Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals

In the absence of a marriage contract and a birth certificate due to their destruction during wartime, marriage and legitimate filiation may be established through relevant and competent evidence, including the testimony of a witness to the marriage, the couple's public and open cohabitation as husband and wife, baptismal certificates naming the parents, family photographs showing recognition of the child's status ante litem motam, and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Furthermore, acquisitive prescription does not run in favor of a co-owner against other co-owners absent a clear and communicated repudiation of the co-ownership.

Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of three children — Inocentes, Lourdes, and Felix — all surnamed Trinidad. Patricio died in 1940, leaving four parcels of land situated in Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, which passed to his three children but were never formally partitioned. Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claims to be the legitimate son of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, and thus entitled to Inocentes' one-third share of the estate. Civil registry records in the relevant municipalities were destroyed during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines and by a fire that razed the old town hall on June 17, 1956, making primary documentary evidence of marriage and birth unavailable.

Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones had three children: Inocentes, Lourdes, and Felix, all surnamed Trinidad. When Patricio died in 1940, he left four parcels of land in Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan — an upland of 1,000 square meters (Lot No. 903), an upland of 500 square meters (Lot No. 864-A), a 12,000-square-meter lot (Lot No. 979), and a riceland of 5,000 square meters (Lot No. 863, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22502 RO-174). The properties passed to his three children but were never partitioned. Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claims to be the legitimate son of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato. He married Candelaria Gaspar in 1966 at the age of twenty-three. Sometime after his marriage, Arturio demanded that the four parcels be partitioned into three equal shares and that he be given the one-third share corresponding to his late father, but Lourdes and Felix refused.

According to the prosecution's evidence, Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato were married on May 5, 1942, in New Washington, Aklan, solemnized by a Protestant pastor named Lauriano Lajaylajay. Isabel Meren, a 72-year-old widow and farmer who owned land near the Trinidad properties, testified that she was personally present at the wedding ceremony and that Lourdes and Felix Trinidad were also in attendance. Jovita Gerardo, the 77-year-old barangay captain of Tigayon and a neighbor who lived approximately thirty meters from Inocentes and Felicidad's house, testified that she used to visit the couple two or three times a week and that she was present when petitioner was born on July 21, 1943. She also attended petitioner's baptismal party. Gerardo identified a baptismal certificate (Exhibit C) naming Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato as the child's father and mother. Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil Registrar of New Washington, Aklan, attesting that records of births, deaths, and marriages in that municipality were destroyed during the Japanese occupation, as well as a certification from the Civil Registrar of Kalibo that records relative to his birth were either destroyed during the war or burned when the old town hall was razed on June 17, 1956.

Petitioner further testified that after his mother died when he was thirteen, the defendants invited him to live with them as their nephew. He lived with them for five years, during which they treated him well and provided for all his needs. At nineteen, he left and lived on his own. After his marriage, the defendants again invited him and his family to live with them. He presented two family photographs taken before the filing of the case: Exhibit A shows petitioner carrying his second daughter, his wife, the late Felix Trinidad carrying petitioner's first daughter, and Lourdes Trinidad; Exhibit B shows Lourdes Trinidad carrying petitioner's first child. Petitioner testified that during his mother's lifetime, they received a share of the produce of the land — coconuts, palay, and corn. A few years after he and his family moved in with the defendants, he requested partition of the land to claim his father's share, provoking the defendants' ire and causing them to disown him and make him vacate the house.

For their part, the defendants denied that petitioner was Inocentes' son. Lourdes Trinidad, 75 years old and single, testified that Inocentes returned from Manila in 1941 and lived only fifteen days before dying single and without issue. She acknowledged knowing Felicidad Molato as a resident of Tigayon but denied that Felicidad was ever married to Inocentes. She also denied that petitioner had ever lived with them, claiming he stayed with his grandmother Maria Concepcion. Pedro Briones, a first cousin of the defendants, testified that Inocentes died in 1940 unmarried, though he admitted he stayed with the Trinidad family for only three months and could not recall whether Inocentes had cohabited with anyone. Beatriz Trinidad Sayon, another cousin, testified that Inocentes died single in March 1941, about one and a half months after returning from Manila, where he had lived most of his life. The trial court found the defendants' witnesses' testimony unpersuasive, taking judicial notice that World War II did not begin until December 7, 1941, with Japanese forces occupying Manila only on January 2, 1942, making it improbable that Aklan was under Japanese occupation in March 1941 as the defense witnesses claimed. The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner, finding him the legitimate son of Inocentes Trinidad entitled to one-third of the four parcels. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that petitioner failed to prove his parents' marriage and filiation and that acquisitive prescription had set in.

• Sufficiency of Evidence of Marriage: Petitioner argued that he had proven by preponderant evidence the marriage of his parents, Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, through the testimony of Isabel Meren, who was personally present at the wedding ceremony solemnized by a Protestant pastor on May 5, 1942 in New Washington, Aklan, and through the testimony of Jovita Gerardo regarding the couple's public cohabitation as husband and wife.
• Sufficiency of Evidence of Filiation: Petitioner maintained that he adduced sufficient evidence to prove he was the son of Inocentes Trinidad, including his baptismal certificate naming Inocentes and Felicidad as his parents, family photographs showing the defendants' recognition of him as their nephew ante litem motam, and his continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, as demonstrated by his living with the defendants and receiving a share of the land's produce.
• Destruction of Records as Excuse: Petitioner argued that the absence of a marriage contract and birth certificate was not fatal to his case, as the civil registry records were destroyed during the Japanese occupation and by a fire that razed the old town hall, and that other forms of relevant evidence could substitute for the missing primary documents.
• Imprescriptibility of Partition: Petitioner contended that his claim was not time-barred, as the action for partition is imprescriptible and acquisitive prescription could not set in because the defendants never repudiated the co-ownership, having shared the land's produce with petitioner and his mother prior to the filing of the case.
• Collateral Attack on Filiation: Petitioner submitted that his status as a legitimate child could not be collaterally attacked by the private respondents in an action for partition.

• Insufficiency of Evidence of Marriage: Respondents countered that petitioner failed to adduce preponderant evidence that his parents were legally married, noting that no marriage contract was presented and that the testimony of a single witness (Isabel Meren) was insufficient to establish the fact of marriage against the testimony of two defense witnesses (Pedro Briones and Beatriz Trinidad Sayon) who claimed Inocentes died single.
• Insufficiency of Evidence of Filiation: Respondents argued that petitioner had not established that he was recognized as a legitimate son of Inocentes in the record of birth, a final judgment, a public document, or a private handwritten instrument, nor that he was in continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.
• Acquisitive Prescription: Respondents maintained that they had been in possession of the parcels of land in the concept of owners since their father Patricio died in 1940, and that even counting from 1964 when petitioner attained the age of majority, they had possessed the land for more than ten years, thus acquiring ownership by acquisitive prescription under Article 1134 of the Civil Code.
• Denial of Co-habitation and Recognition: Respondents denied that petitioner had lived with them and denied that Inocentes had ever cohabited with Felicidad Molato as husband and wife.

• Proof of Marriage and Filiation: Whether petitioner presented sufficient evidence of his parents' marriage and of his filiation as the legitimate son of Inocentes Trinidad.
• Collateral Attack on Filiation: Whether petitioner's status as a legitimate child was subject to collateral attack in the action for partition.
• Acquisitive Prescription: Whether petitioner's claim over the properties was time-barred under the rules on acquisitive prescription.

• Proof of Marriage and Filiation: Yes. Petitioner sufficiently proved his parents' marriage and his filiation through witness testimony to the nuptial, the couple's public cohabitation, a baptismal certificate, family photographs showing recognition ante litem motam, and continuous possession of status, all of which constitute competent evidence in the absence of destroyed civil registry records.
• Collateral Attack on Filiation: The doctrine barring collateral attack on filiation was recognized, but the Court found no need to rule on its application because petitioner chose to present direct evidence of his filiation and his parents' marriage rather than rely solely on the doctrine.
• Acquisitive Prescription: No. Acquisitive prescription did not set in because the defendants never repudiated the co-ownership, as evidenced by petitioner's receipt of his share of the land's produce prior to the action and the continued registration of the properties in Patricio Trinidad's name.

• Proof of Marriage and Filiation: The Court applied the rule from Pugeda vs. Trias that when the existence of a marriage is questioned in litigation, it may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage contract, including the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the couple's public and open cohabitation as husband and wife, baptismal certificates of children born during the union, and mention of the nuptial in subsequent documents. Petitioner presented Isabel Meren, who testified she was personally present at the wedding of Inocentes and Felicidad on May 5, 1942, and Jovita Gerardo, who testified that the couple deported themselves as husband and wife and that she was present at petitioner's birth and baptism. Gerardo's testimony also gave rise to the disputable presumption that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. For filiation, the Court applied Articles 265, 266, and 267 of the Civil Code (now Arts. 170 and 171 of the Family Code), which allow filiation to be proved by the record of birth, an authentic document, a final judgment, continuous possession of status, or by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. Petitioner presented his baptismal certificate, family photographs showing the defendants' acceptance of him as Inocentes' son before the case was filed, and evidence of continuous possession of status. The Court noted that while Gerardo's testimony did not constitute family reputation regarding pedigree because she was not a member of the Trinidad family, the totality of petitioner's positive evidence preponderated over the respondents' self-serving negations. The defense witnesses' testimony was found unreliable: Pedro Briones stayed with the Trinidad family for only three months and gave evasive answers, while Beatriz Sayon's claim that Inocentes died in March 1941 was contradicted by the historical fact that the Japanese occupation did not reach Aklan until after January 2, 1942. Petitioner's consistent use of the Trinidad surname without objection from the respondents further constituted presumptive proof of his status as Inocentes' legitimate child.

• Collateral Attack on Filiation: The Court acknowledged the doctrinal rule that a collateral attack on filiation is not permitted. However, because petitioner chose to present direct evidence of his filiation and of his parents' marriage rather than rely on this axiom, the Court found no need to rule on the doctrine's application to petitioner's cause.

• Acquisitive Prescription: The Court applied Article 494 of the Civil Code, under which the act of one co-owner benefits all other co-owners unless the former repudiates the co-ownership. Prescription does not run in favor of a co-owner against other co-owners so long as the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized. The Court found that prior to the action for partition, petitioner had been receiving his share of the land's produce in the concept of a co-owner, demonstrating the respondents' recognition of the co-ownership. There was no evidence of repudiation of the co-ownership of petitioner's father Inocentes over the land, and the titles remained in Patricio Trinidad's name. Although the respondents had possessed the parcels openly since 1940 and had ceased sharing the produce during the pendency of the case, they manifested no repudiation of the co-ownership. Relying on Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner and duly communicated to the other co-owners. An action for partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches.

• Proof of Marriage Without Marriage Contract — When the existence of a marriage is questioned in litigation, the marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage contract. Competent evidence includes: (a) the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, (b) the couple's public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, (c) the birth and baptismal certificates of children born during such union, and (d) the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents. The failure to present a marriage contract is not proof that no marriage took place. The Court applied this doctrine by accepting the testimony of Isabel Meren, who witnessed the wedding, and Jovita Gerardo, who testified to the couple's cohabitation, as sufficient proof of the marriage of Inocentes and Felicidad.

• Proof of Legitimate Filiation Without Birth Certificate — Under Articles 265, 266, and 267 of the Civil Code (now Arts. 170 and 171 of the Family Code), legitimate filiation is proved, in order of preference, by: (a) the record of birth in the Civil Register, or an authentic document or final judgment; (b) in the absence thereof, by continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; (c) in the absence of all the foregoing, by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. Such other means may include baptismal certificates, judicial admissions, family Bible entries, common reputation respecting pedigree, admission by silence, testimony of witnesses, and other proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The Court applied this doctrine by accepting petitioner's baptismal certificate, family photographs, and evidence of continuous possession of status as sufficient proof of filiation.

• Disputable Presumption of Marriage — A man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. The Court relied on this presumption, arising from Jovita Gerardo's testimony regarding Inocentes and Felicidad's cohabitation, to support the finding that a valid marriage existed.

• Imprescriptibility of Action for Partition in Co-ownership — An action for partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches so long as the co-ownership is recognized. Prescription does not run in favor of a co-owner against other co-owners unless the former expressly or impliedly repudiates the co-ownership, and such repudiation is duly communicated to the other co-owners. A co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of other co-owners absent a clear repudiation. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that the respondents' continued sharing of the land's produce with petitioner and the continued registration of the properties in Patricio's name negated any repudiation of co-ownership.

• Collateral Attack on Filiation Prohibited — A collateral attack on filiation is not permitted. The Court recognized this doctrine but found it unnecessary to apply because petitioner presented direct evidence of his filiation and his parents' marriage.

• "Although the marriage contract is considered the primary evidence of the marital union, petitioner's failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place, as other forms of relevant evidence may take its place." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on the proof of marriage without a marriage contract, establishing that the absence of primary documentary evidence is not fatal when other competent evidence is available.

• "In a co-ownership, the act of one benefits all the other co-owners, unless the former repudiates the co-ownership. Thus, no prescription runs in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his or her co-owners or co-heirs, so long as he or she expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership." — This passage states the controlling doctrine on acquisitive prescription in co-ownership, the basis for the Court's ruling that petitioner's claim was not time-barred.

• "the totality of petitioner's positive evidence clearly preponderates over private respondents' self-serving negations." — This passage captures the Court's application of the preponderant evidence standard, emphasizing that the aggregate weight of petitioner's documentary and testimonial evidence outweighed the respondents' evasive and self-interested denials.

• Pugeda vs. Trias, 4 SCRA 849 (1962) — Controlling precedent followed. Established that marriage may be proven by relevant evidence when its existence is questioned in litigation, enumerating the forms of competent evidence including witness testimony, cohabitation, baptismal certificates, and mention in subsequent documents.
• Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 675 (1991) — Followed. Held that an illegitimate child may establish filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," including baptismal certificates, judicial admissions, family Bible entries, common reputation, admission by silence, and testimony of witnesses.
• Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 337 (1992) — Followed. Held that prescription does not run against co-owners with respect to an action for partition so long as the heirs invoking prescription have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership.
• De Castro vs. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23 — Cited for the proposition that the right to demand partition does not prescribe.
• Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 (1987) — Cited for the rule that an action for partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches, and that a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of other co-owners absent clear repudiation.

• Articles 265, 266, and 267, Civil Code of the Philippines — These provisions govern the proof of legitimate filiation, establishing a hierarchy of evidence: record of birth or authentic document or final judgment (Art. 265), continuous possession of status (Art. 266), and any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws (Art. 267). The Court applied these provisions to hold that petitioner's baptismal certificate, family photographs, and witness testimony constituted sufficient proof of filiation under Art. 267. These provisions are now embodied in Arts. 170 and 171 of the Family Code.
• Article 494, Civil Code of the Philippines — Provides that the act of one co-owner benefits all other co-owners unless the former repudiates the co-ownership. The Court applied this provision to hold that prescription did not run against petitioner because the respondents never repudiated the co-ownership.
• Article 1134, Civil Code of the Philippines — Governs acquisitive prescription through possession for at least ten years. The Court of Appeals applied this provision to rule that respondents acquired ownership by prescription, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the provision could not apply absent repudiation of co-ownership.
• Section 3(aa), Rule 131, Rules of Court — Establishes the disputable presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. The Court invoked this presumption based on Jovita Gerardo's testimony regarding Inocentes and Felicidad's cohabitation.
• Section 40, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Governs family reputation or tradition as evidence of pedigree, requiring that the witness be a member of the family by consanguinity or affinity. The Court noted that Gerardo's testimony did not qualify under this rule because she was not a member of the Trinidad family.
• Section 41, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Allows common reputation as evidence of pedigree. The Court cited this provision in connection with Gerardo's testimony respecting the marriage of Inocentes and Felicidad.

Davide Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug, and Quisumbing, JJ., concurred. No separate concurring opinions were written.