Travel & Tours Advisers, Inc. vs. Cruz, Sr., et al.

The driver of a vehicle that bumps the rear of another is presumed to be the cause of the accident unless contradicted by other evidence, and the employer of the negligent driver is solidarily liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code absent proof that it actually observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the employee's selection and supervision; the contributory negligence of the other driver, shown by his violation of his authorized route, mitigates the award of damages under Article 2179.

Petitioner Travel & Tours Advisers, Inc. operates a provincial passenger bus line under a public utility bus franchise for the Manila–Ilocos Norte/Cagayan–Manila route, and employed Edgar Calaycay as a bus driver. Respondent Edgar Hernandez owned and drove an Isuzu passenger jeepney plying a franchised route in Pampanga; respondent Virginia Muñoz was one of his passengers, and Alberto Cruz, Jr., the son of respondent Alberto Cruz, Sr., was another. Liability for the collision is governed by the quasi-delict provisions of the Civil Code, particularly Articles 2176, 2179, 2180, 2185, and 2206, which allocate fault between the drivers and impose vicarious responsibility on the employer.

At about 7:50 p.m. on January 9, 1998, respondent Edgar Hernandez was driving an Isuzu passenger jeepney with plate number DSG-944, which he owned, along the Angeles–Magalang Road in Barangay San Francisco, Magalang, Pampanga. A Daewoo passenger bus with plate number NXM-116, owned by petitioner Travel & Tours Advisers, Inc. and driven by Edgar Calaycay, was travelling in the same direction. The bus bumped the rear portion of the jeepney, causing the jeepney to ram into an acacia tree. Alberto Cruz, Jr. died as a result, and Virginia Muñoz, a passenger of the jeepney, suffered serious physical injuries.

Respondents Edgar Hernandez, Virginia Muñoz, and Alberto Cruz, Sr., the father of the deceased, filed a complaint for damages before the Regional Trial Court, docketed as Civil Case No. 9006, alleging that the collision was due to the reckless, negligent, and imprudent manner in which Calaycay drove the bus in disregard of traffic laws, rules, and regulations. They prayed for actual damages of ₱140,000 for coffin, funeral, vigil, food, and internment expenses and ₱300,000 as moral, compensatory, and consequential damages, plus ₱6,000 a month as lost income, for Alberto Cruz, Sr.; ₱40,000 as actual damages and ₱150,000 as moral, compensatory, and consequential damages for Virginia Muñoz; ₱42,400 as actual damages plus ₱500 a day as unrealized net income for four months and ₱150,000 as moral, compensatory, and consequential damages for Edgar Hernandez; and ₱50,000 as attorney's fees plus ₱1,000 per court appearance, ₱30,000 as litigation expenses, and the costs of suit.

For its defense, petitioner claimed that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Calaycay, and that it was Hernandez who drove recklessly and imprudently by suddenly entering the bus's lane without ensuring that the road was clear. Petitioner further alleged that Hernandez violated his franchise by travelling along an unauthorized line or route, that the jeepney was overloaded with passengers, and that the deceased Alberto Cruz, Jr. was clinging to the back of the jeepney.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals were one in finding that both vehicles were not on their authorized routes at the time of the incident. Francisco Tejada, the conductor of petitioner's bus, admitted on cross-examination that the driver passed through Magalang Road instead of the usual Sta. Ines route because of heavy traffic at Bamban, Tarlac — a statement that belied petitioner's contention that the Bamban Bridge was closed and under construction due to lahar. Both courts likewise found that the jeepney was bumped on its left rear portion, as established by the unrebutted testimonies of Hernandez and Muñoz and by the photographs of the jeepney, and that the bus was running very fast, the force of the impact having sent the jeepney crashing head-on against an acacia tree. Tejada's claim that the jeepney suddenly appeared and crossed the bus's lane diagonally was rejected as uncorroborated and inconsistent with the physical evidence, since a diagonal position would have produced an impact on the jeepney's left side rather than on its left rear portion. As to petitioner's claim that the jeepney was overloaded and that the deceased was clinging to its rear, Virginia Muñoz testified that only about sixteen passengers were on board, within the jeepney's twenty-passenger seating capacity; the defense declined to cross-examine her, and Tejada himself admitted that he did not really see what happened to the passenger allegedly clinging to the left side.

• Route and Franchise: Petitioner argued that its bus was not "out of line" because it holds a public utility bus franchise for provincial operation from Manila–Ilocos Norte/Cagayan–Manila, which allows the bus to traverse any point between those terminals; that the driver's taking of Magalang Road instead of the Bamban Bridge was of no moment because the bridge was closed to traffic due to the effects of lahar; and that Magalang Road lies between the points of its authorized provincial operation.
• Negligence and the Rear-End Impact: Petitioner maintained that the fact that the jeepney was bumped on its left rear portion did not preponderantly prove that the bus driver was the negligent party, and that it was respondent Edgar Hernandez who drove his passenger jeepney in a reckless and imprudent manner by suddenly entering the lane of the bus without seeing to it that the road was clear.
• Contributory Negligence of Hernandez: Petitioner contended that Hernandez failed to observe the degree of care, precaution, and vigilance required of a public utility driver when he allowed the deceased Alberto Cruz, Jr. to hang on to the rear portion of the jeepney, that the jeepney was overloaded, and that Hernandez violated his franchise by travelling along an unauthorized line or route, so that the presumption of negligence should attach to him.
• Speed and Failure to Stop: Petitioner asserted that the bus driver was not speeding or negligent when he failed to steer the bus to a complete stop.
• Diligence of a Good Father of a Family: Petitioner claimed that it exercised extraordinary diligence, or the diligence of a good father of a family, in the selection and supervision of driver Calaycay.
• Damages: Petitioner argued that there was no factual and legal basis for the various awards of monetary damages, and specifically that the award for the loss of earning capacity of Alberto Cruz, Jr. was improper because the certification from the deceased's employer stating that he earned ₱6,000 per month was not presented and identified in open court.

• Negligence and Proximate Cause: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the negligence of petitioner's bus driver was the proximate cause of the collision.
• Route and Franchise: Whether petitioner's bus was "out of line" or otherwise in violation of its franchise at the time of the accident.
• Contributory Negligence: Whether respondent Edgar Hernandez's violation of his authorized route, the alleged overloading of the jeepney, and the deceased's alleged position at the running board constituted contributory negligence.
• Employer's Liability: Whether petitioner exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employee, Edgar Calaycay.
• Damages: Whether there is factual and legal basis for the various awards of monetary damages, including the award for loss of earning capacity and the award of attorney's fees.

• Negligence and Proximate Cause: No. The finding that the bus driver's negligence was the proximate cause stands, the rear-end impact having raised the presumption that the driver who bumped the jeepney caused the accident, which petitioner failed to rebut.
• Route and Franchise: No. Veering away from the usual route is not the same as being out of line; the bus remained within its franchised Manila–Ilocos Norte/Cagayan–Manila route, while the jeepney was indisputably travelling outside its allowed route.
• Contributory Negligence: Partly yes. The jeepney's violation of its authorized route constituted contributory negligence under Article 2179 of the Civil Code, warranting a fifty-percent mitigation of petitioner's liability; the claims of overloading and of the deceased clinging to the jeepney were not proven.
• Employer's Liability: No. Petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of Calaycay under Article 2180, no proof having been adduced that he underwent the company's seminars, submitted the required clearances, or was covered by its rules and regulations.
• Damages: Partly yes. The awards for loss of earning capacity and attorney's fees must be deleted for lack of proof, and the remaining awards reduced by half on account of Hernandez's contributory negligence.

• Negligence and Proximate Cause: As a rule, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to the review and revision of errors of law, the appellate court's findings of fact being deemed conclusive, subject only to the exceptions enumerated in jurisprudence. The issues presented were all factual and fell under none of the exceptions; moreover, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals were in full agreement with those of the trial court. Even on the merits, the finding that the bus driver's negligence was the proximate cause is supported by the record. Both lower courts found that the jeepney was bumped on its left rear portion, and under Raynera vs. Hiceta, drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the accident unless contradicted by other evidence, the rationale being that the driver of the rear vehicle has full control of the situation as he is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. Petitioner failed to overturn that presumption. The testimony of conductor Francisco Tejada that the jeepney suddenly appeared and crossed the bus's lane diagonally was uncorroborated and inconsistent with the physical evidence: had the jeepney been in a diagonal position, the impact would have registered on the left side of its body near the rear, not on its left rear portion, and the photographs showed that the center of the jeepney's front portion struck the acacia tree. Tejada himself effectively admitted that the bus was running very fast when he declared that the driver could not suddenly apply the brakes in full stop because the bus might turn turtle, and the force of the impact — which sent the jeepney crashing head-on against the acacia tree — showed that the bus was speeding. Rate of speed, in connection with other circumstances, is one of the principal considerations in determining recklessness, and the very fact of speeding is indicative of imprudent behavior, since a motorist must drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with the conditions encountered.

• Route and Franchise: Both the RTC and the CA found that neither vehicle was on its authorized route at the time of the mishap. The conductor of petitioner's bus admitted on cross-examination that the driver took Magalang Road instead of the usual Sta. Ines route because of heavy traffic at Bamban, Tarlac, a testimony that belied petitioner's contention that the Bamban Bridge was closed and under construction due to lahar. Regardless of the reason, the bus likewise veered from its usual route. Petitioner's assertion that the bus was not out of line is correct, however, because its public utility bus franchise for provincial operation from Manila–Ilocos Norte/Cagayan–Manila allows the bus to traverse any point between those terminals. Veering away from the usual route is different from being out of line; a public utility vehicle may veer away from its usual route as long as it does not go beyond its allowed route under its franchise. The bus therefore cannot be considered to have violated the contents of its franchise. On the other hand, it is indisputable that the jeepney was traversing a road outside its allowed route. Necessarily, the case is not one of in pari delicto, because only one party violated a traffic regulation, and Article 2185 of the New Civil Code — which presumes that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if, at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation — would seem applicable. That provision, however, is merely a presumption, and from the factual findings of both the RTC and the CA based on the evidence presented, the proximate cause of the collision is the negligence of the driver of petitioner's bus.

• Contributory Negligence: Although the negligence of petitioner's bus driver was the proximate cause of the death of Alberto Cruz, Jr., the jeepney was in violation of its allowed route at the time of the vehicular accident, so that its owner and driver were likewise guilty of negligence under Article 2179 of the Civil Code. When the plaintiff's negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages; but if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, subject to mitigation by the courts. Petitioner and its driver are therefore not solely liable for the damages caused to the victims, and petitioner must be held liable only for the damages actually caused by its negligence. The determination of the mitigation varies depending on the circumstances of each case; the Court had sustained a mitigation of 50% in Rakes vs. AG & P, 20% in Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and LBC Air Cargo, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, and 40% in Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Court of Appeals and Philippine Bank of Commerce vs. Court of Appeals. Considering the circumstances, the heirs of Alberto Cruz, Jr. shall recover only 50% of the award from petitioner and its driver, and 50% shall be borne by respondent Edgar Hernandez, pursuant to Rakes vs. AG & P. Petitioner's claim that the jeepney was overloaded and that the deceased was clinging to its rear was not established: Virginia Muñoz testified that only about sixteen passengers were on board, within the jeepney's seating capacity of twenty, and the defense declined to cross-examine her; the only other supporting evidence was Tejada's testimony, which he himself effectively retracted when he admitted that he did not really see what happened to the passenger allegedly clinging to the left side. Tejada was thus not a credible witness, and his testimony is not worthy of belief.

• Employer's Liability: Under Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176, of the Civil Code, the employer of a negligent employee is liable for the damages caused by the latter. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the employer either in the selection of the employee or in the supervision over him after such selection. The presumption may be rebutted by a clear showing that the employer exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of the employee; to escape solidary liability, the employer must adduce sufficient proof of such degree of care. Petitioner failed to do so. Although it claimed to have issued policies, rules, and regulations, conducted seminars, required medical check-ups and drug testing, and required clearances, no evidence showed that these measures were actually applied to Calaycay. No proof was presented that he attended the seminars or examinations, that he received the manual, or that he underwent any training before or during his employment; his driver's license was never presented. The cash voucher for the alleged lecture on traffic rules and regulations was for a seminar conducted on May 20 and 21, 1995, when Calaycay was not yet in the company's employ, his employment having begun only in 1996. The company's general manager admitted that Calaycay was not able to produce the required clearances and that the seminars were compulsory only for drivers and conductors then in Manila. The company did not even know the correct and true name of its driver, its records showing the driver as "Calaycay Francisco." In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and service records; due diligence in supervision includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations, the issuance of proper instructions for the protection of the public, the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures, and the actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with those rules through dependable supervisors.

• Damages: Actual damages must be substantiated by documentary evidence, such as receipts, to prove the expenses incurred as a result of the death of the victim; only the ₱25,000 paid for funeral services rendered by Magalena Memorial Home was duly receipted, so the award of ₱50,000 as actual damages was properly reduced. The award for loss of earning capacity must be deleted because the records are bereft of any showing that the certification from the deceased's employer stating that he earned ₱6,000 per month was presented and identified during the trial; compensation for lost income is in the nature of damages and requires due proof of the damages suffered, including unbiased proof of the deceased's average income. The award of attorney's fees must likewise be deleted: the award of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the general rule, and attorney's fees as part of damages are awarded only in the instances specified in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, which require the court to make findings of fact and law bringing the case within an enumerated instance. The RTC's justification — that while no document was submitted to prove that the plaintiffs spent attorney's fees, it was clear that they paid their lawyer — was conjectural and did not justify the grant. All the remaining awards are reduced by half to reflect the contributory negligence of respondent Hernandez: the heirs of Alberto Cruz, Jr. are entitled to ₱12,500 as actual damages, ₱25,000 as civil indemnity for his death, and ₱25,000 as moral damages; Virginia Muñoz is entitled to ₱8,372 as actual damages and ₱15,000 as moral damages; and Edgar Hernandez, due to his contributory negligence, is entitled to only half of the ₱40,200 awarded by the CA as actual damages, or ₱20,100. Petitioner shall also settle half of the cost of the suit.

• Rear-end collision presumption — The driver of a vehicle who bumps the rear of another vehicle is presumed to be the cause of the accident unless contradicted by other evidence. The rationale is that the driver of the rear vehicle has full control of the situation, being in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. In this case, the jeepney was struck on its left rear portion, and petitioner failed to overturn the presumption, its conductor's testimony being uncorroborated and inconsistent with the physical evidence of the damage.

• "Veering away from the usual route" distinguished from being "out of line" — A public utility vehicle may veer away from its usual route without violating its franchise, so long as it does not go beyond the route allowed by that franchise. The bus's diversion to Magalang Road remained within its Manila–Ilocos Norte/Cagayan–Manila franchise and thus did not amount to a franchise violation; the jeepney, by contrast, was indisputably travelling outside its allowed route.

• Presumption of negligence under Article 2185 of the Civil Code — Unless there is proof to the contrary, a person driving a motor vehicle is presumed to have been negligent if, at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. The presumption is disputable and yields to contrary proof; here, the factual findings of both lower courts established the negligence of the bus driver as the proximate cause notwithstanding the jeepney's own route violation.

• Vicarious liability of employers under Article 2180 of the Civil Code — An employer is liable for the damages caused by its employee acting within the scope of his assigned tasks, and when injury is caused by the employee's negligence, a presumption of law instantly arises that the employer was negligent either in the selection of the employee or in the supervision over him after such selection. To escape solidary liability, the employer must adduce sufficient proof that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family. Due diligence in selection requires examination of the employee's qualifications, experience, and service records; due diligence in supervision requires the formulation of suitable rules and regulations, the issuance of proper instructions for the protection of the public, the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures, and the actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with those rules through dependable supervisors.

• Contributory negligence and mitigation of damages under Article 2179 of the Civil Code — Where the plaintiff's negligence was only contributory and the immediate and proximate cause of the injury remains the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. The degree of mitigation varies with the circumstances of each case; the Court fixed it at 50% following Rakes vs. AG & P.

• Proof of actual damages and loss of earning capacity — Actual damages must be substantiated by documentary evidence, such as receipts, to prove the expenses incurred. Compensation for lost income is in the nature of damages and requires due proof of the damages suffered, including unbiased proof of the deceased's average income; a certification never presented and identified in open court cannot support an award for loss of earning capacity.

• Attorney's fees as an exception — Attorney's fees as part of damages are awarded only in the instances specified in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, and it is necessary for the court to make findings of fact and law that would bring the case within the ambit of those enumerated instances to justify the award, which must in all cases be reasonable. An award resting on the conjectural assumption that the plaintiffs must have paid their lawyer cannot stand.

• "Veering away from the usual route" is different from being "out of line." A public utility vehicle can and may veer away from its usual route as long as it does not go beyond its allowed route in its franchise, in this case, Manila-Ilocos Norte/Cagayan-Manila. — This passage supplies the ratio for rejecting petitioner's franchise-violation theory while simultaneously establishing that the jeepney alone was outside its authorized route, the premise for the finding of contributory negligence.

• "The rationale behind the presumption is that the driver of the rear vehicle has full control of the situation as he is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him." — This states the canonical justification for the rear-end collision presumption, the doctrinal core of the ruling on proximate cause.

• "When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee there instantly arises a presumption of the law that there was negligence on the part of the employer either in the selection of his employee or in the supervision over him after such selection." — This is the Court's formulation of the employer's presumptive negligence under Article 2180, which petitioner failed to rebut.

• "compensation for lost income is in the nature of damages and as such requires due proof of the damages suffered; there must be unbiased proof of the deceased's average income." — This passage is the basis for deleting the award of ₱250,000 for loss of earning capacity, the supporting certification never having been presented and identified in open court.

• Raynera vs. Hiceta, 365 Phil. 546 (1999) — Controlling precedent for the rule that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the accident unless contradicted by other evidence; applied to sustain the finding of the bus driver's negligence.
• Rakes vs. AG & P, 7 Phil. 359 (1907) — The precedent followed in fixing the mitigation of petitioner's liability at 50% on account of the plaintiff's contributory negligence.
• Baliwag Transit, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 330 Phil. 785 (1996) — Cited for the rule that the employer of a negligent employee is liable for damages, with a presumption of negligence in selection or supervision that the employer must rebut.
• Metro Manila Transit Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 359 Phil. 18 (1998) and G.R. No. 104408, June 21, 1993, 223 SCRA 521 — Cited for the standards of due diligence in the selection of employees (examination of qualifications, experience, and service records) and in their supervision (suitable rules, proper instructions, disciplinary measures, and actual implementation and monitoring of compliance).
• People vs. Ereno, 383 Phil. 30 (2000) — Cited for the requirement that compensation for lost income, being in the nature of damages, be supported by due proof, including unbiased proof of the deceased's average income.
• Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 232 Phil. 327 (1987) and LBC Air Cargo, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 311 Phil. 715 (1995) — Cited as instances in which the Court sustained a 20% mitigation of liability.
• Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102383, November 26, 1992, 216 SCRA 51 and Philippine Bank of Commerce vs. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 667 (1997) — Cited as instances in which the Court sustained a 40% mitigation of liability.
• Syki vs. Begasa, 460 Phil. 381 (2003) and Lambert vs. Heirs of Castillon, 492 Phil. 384 (2005) — Cited for the principle that the mitigation of the defendant's liability varies according to the circumstances of each case.
• Benedicto vs. Villaflores, 646 Phil. 733 (2010) — Cited for the requirement that the grant of attorney's fees be justified by findings of fact and law bringing the case within the instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code.
• Fuentes vs. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1163 (1993) and Boneng y Bagawili vs. People, 363 Phil. 594 (1999) — Cited for the rule that the Court's jurisdiction under Rule 45 is limited to the review of errors of law, the appellate court's factual findings being conclusive.

• Article 2176, New Civil Code — Provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done, and that such fault or negligence, absent a pre-existing contractual relation, is a quasi-delict. This is the foundational provision for the liability of the bus driver and, through him, of petitioner as employer.
• Article 2179, New Civil Code — Provides that when the plaintiff's negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury he cannot recover damages, but if his negligence was only contributory, the plaintiff may recover damages subject to mitigation by the courts. Applied to reduce by half the awards against petitioner because of the jeepney's violation of its authorized route.
• Article 2180, New Civil Code — Makes the obligation under Article 2176 demandable not only for one's own acts but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible, holds employers liable for damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, and extinguishes that responsibility upon proof that the employer observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. Petitioner failed to discharge this burden, so it was held solidarily liable with its driver.
• Article 2185, New Civil Code — Creates a disputable presumption that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if, at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. Applied to the jeepney, which was travelling outside its authorized route, but held insufficient to overcome the factual finding that the bus driver's negligence was the proximate cause.
• Article 2206, New Civil Code — Provides that damages for death caused by a quasi-delict shall include, in addition to the indemnity for the death itself, the loss of earning capacity of the deceased and moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death. Cited in the CA's computation of the awards, which the Court later reduced for lack of proof.
• Article 2208, New Civil Code — Enumerates the instances in which attorney's fees and expenses of litigation may be recovered in the absence of stipulation, and requires in all cases that they be reasonable. Applied to delete the award of attorney's fees, the trial court's justification being conjectural and unsupported by findings bringing the case within any enumerated instance.
• Rule 45, Revised Rules of Court — Governs the petition for review on certiorari, which may raise only questions of law. Applied to hold that the issues raised were factual and that the CA's findings, being in full agreement with the trial court's, were conclusive absent any of the recognized exceptions.

Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Perez, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.