Trillana vs. Crisostomo

Absent fraud, a will duly probated after publication binds all persons; a prior will expressly revoked by a later will need not be separately set for probate while the later will is allowed; and an appellant whose interest is merely contingent is not a party in interest on appeal.

The testate estate of Damasa Crisostomo is the subject of the proceedings, with Nazario Trillana as administrator-appellee and Consorcia P. Crisostomo and others as petitioners-appellants. The controversy implicated the probate of two wills executed by the decedent and the procedural framework governing allowance of wills, petitions for relief from judgment, and the publication and notice requirements for probate. The relevant provisions included sections 3 and 4 of Rule 77, section 2 of Rule 38, section 69 of Rule 123, and section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Damasa Crisostomo died leaving a testate estate administered by Nazario Trillana as administrator-appellee. Consorcia P. Crisostomo and others, petitioners-appellants, claimed to be nephews and nieces and therefore legal heirs of the deceased, although they did not specify the degree of their relationship.

The decedent executed two wills: one dated August 16, 1948 and another dated October 19, 1948. The October 19 will was filed for allowance on November 1, 1948 with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. The court set the hearing for December 2, 1948; its order was published in The Star Reporter, a newspaper of general circulation in Bulacan, on November 5, 12, and 19, and the corresponding notices were served by the Clerk of Court in accordance with law. On January 5, 1949, the court rendered judgment admitting the October 19 will to probate.

The August 16 will, according to the appellants’ attorneys, was sent together with a writing called “Manifestation” by registered mail on October 30, 1948 from Manila to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan by Attorney Tomas V. Barnes, and must have been received by the Clerk on or after November 1, 1948, the date the subsequent October 19 will was filed for probate. The August 16 will was expressly and absolutely revoked by the October 19 will. Both wills left all the testatrix’s properties as legacies to other persons.

Appellants filed a petition for relief from the January 5 judgment on May 12, 1949. The lower court denied the petition for relief; appellants moved for reconsideration on August 27, 1949, and the denial led to this appeal. The record before the Supreme Court showed that the October 19 will had been admitted to probate after publication and notice, that the August 16 will had been revoked by the later will, and that both wills disposed of all properties as legacies to persons other than the appellants.

• Fraud: Petitioners-appellants argued that the January 5 judgment probating the October 19, 1948 will was obtained through fraud because the proponents did not cause personal notice of the hearing upon the legal heirs, contrary to Rule 77, section 4.
• Duty to Set Date for Earlier Will: They maintained that the lower court failed to perform its legal duty to set a date for proving the August 16, 1948 will.
• Fault or Negligence: They argued that the failure to set aside a date for proving the August 16 will together with the October 19 will was entirely due to the lower court’s fault or negligence.
• Interest to Appeal: They contended that they were interested parties and could appeal because, if the October 19 will were disallowed, the August 16 will allowed, and the legacies in the latter declared invalid or the legatees incapable to inherit, the legacies would go to them.

• Compliance with Publication and Notice: The administrator-appellee, through counsel’s statement of facts, maintained that the probate court set the hearing of the October 19, 1948 will on December 2, 1948; that a copy of the order was published in The Star Reporter on November 5, 12, and 19; and that the corresponding notices were served by the Clerk of Court in accordance with law.
• No Fraud: The administrator-appellee effectively countered that no fraud attended the probate, and the appellants did not deny the statement regarding publication and notice.

• Fraud in Probate: Whether the judgment admitting the October 19, 1948 will to probate was obtained through fraud because personal notice was not given to the legal heirs under Rule 77, section 4.
• Raising New Issue on Appeal: Whether the question of the lower court’s compliance with Rule 77, section 4 may be considered for the first time on appeal.
• Duty to Set Date for Earlier Will: Whether the lower court failed to perform its legal duty to set a date for proving the August 16, 1948 will.
• Fault or Negligence: Whether the failure to set a date for proving the August 16 will together with the October 19 will was due to the lower court’s fault or negligence.
• Interest to Appeal: Whether the petitioners-appellants had a material and direct interest entitling them to appeal from the judgment allowing the October 19 will instead of the August 16 will.

• Fraud in Probate: No. No fraud was shown; the appellants failed to prove that the January 5 judgment was obtained through fraud, and the denial of relief under section 2, Rule 38 was proper.
• Raising New Issue on Appeal: No. The question whether the lower court complied with Rule 77, section 4 was not raised in the original petition for relief or motion for reconsideration and cannot be considered for the first time on appeal.
• Duty to Set Date for Earlier Will: No. The August 16, 1948 will had been expressly and absolutely revoked by the October 19, 1948 will, so the lower court was not required to set a date for its separate probate while the revoking will was allowed.
• Fault or Negligence: No. Because the earlier will was revoked and the later will was before the court for allowance, no fault or negligence attached to the failure to set a separate date for the earlier will.
• Interest to Appeal: No. The appellants’ claimed interest was merely contingent or dependent on several uncertain future events, not material and direct as required for a party on appeal.

• Fraud in Probate: The Court could not consider the new claim that the lower court failed to comply with Rule 77, section 4 because it was not raised in the original petition for relief of May 12, 1949 or in the motion for reconsideration dated August 27, 1949. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the legal presumption was that the court complied with its duty and acted in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction in probating the October 19, 1948 will, pursuant to section 69(m)(n) of Rule 123. The administrator-appellee’s attorney stated in the statement of facts attached to the appellants’ petition for relief that the court set the hearing on December 2, 1948; that the order was published in The Star Reporter on November 5, 12, and 19; and that notices were served by the Clerk of Court in accordance with law. The appellants did not deny that statement. Thus, no fraud was shown, and the lower court did not err in denying the petition for relief under section 2, Rule 38. The Court also stated that where a will is duly probated after publication pursuant to section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the order admitting the will is, absent fraud, effective against all persons, and an heir’s distant residence does not render the probate order void for lack of due process.

• Raising New Issue on Appeal: The question whether the lower court, as distinguished from the proponents, complied with Rule 77, section 4 was not raised below. It appeared for the first time on appeal and therefore could not be considered. The legal presumption of regularity supplied the basis for upholding the probate court’s compliance.

• Duty to Set Date for Earlier Will: Even assuming, without deciding, that under section 3 of Rule 77 the court shall set aside a date for proving a will even without petition when it is delivered to the court having jurisdiction, the lower court was right in not setting a date for proving the August 16, 1948 will. That will was expressly and absolutely revoked by the October 19, 1948 will executed by the same testatrix and filed for allowance on November 1, 1948 with the same Court of First Instance of Bulacan. According to the appellants’ attorneys, the August 16 will was sent with a “Manifestation” by registered mail on October 30, 1948 from Manila to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan by Attorney Tomas V. Barnes and must have been received by the Clerk on or after November 1, 1948, the date the subsequent will was filed for probate. If two wills are presented for allowance but one is revoked, the revoked will cannot be included in the probate of the subsequent revoking will because it would be a waste of time to allow the revoked will if the subsequent revoking will is allowed; the revoked will may be probated and allowed only if the subsequent revoking will is disallowed.

• Fault or Negligence: Because the August 16 will had been revoked by the October 19 will, and because the later will was already before the same court for allowance, the failure to set a separate date for the earlier will was not due to any fault or negligence of the lower court. No legal duty required the court to proceed separately on a revoked will while the revoking will was pending.

• Interest to Appeal: The appellants alleged only that they were nephews and nieces and therefore legal heirs of Damasa Crisostomo, without specifying the degree of relationship. They did not claim that if the October 19 will were disallowed, they would inherit the estate. They contended that the wills should be probated jointly and that the August 16 will should be allowed instead of the October 19 will. But both wills left all the testatrix’s properties as legacies to other persons, so the appellants had no interest in the probate of either will and could not appeal from the judgment allowing one instead of the other. Their argument that they were interested parties because the legacies might eventually pass to them if the October 19 will were disallowed, the August 16 will allowed, and its legacies invalidated or the legatees declared incapable to inherit was without merit. In civil actions and special proceedings, unless otherwise provided by law, the interest required for a person to be a party on appeal must be material and direct, such that he will be materially and directly benefited or injured by the court’s order, decree, or judgment, and not indirect or contingent. The interest claimed was purely contingent and dependent on several uncertain future events: (1) the disallowance of the October 19, 1948 will; (2) the allowance of the August 16, 1948 will; and (3) the invalidation of certain legacies in the August 16 will.

• Probate after publication binds all persons — Where a will is duly probated after publication pursuant to section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the order admitting the will is, absent fraud, effective against all persons. An heir or interested party’s distant residence, making presence at the probate date impossible, does not render the probate order void for lack of due process. The Court applied this in upholding the probate of the October 19, 1948 will and in rejecting the fraud claim.
• Revoked will need not be separately probated while revoking will is allowed — If two wills are presented for allowance but one is revoked, the revoked will cannot be included in the probate of the subsequent revoking will, because allowing the revoked will while the revoking will is allowed would be a waste of time. The revoked will may be probated and allowed only if the subsequent revoking will is disallowed. The Court applied this to the August 16, 1948 will, which had been expressly and absolutely revoked by the October 19, 1948 will.
• Material and direct interest for appeal — In civil actions and special proceedings, unless otherwise provided by law, the interest required for a person to be a party on appeal must be material and direct, so that the person will be materially and directly benefited or injured by the court’s order, decree, or judgment; an indirect or contingent interest is insufficient. The Court applied this in holding that the appellants, whose claimed interest depended on the disallowance of the October 19 will, the allowance of the August 16 will, and the invalidation of legacies, could not appeal.
• Presumption of regularity in probate proceedings — In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the legal presumption is that the court complied with its duty and acted in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction in probating a will. The Court applied this because the appellants failed to show that the lower court did not comply with Rule 77, section 4, and the administrator’s statement of publication and notice was undenied.

• "Where a will is duly probated after publication pursuant to 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the order admitting the will is, in the absence of fraud, effective against an persons. The fact that an heir or other interested party lives so far away as to make it impossible for such party to be present at the date appointed for the, probate of the will does not render the order of probate void for lack of due process." — States the rule that probate after publication is effective against all persons absent fraud and that distance from the probate hearing does not violate due process.
• "It stands to reason that if two wills are presented for allowance but one of them revoked will cannot be included in the probate of the latter subsequent will, because it would be a waste of time to allow the revoked will if the subsequent revoking will is allowed. The revoked will may be probated and allowed only if the subsequent revoking will is disallowed." — States the rule on the treatment of a revoked will when a subsequent revoking will is also presented for allowance.
• "In civil actions and special proceedings, unless otherwise provided by law, the interest in order that a person may be a party on appeal must be material and direct, so that he will be materially and directly benefited or injured by the court's order, decree or judgment: and not indirect or contingent" — Defines the interest required for a party to appeal and is the basis for denying the appellants’ standing.
• "The petitioners-appellants having failed to show that the judgment of the lower court of January 5, 1948, probating the will of testatrix of October 19, was obtained through fraud, the lower court did not commit any error in denying the appellant's petition for relief under sec. 2, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, and therefore it is not necessary for us to discuss and pass upon the other propositions of the appellant." — States the ratio decidendi on the absence of fraud and the propriety of denying the petition for relief.

• In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156 — Cited for the rule that a will duly probated after publication is, absent fraud, effective against all persons, and that an heir’s distant residence does not render the probate order void for lack of due process.
• Espinosa vs. Barrios, 40 Off. Gaz., [8 Supp. No. 12], p. 145 — Cited for the rule that the interest required for a person to be a party on appeal must be material and direct, not indirect or contingent.
• McAra vs. MacCay, L.R. 23 Ir., 138; Pepper vs. Pepper, Ir. R. 5 Eq., 85; Matter of Palmer, 58 L.J. P.D. and Adm., 44; Matter of Stephens, 22 L.T. Rep., N.S. 727 — Cited for the rule that a revoked will may be probated and allowed only if the subsequent revoking will is disallowed.

• Section 630, Code of Civil Procedure — Cited for the rule that a will duly probated after publication is, absent fraud, effective against all persons.
• Section 4, Rule 77, Rules of Court — Cited by the appellants as requiring personal notice of the hearing to the legal heirs; the Court declined to consider the new claim regarding the lower court’s compliance because it was not raised below.
• Section 3, Rule 77, Rules of Court — Discussed as requiring the court to set aside a date for proving a will even without petition when the will is delivered to the court having jurisdiction; the Court assumed this without deciding but held that no separate date was required for the revoked August 16, 1948 will.
• Section 2, Rule 38, Rules of Court — The provision under which the petition for relief was filed; denial was proper because no fraud was shown.
• Section 69(m)(n), Rule 123, Rules of Court — Cited for the legal presumption that the court complied with its duty and acted in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction in probating the will.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.