Tuason vs. Register of Deeds

Presidential Decree No. 293 is unconstitutional and void ab initio because it was issued by the President in the exercise of judicial power not vested in him by the Constitution and because it deprived property owners of their titles without notice, hearing, or due process and without compensation.

Petitioner spouses Roman C. Tuason and Remedios V. Tuason were retired public school teachers who purchased a lot in the Carmel Farms, Inc. subdivision in Caloocan City. The land formed part of the Tala Estate, one of the so-called "Friar Lands," which Carmel had bought from the Government under Act No. 1120 and C.A. No. 32, as amended. Those statutes reserved title in the Government until full payment of the purchase price and made any prior sale or encumbrance invalid as against the Government; on default, the Government could enforce its lien by foreclosure. The dispute also involved members of the Consuelo Heights Homeowners Association, who claimed to have been divested of their lands by the same decree.

Petitioner spouses Roman C. Tuason and Remedios V. Tuason were retired public school teachers. On April 6, 1965, using funds pooled from their retirement benefits and savings, they bought from Carmel Farms, Inc. a parcel of land measuring about 8,756 square meters in Carmel's subdivision in Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan City. In virtue of that sale, Carmel's Torrens title No. 64007 over the lot was cancelled and a new title, No. 8314, was issued in the Tuasons' names. The Tuasons took possession of the property.

The land that Carmel had subdivided was part of the Tala Estate, one of the so-called "Friar Lands," which Carmel had bought from the Government under Act No. 1120 and C.A. No. 32, as amended. Under those statutes, until the price was fully paid, title remained in the Government, and any sale or encumbrance made by the purchaser before full payment was invalid as against the Government and subordinate to its prior claim; on default, the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands had the duty to bring suit to enforce the Government's lien by selling the land as in foreclosure. On September 14, 1973, President Ferdinand Marcos, invoking emergency powers, issued Presidential Decree No. 293 with immediate effect.

Presidential Decree No. 293 found that, according to the records of the Bureau of Lands, neither the original purchasers nor their subsequent transferees had made full payment of all installments of the purchase money and interest on the lots claimed by Carmel, including those on which the dwellings of the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association stood. It adjudged that title to the land remained with the Government and that the land occupied by the association members had never ceased to form part of the property of the Republic; all acts purporting to segregate it were null and void ab initio. The decree cancelled sales contracts between the Government and the original purchasers, and between the latter and subsequent transferees, declared all transfers covering specified lots invalid and null and void ab initio as against the Government, declared Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 62603, 62604, and 62605 in Carmel's name invalid and cancelled as against the Government, and declared the lots open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc., the present bona fide occupants, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 32, as amended.

The decree also acknowledged that the lots in the Carmel Subdivision were occupied by the buyers and that the latter's dwellings stood thereon, yet declared the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. to be the present bona fide occupants. On the strength of Presidential Decree No. 293, the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City inscribed on the Tuasons' Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8314 a memorandum stating that, pursuant to the decree, the certificate of title was declared invalid and null and void ab initio and considered cancelled as against the Government, and that the property was declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. The Tuasons discovered that they were no longer owners of the land they had purchased.

The Tuasons filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Sixty-four persons, members of the "Consuelo Heights Homeowners Association" headed by Tomasa Bartolome, later filed petitions for intervention, claiming that they too had been divested of their lands by Presidential Decree No. 293 and adopting the Tuasons' allegations and prayer. The Court noted that Marcos had made the factual findings ostensibly on the basis of "the records of the Bureau of Lands," but the Tuasons and petitioners-intervenors were never confronted with those records and were not afforded a chance to dispute their trustworthiness or present countervailing evidence. No trial was conducted at which interested parties could adduce evidence on the material facts.

• Due Process and Eminent Domain: Petitioners assailed Presidential Decree No. 293 as an arbitrary measure depriving them of their property in favor of a selected group, violating the constitutional provisions on due process and eminent domain.
• Indefeasibility of Torrens Titles: Petitioners invoked the provisions of the Land Registration Act on the indefeasibility of Torrens titles.
• Relief Sought: Petitioners prayed that the Register of Deeds be directed to cancel the derogatory inscription on their title and restore its efficacy, or in the alternative that they be compensated for the loss from the Assurance Fund.
• Intervenors' Position: Petitioners-intervenors, members of the Consuelo Heights Homeowners Association headed by Tomasa Bartolome, adopted as their own the allegations and prayer in the Tuasons' petition.

• Propriety of Certiorari: The Solicitor General questioned the propriety of certiorari because the public respondents were not being sued as judicial or quasi-judicial officers who had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.
• No Unjust Deprivation: He opined that petitioners had no cause to complain of unjust deprivation because in legal contemplation they had never become owners due to non-payment of the purchase price by their predecessor-in-interest.
• Social Justice and Police Power: He argued that the decree was justifiable under the social justice clause of the Constitution and the police power, being a response to the pressing housing need of employees of the Office of the President who were left homeless and landless after they were asked to vacate Malacanang Park.
• Assurance Fund: He expressed the view that petitioners were not entitled to recover anything from the Assurance Fund.

• Propriety of Certiorari and Prohibition: Whether the petition for certiorari could properly be entertained against Presidential Decree No. 293 and its implementation, or treated as a petition for prohibition.
• Exercise of Judicial Power: Whether then-President Marcos, in issuing Presidential Decree No. 293, exercised judicial power not vested in him by the Constitution.
• Due Process: Whether Presidential Decree No. 293 deprived petitioners of property without due process of law because it adjudicated their rights without notice, trial, or opportunity to present evidence.
• Eminent Domain and Compensation: Whether Presidential Decree No. 293 constituted a taking of private property without due process and without compensation.
• Social Justice and Police Power: Whether Presidential Decree No. 293 was a valid exercise of social justice or police power.
• Indefeasibility of Torrens Title: Whether the title issued to Carmel Farms, Inc. and the titles derived by petitioners must be respected pending a proper suit by the Government.
• Class Suit: Whether petitioners-intervenors were properly covered by the judgment as a class suit.

• Propriety of Certiorari and Prohibition: Yes. The petition was in reality directed against an unlawful exercise of judicial power; certiorari could issue, and the petition could also be treated as one for prohibition.
• Exercise of Judicial Power: No. Marcos was never vested with judicial power, which was vested in the Supreme Court and inferior courts established by law; his acts were without jurisdiction and void.
• Due Process: Yes. The adjudication was based on Bureau of Lands records without trial, and petitioners were never confronted with those records or given a chance to dispute them.
• Eminent Domain and Compensation: Yes. Presidential Decree No. 293 took private property without due process and without compensation, from persons relying on the indefeasibility of their titles.
• Social Justice and Police Power: No. The decree was not a licit application of social justice or police power; it was a disguised stratagem to favor a few individuals.
• Indefeasibility of Torrens Title: Yes. The title issued to Carmel created a presumption of regular performance of official duty; until a proper government suit, Carmel's title and petitioners' purchases must be respected.
• Class Suit: Yes. The intervenors' petition fulfilled the requisites for a class suit and was given due course, so they are covered by the judgment.

• Propriety of Certiorari and Prohibition: Rule 65, Section 1, provides that certiorari lies against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions, while Section 2 provides that prohibition lies against proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person exercising judicial or ministerial functions. The petition was in reality directed against an unlawful exercise of judicial power. Marcos made a determination of facts and applied the law to those facts, declaring the legal rights of the parties. These acts constitute a judicial function, or an exercise of jurisdiction — the power and authority to hear or try and decide or determine a cause. Since Marcos was never vested with judicial power, the judicial acts were without jurisdiction. The Court could treat the petition for certiorari as one for prohibition if the averments sufficiently made out a case for prohibition. Relief may be granted as may be proper and efficacious even if not specifically prayed for, the permissible relief being determined by the basic averments of the pleadings. Precedents cited include Felipe vs. Leuterio, Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Yap Tico, Lambert vs. Fox, Herrera vs. Barreto, Conchada vs. Director of Prisons, U.S. vs. Limsiongco, Reynolds vs. Stockton, Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista, Cruz vs. C.I.R., Citizens Labor Union vs. C.I.R., Ras vs. Sua, Alelaya vs. Espanola, and Cultura vs. Tapucar.
• Exercise of Judicial Power: The decree reveals that Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. He adjudged as an established fact that neither the original purchasers nor their subsequent transferees had made full payment of all installments of the purchase money and interest on the lots claimed by Carmel. Applying the law to that situation, he adjudicated that title to the land remained with the Government, that the land had never ceased to form part of the property of the Republic, and that acts purporting to segregate it were null and void ab initio. Judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law. Marcos was never vested with judicial power; his acts were completely alien to his office as chief executive and utterly beyond the permissible scope of the legislative power he had assumed as head of the martial law regime. The acts were therefore indisputably perpetrated without jurisdiction.
• Due Process: Marcos assumed to exercise power — determining the relevant facts and applying the law — without a trial at which all interested parties were accorded the opportunity to adduce evidence to furnish the basis for a determination of the facts material to the controversy. He made the finding ostensibly on the basis of "the records of the Bureau of Lands." There was no indication of the nature and reliability of those records, and they were in no sense conclusive. The Tuasons and petitioners-intervenors were never confronted with those records and were not afforded a chance to dispute their trustworthiness and present countervailing evidence. This was a fatal defect, and the adjudication was patently and grossly violative of the right to due process.
• Eminent Domain and Compensation: The decree was not a licit instance of the application of social justice principles or the exercise of police power. It was in truth a disguised, vile stratagem deliberately resorted to favor a few individuals, in callous and disdainful disregard of the rights of others. It was in reality a taking of private property without due process and without compensation whatever, from persons relying on the indefeasibility of their titles in accordance with and as explicitly guaranteed by law.
• Social Justice and Police Power: The Solicitor General's justification under social justice and police power was rejected. The decree was not a valid exercise of those powers; it favored a few individuals and disregarded the rights of others. It was a taking of private property without due process and without compensation.
• Indefeasibility of Torrens Title: Title to the land purchased by Carmel was actually issued to it by the Government. This gives rise to the strong presumption that official duty has been regularly performed — the ascertainment by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands of the fulfillment of the condition prescribed by law for such issuance, namely, payment in full of the price together with all accrued interest. Against this presumption there was no evidence, so it must be accorded full sway. The title having been duly issued to Carmel, it became effective in the manner provided in Section 122 of the Land Registration Act. It may be that Carmel failed to make full payment; if so, the Government may bring suit to recover unpaid installments and interest, invalidate any sale or encumbrance, and enforce its lien by selling the land in the manner provided by Act No. 190 for the foreclosure of mortgages. Prescription does not lie against the Government. But until and unless such a suit is brought and results in a judgment favorable to the Government, the acquisition of title by Carmel and the purchases by petitioners and petitioners-intervenors must be respected. The eventuation of that contingency cannot affect the conclusion of unconstitutionality and invalidity of Presidential Decree No. 293 and the absolute lack of any right to the land on the part of the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc.
• Class Suit: The requisites are: (1) the subject matter of the controversy is of common or general interest to many persons; (2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court; and (3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class. Section 12, Rule 3, Rules of Court; Sulo ng Bayan, Inc. vs. Araneta, 72 SCRA 347. The petition to intervene substantially fulfilled these requirements and was given due course, so the intervenors are covered by the judgment.

• Judicial Power and Separation of Powers — Under the 1973 Constitution, judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court and inferior courts established by law. A presidential decree that determines facts, applies law, and adjudicates legal rights is an exercise of judicial power. If issued by the President, who was not vested with judicial power, it is without jurisdiction and void. Applied to Presidential Decree No. 293.
• Due Process in Property Adjudications — No person may be deprived of property without notice, hearing, and opportunity to adduce evidence. A finding based on records not disclosed to affected parties, without trial, violates due process. Applied to Marcos' adjudication based on Bureau of Lands records.
• Taking Without Due Process and Compensation — Private property may not be taken without due process and just compensation. Social justice and police power cannot justify an arbitrary transfer of property to a selected group. Applied to Presidential Decree No. 293.
• Indefeasibility of Torrens Title and Presumption of Regularity — A Torrens title issued by the Government is presumed regularly issued; official duty is presumed regularly performed. Until the Government brings a proper suit to enforce its lien, the title and derived purchases must be respected. Applied to Carmel's title and the Tuasons' title.
• Class Suit Requisites — (1) common or general interest to many persons; (2) parties affected so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court; (3) parties bringing the class suit sufficiently numerous or representative of the class. Applied to the petitioners-intervenors.

• "The decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. He made a determination of facts, and applied the law to those facts, declaring what the legal rights of the parties were in the premises." — This states the basis for treating Presidential Decree No. 293 as a judicial act subject to certiorari and prohibition and for holding that Marcos acted without jurisdiction.
• "Since Mr. Marcos was never vested with judicial power, such power, as everyone knows, being vested in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law — the judicial acts done by him were in the circumstances indisputably perpetrated without jurisdiction." — This is the core holding on separation of powers and the lack of presidential judicial power.
• "The adjudication was patently and grossly violative of the right to due process to which the petitioners are entitled in virtue of the Constitution." — This states the due process violation arising from adjudicating property rights without trial or opportunity to dispute the Bureau of Lands records.
• "It was in reality a taking of private property without due process and without compensation whatever, from persons relying on the indefeasibility of their titles in accordance with and as explicitly guaranteed by law." — This rejects the social justice and police power justification and characterizes the decree as an unconstitutional taking.

• Felipe vs. Leuterio, L-4606, May 30, 1952 — Cited in support of the proposition that the acts of Marcos constituted a judicial function.
• Herrera vs. Barreto, 25 Phil. 245 — Cited for the definition of jurisdiction as the power and authority to hear or try and decide or determine a cause.
• Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista, 84 Phil. 101 — Cited for treating a petition for certiorari as one for prohibition.
• Ras vs. Sua, 25 SCRA 153 — Cited for granting proper relief even if not specifically prayed for.
• Sulo ng Bayan, Inc. vs. Araneta, 72 SCRA 347 — Cited for the requisites of a class suit.

• Rule 65, Sections 1 and 2, Rules of Court — Certiorari and prohibition; the Court held that certiorari could issue against an unlawful exercise of judicial power and that the petition could be treated as one for prohibition.
• Article X, Section 1, 1973 Constitution — Judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court and inferior courts established by law; Marcos was not vested with judicial power, so Presidential Decree No. 293 was void.
• Article IV, Sections 1 and 2, 1973 Constitution — Due process and eminent domain; Presidential Decree No. 293 violated due process and took property without compensation.
• Sections 39 and 47, Act No. 496, The Land Registration Act — Indefeasibility of Torrens titles; invoked by petitioners and respected by the Court.
• Sections 11, 12, 13, 15, Act No. 1120 — Friar Lands purchase; title reserved in the Government until full payment, sales or encumbrances before full payment invalid as against the Government, and default allowed foreclosure. The Court used these provisions to explain the Government's remedy.
• Sections 15 and 17, Act No. 1120 — The Government may sue to recover unpaid installments and interest, invalidate any sale or encumbrance, and enforce its lien by foreclosure; prescription does not lie against the Government.
• Section 122, Land Registration Act — Cited in the majority opinion for the proposition that the title issued to Carmel became effective in the manner provided therein.
• Section 5(m), Rule 131, Rules of Court — Presumption that official duty has been regularly performed; applied to the issuance of title to Carmel.
• Section 12, Rule 3, Rules of Court — Class suit requisites; applied to the petitioners-intervenors.
• Act No. 190 — Foreclosure of mortgages; cited as the manner for enforcing the Government's lien.
• Commonwealth Act No. 32, as amended — Presidential Decree No. 293 declared the lots open for disposition pursuant to this law; the Court held that the Malacanang Homeowners Association members had no right to the land.
• Presidential Decree No. 293 — The assailed decree; declared unconstitutional and void ab initio in all its parts.

• Majority: Narvasa, J., wrote the majority opinion; Yap, Fernan, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, and Cortes, JJ., concurred.
• Chief Justice Teehankee: Concurred fully; described Presidential Decree No. 293 as an unparalleled "despotic, capricious, oppressive and unjustifiable exercise of government power"; noted it was one of many unconstitutional decrees of the martial law regime; lamented the prior judicial abdication in Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile and called for adherence to the Rule of Law.
• Justice Feliciano: Concurred; added that Presidential Decree No. 293 is constitutionally offensive as a bill of attainder, prohibited under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions. If viewed as a presidential act, it is an exercise of judicial power denied to the Chief Executive; if viewed as a legislative act, it is a bill of attainder. He voted for nullification.