Trinidad vs. COMELEC

A supplemental petition in a pre-proclamation controversy is a prohibited pleading under the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, and cannot be used to introduce new matters or causes of action not raised in the original petition; where the COMELEC suspends its rules to consider such pleading, it does not commit grave abuse of discretion provided the rights of the parties are equally protected.

Petitioner Wenceslao Trinidad and private respondent Jovito Claudio were rival candidates for the position of mayor of Pasay City in the May 11, 1998 elections. The contest was governed by the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which prescribe specific reglementary periods and prohibited pleadings for pre-proclamation controversies, and by Republic Act No. 7166, whose provisions on canvassing and correction of errors are mirrored in the Omnibus Election Code.

Petitioner Wenceslao Trinidad and private respondent Jovito Claudio both ran for the position of mayor of Pasay City in the May 11, 1998 elections. On May 18, 1998, the Pasay City Board of Canvassers proclaimed Claudio as the elected mayor, having obtained 55,325 votes against Trinidad's 55,097 votes — a margin of 228 votes.

Five days after the proclamation, on May 23, 1998, Trinidad filed a petition for correction of manifest errors and annulment of proclamation before the Commission on Elections. He alleged as grounds, among others, the double canvassing of five election returns and the inclusion of a bogus election return in the canvass. Petitioner claimed that once the questioned errors were corrected, he would obtain a plurality of 54,916 votes as against Claudio's 54,857. On June 8, 1998, Trinidad filed a supplemental petition averring an error in the Summary of Statement of Votes for District II of Pasay City (No. 094338), alleging that the summary credited him with only 1,009 votes when the Statement of Votes (SOV) No. 094284 upon which it was based reflected 1,099 votes for him.

On June 9, 1998, the COMELEC issued an order requiring the parties to file their simultaneous memoranda within five days, after which the case would be deemed submitted for resolution with or without memoranda. The Pasay City Board of Canvassers filed its answer on the same date. On June 15, 1998, Claudio filed his answer/memorandum with a counter-petition for correction, stating that some statements of votes contained errors which, if corrected, would entitle him to an additional forty votes but would result in a deduction of thirteen votes from Trinidad.

Trinidad contested the filing of Claudio's answer/memorandum with counter-petition in his Manifestation and Comments dated July 18, 1998 — thirty-four days after the case had been submitted for resolution on June 14, 1998. In that pleading, petitioner reiterated his plea for the addition of 90 votes to his total and manifested two new errors: first, that the election returns from five precincts were never canvassed, and second, that there were discrepancies in the election returns of nine precincts. These errors, if corrected and accounted for, would allegedly give petitioner an edge of eighteen votes over Claudio — 55,229 to 55,211.

On July 29, 1998, the COMELEC rendered its decision authorizing the Pasay City Board of Canvassers to re-convene and re-canvass the election returns, correcting the manifest clerical errors and the discrepancy between SOV 094284 and SOV 094338, but dismissing the petition for annulment of proclamation and the supplemental petition, and affirming the proclamation of Claudio. Trinidad then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, contending that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming Claudio's proclamation.

• Incomplete Canvassing: Petitioner contended that there was an incomplete canvassing of votes because five precincts of Pasay City — 448-A/448-A-2, 688-A-5, 725-A-4, 95-A/96-A, and 351-A — were never canvassed, these having been overlooked when five other precincts were doubly canvassed.
• Unnecessary Suspension of Rules: Petitioner maintained that there was no need for the COMELEC to suspend its rules of procedure in order to resolve the issues raised in the Supplemental Petition, arguing that even without it, the COMELEC would have basis to order the correction of errors since the petition itself stated the number of votes garnered by both parties.
• Unequal Application of Suspension: Petitioner alleged that the suspension of the COMELEC rules of procedure should have been applied equally, implying that the COMELEC favored the private respondent in considering his counter-petition.
• Impropriety of Counter-Petition: Petitioner argued that there is no provision or concept in the Omnibus Election Code or the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that mentions a "counter-petition" in pre-proclamation cases, asserting that a petition is an original action requiring compliance with jurisdictional requirements such as payment of filing fees, mandatory compliance with periods, service of summons, setting of the case for hearing, and reception of evidence.

• Timeliness and Jurisdiction: The Solicitor General, representing the COMELEC, argued that the eight precincts — covering the five uncanvassed election returns and the three erroneous statements of votes — were not raised before the Commission en banc, and that the issues were raised beyond the reglementary periods prescribed by both the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and Republic Act No. 7166.
• Authority to Suspend Rules: The COMELEC maintained that in order to fulfill its mandate of faithfully determining the will of the electorate, it may brush aside its rules if they stand in the way of finding the truth, and may suspend its rules provided the rights of the parties are equally protected and act thereon pro hac vice.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in affirming the proclamation of respondent Jovito Claudio as elected mayor of Pasay City.
• Timeliness of Supplemental Petition: Whether the Supplemental Petition filed by petitioner was filed within the reglementary period and was a proper pleading in a pre-proclamation controversy.
• Timeliness of Manifestation on Incomplete Canvassing: Whether the issue of incomplete canvassing was properly and timely raised before the COMELEC.
• Propriety of Counter-Petition: Whether the counter-petition for correction filed by private respondent was a proper pleading in a pre-proclamation controversy.
• Equal Application of Suspended Rules: Whether the COMELEC applied the suspension of its rules of procedure equally to both parties.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The COMELEC did not exceed or abuse its jurisdiction; absent a showing of patent and gross abuse of discretion, the Court will not interfere with its decisions and rulings.
• Timeliness of Supplemental Petition: No. The Supplemental Petition was filed 21 days after proclamation, beyond the five-day reglementary period for correction of manifest errors, and was a prohibited pleading under Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
• Timeliness of Manifestation on Incomplete Canvassing: No. The issue of incomplete canvassing was raised for the first time in the Manifestation filed July 18, 1998, thirty-four days after the case had been submitted for resolution, and beyond the reglementary period whether treated as a pre-proclamation controversy or an election protest.
• Propriety of Counter-Petition: Yes, the counter-petition was proper. It was akin to a counterprotest, which is not a prohibited pleading under Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure and is equivalent to an answer with a counterclaim under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which applies suppletorily.
• Equal Application of Suspended Rules: Yes. The COMELEC applied the suspension equally; petitioner himself benefited from the suspension when his Supplemental Petition was resolved in his favor and he was credited with the additional ninety votes claimed therein.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The Court examined whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in affirming Claudio's proclamation. The scope of review in certiorari proceedings is confined to determining whether the lower tribunal acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The Court found no patent or gross abuse of discretion in the COMELEC's resolution, and absent such showing, declined to interfere with its decisions and rulings.

• Timeliness of Supplemental Petition: The Supplemental Petition was properly characterized as a petition for correction of manifest errors, not a petition for declaration of nullity, as it sought correction of erroneous copying of figures into the summary statement of votes from the statement of votes. Under Section 5(b), Rule 27 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a petition for correction must be filed not later than five days following the date of proclamation. The Supplemental Petition was filed on June 8, 1998 — exactly 21 days from the May 18, 1998 proclamation — and was therefore filed beyond the reglementary period. Moreover, under Rule 13, Section 1(g) of the 1993 COMELEC Rules, supplemental pleadings in special actions and special cases are prohibited, and pre-proclamation controversies are classified as special cases under Section 5(h), Rule 1. The Supplemental Petition also violated Section 3, Rule 9, which permits supplemental pleadings only for transactions, occurrences, or events that have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented — whereas the subject of the supplemental pleading was a new issue not even advanced in the original petition. A supplemental petition merely supplies deficiencies in aid of the original petition and cannot be used to introduce a new matter or cause of action, which is precisely what petitioner had done.

• Timeliness of Manifestation on Incomplete Canvassing: The issue of incomplete canvassing — that five precincts were never canvassed — was raised for the first time in the Manifestation and Comments filed on July 18, 1998, thirty-four days after the case had been submitted for resolution on June 14, 1998. When a case is already deemed submitted for decision, the court can only consider evidence presented prior to that period and cannot take into account evidence presented thereafter without prior leave of court. The rule in election protests, as held in Arroyo vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, is that the protestant must stand or fall upon the issues raised in the original or amended pleading filed prior to the lapse of the statutory period. Whether treated as a pre-proclamation controversy (which must be filed not later than five days following proclamation) or an election protest (which must be filed within ten days after proclamation), the Manifestation was filed beyond the reglementary period.

• Propriety of Counter-Petition: The Answer/Memorandum with Counter-Petition for Correction filed by Claudio was akin to a counterprotest, which is not a prohibited pleading under Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Counterprotests are provided for under Ordinary Actions (Section 3, Rule 20) and are equivalent to an answer with a counterclaim under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which applies suppletorily to the COMELEC Rules.

• Equal Application of Suspended Rules: The COMELEC needed to suspend its rules of procedure to consider the Supplemental Petition, which was otherwise time-barred and prohibited. Without such suspension, the Supplemental Petition would have been dismissed. The suspension was properly applied equally: petitioner himself benefited from it when the COMELEC considered his Supplemental Petition and credited him with the additional ninety votes claimed therein. He could not therefore be heard to complain that the COMELEC did not accord him the same treatment given to the private respondent. Both Republic Act No. 7166 and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure covered the same subject matter on which the suspension was made.

• Prohibition on Supplemental Pleadings in Pre-Proclamation Controversies — Under Section 1(g), Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, supplemental pleadings in special actions and special cases are prohibited. Pre-proclamation controversies are classified as "special cases" under Section 5(h), Rule 1. A supplemental petition in a pre-proclamation controversy is therefore a prohibited pleading. A supplemental petition merely supplies deficiencies in aid of the original petition and cannot be used to introduce a new matter or cause of action. Unlike an amended pleading, which is a substitute for the original, a supplemental pleading does not supersede the original but assumes that the original pleading stands.

• Correction of Manifest Errors — Correction of manifest errors refers to errors in the election returns, in the entries of the statement of votes by precinct/per municipality, or in the certificate of canvass. The word "manifest" means evident to the eye and understanding; visible; open, palpable, uncontrovertible; needing no evidence to make it more clear; not obscure or hidden. A manifest clerical error is one that is visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, apparent from the papers, and does not include an error which may, by evidence dehors the record, be shown to have been committed.

• Reglementary Period for Correction of Manifest Errors — Under Section 5(b), Rule 27 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a petition for correction of manifest errors must be filed not later than five days following the date of proclamation. Failure to file within this period renders the petition time-barred.

• COMELEC's Authority to Suspend Rules — The COMELEC may suspend its rules of procedure in order to fulfill its mandate of faithfully determining the will of the electorate, provided the rights of the parties are equally protected. Where rules are obstacles to doing justice, they are mere technicalities that should not stand in the way of determining who between the contending parties has the mandate of the electorate.

• Counterprotest as Proper Pleading — A counterprotest is not a prohibited pleading under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and is equivalent to an answer with a counterclaim under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which applies suppletorily to the COMELEC Rules.

• "When a case is already deemed submitted for decision or resolution, the court can only consider the evidence presented prior to this period. It can not and must not take into account evidence presented thereafter without obtaining prior leave of court." — This passage establishes the rule that issues and evidence cannot be introduced after a case has been submitted for resolution, which was the basis for rejecting petitioner's belated claim of incomplete canvassing.

• "As the name connotes, a supplemental petition merely supplies deficiencies in aid of the original petition. It cannot be used to introduce a new matter or a new cause of action or defense which is precisely what the petitioner had done in the instant case." — This defines the scope and limitation of supplemental pleadings in election cases, distinguishing them from amended pleadings and explaining why the Supplemental Petition was improper.

• "A supplemental pleading is not like an amended pleading — a substitute for the original one. It does not supersede the original, but assumes that the original pleading is to stand, and the issues joined under the original pleading remain as issues to be tried in the action." — This passage articulates the doctrinal distinction between supplemental and amended pleadings, cited from Delbros Hotel Corporation vs. Intermediate Appellate Court.

• "Unless it is shown that there is patent and gross abuse of discretion, we will not interfere with its decisions and rulings." — This states the standard of judicial review over COMELEC decisions in certiorari proceedings, limiting interference to cases of patent and gross abuse of discretion.

• Arroyo vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 246 SCRA 384 — Cited for the rule that in an election protest, the protestant or counter-protestant must stand or fall upon the issues raised in the original or amended pleading filed prior to the lapse of the statutory period. Applied to hold that petitioner's belated raising of the incomplete canvassing issue was improper.

• Mentang vs. Commission on Elections, 229 SCRA 666 — Cited for the definition of correction of manifest errors as referring to errors in the election returns, entries of the statement of votes, or certificate of canvass. Applied to classify the Supplemental Petition as a petition for correction of manifest errors rather than a petition for declaration of nullity.

• Delbros Hotel Corporation vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 159 SCRA 533 — Cited for the distinction between supplemental and amended pleadings: a supplemental pleading does not supersede the original but assumes it stands, while an amended pleading is a substitute. Applied to show that the Supplemental Petition improperly introduced a new cause of action.

• Rodriguez vs. Comelec, 119 SCRA 465 — Quoted within the COMELEC resolution for the principle that while election controversies should be speedily settled, this objective does not free the COMELEC from compliance with established principles of fairness and justice, adjudicating cases on substantive merits rather than technicality.

• Saura Import & Export Co., Inc. vs. David, 52 OG 3145 — Cited for the definition of a manifest clerical error as one visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, apparent from the papers, and not including an error shown by evidence dehors the record.

• Section 5(b), Rule 27, 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Provides that a petition for correction of manifest errors must be filed not later than five days following the date of proclamation. Applied to hold that the Supplemental Petition, filed 21 days after proclamation, was time-barred.

• Section 1(g), Rule 13, 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Prohibits supplemental pleadings in special actions and special cases. Applied to hold that the Supplemental Petition was a prohibited pleading, pre-proclamation controversies being special cases under the Rules.

• Section 5(h), Rule 1, 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Defines "special cases" as referring to pre-proclamation cases. Applied to classify the pre-proclamation controversy as a special case, thereby triggering the prohibition on supplemental pleadings.

• Section 3, Rule 9, 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Permits supplemental pleadings only for transactions, occurrences, or events that have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Applied to show that the Supplemental Petition did not meet this requirement, as it raised a new issue not advanced in the original petition.

• Section 3, Rule 35, 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Provides that an election protest must be filed within ten days after proclamation. Applied to show that the Manifestation raising incomplete canvassing was filed beyond the reglementary period whether treated as a pre-proclamation controversy or an election protest.

• Sections 17 and 20, Republic Act No. 7166 (now Section 243, Omnibus Election Code) — Cover the same subject matter as Sections 2 and 9, Rule 27 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure regarding correction of errors in canvassing. Applied to confirm that both the statute and the rules were properly suspended by the COMELEC.

• Section 3, Rule 20, 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Provides for counterprotests under Ordinary Actions. Applied to hold that Claudio's counter-petition was akin to a counterprotest, equivalent to an answer with a counterclaim under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and was not a prohibited pleading.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Quisumbing, Purisima, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concurred. Panganiban, J., concurred in the result and agreed that the issue on incomplete canvass was filed out of time. Bellosillo, J., took no part due to personal relationship to a party. Mendoza, J., took no part because of close personal relationship to a party. Pardo, J., took no part.