Torres, et al. vs. Dalangin

A lawyer may be disciplined only upon substantial evidence, and charges of gross immorality or gross misconduct that rest on mere allegations, speculation, or unsubstantiated affidavits do not warrant suspension or disbarment. The Court may impose a lesser sanction, such as an admonition or fine, for acts that do not erode the lawyer's moral character but nonetheless reflect poorly on the profession.

These consolidated administrative cases arose from reciprocal disbarment complaints filed by and against lawyers who were involved in prior litigation and disciplinary proceedings. Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin, a former district public attorney, was accused by Atty. Rosita L. Dela Fuente-Torres and others of gross immorality, malpractice, and gross misconduct. Atty. Dalangin, in turn, filed counter-complaints against Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres for alleged violations of the Anti-Wiretapping Act and for suborning perjury. The cases were consolidated before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, which recommended Atty. Dalangin's suspension for three years and the dismissal of his counter-charges.

Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin, a former district public attorney, was the respondent in two administrative complaints and the complainant in two others. In CBD Case No. 11-3215, Atty. Torres, Felicidad Samatra, Glenda Alvaro, Mary Noveras, and Generosa Camacho accused Atty. Dalangin of gross immorality, malpractice, and gross misconduct. They alleged that he orchestrated groundless suits against employees of the Judiciary and a fellow lawyer, maintained an illicit affair with Julita Pascual, a clerk at the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), with whom he allegedly had a daughter named Julienne, collected attorney's fees from indigent litigants while working at PAO, misquoted jurisprudence in a pleading, and submitted fraudulent evidence in a civil case.

Atty. Dalangin denied all charges. He claimed he had no hand in the preparation of the disbarment complaint against Atty. Torres, that his relationship with Pascual was merely friendly, that he was a godfather to her children, and that his appearances outside his jurisdiction were with the Regional Public Attorney's verbal authority. He also asserted that any mistakes in presenting evidence had been rectified in court.

In CBD Case No. 12-3292, Alvaro alleged that on November 14, 2011, while waiting for a hearing at the RTC lobby in Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, Atty. Dalangin hurled slanderous remarks at her, called her a "certified swindler," and threatened her for her participation in the earlier complaint. Atty. Dalangin admitted the confrontation but denied shouting invectives, claiming he merely confronted Alvaro for what he believed were lies in her affidavit and that he had banned her from PAO because she was a fixer.

In CBD Case No. 12-3369, Atty. Dalangin sought the disbarment of Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres for conspiring with their clients in filing the earlier complaint and for violating the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He alleged that a transcript of a recorded telephone conversation between Nonilo Alejo and Wilma Pineda was submitted without Pineda's consent. Atty. Andres argued the complaint was filed to harass him, while Atty. Torres contended that the reference to the Anti-Wiretapping Act was an admission that the conversation transpired and that no wire or cable was used to tap cellular phones.

In CBD Case No. 12-3458, Atty. Dalangin charged Atty. Torres with grave misconduct and dishonesty for submitting affidavits from Marzan and Valdez that allegedly contained untruthful statements, claiming Atty. Torres pressured them to sign the affidavits in exchange for the dismissal of a perjury case. Atty. Torres insisted on the truth of the statements.

The IBP Investigating Commissioner found sufficient bases for Atty. Dalangin's suspension for three years, citing gross immorality and gross misconduct, and recommended the dismissal of the charges against Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres. The IBP Board of Governors adopted this recommendation. Atty. Dalangin's motion for reconsideration was denied, and he filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.

• Gross Immorality: Complainants alleged that Atty. Dalangin maintained an illicit affair with Pascual, resulting in the birth of a child, Julienne, and that this was known to the community and the courts, constituting a breach of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the CPR.
• Gross Misconduct and Malpractice: Complainants argued that Atty. Dalangin filed groundless suits against employees of the Judiciary and a fellow lawyer, collected attorney's fees from indigent clients, appeared outside his jurisdiction without authority, misquoted jurisprudence, and submitted fraudulent evidence, violating Rules 1.02, 1.03, 10.01, 10.02, and 18.03 of the CPR.
• Gross Misconduct (A.C. No. 10759): Alvaro argued that Atty. Dalangin's public outburst, in which he called her a "certified swindler" and threatened her, violated Rules 1.01, 1.02, 7.03, and 8.02 of the CPR.

• Denial of Charges: Atty. Dalangin denied having a hand in the preparation of the disbarment complaint against Atty. Torres, asserting that neither his name nor his signature appeared in the records.
• Relationship with Pascual: Atty. Dalangin claimed his relationship with Pascual was maliciously misinterpreted, that he was only a close friend of the Pascuals, and that some of Pascual's children, including Julienne, were his godchildren.
• PAO Appearances: Atty. Dalangin admitted appearing as a public attorney beyond his jurisdiction but claimed this was with the Regional Public Attorney's verbal authority, which he argued was sufficient under office practice.
• Confrontation with Alvaro: Atty. Dalangin admitted the confrontation but denied shouting invectives, explaining that he merely confronted Alvaro for what he claimed were lies in her affidavit and that he banned her from PAO because she was a fixer.
• Counter-Charges: Atty. Dalangin argued that Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres conspired with their clients in filing the complaint and violated the Anti-Wiretapping Act by submitting a transcript of a recorded conversation without consent.

• Gross Immorality: Whether Atty. Dalangin's alleged illicit affair with Pascual was established by substantial evidence to warrant suspension.
• Gross Misconduct and Malpractice: Whether the charges of malpractice, including the demand for attorney's fees from indigent clients, unauthorized appearances, and submission of misleading evidence, were supported by sufficient evidence.
• Misquote of Jurisprudence: Whether Atty. Dalangin's misquote of jurisprudence in a pleading constituted a breach of Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the CPR.
• Conduct in Court Premises (A.C. No. 10759): Whether Atty. Dalangin's outburst against Alvaro within court premises violated Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the CPR.
• Counter-Charges (A.C. No. 10760 and 10761): Whether Atty. Dalangin's charges against Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres for violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act and perjury were substantiated.

• Gross Immorality: No. The charge of gross immorality was not established by substantial evidence. The affidavits relied upon contained only general statements, and the birth certificate of Julienne indicated Pascual's husband as the father, not Atty. Dalangin. The Court found the evidence insufficient to warrant suspension.
• Gross Misconduct and Malpractice: No. The charges of malpractice, including the demand for attorney's fees and unauthorized appearances, were not substantiated. The Court noted that the alleged demand for fees was based on a lone affidavit executed years after the incident, and the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty prevailed.
• Misquote of Jurisprudence: Yes, but only an admonition was warranted. Atty. Dalangin's misquote of jurisprudence in a pleading constituted a breach of Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the CPR, but the Court found that suspension was too harsh a penalty for a single incident where there was no clear intent to mislead.
• Conduct in Court Premises (A.C. No. 10759): Yes. Atty. Dalangin's outburst against Alvaro within court premises violated Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the CPR. The Court imposed a fine of ₱5,000.00, considering the mitigating circumstance of provocation.
• Counter-Charges (A.C. No. 10760 and 10761): No. The charges against Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres were dismissed for lack of merit. The alleged violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act was not substantiated, and the charge of perjury against Atty. Torres was not established by clear and convincing proof.

• Gross Immorality: The Court applied the substantial evidence standard, requiring "that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion." The affidavits considered by the IBP contained only general statements of supposed personal and public knowledge, with scant and unsubstantiated circumstances. The birth certificate of Julienne, a public document, indicated Pascual's husband as the father, not Atty. Dalangin. The photographs of Atty. Dalangin, Pascual, and Julienne in Puerto Princesa were explained as being taken during a wedding where Atty. Dalangin was a principal sponsor. The Court found that the evidence did not adequately prove an amorous relationship, but noted that Atty. Dalangin's display of closeness with Pascual's family could have sparked suspicion. The Court admonished him to be more prudent, citing the principle that lawyers "must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character."
• Gross Misconduct and Malpractice: The Court found that the charge of malpractice for demanding attorney's fees from an indigent client was unsubstantiated, as it was based on a lone affidavit executed in 2010 for an incident allegedly occurring in 2001. The claim that Atty. Dalangin knowingly brought a groundless suit against a fellow lawyer had no basis, as the affidavit of Marzan and Valdez did not allege that they were fraudulently lured into signing the complaint. The Court also applied the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty, noting that it was highly improbable that courts would fail to notice unauthorized appearances.
• Misquote of Jurisprudence: The Court found that Atty. Dalangin violated Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the CPR by misquoting jurisprudence in a pleading. However, the Court noted that the supposed quotation was Atty. Dalangin's own conclusion from the cited jurisprudence, with no clear indication of intent to mislead. The Court found an admonition adequate, as suspension would be too harsh for a single incident.
• Conduct in Court Premises (A.C. No. 10759): The Court found that Atty. Dalangin's outburst against Alvaro, witnessed by security guards and other persons, violated Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the CPR, which prohibits lawyers from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on their fitness to practice law. The Court considered the provocation as a mitigating circumstance and imposed a fine of ₱5,000.00, noting that A.C. No. 10759 was a distinct case from A.C. No. 10758.
• Counter-Charges (A.C. No. 10760 and 10761): The Court affirmed the IBP's dismissal of Atty. Dalangin's counter-charges. In A.C. No. 10760, the alleged violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act was not substantiated, as Pineda denied the truth of the statements in the transcript, casting doubt on the existence of a recorded conversation. In A.C. No. 10761, the charge of perjury against Atty. Torres was not established by clear and convincing proof, as there was no evidence that she actively participated in the intentional commission of fraud.

• Substantial Evidence in Administrative Cases — The quantum of proof required in administrative cases against lawyers is substantial evidence, defined as "that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion." This is less than proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases and preponderance of evidence in civil cases. The Court applied this standard in finding that the charges of gross immorality and gross misconduct against Atty. Dalangin were not sufficiently established.
• Burden of Proof in Disciplinary Proceedings — The burden of proof rests on the complainant, who must establish the case against the respondent by "clear, convincing and satisfactory proof, disclosing a case that is free from doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary power." Mere allegation is not evidence, and charges based on suspicion and speculation cannot be given credence.
• Only the Supreme Court Can Discipline Lawyers — The Supreme Court has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline lawyers. The factual findings and recommendations of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline and the IBP Board of Governors are merely recommendatory, subject to review by the Court. The Court may impose a different sanction than that recommended by the IBP.
• Sanction Proportional to the Offense — Only acts that cause loss of moral character should merit disbarment or suspension, while acts that neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should justify a lesser sanction, unless they clearly show the lawyer's unfitness to continue in the practice of law. The Court applied this principle in imposing an admonition and a fine instead of suspension.

• "The quantum of proof in administrative cases is substantial evidence." — This passage establishes the evidentiary standard applied throughout the decision, distinguishing it from the standards in criminal and civil cases.
• "Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts which neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyer's unfitness to continue in the practice of law." — This passage articulates the principle guiding the Court's choice of sanction, supporting the imposition of an admonition and fine rather than suspension.
• "As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community." — This passage underscores the public perception requirement for lawyers' conduct, which informed the Court's admonition to Atty. Dalangin.
• "It is the Supreme Court, not the IBP, which has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline lawyers." — This passage affirms the Court's exclusive authority over lawyer discipline and the recommendatory nature of IBP findings.

• Saladaga vs. Astorga, 748 Phil. 1 (2014) — Cited for the rule that substantial evidence is the quantum of proof required in administrative cases.
• Reyes vs. Nieva, A.C. No. 8560, September 6, 2016 — Cited for reiterating the substantial evidence rule in administrative proceedings.
• Cabas vs. Sususco, A.C. No. 8677, June 15, 2016 — Cited for the rule that "mere allegation is not evidence" and that charges based on suspicion and speculation cannot be given credence.
• Advincula vs. Macabata, 546 Phil. 431 (2007) — Cited for the burden of proof in disciplinary proceedings and the principle that sanctions should be proportional to the offense.
• Vitug vs. Rongcal, 532 Phil. 615 (2006) — Cited for the principle that lawyers must be seen to be of good moral character and for the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty.
• Valdez vs. Dabon, Jr., 773 Phil. 109 (2015) — Cited for the principle that lawyers must handle their personal affairs with great caution.
• Bernardino vs. Santos, 754 Phil. 52 (2015) — Cited for the principle that only the Supreme Court has the duty to discipline lawyers.
• Vasco-Tamaray vs. Daquis, A.C. No. 10868, January 26, 2016 — Cited for the principle that IBP findings and recommendations are recommendatory, subject to review by the Court.

• Article XV, Section 2, 1987 Constitution — Provides that marriage is an inviolable social institution and shall be protected by the State. The Court cited this provision in discussing the seriousness of extramarital affairs but found the evidence insufficient to establish such a relationship.
• Rule 139-B, Section 12, Rules of Court — Governs the review and decision by the IBP Board of Governors in administrative cases. The Court discussed the former and amended versions of this rule, emphasizing that IBP resolutions are transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
• Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility — Prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. Cited in the charges against Atty. Dalangin and in his counter-charges against Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres.
• Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility — Prohibits lawyers from counseling or abetting activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. Cited in the counter-charges.
• Rule 7.03, Canon 7, Code of Professional Responsibility — Prohibits lawyers from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on their fitness to practice law or behaving in a scandalous manner. The Court found Atty. Dalangin violated this rule in A.C. No. 10759.
• Rule 10.02, Canon 10, Code of Professional Responsibility — Prohibits lawyers from knowingly misquoting or misrepresenting the contents of papers, the language or argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority. The Court found Atty. Dalangin violated this rule in A.C. No. 10758.
• Republic Act No. 4200 (Anti-Wiretapping Act), Section 1 — Prohibits any person from tapping any wire or cable or using any other device to secretly overhear, intercept, or record private communications. Cited in the counter-charges against Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres.
• Article 183, Revised Penal Code — Defines false testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. Cited in the charge against Atty. Torres in A.C. No. 10761.

Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno, Associate Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Francis H. Jardeleza, Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, Samuel R. Martires, Noel Gimenez Tijam, and Alexander G. Gesmundo concurred in the decision.

• Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta — Justice Peralta filed a separate opinion, stating "In the result, pls. see separate opinion," indicating a concurrence in the result but with separate reasoning. The text does not provide the substance of this separate opinion.