false representation of marital eligibility, his failure to provide support despite repeated promises, and the violent September 9, 2001 raid on her residence.

• Extortion Motive: Respondent argued that complainant merely wanted to exact money from him, citing an affidavit from complainant's uncle Antonio Orogo alleging that complainant and her mother had engaged in a practice of extorting money from various men since complainant was 11 years old.
• Denial of Cohabitation: Respondent denied living with complainant at the Puncia Apartment, asserting that he was already married and that complainant was merely his kumadre (co-godparent); he claimed he only passed by her house when visiting Representative Roco and occasionally left bags of clothing there to save fare money.
• Denial of Paternity: Respondent denied fathering Billy John, claiming complainant had several live-in partners, and alleged that complainant forged his signature on the Certificate of Live Birth, the affidavit of support, and the promissory note.
• Impossibility of Notarization: Respondent contended that it was physically impossible for him to have appeared before Notary Public Vicente Estala on February 15, 2001, to acknowledge paternity, as he attended a hearing at the RTC of Libmanan, Camarines Sur on that date.
• Photographs as Extortion Evidence: Respondent argued that the photographs showing him with Billy John were surreptitiously taken by complainant to extort money from him, and that the pictures could not prove paternity.
• Political Motivation: Respondent alleged that politics was involved in the filing of the complaint, as complainant worked for then-Representative Luis Villafuerte, the political opponent of Representative Roco, whose staff respondent belonged to.
• Procedural Objection to Photographs: Respondent argued in his motion for reconsideration before the IBP that the photographs were not conclusive and their admission violated the Rules of Court because nobody testified on the circumstances of their taking and accuracy.

• Gross Immorality: Whether respondent committed gross immorality warranting disciplinary action, as established by substantial evidence.
• Paternity of Billy John: Whether respondent's paternity of Billy John was sufficiently established in the administrative proceedings.
• Proper Penalty: Whether the penalty of three-year suspension from the practice of law was appropriate under the circumstances.

• Gross Immorality: Yes. Substantial evidence — including the MTCC's findings in the replevin case, photographs showing intimate relations, and documentary evidence — established that respondent maintained an extramarital affair with complainant, constituting gross immorality under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
• Paternity of Billy John: Not ruled upon. Paternity was not sufficiently established by the evidence presented in the administrative case; the issue must be alleged and proved in separate proceedings before the proper tribunal.
• Proper Penalty: Three-year suspension. The penalty was warranted given respondent's blatant attempts to deceive the courts and the IBP regarding his true relationship with complainant, justifying an increase from the two-year penalty applied in cases without such aggravating circumstances.

• Gross Immorality: The Court applied the standard that immoral conduct must be not merely immoral but grossly immoral — so corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree — to warrant disciplinary action. The principal piece of evidence was the MTCC decision in the replevin case, which respondent himself had attached to his answer. Although the MTCC ruled in respondent's favor on ownership, it expressly disbelieved his explanation for leaving clothing at complainant's residence and found that the furniture he sought to recover were gifts of love, not items for reimbursement. The Court found no reason to mistrust the MTCC's observations, which were arrived at after a trial on the merits, and noted that the replevin case and the administrative case shared a common factual backdrop — the parties' contrasting accounts of their relationship. The photographs further demonstrated an unmistakable closeness between complainant and respondent, showing them seated beside each other with arms touching and with complainant embracing respondent from behind, both looking directly at the camera. Respondent failed to explain these photographs and his claim that they were surreptitiously taken was contradicted by the angles and the subjects' direct gaze at the camera. The affidavit of support and promissory note, which respondent claimed were forged, were not convincingly refuted: the Court compared his sample signatures on his credit card and ATM card not only to the disputed documents but also to his signatures on pleadings before the IBP, and found that the signatures across all sets appeared dissimilar, suggesting respondent used several different signatures. Respondent also failed to file criminal charges for the alleged falsification. The affidavit of Antonio Orogo, which respondent offered to rebut the allegations, was given no evidentiary value because Orogo was never presented as a witness for cross-examination, rendering the affidavit hearsay. The affidavits of Representative Roco and respondent's wife, executed only on June 15, 2009 — approximately four months after the IBP Board of Governors had already found respondent culpable — were likewise accorded little weight due to their belated execution. Under the doctrine that the burden of evidence shifts to the respondent when his moral character is assailed, respondent was duty-bound to meet the charges decisively and present evidence of his moral fitness; mere denial did not suffice. He failed to provide concrete corroboration of his denials or satisfactorily prove his extortion claim.

• Paternity of Billy John: The Court found that paternity was not sufficiently established by the evidence presented in the administrative case. The photographs, while indicative of a romantic relationship, could not prove paternity. The Certificate of Live Birth containing an Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity was the subject of a separate complaint for cancellation of acknowledgment filed by respondent, and the Court declined to discuss the validity of his signature thereon, leaving the issue to be threshed out in the proper proceeding before the proper tribunal.

• Proper Penalty: The Court applied the principle that the penalty for immoral conduct — whether disbarment, indefinite suspension, or definite suspension — depends on the circumstances of the case. In Samaniego vs. Ferrer, the Court recognized suspension for two years as adequate for gross immorality in the absence of aggravating circumstances such as an adulterous relationship coupled with refusal to support one's family, maintaining illicit relationships with at least two women during the marriage, or abandoning one's legal wife. Here, the Court agreed with the IBP Board of Governors that a three-year suspension was proper, not merely because of the illicit affair itself, but because of respondent's "blatant attempts to deceive the courts and the IBP regarding his true relationship with complainant." Technical rules of procedure and evidence were not strictly applied in the administrative proceedings, as administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.

• Gross Immorality as Ground for Disciplinary Action — Immoral conduct that is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community constitutes gross immorality warranting suspension or disbarment. To be the basis of disciplinary action, such conduct must be so corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or committed under scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. The Court applied this standard to find respondent's extramarital affair, established by substantial evidence, to be grossly immoral.

• Substantial Evidence Standard in Administrative Proceedings — In administrative cases against members of the Bar, guilt must be established by substantial evidence, defined as that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The Court found substantial evidence in the MTCC replevin decision, photographs, and documentary evidence.

• Shifting Burden of Evidence in Disciplinary Proceedings — While the burden of proof is upon the complainant, the respondent has the duty to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of the Bar. When his moral character is assailed such that his right to continue practicing law is imperiled, he must meet the charges squarely and present evidence to the satisfaction of the investigating body and the Court. Mere denial does not suffice. The Court applied this principle from Narag vs. Narag to hold that respondent failed to discharge this burden.

• Hearsay Affidavits in Administrative Proceedings — Unless affiants themselves take the witness stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits, those affidavits must be excluded as hearsay. The Court applied this rule to deny evidentiary value to the affidavit of Antonio Orogo, who was never presented for cross-examination.

• Relaxation of Technical Rules in Administrative Proceedings — Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied in administrative proceedings; administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. The Court invoked this principle to uphold the admission of photographs despite respondent's objection that no one testified on the circumstances of their taking.

• "Immoral conduct has been described as conduct that is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. To be the basis of disciplinary action, such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency." — This passage provides the canonical formulation of gross immorality as a ground for disciplinary action against lawyers, quoted from Advincula vs. Advincula and applied to the facts of this case.

• "While the burden of proof is upon the complainant, respondent has the duty not only to himself but also to the court to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of the bar. Mere denial does not suffice." — This passage articulates the shifting burden of evidence in disbarment proceedings, placing an affirmative duty on the respondent to prove moral fitness when his character is assailed.

• "It is not difficult to manufacture charges in the affidavits, hence, it is imperative that their truthfulness and veracity be tested in the crucible of thorough examination. The hornbook doctrine is that unless the affiants themselves take the witness stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits, those affidavits must be excluded from the proceedings for being inadmissible and hearsay." — This passage, quoted from Boyboy vs. Yabut, establishes the rule that untested affidavits are inadmissible hearsay, applied to deny evidentiary weight to Orogo's affidavit.

• Advincula vs. Advincula, A.C. No. 9226, June 14, 2016, 793 SCRA 237 — Followed. Provided the formulation of gross immorality and the principle that good moral character must be maintained from admission to retirement, as well as the citation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7, and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

• Samaniego vs. Ferrer, 578 Phil. 1 (2008) — Followed. Established that the penalty for immoral conduct — disbarment, indefinite suspension, or definite suspension — depends on the circumstances of the case, and that two-year suspension is adequate absent aggravating circumstances.

• Ferancullo vs. Ferancullo, Jr., 538 Phil. 501 (2006) — Followed. Cited for the proposition that two-year suspension was adequate for gross immorality absent aggravating circumstances, and for the principle that technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied in administrative proceedings.

• Narag vs. Narag, 353 Phil. 643 (1998) — Followed. Established that when a lawyer's moral character is assailed, the burden of evidence shifts to him to prove moral fitness, and mere denial does not suffice.

• Boyboy vs. Yabut, 449 Phil. 664 (2003) — Followed. Provided the hornbook doctrine that affidavits not testified to by their affiants are inadmissible hearsay, applied to exclude Orogo's affidavit.

• Re: Rafael Dimaano, A.M. No. 17-03-03-CA & IPI No. 17-258-CA-J, July 11, 2017 — Followed. Cited for the definition of substantial evidence as that amount of relevant evidence a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

• Reyes vs. Nieva, A.C. No. 8560, September 6, 2016, 802 SCRA 196 — Followed. Cited for the proposition that guilt in administrative proceedings must be established by substantial evidence.

• Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court — Authorizes the Supreme Court to disbar or suspend a member of the Bar for, among other grounds, grossly immoral conduct, deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct. Applied as the statutory basis for finding respondent liable and imposing the penalty of suspension.

• Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility — Provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. Applied to characterize respondent's extramarital affair as prohibited immoral conduct.

• Canon 7, Code of Professional Responsibility — Provides that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. Applied to underscore the expectation that lawyers must not only be of good moral character but must also be seen to be so.

• Rule 7.03, Code of Professional Responsibility — Provides that a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession, whether in public or private life. Applied to hold respondent's extramarital affair and deceptive conduct as adversely reflecting on his fitness to practice law.

Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen wrote a concurring opinion, the text of which is not included in the provided case material. The following justices concurred: Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chairperson), Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza, Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, Associate Justice Samuel R. Martires, Associate Justice Noel Gimenez Tijam, Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., and Associate Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo.