Tuates vs. Bersamin

An absolute and express repeal of a penal law extinguishes both the criminal and civil liabilities arising from the repealed offense, because where there is no crime, no civil liability ex delicto can attach; the civil liability being rooted in the criminal, the extinction of the former necessarily extinguishes the latter.

Petitioners Prescilla Tuates and Andres de la Paz were charged with and convicted of violating Presidential Decree No. 772, the Anti-Squatting Law, which penalized squatting and other similar acts. Private respondent I.C. Construction, Inc. claimed ownership of the land occupied by petitioners. While petitioners' appeal from their MTC conviction was pending before the RTC, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8368, the "Anti-Squatting Law Repeal Act of 1997," which expressly and unconditionally repealed P.D. 772 and mandated the dismissal of all pending cases under the old law. The dispute centered on whether this repeal extinguished only the criminal liability or both the criminal and civil aspects of the pending cases.

Petitioners Prescilla Tuates and Andres de la Paz were charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 772, the Anti-Squatting Law, before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 38, in Criminal Cases Nos. 38-0130 and 38-0131. The cases arose from petitioners' alleged illegal occupation of land claimed by private respondent I.C. Construction, Inc. After trial, the MTC convicted petitioners on December 16, 1996.

Petitioners appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96, which affirmed the conviction in toto in its decision dated September 10, 1997, in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-97-70428 and Q-97-70429. Pending resolution of petitioners' motion for reconsideration before the RTC, Republic Act No. 8368 — the "Anti-Squatting Law Repeal Act of 1997" — was enacted on October 27, 1997. The law expressly and unconditionally repealed P.D. 772 and provided in Section 3 that all pending cases under P.D. 772 shall be dismissed upon the effectivity of the Act.

In its Order dated January 28, 1998, the RTC ruled that only petitioners' criminal convictions were extinguished by R.A. 8368, while the civil aspect — specifically the removal of petitioners' illegally constructed house and improvements — remained executory against them. Petitioners elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review in CA-G.R. SP No. 46845. The Court of Appeals sustained the RTC's ruling and denied due course to the petition in its decision dated April 30, 1999; petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on June 9, 1999. Petitioners then filed the present petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, contending that the repeal of P.D. 772 extinguished both the criminal and civil aspects of the cases against them.

• Extinction of Both Criminal and Civil Liability: Petitioners argued that the express repeal of P.D. 772 by R.A. 8368 absolves them of any criminal or civil liability, the repeal being absolute and categorical.
• Error of the Lower Courts: Petitioners maintained that the RTC and the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the civil aspect of the judgment remained executory despite the repeal.
• Ignorance of Applicable Laws and Jurisprudence: Petitioners contended that the Court of Appeals grossly erred in ignoring applicable laws and jurisprudence when it affirmed the RTC's Order.

• Civil Liability Survives Repeal: Private respondent insisted that only criminal liability was extinguished by the repeal, while civil liability remained in accordance with Article 113 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that the offender shall continue to be obliged to satisfy civil liability resulting from the crime except in case of extinction of civil liability as provided in the preceding article.
• Title Already Adjudged: Private respondent argued that the petition should be denied due course because its title to the subject land had already been adjudged in its favor.

• Effect of Repeal on Criminal Liability: Whether the express and absolute repeal of P.D. 772 by R.A. 8368 extinguished the criminal liability of petitioners.
• Effect of Repeal on Civil Liability: Whether the repeal of P.D. 772 likewise extinguished the civil liability arising from the violation thereof, or whether the civil aspect remained executory as held by the lower courts.

• Effect of Repeal on Criminal Liability: Yes. The express, categorical, definite, and absolute repeal of P.D. 772 under Section 2 of R.A. 8368 obliterated the offense of squatting, depriving courts of authority to punish persons charged under the old law.
• Effect of Repeal on Civil Liability: Yes. Civil liability ex delicto was likewise extinguished, being rooted in the criminal liability; where there is no crime, no civil liability arising from the crime can subsist.

• Effect of Repeal on Criminal Liability: The repeal of P.D. 772 by R.A. 8368 was explicit, categorical, definite, and absolute. An unqualified repeal of a penal law constitutes a legislative act of rendering legal what had been previously declared illegal, such that the offense no longer exists and it is as if the person who committed it never did so. Section 3 of R.A. 8368 unconditionally mandated the dismissal of all pending cases under P.D. 772 upon the effectivity of the Act. The clear intent of the legislature was to decriminalize squatting. In People vs. Leachon, Jr., the Court had implicitly recognized this unconditional repeal when it ordered the dismissal of a pending petition solely because of the enactment of R.A. 8368. Accordingly, petitioners' criminal liability was extinguished.

• Effect of Repeal on Civil Liability: Because the absolute repeal obliterated the offense entirely, there being no criminal liability, there could likewise be no civil liability ex delicto, as the latter is rooted in the former. Where an act or omission is not a crime, no person can be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question. The Court rejected private respondent's reliance on Article 113 of the Revised Penal Code, as that provision presupposes the existence of a crime from which civil liability flows. The Court noted, however, that the repeal did not grant unbridled license to illegally occupy lands; legitimate landowners retained recourse under R.A. 7279 (against professional squatters and squatting syndicates), the Revised Penal Code (trespass to property, usurpation of real rights), the Rules of Court (forcible entry and unlawful detainer), and the Civil Code (damages).

• Absolute Repeal of Penal Law — An unqualified or absolute repeal of a penal law renders legal what had previously been declared illegal, such that the offense no longer exists and it is as if the person who committed it never did so. The court is deprived of authority to punish a person charged under the repealed law. Applied in this case, the express and unconditional repeal of P.D. 772 by R.A. 8368 obliterated the crime of squatting, extinguishing criminal liability for all pending cases.
• Civil Liability Ex Delicto — Civil liability arising from a crime is rooted in the criminal liability; where there is no crime, no civil liability ex delicto can attach. The extinction of criminal liability by repeal of the penal law necessarily extinguishes the civil liability predicated on that crime. Applied here, because the repeal of P.D. 772 eliminated the offense, the civil aspect (removal of structures) predicated on that offense could not survive independently.

• "The repeal of P.D. No. 772 under Section 2 of R.A. No. 8368 is explicit, categorical, definite and absolute. As such, the act that was penalized by P.D. 772, i.e., squatting, ceases to be criminal under R.A. 8368, and the previous offense is obliterated." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on the effect of an absolute repeal of a penal law on the existence of the offense.

• "Hence, there being no criminal liability, there is likewise no civil liability because the latter is rooted in the former. Where an act or omission is not a crime, no person can be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, logically, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question." — This is the canonical formulation of the Court's ruling that civil liability ex delicto cannot survive the extinction of criminal liability through repeal.

• "This is not to say, however, that people now have the unbridled license to illegally occupy lands they do not own." — This qualifying statement clarifies that the repeal does not abolish property rights or the remedies available to landowners under other laws.

• People vs. Pimentel, 288 SCRA 542 (1998) — Cited for the proposition that an absolute repeal of a penal law deprives courts of authority to punish persons charged under the old law, as the offense no longer exists.
• Benedicto vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125359, September 4, 2001 — Cited for the principle that an unqualified repeal of a penal law constitutes a legislative act of rendering legal what had been previously declared illegal.
• Manantan vs. Court of Appeals, 350 SCRA 387 (2001) — Cited for the principle that where there is no crime, no civil liability ex delicto can attach.
• People vs. Leachon, Jr., 296 SCRA 163 (1998) — Cited as implicit recognition of the unconditional repeal of P.D. 772, where the Court ordered dismissal of a pending petition solely because of the enactment of R.A. 8368.

• Section 2, Republic Act No. 8368 (Anti-Squatting Law Repeal Act of 1997) — Expressly and absolutely repealed P.D. 772. The Court found the repeal to be "explicit, categorical, definite and absolute," thereby obliterating the offense of squatting.
• Section 3, Republic Act No. 8368 — Mandated that all pending cases under P.D. 772 shall be dismissed upon the effectivity of the Act. The Court relied on this provision to conclude that the legislature clearly intended to decriminalize squatting and dismiss all pending cases.
• Article 113, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the offender shall continue to be obliged to satisfy civil liability resulting from the crime, except in case of extinction of civil liability. Private respondent relied on this provision, but the Court effectively held it inapplicable because there was no subsisting crime to which civil liability could attach.
• Section 27, Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act) — Cited as an alternative remedy for landowners, penalizing professional squatters and squatting syndicates, expressly preserved by Section 4 of R.A. 8368.
• Article 281, Revised Penal Code (Trespass to Property) — Identified as an available remedy for landowners whose property rights are violated.
• Article 312, Revised Penal Code (Occupation of Real Property or Usurpation of Real Rights in Property) — Identified as another available criminal remedy for landowners.
• Rule 70, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Identified as providing civil remedies for forcible entry and unlawful detainer available to landowners.

Bellosillo, Acting C.J. (Chairman), Quisumbing, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concurred. Mendoza, J., was on official leave.