Torres vs. Director, Bureau of Corrections

The President's determination of whether a conditional pardonee has breached the conditions of his pardon under Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code is purely executive in nature and not subject to judicial scrutiny; no final judicial pronouncement of guilt is required before the pardonee may be recommitted to prison.

Wilfredo Sumulong Torres was convicted of two counts of estafa by the Court of First Instance of Manila sometime before 1979, and those convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The maximum sentence would have expired on November 2, 2000. On April 18, 1979, the President granted Torres a conditional pardon on the condition that he would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines." Torres accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. The present petition was filed by his wife, Lydia dela Rosa Torres, and their daughters, Ramona Elisa R. Torres and Maria Cecilia R. Torres, against the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa.

Wilfredo Sumulong Torres was convicted of two counts of estafa by the Court of First Instance of Manila sometime before 1979. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, and the maximum sentence was set to expire on November 2, 2000. On April 18, 1979, the President of the Philippines granted Torres a conditional pardon, the sole condition being that he would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines." Torres accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement.

Thereafter, Torres was charged with twenty counts of estafa before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and was also convicted of sedition by the same court. On May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation of Torres's conditional pardon on account of these subsequent charges and conviction. On September 8, 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon. On October 10, 1986, then Minister of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales issued, "by authority of the President," an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against Torres, who was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his original sentence.

Torres previously challenged the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment in Torres vs. Gonzales (152 SCRA 272), where the Supreme Court ruled that the Executive Department had two options in proceeding against a conditionally pardoned convict alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon: to proceed under Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code, or to proceed under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. The President's choice to proceed under Section 64(i) was held to be an exercise of executive prerogative not subject to judicial scrutiny. Torres, through his wife and daughters, thereafter filed the present petition for habeas corpus, alleging that he had been acquitted in two of the three criminal cases filed against him subsequent to his conditional pardon, and that the third case had remained pending for thirteen years in apparent violation of his right to a speedy trial. Petitioners contended that the President's exercise of prerogative under Section 64(i) to determine the occurrence of a breach without a final judicial conviction violated Torres's right to due process and the constitutional presumption of innocence, constituting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

• Due Process and Presumption of Innocence: Petitioners contended that the President's exercise of prerogative under Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code to determine the occurrence of a breach of a conditional pardon, without a final judicial pronouncement of guilt, violated the pardonee's right to due process and the constitutional presumption of innocence, constituting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
• Speedy Trial: Petitioners asserted that Torres had allegedly been acquitted in two of the three criminal cases filed against him subsequent to his conditional pardon, and that the third case had remained pending for thirteen years, in apparent violation of his right to a speedy trial.

• Executive Prerogative vs. Due Process: Whether the President's determination of a breach of a conditional pardon under Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code, without a final judicial conviction of the pardonee for the subsequent offense, violates the pardonee's right to due process and the constitutional presumption of innocence.
• Availability of Habeas Corpus: Whether the writ of habeas corpus lies to secure the release of a pardonee who has been recommitted to prison pursuant to the President's cancellation of his conditional pardon.

• Executive Prerogative vs. Due Process: No. The grant of pardon, the determination of the terms and conditions of the pardon, the determination of the occurrence of the breach thereof, and the proper sanctions for such breach are purely executive acts not subject to judicial scrutiny. A final judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of the pardonee is not a requirement for the President to determine whether there has been a breach.
• Availability of Habeas Corpus: No. Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person's liberty has been judicially adjudged as illegal or unlawful. The incarceration of Torres remains legal because, were it not for the grant of conditional pardon — which had been revoked because of a breach determined by the President — he would have served his final sentence for his first conviction until November 2, 2000.

• Executive Prerogative vs. Due Process: A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal, whereby the former releases the latter subject to the condition that, upon non-compliance with the terms of the pardon, the pardonee will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence. By consenting to the terms of this contract, the pardonee places himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate, who is duty-bound to ensure compliance with the conditions of the pardon. Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes the Chief Executive to order the arrest and re-incarceration of any person who, in his judgment, fails to comply with the conditions of his pardon. This exercise of presidential judgment is beyond judicial scrutiny; the determination of the violation rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive. The pardonee, having consented to place his liberty on conditional pardon upon the judgment of the power that granted it, cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered. The Court had consistently so ruled in Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons, Sales vs. Director of Prisons, Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol, and Torres vs. Gonzales. It matters not that Torres had allegedly been acquitted in two of the three subsequent criminal cases and that the third remained pending for thirteen years.

• Availability of Habeas Corpus: The writ of habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person's liberty has been judicially adjudged as illegal or unlawful. Torres's incarceration remained legal because, absent the conditional pardon (which had been validly revoked), he would have served his original sentence until November 2, 2000. The prerogative to reinstate a revoked conditional pardon, should the pardonee's acquittal from subsequent charges warrant it, is solely vested in the Chief Executive. Courts have no authority to interfere with the grant or reinstatement of a pardon, as such powers are undisputedly and absolutely lodged in the President's office.

• Conditional Pardon as a Contract — A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal, whereby the former will release the latter subject to the condition that if the pardonee does not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one. By accepting the pardon, the pardonee consents to the terms and places himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive, who is duty-bound to ensure compliance. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that Torres, having accepted the conditional pardon, could not invoke the aid of the courts to challenge the executive determination of breach.

• Executive Prerogative to Determine Breach of Conditional Pardon — The grant of pardon, the determination of the terms and conditions, the determination of the occurrence of a breach, and the proper sanctions for such breach are purely executive acts not subject to judicial scrutiny. A final judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of the pardonee is not a requirement for the President to determine whether there has been a breach. The pardonee, having consented to place his liberty upon the judgment of the power that granted the pardon, cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered. The Court applied this doctrine to dismiss the petition, reaffirming its consistent rulings in Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons, Sales vs. Director of Prisons, Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol, and Torres vs. Gonzales.

• Two Options of the Executive Department — In proceeding against a conditionally pardoned convict alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed under Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code, or (ii) to proceed under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. The President's choice between these options is an exercise of executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.

• "The grant of pardon, the determination of the terms and conditions of the pardon, the determination of the occurrence of the breach thereof, and the proper sanctions for such breach, are purely executive acts and, thus, are not subject to judicial scrutiny." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi: that all aspects of conditional pardon — from grant to revocation — fall within exclusive executive prerogative and are beyond the reach of judicial review.

• "The determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, and the pardonee, having consented to place his liberty on conditional pardon upon the judgment of the power that has granted it, cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered." — This is the canonical formulation of the rule that a pardonee waives judicial recourse by accepting a conditional pardon, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on executive clemency.

• "Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person's liberty has been judicially adjudged as illegal or unlawful." — This passage defines the scope of the writ of habeas corpus as applied to executive recommitment, establishing that a lawful underlying sentence negates the writ even where the pardon has been revoked.

• Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons, 68 Phil. 154 — Controlling precedent establishing that the President need not wait for a judicial pronouncement of guilt before recommitting a pardonee under Section 64(i); followed and reaffirmed in this decision.
• Sales vs. Director of Prisons, 87 Phil. 495 — Followed precedent reinforcing the same rule that executive determination of breach is beyond judicial scrutiny.
• Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol, 108 Phil. 353 — Followed precedent consistent with the rule that recommitment under Section 64(i) does not require a final judicial conviction.
• Torres vs. Gonzales, 152 SCRA 272 — Prior ruling involving the same petitioner, which established the two-options doctrine (Section 64(i) or Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code) and held that the President's choice is an executive prerogative not subject to judicial scrutiny; directly reaffirmed.
• Alvarez vs. Director of Prisons, 80 Phil. 50 — Cited for the doctrine that a conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal.

• Section 64(i), Revised Administrative Code — Authorizes the Chief Executive to order "the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence." The Court applied this provision to uphold the President's authority to recommit Torres without prior judicial conviction, holding that the exercise of presidential judgment under this provision is beyond judicial scrutiny.
• Article 159, Revised Penal Code — Identified as an alternative basis for proceeding against a conditionally pardoned convict who breaches the conditions of pardon. The Court noted that the Executive Department has two options — to proceed under Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code or under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code — and that the President's choice is an executive prerogative.

Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and Kapunan, JJ., concurred.