Tortona vs. Gregorio

The presumption of regularity attached to notarized documents is disputable and may be overcome by clear, positive, and convincing evidence that the signature or thumbmark of a purported party is forged. A notarized Deed of Absolute Sale is void where the thumbmark of the alleged seller is proven to be a forgery.

Sisters Rufina Casimiro and Rafaela Casimiro co-owned undivided shares with their other siblings in two parcels of land in Bacoor, Cavite. Rufina held a 1/10 share in a parcel covered by OCT No. 0-923 and a 1/5 share in another parcel covered by TCT No. T-10058. During her lifetime, Rufina regularly collected her share of income from the properties. After her death, her heirs—now petitioners—continued to receive these income shares. In 1997, a cousin offered petitioners a goodwill sum for the sale of the first parcel to the Department of Public Works and Highways, which prompted petitioners to investigate the title. They discovered that a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 14, 1974, purported to convey Rufina’s shares to Rafaela. Subsequently, respondents, as Rafaela’s heirs, executed a Declaration of Heirship and Extrajudicial Partition that consolidated Rufina’s former shares into their own.

• Nature of the Action: Petitioners, heirs of Rufina Casimiro, sought recovery of real property and damages, alleging that a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale purporting to convey their mother’s undivided shares in two parcels of land to their aunt Rafaela Casimiro was forged.

• Co-ownership: Rufina and Rafaela Casimiro were sisters who, with other siblings, co-owned two parcels of land in Bacoor, Cavite. Rufina held an undivided 1/10 share in a parcel covered by OCT No. 0-923, and an undivided 1/5 share in a parcel covered by TCT No. T-10058.

• Discovery of the Alleged Sale: In 1997, a cousin offered petitioners a “balato” of ₱50,000.00 in connection with the sale of the first parcel to the Department of Public Works and Highways. When petitioners inquired about their mother’s share, they were told that the properties had already been sold by Rufina to Rafaela during their lifetime. A verification with the Registry of Deeds revealed that OCT No. 0-923 had been cancelled on the basis of a Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed on February 14, 1974. Likewise, Rufina’s 1/5 share in the second parcel had been transferred. Respondents later executed a Declaration of Heirship and Extrajudicial Partition consolidating Rufina’s former shares into their own.

• Allegations of Forgery: Petitioners claimed their mother Rufina was illiterate and could not write her name; she only affixed thumbmarks on documents, and whenever she did so, at least one of her children assisted her. They asserted that if the sale to Rafaela had been genuine, they would have known about it. To prove forgery, they presented three standard documents bearing Rufina’s genuine thumbmarks: a “Kasulatan sa Bilihan ng Lote” dated February 19, 1979 (Exhibit “F”); a “Kasulatang Paghahati sa Labas ng Hukuman na may Lakip na Bilihan ng Lupa” dated March 31, 1982 (Exhibit “G”); and Rufina’s Residence Certificate dated July 21, 1971 (Exhibit “H”), plus a receipt from the Rural Bank of Zapote (Exhibit “H-1”). Each showed that a child assisted Rufina.

• NBI Fingerprint Examination: The trial court ordered the questioned document transmitted to the National Bureau of Investigation. NBI fingerprint examiner Eriberto B. Gomez, Jr. conducted the examination. In his First Report (Technical Investigation/Identification Report FP Case No. 2000-182-A dated July 13, 2000), Gomez stated that the purported thumbmarks of Rufina Casimiro in the Deed of Absolute Sale were “not identical” with her standard thumbmarks and concluded that “the thumbmarks appearing in the … Deed of Absolute Sale … were not impressed by Rufina Casimiro.” His Second Report dated May 2, 2001, noted that the standard thumbmarks were “faint, blurred and lacking the necessary ridge characteristics to warrant positive identification.” During testimony, however, Gomez clarified that while standard thumbmarks lacked sufficient ridge characteristics for positive identification, all standard thumbmarks were in the same fingerprint pattern, agreed in the flow of ridges, and showed no discrepancy in ridge characteristics. He further testified that the questioned thumbmarks were of the “circle type,” whereas the standard thumbmarks were of the “loop type.”

• Trial Court’s Independent Examination: The trial judge personally examined the thumbmarks and was convinced they were “very different”; he found by naked eye that the questioned thumbmarks were of the “circle type” and the genuine ones of the “loop type,” as the NBI expert described.

• Respondents’ Evidence: Respondents presented as their lone witness Atty. Arcadio Espiritu, the notary public who notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale. He testified that the parties personally appeared before him and that Rufina affixed her thumbmarks in his presence. However, on cross-examination, it was established that Atty. Espiritu had previously notarized an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication wherein a certain Victor Guinto declared himself sole heir of his deceased sister, despite Atty. Espiritu’s personal knowledge as a longtime neighbor that there were other siblings. Atty. Espiritu admitted he was “not concerned about the truth and falsities of entries in the document.”

• Court of Appeals Ruling: The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the notarized deed enjoyed a presumption of regularity, and that petitioners failed to present clear and convincing evidence of forgery, particularly in light of Gomez’s Second Report stating that the standard thumbmarks lacked clarity for positive identification.

• Forgery: Petitioners argued that the thumbmarks of Rufina Casimiro on the Deed of Absolute Sale were forged. They presented the expert testimony of NBI fingerprint examiner Gomez, who concluded after comparison that the questioned thumbmarks were not impressed by Rufina, and the trial court’s own physical examination confirmed that the patterns were different (circle type vs. loop type).
• Illiteracy and Practice: Petitioners maintained that their mother was illiterate, could not sign her name, and never transacted involving her properties without the assistance of at least one of her children. The standard documents showed such assistance, while the disputed deed did not.
• Notary’s Credibility: Petitioners impugned the credibility of the notary public, Atty. Espiritu, who had previously notarized a false affidavit of self-adjudication despite personal knowledge of the existence of other heirs, and had admitted indifference to the truth of the documents he notarized.

• Presumption of Regularity: Respondents relied on the presumption that the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale was duly executed and regular. They argued that petitioners failed to rebut this presumption with clear and convincing evidence.
• Expert Witness Competence: Respondents assailed the qualification of NBI fingerprint examiner Gomez, branding him as “just an ordinary employee” whose primary duty was taking fingerprints for clearances and criminal cases. They contended that his Second Report, noting the standard thumbmarks were faint and blurred, effectively superseded the First Report and prevented any valid comparison.
• Notary’s Testimony: Respondents pointed to the testimony of Atty. Espiritu that both parties personally appeared before him and Rufina affixed her thumbmarks in his presence, reinforcing the deed’s authenticity.

• Forgery and Validity of Deed: Whether the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale is void on the ground that the thumbmarks of Rufina Casimiro were forged, thereby vitiating her consent.

• Forgery and Validity of Deed: The Deed of Absolute Sale was void because petitioners proved by clear and convincing evidence that Rufina Casimiro’s thumbmarks were forged. The presumption of regularity of notarized documents is disputable and was successfully rebutted. NBI examiner Gomez’s First Report established that the questioned thumbmarks were not identical to the genuine standard thumbmarks of Rufina; the trial judge independently examined the documents and reached the same conclusion. Gomez clarified that despite the faintness of standard thumbmarks, the three comparison requirements—fingerprint pattern, flow of ridges, and location/relationship of ridge characteristics—were satisfied and showed agreement among the standards, while the questioned thumbmarks were of a different pattern (circle type vs. loop type). The Second Report did not supersede the First Report, as Gomez expressly denied that it did. The notary public’s credibility was impeached by his admission that he notarized a false affidavit of self-adjudication despite personal knowledge of other heirs, and his declaration that he was unconcerned with the truth of the documents he notarized. Physical facts demonstrated by the thumbmark comparison prevailed over the notary’s self-serving testimony. The trial court’s factual findings, being supported by the evidence, were entitled to greater weight than the Court of Appeals’ contrary appreciation.

• Presumption of Regularity of Notarized Documents — A notarized document carries the evidentiary weight of due execution and enjoys a presumption of regularity. However, this presumption is disputable and may be contradicted by evidence that is clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant.
• Proof of Forgery — Forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive, and convincing evidence. The best evidence of a forged signature (or thumbmark) is the instrument itself containing the alleged forgery. A comparison between the questioned signature/thumbmark and the authentic, genuine specimens is necessary. Judges must conduct an independent examination of the questioned writing or thumbmark to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to authenticity.
• Expert Testimony under Rule 130, Section 49 — The opinion of an expert witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience, or training may be received in evidence. Courts exercise wide discretion in weighing expert testimony, considering factors such as the witness’s ability, character, demeanor, reasoning, possible bias, opportunity for study, and whether common knowledge is insufficient. The expert opinion may be given controlling effect where common knowledge utterly fails. The probative force of expert testimony lies in the aid it renders courts by showing the facts that serve as the basis for the expert’s criterion and the logic of the conclusion.
• Competence of NBI Fingerprint Examiners — The performance of routine functions such as taking fingerprints does not negate an examiner’s special knowledge, skill, experience, or training. The credibility of an expert witness is enhanced where the expert was designated by the National Bureau of Investigation itself rather than handpicked by the party presenting the testimony.

• “Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest … A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.” (quoting Nunga v. Atty. Viray)
• “It is true that notarized documents are accorded evidentiary weight as regards their due execution. Nevertheless, while notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity, this presumption is disputable. They can be contradicted by evidence that is clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant.”
• “The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of the theory or opinion of the expert, but rather in the aid that he can render to the courts in showing the facts which serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded.” (quoting People v. Malejana)
• “As the Supreme Court ruled in People vs. Abatayo, 87 Phil. 794, 798, ‘Thumbmarks never lie’.”
• “A judge must therefore conduct an independent examination of the signature itself in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity …” (quoting Mendoza v. Fermin)
• “As against petitioners’ evidence, all that respondents presented was the testimony of the notarizing lawyer, whose own acts are clouded with suspicion.”

• Nunga v. Atty. Viray, 366 Phil. 155 (1999) — Cited for the principle that notarization is invested with substantive public interest and converts a private document into a public document entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.
• Basilio v. Court of Appeals, 400 Phil. 120 (2000) — Cited for the rule that notarized documents carry a presumption of regularity with respect to due execution, but the presumption is disputable.
• Heirs of Trazona v. Heirs of Canada, 723 Phil. 388 (2013) — Reiterated that the presumption of regularity of notarized documents can be contradicted by clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant evidence.
• Salomon v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 263 Phil. 1068 (1990) — Laid down factors for evaluating expert testimony: the trial court has wide discretion in weighing such testimony, considering the witness’s ability, character, possible bias, reasoning, and opportunity for study.
• Rojales v. Dime, G.R. No. 194548, February 10, 2016 — Sustained the competence and credibility of the same NBI fingerprint examiner, Eriberto B. Gomez, Jr., and reproduced his detailed testimony on the three requisites for fingerprint comparison.
• Heirs of Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 360 Phil. 753 (1998) — Established that forgery must be proved by clear, positive, and convincing evidence, and that the best evidence is the instrument itself bearing the alleged forged signature for comparison with genuine specimens.
• Mendoza v. Fermin, 738 Phil. 429 (2014) — Emphasized the duty of a judge to conduct an independent examination of a signature to determine authenticity.
• Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) — Discussed as persuasive authority on the standards for admissibility of expert scientific testimony and the trial judge’s “gatekeeper” role.

• Rule 130, Section 49, Revised Rules on Evidence — Opinion of expert witness. Applied to admit and evaluate the testimony of the NBI fingerprint examiner on the genuineness of the thumbmarks.
• Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Petition for review on certiorari. The Court recognized the general rule that only questions of law are raised, but applied the exceptions due to conflicting findings of the lower courts and misapprehension of facts by the Court of Appeals.

Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, Associate Justice Samuel R. Martires, Associate Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo. (All concurred without separate opinions.)