Torres vs. Yu

Where the issue is whether the factual findings in the CFI's decision are supported by substantial evidence, or where that issue is raised together with the legal issue of whether the conclusions conform to law and jurisprudence, the petition for review should be filed with the Court of Appeals; where the only issue is a pure question of law, the petition for review on certiorari should be filed with the Supreme Court. Republic Act No. 6031, as the later law, superseded Republic Act No. 5433 on the matter of grounds for review, but Republic Act No. 5433 supplies the deficiencies of Republic Act No. 6031 regarding the mode of review (petition for review) and the reviewing tribunal (Court of Appeals).

The case concerns the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under section 45 of the Judiciary Law, as amended by Republic Act No. 6031, to review decisions of the Court of First Instance in cases exclusively cognizable by inferior courts. Prior to the amendments, all CFI decisions involving factual issues were appealable to the Court of Appeals as a matter of right, with no distinction between cases originating from inferior courts and those originally filed in the CFI. To avoid protracted litigation in cases from inferior courts — which could pass through four courts including the Supreme Court — Congress enacted Republic Act No. 5433 (effective September 9, 1968) and later Republic Act No. 6031 (effective August 4, 1969), which transformed inferior courts into courts of record, abolished trial de novo on appeal, and made CFI decisions in cases exclusively cognizable by inferior courts final subject to certain conditions. The ambiguity of Republic Act No. 6031 — which failed to specify the reviewing tribunal and the mode of review — generated the controversy that this case required the Court to resolve.

Anita G. Torres and Lazaro Torres, on one side, and Nora S. Yu and Jose B. Yu, on the other, were disputing parties in an ejectment suit over a one-third portion on the southern side of Stall No. 1 of the Lingayen Central Market. The municipal court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, in its decision dated September 1, 1975 in Civil Case No. 3509, ordered the Yu spouses to vacate the disputed portion and to pay the Torres spouses the sum of ninety pesos a month from February 19, 1975 until possession of the stall was restored to them.

The Yu spouses appealed to the Court of First Instance. The CFI, in a decision dated October 27, 1975 in Civil Case No. 15178, affirmed the municipal court's judgment in full. A copy of that decision was received by the Yu spouses on October 28, 1975. Fifteen days later, they filed a motion for reconsideration. They received the order denying the motion on December 9, 1975. Fourteen days thereafter, or on December 23, 1975, the Yu spouses mailed their petition for review to the Court of Appeals, following the resolution adopted by the Court of Appeals on August 12, 1971, which prescribed the procedure for elevating CFI decisions in cases exclusively cognizable by inferior courts.

The Court of Appeals, per Gatmaitan, J., in its resolution of January 13, 1976 in CA-G.R. No. SP-04952, gave due course to the petition, required the Torres spouses to answer, set the case for hearing on February 11, and directed the issuance of a preliminary injunction upon the Yu spouses' filing of a bond in the sum of one thousand pesos. The Torres spouses assailed that resolution before the Supreme Court via a special civil action of certiorari filed on February 2, 1976, contending that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 6031 to review the CFI decision. In the meantime, the CFI decision was executed. The Yu spouses, for their part, maintained that whether the factual findings in the CFI decision were supported by substantial evidence was an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.

• Lack of CA Jurisdiction: Petitioners contended that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 6031 to review the CFI decision in a case exclusively cognizable by an inferior court, because the issue of whether the CFI's factual findings were supported by substantial evidence was allegedly a purely legal question within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

• CA Jurisdiction over Substantial Evidence Issue: Respondents Yu contended that whether the factual findings in the CFI decision were supported by substantial evidence was an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, as distinguished from a pure question of law reserved to the Supreme Court.

• Jurisdiction — Factual Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review a CFI decision in a case exclusively cognizable by an inferior court when the issue is whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.
• Jurisdiction — Pure Legal Issue: Whether the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction when the only issue is whether the CFI's conclusions are in consonance with law and jurisprudence, i.e., a pure question of law.
• Statutory Interpretation — RA 5433 and RA 6031: Whether Republic Act No. 6031 repealed Republic Act No. 5433, and which law governs the mode and venue of review of CFI decisions in cases exclusively cognizable by inferior courts.

• Jurisdiction — Factual Issue: Yes. Where the issue is whether the factual findings in the CFI decision are supported by substantial evidence, or where that issue is raised together with a legal issue, the petition for review should be filed with the Court of Appeals, as such issues require examination and evaluation of the evidence — a function within the prerogative of that court.
• Jurisdiction — Pure Legal Issue: No, the Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction in such cases. If the only issue is whether the CFI's conclusions conform to law and jurisprudence — a purely legal question — the petition for review on certiorari should be filed with the Supreme Court, as expressly provided in the last proviso of section 45, as amended by Republic Act No. 6031.
• Statutory Interpretation — RA 5433 and RA 6031: Republic Act No. 6031, as the later law, superseded Republic Act No. 5433 on the matter of grounds for review, but Republic Act No. 5433 was not totally abrogated because it supplies the deficiencies of Republic Act No. 6031 regarding the mode of review (petition for review) and the reviewing tribunal (Court of Appeals).

• Jurisdiction — Factual Issue: The determination of whether factual findings are supported by substantial evidence is not a purely legal question; it requires examination and evaluation of the evidence, which is the prerogative of the Court of Appeals. Republic Act No. 6031 provides that the CFI decision in cases exclusively cognizable by inferior courts shall be final, provided that the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence and the conclusions are not clearly against law and jurisprudence. The Court of Appeals adopted a resolution on August 12, 1971 prescribing the filing of a petition for review when a CFI decision in such cases is assailed for lack of substantial evidence and for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. The Yu spouses followed that resolution in filing their petition. Because the Yu spouses assailed the CFI decision on the ground that its factual findings were not supported by substantial evidence, the Court of Appeals acted within its jurisdiction and did not commit grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the petition.

• Jurisdiction — Pure Legal Issue: The last proviso of section 45, as amended by Republic Act No. 6031, expressly reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review, in its discretion, any case involving a question of law by certiorari. Where the only issue is whether the CFI's conclusions are in consonance with law and jurisprudence, that is a purely legal question and should be ventilated in the Supreme Court by means of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the form adopted by Republic Act No. 5440.

• Statutory Interpretation — RA 5433 and RA 6031: Both Republic Acts Nos. 5433 and 6031 abolished appeal by record on appeal to the Court of Appeals from CFI decisions in cases exclusively cognizable by inferior courts, intending that litigation should, if possible, be terminated at the CFI level. However, both laws assume the CFI is not infallible, and in exceptional cases the rule on finality should not be enforced. There is repugnancy between the two laws on the grounds for review: Republic Act No. 5433 allows review when the CFI committed errors of fact or of fact and law warranting reversal, while Republic Act No. 6031 provides that the grounds are that the factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence and the conclusions are contrary to law and jurisprudence. As the later law, Republic Act No. 6031 prevails on the matter of grounds. But Republic Act No. 5433 should not be considered totally abrogated because it indicates the mode of review (petition for review) and the reviewing tribunal (Court of Appeals), thereby supplying the deficiencies of Republic Act No. 6031, which is silent on these matters.

• Finality of CFI Decisions in Inferior Court Cases — Under section 45 of the Judiciary Law, as amended by Republic Act No. 6031, the decision of the CFI in cases falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of municipal and city courts shall be final, provided that (1) the findings of fact contained in said decision are supported by substantial evidence, and (2) the conclusions are not clearly against the law and jurisprudence. If either condition is not met, the finality rule does not apply and the decision may be reviewed by the appropriate appellate court.

• Bifurcated Appellate Jurisdiction Based on Nature of Issue — Where the issue involves whether factual findings are supported by substantial evidence (a question of fact or mixed question of fact and law), the petition for review should be filed with the Court of Appeals. Where the only issue is whether the CFI's conclusions conform to law and jurisprudence (a pure question of law), the petition for review on certiorari should be filed with the Supreme Court. The substantial evidence rule does not involve a painstaking review of evidence but merely the determination of the existence in the record of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the findings and conclusion.

• Supersession Without Total Abrogation — A later law (Republic Act No. 6031) may supersede an earlier law (Republic Act No. 5433) on matters where they are repugnant, while the earlier law continues to supply deficiencies on matters where the later law is silent, such as the mode of review and the reviewing tribunal.

• "We hold that if the only issue is whether the conclusions of the Court of First Instance are in consonance with law and jurisprudence, then that issue is a purely legal question. It should be ventilated in this Court by means of a petition for review on certiorari, as expressly provided in the last proviso of section 45, as amended by Republic Act No. 6031." — This passage articulates the Court's holding on the bifurcation of appellate jurisdiction based on the nature of the issue raised, reserving pure questions of law to the Supreme Court.

• "But if the issue is whether 'the findings of fact contained' in the decision of the Court of First Instance 'are supported by substantial evidence', which is not purely a legal issue, or if that issue is raised together with the legal issue of whether the conclusions of the Court of First Instance are in conformity with pertinent law and jurisprudence, then the petition for review should be filed in the Court of Appeals." — This passage defines the complementary rule: questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law fall within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.

• "It is said that hard cases make bad law. The converse is true. A bad law (meaning a law that is ambiguous and deficient) makes cases hard. Republic Act No. 6031 is such a law." — This passage characterizes the legislative deficiency that generated the controversy, explaining why judicial interpretation was necessary to fill the gaps in the statute.

• Buenbrazo vs. Marave, L-41144, December 29, 1980, 101 SCRA 849 — Cited as supporting authority for the proposition that the Court of Appeals' resolution of August 12, 1971 prescribing the petition for review procedure is a correct implementation of Republic Act No. 6031, which had been in force for more than eleven years.

• Estrella vs. CA, L-56284, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 581 — Cited alongside Buenbrazo as further authority upholding the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction and procedure under Republic Act No. 6031.

• Section 45, Judiciary Law (as amended by Republic Act No. 6031) — Governs the appellate jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance over cases arising in city and municipal courts. Provides that in cases under the exclusive original jurisdiction of municipal and city courts appealed to the CFI, the CFI decision shall be final, provided the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence and the conclusions are not clearly against the law and jurisprudence. The last proviso reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review, by certiorari, any case involving a question of law.

• Section 29, Judiciary Law (as amended by Republic Act No. 5433) — Originally governed the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. As amended, it provided that CFI decisions affirming in full the judgment of an inferior court may be elevated to the Court of Appeals only on petition for review, which the CA may entertain when it shows prima facie that the CFI committed errors of fact or of fact and law warranting reversal or modification. The Court held that this provision supplies the mode of review and reviewing tribunal that Republic Act No. 6031 omits.

• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Prescribes the form of petition for review on certiorari for appeals to the Supreme Court, adopted by Republic Act No. 5440. Applied as the proper mode for elevating pure questions of law from CFI decisions in inferior court cases to the Supreme Court.

• Section 22, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 — Cited in Justice Vasquez's concurring opinion as the provision that would replace the substantial evidence rule under Republic Act No. 6031, applying instead the qualification that the lower court committed errors of fact or law warranting reversal or modification, and providing for appeal by petition for review to the Intermediate Appellate Court.

Makasiar, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, and Gutierrez Jr., JJ., concurred. Fernando, C.J., was on leave.

Teehankee, Acting C.J. (concurring) — Concurred in the result, upholding CA jurisdiction, but on the broader ground that Republic Act No. 6031 was enacted to lessen the number of appeals and relieve the Supreme Court of cases originating from the exclusive original jurisdiction of municipal and city courts. Maintained that all petitions for review — whether involving questions of fact, law, or both — should be uniformly filed with the Court of Appeals, which is fully equipped with fifteen divisions to handle them, subject to the reserved jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over pure questions of law via certiorari. Emphasized that the substantial evidence rule does not involve a painstaking review of evidence but merely the determination of whether relevant evidence exists that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.

De Castro, J. (concurring) — Concurred, observing that the first ground under Republic Act No. 6031 (substantiality of evidence) necessarily involves a question of fact or a mixed question of fact and law, because it requires assessment and evaluation of evidence. Distinguished this from the second ground (conclusions contrary to law and jurisprudence), which expressly raises a question of law. Noted that Section 22 of B.P. No. 129 lends support to the view that the Court of Appeals was never intended to be stripped of appellate jurisdiction over such appeals.

Vasquez, J. (concurring) — Concurred in the conclusion but on different grounds. Clarified that neither Republic Act No. 5433 nor Republic Act No. 6031 abolished appeals from CFI decisions to the Court of Appeals; rather, they changed the mode of taking the appeal. Disagreed with the main opinion's bifurcation test, arguing instead that the proper test for determining where the appeal should be filed is whether the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to the Constitution and Section 17 of the Judiciary Law, with all other appeals going to the Court of Appeals. Observed that Section 22 of B.P. No. 129 would render the substantial evidence rule under Republic Act No. 6031 obsolete once it became operative.