Tua vs. Mangrobang

The ex parte issuance of a Temporary Protection Order under Section 15 of RA 9262 does not violate the due process clause, because the respondent is apprised of the charges and afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard through the filing of an opposition and the hearing on the merits for a Permanent Protection Order; the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessity of protecting women and children from imminent violence.

Ralph P. Tua and Rossana Honrado-Tua were married on January 10, 1998 in Makati City and had three minor children. The spouses had separated, with Rossana having filed a legal separation case and moved out of the conjugal dwelling. The dispute centers on Republic Act No. 9262, the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004, which authorizes courts to issue Temporary Protection Orders ex parte on the date of filing of the application and barangay officials to issue Barangay Protection Orders, providing legal remedies for victims of violence.

Ralph P. Tua and Rossana Honrado-Tua were married on January 10, 1998 in Makati City. They had three children: Joshua Raphael, born February 9, 1999; Jesse Ruth Lois, born June 27, 2000; and Jezreel Abigail, born December 25, 2001. The spouses had been maintaining separate residences since November 2004, and Rossana had filed a legal separation case. She had moved out of the conjugal dwelling with the children and was staying with a certain Rebendor Zuñiga, which petitioner characterized as improper.

On May 20, 2005, Rossana filed a verified petition with the RTC of Imus, Cavite, Branch 22, for herself and on behalf of her minor children, seeking a protection order under RA 9262 against her husband. In her affidavit attached to the petition, she alleged that petitioner had gone to her room and cocked his gun, pointing the barrel to his own head, to convince her not to proceed with the legal separation case. She recounted that petitioner had fed their other children fried chicken that their youngest daughter had chewed and spat out, and that he would threaten a crying child with a belt. She further alleged that when she told petitioner she felt unsafe and asked him to stop coming to the house, he became furious, threatened to withhold financial support, held her by the nape, and pushed her flat onto the bed. On May 4, 2005, while she was at work, petitioner and companions went to her new home, forcibly took the children, and refused to return them.

On May 23, 2005, the RTC issued a Temporary Protection Order effective for thirty days, enjoining petitioner from committing or threatening physical, verbal, and emotional harm against respondent and other family members, and restraining him from harassing, annoying, contacting, or otherwise communicating with respondent. The TPO set the hearing for a Permanent Protection Order on June 9, 2005. Petitioner filed a Comment with an Urgent Motion to Lift the TPO, denying the allegations and asserting that the TPO's issuance was unconstitutional for violating the due process clause. Without awaiting resolution of his Comment, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, assailing the TPO. The CA issued a temporary restraining order on June 9, 2005, and thereafter denied the petition on October 28, 2005, upholding the TPO and finding no grave abuse of discretion by the RTC.

• Due Process Violation: Petitioner contended that Section 15 of RA 9262, authorizing ex parte issuance of a TPO, violates the due process clause of the Constitution, as it deprives the respondent of the opportunity to be heard before the order issues.
• Constitutionality as Lis Mota: Petitioner argued that the constitutionality of RA 9262 is the very lis mota of the case, contrary to the CA's finding, because he is assailing the validity of the law upon which respondent's right to a protection order is based.
• Invalid Delegation of Legislative Power: Petitioner assailed that there is an invalid delegation of legislative power to the courts and to barangay officials to issue protection orders.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner claimed that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the TPO because the petition was bereft of any indication of grounds for its issuance, asserting that the allegations in respondent's affidavit amounted to nothing more than normal quarrels between husband and wife, insufficiently grave or imminent to merit a TPO.

• Due Process — Ex Parte TPO: Whether the ex parte issuance of a Temporary Protection Order under Section 15 of RA 9262 violates the due process clause of the Constitution.
• Constitutionality as Lis Mota: Whether the constitutionality of RA 9262 is the lis mota of the case, such that the CA erred in refusing to rule on it.
• Invalid Delegation: Whether RA 9262 constitutes an invalid delegation of legislative power to the courts and to barangay officials.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the TPO dated May 23, 2005.

• Due Process — Ex Parte TPO: No. The ex parte issuance of a TPO under Section 15 of RA 9262 does not violate due process, as the respondent is apprised of the charges and afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard through pleadings and a subsequent hearing on the merits for a PPO.
• Constitutionality as Lis Mota: Yes, the constitutionality of RA 9262 is the lis mota, contrary to the CA's finding; however, the law is constitutional and the challenge was rejected on the merits.
• Invalid Delegation: No. Congress's entrusting of the issuance of protection orders to the courts is in pursuance of judicial authority to settle justiciable controversies, and the Punong Barangay's issuance of BPOs is purely executive in nature under the Local Government Code.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The allegations in respondent's verified petition and affidavit, including acts falling under Section 5(a), (d), (e)(2), (f), (h), and (i) of RA 9262, constituted sufficient bases for the RTC's ex parte determination that a TPO should issue.

• Due Process — Ex Parte TPO: Relying on Garcia vs. Drilon, the Court held that the ex parte TPO serves a vital public interest in protecting women and children from imminent violence. The ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is the protection of women and children from violence. The victim is required to verify the allegations and attach witnesses' affidavits to the petition, providing a rational basis for the judge's ex parte determination. Moreover, the TPO is not the final word: the court orders immediate notice to the respondent, who may file an opposition within five days, and a hearing on the merits for a PPO is scheduled. The essence of due process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence, and "to be heard" includes being heard through pleadings, not only verbal arguments. The analogy to a writ of preliminary attachment, issued without notice and hearing because delay may enable the defendant to abscond, applies equally: a VAWC victim may suffer further harm or death if notice and hearing were required before protective measures could issue.

• Constitutionality as Lis Mota: The Court found that the CA erred in refusing to rule on the constitutionality of RA 9262 on the ground that it was not the lis mota. Since petitioner was assailing the validity of RA 9262, upon which respondent's right to a protection order is based, the constitutionality of the law must first be decided. The alleged unconstitutionality of RA 9262 is a valid cause for the non-issuance of a protection order. Notwithstanding this finding, the Court found no merit in declaring RA 9262 unconstitutional.

• Invalid Delegation: Under Section 2, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, Congress has the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts. The act of Congress entrusting the courts with the issuance of protection orders is in pursuance of the judiciary's authority to settle justiciable controversies involving enforceable rights. As to barangay officials, Section 14 of RA 9262 authorizes the Punong Barangay, or in his unavailability any Barangay Kagawad, to issue a BPO ordering the perpetrator to desist from causing or threatening physical harm. Such function is purely executive in nature, in pursuance of the Punong Barangay's duty under the Local Government Code to enforce all laws and ordinances and maintain public order in the barangay.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Section 15 of RA 9262 authorizes the court to issue a TPO on the date of filing after ex parte determination that there is basis for issuance. The court's discretion is based on the petition and the affidavit attached thereto. The alleged acts of petitioner — cocking a gun and pointing it to his head to dissuade respondent from pursuing legal separation, feeding children food spat out by another child, threatening a crying child with a belt, holding respondent by the nape and pushing her onto the bed, and threatening to withhold financial support — fall under Section 5(a), (d), (e)(2), (f), (h), and (i) of RA 9262. While not conclusive, these allegations are enough bases for the issuance of a TPO. Grave abuse of discretion requires a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner; no such abuse was found. Factual matters raised by petitioner should be presented during the hearing on the merits for the PPO.

• Ex parte TPO under RA 9262 does not violate due process — The ex parte issuance of a Temporary Protection Order is constitutionally permissible because the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessity of protecting women and children from imminent violence. Due process is satisfied where the respondent is apprised of the charges and afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard through pleadings and a subsequent hearing on the merits. The essence of due process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence; "to be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court but includes being heard through pleadings.

• Grave abuse of discretion — Grave abuse of discretion exists when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

• Lis mota requirement for constitutional adjudication — The constitutionality of a law must be the very lis mota of the case before a court will rule on it. Where a party assails the validity of the law upon which the opposing party's right is based, the constitutionality of that law must first be decided, as its alleged unconstitutionality is a valid cause for the non-issuance of the relief sought.

• "The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi for upholding the constitutionality of ex parte TPOs, drawing the analogy to preliminary attachment to justify the exception to the ordinary notice-and-hearing requirement.

• "It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security." — This formulation establishes the doctrinal basis for subordinating standard procedural due process to the compelling public interest in protecting VAWC victims, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on RA 9262.

• "The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. 'To be heard' does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings." — This passage defines the controlling standard for procedural due process in the context of ex parte protection orders, clarifying that the opportunity to file an opposition suffices.

• Garcia vs. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 352 — Controlling precedent. The Court relied extensively on Garcia for the proposition that the ex parte TPO under Section 15 of RA 9262 does not violate due process, quoting its rationale at length. Garcia also supplied the reasoning that the Punong Barangay's issuance of a BPO is purely executive in nature.

• NPC Employees Consolidated Union vs. National Power Corporation, 550 Phil. 199 (2007) — Cited for the proposition that Congress has the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts under Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution, and that the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness, and expediency of any law is the legislature.

• Chua Huat vs. Court of Appeals, 276 Phil. 1 (1991) — Cited for the established doctrine defining grave abuse of discretion as a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

• Section 15, RA 9262 — Defines Temporary Protection Orders as protection orders issued by the court on the date of filing after ex parte determination that such order should be issued, effective for thirty days, with a hearing on a PPO scheduled prior to or on the date of expiration. Applied to uphold the RTC's authority to issue the TPO ex parte based on the petition and supporting affidavit.

• Section 5, RA 9262 — Enumerates acts constituting violence against women and their children, including causing physical harm, threatening physical harm, placing the woman or child in fear of imminent physical harm, restricting freedom of movement by force or threat, inflicting or threatening self-harm to control actions, causing emotional or psychological distress, and causing mental or emotional anguish. Applied to classify petitioner's alleged acts as falling under paragraphs (a), (d), (e)(2), (f), (h), and (i).

• Section 14, RA 9262 — Authorizes the Punong Barangay, or in his unavailability any Barangay Kagawad, to issue Barangay Protection Orders ex parte, effective for fifteen days, ordering the perpetrator to desist from acts under Section 5(a) and (b). Applied to demonstrate that the barangay function is purely executive in nature.

• Section 2, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Provides that Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts. Applied to uphold Congress's authority to entrust courts with the issuance of protection orders.

• Section 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — vests judicial power in the Supreme Court and lower courts, including the duty to settle justiciable controversies. Applied to characterize the courts' issuance of protection orders as in pursuance of judicial authority.

Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Roberto A. Abad, Jose Catral Mendoza, and Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen concurred.