Trinidad vs. Ang

The suspension of arraignment on account of a pending petition for review with the DOJ or the Office of the President is limited to sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office; after the expiration of that period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or deny the motion to defer arraignment. Cases decided prior to the December 1, 2000 amendment of Section 11, Rule 116, which allowed indefinite deferment, are no longer controlling.

Petitioners spouses Alexander and Cecilia Trinidad were charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Masbate City. The case was covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure. Respondent Victor Ang was the complainant in the underlying bouncing-checks charge. Petitioners had sought to defer their arraignment pending resolution of a petition for review they filed with the Department of Justice contesting the prosecutor's resolution finding probable cause.

On September 3, 2007, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Masbate City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against spouses Alexander Trinidad and Cecilia Trinidad. On October 10, 2007, the petitioners filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice, contesting that Resolution.

On March 3, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed the Information before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Fifth Judicial Region, Masbate City. Because the case fell under the Rules on Summary Procedure, the MTCC ordered the petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits and to appear in court within ten days from receipt of the order. The petitioners instead filed a Manifestation and Motion to Defer Arraignment and Proceedings and Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest, praying for the deferment of their arraignment in view of the still-pending petition for review before the DOJ.

The MTCC, in its Order dated May 28, 2009, granted the motion, subject to paragraph (c), Section 11, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On August 10, 2009, however, the MTCC reconsidered that order and set the petitioners' arraignment on September 10, 2009. By that time, one year and ten months had already elapsed since the petitioners filed their petition for review with the DOJ on October 10, 2007.

The petitioners elevated the matter to the RTC via a petition for certiorari, docketed as SCA No. 05-2009. The RTC, in its decision of January 6, 2010, denied the petition, holding that the MTCC judge did not err in setting the arraignment after the lapse of one year and ten months from the filing of the petition for review with the DOJ. The RTC explained that the cases cited by the petitioners were decided before the December 1, 2000 amendment of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, after which the Supreme Court applied the 60-day limit on suspension of arraignment in cases involving a pending petition for review with the DOJ. The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the motion in its order dated July 5, 2010.

The petitioners then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari, essentially claiming that the 60-day limit on suspension of arraignment is only a general rule and citing several cases to argue that arraignment should be deferred until the DOJ petition for review is resolved. The Court initially denied the petition for failure to state the material dates of receipt of the assailed RTC order and of filing the motion for reconsideration. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, asserting that the date of receipt of the RTC order was in fact stated in the petition and that the motion for reconsideration before the RTC was filed on January 2, 2010.

• Compliance with Formal Requirements: Petitioners argued that the date of receipt of the assailed RTC order was in fact stated in the petition, and that the motion for reconsideration before the RTC was filed on January 2, 2010.
• Sixty-Day Limit as General Rule: Petitioners contended that the 60-day limit on suspension of arraignment is only a general rule, citing Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. How, Roberts, Jr. vs. CA, and Dimatulac vs. Villon to argue that the arraignment of an accused should be deferred until the petition for review with the DOJ is resolved.

• Procedural Compliance: Whether the petition for review on certiorari should be reinstated despite the initial denial for failure to state the material dates of receipt of the assailed RTC order and of filing the motion for reconsideration.
• Suspension of Arraignment: Whether the trial court is bound to arraign the accused after the expiration of the 60-day period prescribed under Section 11(c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, notwithstanding the pendency of a petition for review before the DOJ.

• Procedural Compliance: Yes. The motion for reconsideration was granted and the petition reinstated, the Court having found that the petition stated the date of receipt of the RTC's assailed order, and the omission of the date of filing the motion for reconsideration being a formal defect warranting relaxation of the rules in the interest of justice.
• Suspension of Arraignment: No reversible error was committed by the RTC. Under Section 11(c), Rule 116, as amended effective December 1, 2000, the suspension of arraignment due to a pending petition for review with the DOJ cannot exceed 60 days from filing; after that period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or deny the motion to defer.

• Procedural Compliance: A careful examination of the petition revealed that it did state the date when the petitioners received a copy of the RTC's assailed order. The failure to state the material date of filing the motion for reconsideration was only a formal requirement, and the Court relaxed the rules in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice. The motion for reconsideration was therefore granted and the petition reinstated.

• Suspension of Arraignment: Section 11(c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor pending at either the DOJ or the Office of the President is a ground for suspension of arraignment, provided that the period of suspension shall not exceed 60 days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. In Samson vs. Daway, the Court explained that after the expiration of the 60-day period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or deny the motion to defer arraignment. In the present case, the petitioners filed their petition for review with the DOJ on October 10, 2007; when the RTC set the arraignment on August 10, 2009, one year and ten months had already lapsed—far beyond the 60-day limit. The cases cited by the petitioners—Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. How, Roberts, Jr. vs. CA, and Dimatulac vs. Villon—were all decided prior to the December 1, 2000 amendment of Section 11, Rule 116, at which time there was no 60-day limit on the suspension of arraignment. Those precedents thus no longer apply under the amended Rules.

• Sixty-Day Limit on Suspension of Arraignment (Section 11[c], Rule 116) — Under the amended Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (effective December 1, 2000), the pendency of a petition for review with the DOJ or the Office of the President is a ground for suspension of arraignment, but the period of suspension shall not exceed 60 days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. After the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or deny the motion to defer arraignment. Cases decided prior to the amendment, which allowed indefinite deferment, are no longer controlling.

• Liberal Construction of Procedural Rules — Formal defects in a petition for review on certiorari, such as the omission of one material date, may be relaxed in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, particularly where the petition substantially complies with the requirement by stating the date of receipt of the assailed order.

• "while the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment." — This passage, drawn from Samson vs. Daway and applied in the Resolution, articulates the controlling rule on the 60-day limit and the trial court's duty after its expiration.

• "the cases cited by the petitioners — Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How, Roberts, Jr. v. CA, and Dimatulac v. Villon — were all decided prior to the amendment to Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which took effect on December 1, 2000. At the time these cases were decided, there was no 60-day limit on the suspension of arraignment." — This passage explains why pre-amendment precedents cited by petitioners no longer apply, establishing the temporal dividing line for the doctrine.

• "the petitioners' failure to state the material date of filing the motion for reconsideration is only a formal requirement that warrants the relaxation of the rules in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice." — This passage states the Court's rationale for reinstating the petition despite a procedural defect, illustrating the doctrine of liberal construction of procedural rules.

• Samson vs. Daway, G.R. Nos. 160054-55, July 21, 2004, 434 SCRA 612 — Controlling authority. The Court relied on this case for the proposition that after the expiration of the 60-day suspension period under Section 11(c), Rule 116, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or deny the motion to defer arraignment.
• Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. How, G.R. No. 140863, August 22, 2000, 338 SCRA 511 — Distinguished and effectively overruled insofar as it allowed indefinite deferment of arraignment. Decided prior to the December 1, 2000 amendment of Section 11, Rule 116, when no 60-day limit existed.
• Roberts, Jr. vs. CA, G.R. No. 113930, March 5, 1996, 254 SCRA 307 — Distinguished and no longer controlling for the same reason: decided before the amendment introducing the 60-day limit.
• Dimatulac vs. Villon, G.R. No. 127107, October 12, 1998, 297 SCRA 679 — Distinguished and no longer controlling, having been decided before the amendment of Section 11, Rule 116.

• Section 11(c), Rule 116, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (as amended, effective December 1, 2000) — Provides that a petition for review of the prosecutor's resolution pending at either the DOJ or the Office of the President is a ground for suspension of arraignment, provided that the period of suspension shall not exceed 60 days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. The Court applied this provision to hold that the trial court was bound to arraign the petitioners after the 60-day period had long lapsed.
• Section 4(b), Rule 45, Rules of Court — Requires that a petition for review indicate the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration was filed, and when notice of the denial thereof was received. The Court found that the petition substantially complied with this requirement.
• Section 5, Rule 45, Rules of Court — Provides that failure of the petitioner to comply with the requirements regarding contents of and documents accompanying the petition shall be sufficient ground for dismissal. The Court relaxed this rule in the interest of justice.
• Section 5(d), Rule 56, Rules of Court — Provides that failure to comply with the requirements regarding proof of service and contents of and documents accompanying the petition is a ground for dismissal of the appeal. Cited in relation to the initial denial of the petition.

Carpio Morales (Chairperson), Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., and Sereno, JJ., concurred.