Torres vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation

A motion for reconsideration under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service may be filed only by mail or by personal delivery, and a facsimile transmission does not constitute a valid mode of filing nor is it admissible as electronic evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000. The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is mandatory and jurisdictional, and failure to conform renders the judgment final and executory.

Petitioner Ellery March G. Torres was employed as a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor (SMOS) at respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), specifically assigned to Casino Filipino-Hyatt (CF Hyatt) Manila. PAGCOR is a government-owned and controlled corporation whose employees are subject to the Civil Service laws and the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. The administrative framework governing disciplinary proceedings and appeals within the civil service prescribes specific modes and periods for filing motions for reconsideration and appeals, which are jurisdictional in nature.

Petitioner Ellery March G. Torres was a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor (SMOS) at respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), assigned to Casino Filipino-Hyatt (CF Hyatt) Manila. On the basis of an intelligence report regarding the padding of Credit Meter Readings (CMR) of slot machines at CF Hyatt, PAGCOR's Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU) conducted an investigation. The CIU discovered a scheme of CMR padding committed by adding a zero after the first digit of the actual CMR or adding a digit before the first digit, such that a slot machine with an actual CMR of ₱5,000.00 would be issued a CMR receipt reflecting either ₱50,000.00 or ₱35,000.00. Based on its investigation of all CMR receipts and slot machine jackpot slips issued by CF Hyatt for February and March 2007, the CIU identified the members of the syndicate responsible, which included petitioner.

On May 4, 2007, petitioner was served a Memorandum of Charges for dishonesty, serious misconduct, fraud, and violation of office rules and regulations, all considered grave offenses with the penalty of dismissal. The charges alleged that sometime between November 2006 and March 2007, petitioner facilitated and actively participated in a fraudulent scheme involving the irregular manipulation of CMR, leading to the misappropriation of money earmarked for the slot machine jackpot at CF Hyatt Manila. On the same day, a second Memorandum of Charges signed by Senior Branch Manager Rogelio Y. Bangsil, Jr. was issued, informing petitioner of the charge of dishonesty for padding anomalous slot machine jackpot receipts. Petitioner was required to explain in writing within seventy-two hours why he should not be sanctioned or dismissed, and was placed under preventive suspension effective immediately.

On May 7, 2007, petitioner wrote Manager Bangsil a letter of explanation and refutation, denying any involvement or participation in the fraudulent manipulation of the CMR or padding of slot machine receipts, and requesting a formal investigation of the accusations. On August 4, 2007, petitioner received a letter dated August 2, 2007 from Atty. Lizette F. Mortel, Managing Head of PAGCOR's Human Resource and Development Department, informing him that the Board of Directors, in its meeting on July 31, 2007, had approved the recommendation of the Adjudication Committee to dismiss him from the service for dishonesty, gross misconduct, serious violations of office rules and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the company, and loss of trust and confidence.

On September 14, 2007, petitioner filed with the CSC a complaint against PAGCOR and its Chairman for illegal dismissal, non-payment of backwages, and other benefits. He alleged that he had denied all charges, had requested a formal investigation which PAGCOR did not conduct, and had sent a letter of reconsideration dated August 13, 2007 to PAGCOR's Chairman, the members of the Board of Directors, and the Merit Systems Protection Board, which was not acted upon. PAGCOR, in its Comment, alleged that petitioner failed to perfect an appeal within the period and manner provided by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. The CSC treated the complaint as an appeal and denied it on June 23, 2008, finding that the appeal had prescribed. The CSC did not credit petitioner's claim that he sent a facsimile transmission of his letter of reconsideration, finding PAGCOR's denial of receipt more credible as it was supported by certifications from its employees, and noting that one of the telephone numbers to which petitioner allegedly sent the fax did not belong to PAGCOR's Office of the Board of Directors.

• Timeliness of Motion for Reconsideration: Petitioner contended that he filed his letter of reconsideration on August 13, 2007, within the fifteen-day period, by means of a facsimile transmission sent to PAGCOR's Office of the Board of Directors.
• Validity of Facsimile Filing: Petitioner argued that the sending of documents through electronic data messages, including facsimile, is sanctioned under Republic Act No. 8792, the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000.
• Denial of Due Process: Petitioner asserted that the CA erred in affirming his dismissal based merely on technicality without considering his allegations of summary and arbitrary dismissal based on fabricated and unfounded accusations.
• Credibility of PAGCOR's Denial: Petitioner claimed that PAGCOR could easily deny receipt of the letter by ordering its employees to execute affidavits of denial under threat of administrative sanction or termination, rendering such denial baseless and conjectural.
• CSC Errors: Petitioner argued that the CSC erred in giving more weight to PAGCOR's denial of receipt, in not resolving his Ex-Parte Motion to Issue Subpoena Duces Tecum, and in ruling that his failure to send the letter through mail or personal service forfeited his right to appeal.

• Failure to Perfect Appeal: Respondent PAGCOR alleged that petitioner failed to perfect an appeal within the period and manner provided by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
• Non-Receipt of Letter of Reconsideration: Respondent denied having received petitioner's letter of reconsideration, supported by certifications issued by its employees.
• Wrong Telephone Number: Respondent contended that verification of one of the telephone numbers where petitioner allegedly sent his fax disclosed that such number did not belong to PAGCOR's Office of the Board of Directors.

• Perfection of Appeal: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the dismissal of petitioner's appeal based on prescription, without considering the allegations of summary and arbitrary dismissal.
• Validity of Facsimile Filing: Whether a letter of reconsideration sent via facsimile transmission constitutes a valid filing under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
• Electronic Evidence: Whether a facsimile transmission is admissible as electronic evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000.

• Perfection of Appeal: No. The CSC correctly dismissed the appeal, petitioner's complaint having been filed forty-one days after receipt of the dismissal letter, beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period under Section 43 of the Revised Uniform Rules.
• Validity of Facsimile Filing: No. The Uniform Rules sanction only two modes of filing a motion for reconsideration — by mail or by personal delivery — and facsimile transmission is not among them.
• Electronic Evidence: No. A facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data message" or "electronic document" within the context of the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 and is therefore not admissible as electronic evidence.

• Perfection of Appeal: Petitioner received the letter of dismissal on August 4, 2007, giving him until August 19, 2007 to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal. Records did not show that petitioner had filed a motion for reconsideration in any sanctioned form. The CSC found that PAGCOR's denial of receipt was supported by certifications from its employees, and that one of the telephone numbers to which petitioner allegedly sent the fax did not belong to PAGCOR's Office of the Board of Directors. When petitioner filed his complaint with the CSC on September 14, 2007 — treated as an appeal — forty-one days had elapsed, well beyond the fifteen-day period under Section 43. The right to appeal is statutory, not constitutional, and its perfection in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is mandatory and jurisdictional. Failure to conform renders the judgment final and executory, and the CSC was without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.

• Validity of Facsimile Filing: Sections 37, 38, 39, and 43 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service govern the finality of decisions, the filing of motions for reconsideration, and the filing of appeals. Section 39 expressly provides that a motion for reconsideration sent by mail shall be deemed filed on the date shown by the postmark on the envelope, and in case of personal delivery, the date stamped by the proper office. These are the only two sanctioned modes. Facsimile transmission is not recognized as a valid mode of filing under the Uniform Rules. Citing Garvida vs. Sales, Jr., the Court reiterated that a facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading; it is at best an exact copy preserving the marks of an original, and without the original there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic or a sham.

• Electronic Evidence: Petitioner's reliance on Republic Act No. 8792, the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, was misplaced. Citing MCC Industrial Sales Corporation vs. Ssangyong Corporation, the Court held that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document" as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act do not include a facsimile transmission. A facsimile transmission cannot be considered electronic evidence, is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule, and is not admissible as electronic evidence. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner indeed sent a letter of reconsideration via facsimile, such transmission did not toll the period to appeal because the mode used was not sanctioned by the Uniform Rules.

• Jurisdictional Nature of the Right to Appeal — The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process, except where granted by statute, in which case it must be exercised in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. Failure to conform renders the judgment final and executory and unappealable. Final and executory judgments can no longer be attacked or modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land. Applied in this case to hold that petitioner's failure to file a valid motion for reconsideration or appeal within the fifteen-day reglementary period rendered PAGCOR's dismissal decision final, depriving the CSC of jurisdiction to entertain the belated appeal.

• Inadmissibility of Facsimile Transmissions as Electronic Evidence — A facsimile transmission is not a genuine and authentic pleading; without the original, there is no way of determining whether the facsimile is genuine or a sham. A facsimile transmission does not fall within the definitions of "electronic data message" or "electronic document" under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, and is therefore not admissible as electronic evidence, nor is it the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule. Applied in this case to reject petitioner's claim that his faxed letter of reconsideration constituted a valid filing.

• Exclusive Modes of Filing Under the Uniform Rules — Under Section 39 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, a motion for reconsideration may be filed only by mail (deemed filed on the date of the postmark) or by personal delivery (deemed filed on the date stamped by the proper office). No other mode of filing is sanctioned. Applied in this case to hold that facsimile transmission is not a recognized mode of filing a motion for reconsideration.

• "Clearly, a motion for reconsideration may either be filed by mail or personal delivery. When a motion for reconsideration was sent by mail, the same shall be deemed filed on the date shown by the postmark on the envelope which shall be attached to the records of the case and in case of personal delivery, the motion is deemed filed on the date stamped thereon by the proper office." — This passage states the Court's interpretation of Section 39 of the Uniform Rules, establishing that only two modes of filing are sanctioned and foreclosing facsimile transmission as a valid mode.

• "A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading." — Quoted from Garvida vs. Sales, Jr., this passage defines why facsimile transmissions are inherently unreliable as pleadings and cannot substitute for originals.

• "We, therefore, conclude that the terms 'electronic data message' and 'electronic document,' as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence." — Quoted from MCC Industrial Sales Corporation vs. Ssangyong Corporation, this passage establishes the controlling rule that facsimile transmissions fall outside the coverage of the Electronic Commerce Act.

• Garvida vs. Sales, Jr., G.R. No. 124893, April 18, 1997, 271 SCRA 767 — Controlling precedent followed. Established that pleadings filed through fax machines are inadmissible in evidence because a facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading and may be a sham. The Court applied this ruling to reject petitioner's facsimile transmission of his letter of reconsideration.

• MCC Industrial Sales Corporation vs. Ssangyong Corporation, G.R. No. 170633, October 17, 2007, 536 SCRA 408 — Controlling precedent followed. Determined that facsimile transmissions are not "electronic data messages" or "electronic documents" under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 and are therefore not admissible as electronic evidence. The Court relied on this to reject petitioner's reliance on the Electronic Commerce Act.

• Peña vs. Government Service and Insurance System, G.R. No. 159520, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 383 — Controlling precedent followed. Enunciated that the right to appeal is statutory, not constitutional, and that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is mandatory and jurisdictional. The Court applied this principle to hold that petitioner's failure to perfect his appeal rendered the dismissal decision final and executory.

• Section 37, Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service — Governs the finality of decisions rendered by heads of agencies; decisions imposing penalties exceeding thirty days' suspension or a fine exceeding thirty days' salary become final and executory after the lapse of the reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration or appeal if no such pleading is filed. Applied to determine when PAGCOR's dismissal of petitioner became final.

• Section 38, Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service — Provides that a party adversely affected by a decision may file a motion for reconsideration with the disciplining authority within fifteen days from receipt thereof. Applied to establish the fifteen-day period within which petitioner should have filed his motion for reconsideration.

• Section 39, Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service — Specifies the modes of filing: by mail (deemed filed on the date of the postmark) or by personal delivery (deemed filed on the date stamped by the proper office). Applied to hold that facsimile transmission is not a sanctioned mode of filing.

• Section 43, Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service — Governs the filing of appeals to the Commission Proper within fifteen days from receipt of the decision. Applied to hold that petitioner's complaint, treated as an appeal and filed forty-one days after receipt of the dismissal letter, was filed out of time.

• Republic Act No. 8792 (Electronic Commerce Act of 2000) — Petitioner invoked this law to support the validity of filing via facsimile transmission. The Court held, relying on precedent, that the definitions of "electronic data message" and "electronic document" under this Act do not include facsimile transmissions.

Renato C. Corona (Chief Justice), Antonio T. Carpio (on official leave), Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Arturo D. Brion, Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Roberto A. Abad, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Jose Portugal Perez, Jose Catral Mendoza, Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, Bienvenido L. Reyes, Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe. No separate concurring opinions were written.