Torrecampo vs. NLRC

The 60-day period under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for filing a petition for certiorari is mandatory and inextendible, and a client is bound by counsel's procedural mistakes absent gross negligence that deprives the client of due process, particularly where the client himself failed to monitor the progress of his case.

Petitioners Rey Torrecampo, Jovita V. Calma, Winthrop Mark N. Barba and Leo Q. Tapnio sought to reverse and set aside the CA Resolutions dated 12 July 2011 and 6 December 2011 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 119590. The CA had dismissed their Petition for Certiorari for having been filed out of time, rendering the NLRC Decision dated 5 January 2011 and its Resolution dated 7 March 2011 final and executory.

Petitioners received a copy of the NLRC Resolution dated 7 March 2011, which denied their Motion for Reconsideration, on 21 March 2011. Under Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, they had 60 days from that notice, or until 20 May 2011, within which to file a petition for certiorari. They filed their petition before the CA only on 25 May 2011, five days after the expiration of the 60-day reglementary period.

In their petition, petitioners claimed that they had filed it within the 60-day reglementary period, stating that the housemaid of their counsel on record had erroneously informed them that the assailed NLRC Resolution was received on 27 March 2011 instead of 21 March 2011. The CA found that petitioners received the NLRC Resolution on 21 March 2011, not 27 March 2011, and that they had failed to perfect their petition within the 60-day period. The CA also noted that petitioners had attempted to mislead the appellate court as to the date of receipt of the assailed decision.

Petitioners timely interposed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution dated 6 December 2011. Aggrieved, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari before the SC.

• Liberal Construction of Rules: Petitioners argued that the strict application of the rules of procedure was not justified under the circumstances, given the extant merits of the case, and pleaded for the liberal interpretation of the rule on perfection of appeal so that the case could be threshed out on the merits and not on technicality.
• Negligence of Former Counsel: Petitioners argued that the delay in assailing the NLRC Resolution was mainly attributable to their former counsel, who, for unknown reasons and without promptly informing them, had deserted their case.
• Reliance on Housemaid's Declaration: Petitioners reasoned that they had merely relied on the declarations made by the housemaid of their counsel, who had erroneously informed them of the date of receipt of the NLRC Resolution.

• Strict Application of Rules: Whether the CA gravely erred in strictly applying the rules of procedure and pleading against the petitioners.

• Strict Application of Rules: No. The 60-day period under Section 4, Rule 65 is mandatory and inextendible, and petitioners filed their petition five days late. The negligence of their former counsel did not excuse the late filing, absent gross negligence depriving them of due process.

• Strict Application of Rules: The SC held that under Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, certiorari should be instituted within 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case. Rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with and should not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming substantial merit. Rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking certain proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent needless delays and to orderly and promptly discharge judicial business; by their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory. It is beyond dispute that petitioners received a copy of the 7 March 2011 NLRC Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration on 21 March 2011. Applying Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, petitioners had until 20 May 2011 within which to file their petition for certiorari. The filing of the petition before the CA five days later, or on 25 May 2011, resulted in the non-perfection of the appeal, rendering the decision of the NLRC final and executory.

The SC was not persuaded by petitioners' argument that they should not be bound by their counsel's negligence. Petitioners were not entirely blameless as they were not vigilant in monitoring the progress of their case. The general rule is that a client is bound by the counsel's acts, including even mistakes in the realm of procedural technique. The rationale is that a counsel, once retained, holds the implied authority to do all acts necessary or, at least, incidental to the prosecution and management of the suit in behalf of his client, such that any act or omission by counsel within the scope of the authority is regarded, in the eyes of the law, as the act or omission of the client himself. A recognized exception is when the reckless or gross negligence of the counsel deprives the client of due process of law. For the exception to apply, however, the gross negligence should not be accompanied by the client's own negligence or malice, considering that the client has the duty to be vigilant in respect of his interests by keeping himself up-to-date on the status of the case. Failing in this duty, the client should suffer whatever adverse judgment is rendered against him. A litigant bears the responsibility to monitor the status of his case, for no prudent party leaves the fate of his case entirely in the hands of his lawyer. It is the client's duty to be in contact with his lawyer from time to time in order to be informed of the progress and developments of his case; to merely rely on the bare reassurances of his lawyer that everything is being taken care of is not enough. Well settled is the doctrine that appeal is not a constitutional right, but a mere statutory privilege; hence, parties who seek to avail themselves of it must comply with the statutes and rules allowing it. There is no doubt that no petition for certiorari was perfected by the petitioners within the 60-day period under Rule 65. Consequently, the CA did not commit an error in dismissing the appeal on account of non-perfection of the same.

• Mandatory Nature of the 60-Day Period under Rule 65 — The 60-day period under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for filing a petition for certiorari is mandatory and inextendible. The SC applied this rule strictly, holding that petitioners' filing five days late resulted in the non-perfection of their appeal and rendered the NLRC decision final and executory.
• Client Bound by Counsel's Negligence — A client is bound by the acts and omissions of his counsel, including mistakes in procedural technique, because counsel holds implied authority to do all acts necessary or incidental to the prosecution and management of the suit. The exception is when the counsel's reckless or gross negligence deprives the client of due process, provided the client himself is not negligent or malicious. The SC applied this rule, holding that petitioners were bound by their former counsel's negligence because they failed to monitor their case.
• Appeal as a Statutory Privilege — Appeal is not a constitutional right but a mere statutory privilege, and parties who seek to avail themselves of it must comply with the statutes and rules allowing it. The SC applied this doctrine to deny the petition.

• "The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case." — The SC states the mandatory nature of the 60-day period under Rule 65, justifying strict compliance.
• "The general rule is that a client is bound by the counsel's acts, including even mistakes in the realm of procedural technique." — The SC states the general rule on counsel's negligence, which it applied to bind petitioners.
• "A recognized exception to the rule is when the reckless or gross negligence of the counsel deprives the client of due process of law." — The SC identifies the exception to the general rule, which it found inapplicable.
• "Well settled is the doctrine that appeal is not a constitutional right, but a mere statutory privilege." — The SC states the doctrine on appeal, which it used to justify strict compliance with the rules.

• Labao vs. Flores, G.R. No. 187984, 15 November 2010, 634 SCRA 723 — Cited for the rule that the 60-day period is inextendible to avoid unreasonable delay.
• Laguna Metts Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 611 Phil. 530 (2009) — Cited for the rule that rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with and that rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts are mandatory.
• Suliman vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 190970, 24 November 2014 — Cited for the rule that a client is bound by counsel's acts and the exception for gross negligence.
• Bejarasco vs. People, G.R. No. 159781, 2 February 2011, 641 SCRA 328 — Cited for the rule that a litigant bears the responsibility to monitor the status of his case.
• Sarah Lee Philippines, Inc. vs. Macatlang, G.R. Nos. 180147, 180148, 180149, 180150, 180319 & 180685, 4 June 2014, 724 SCRA 552 — Cited for the doctrine that appeal is not a constitutional right but a mere statutory privilege.

• Section 4, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that the petition for certiorari shall be filed not later than 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. The SC applied this provision to hold that petitioners' petition, filed on 25 May 2011, was five days late because they received the NLRC Resolution on 21 March 2011 and had until 20 May 2011 to file.
• Section 4, Rule 65, Revised Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC — Provides that the petition shall be filed not later than 60 days from notice of the judgment or resolution, and in case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, the 60-day period shall be counted from the notice of the denial of the motion. The SC applied this provision to compute the 60-day period from petitioners' receipt of the NLRC Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration on 21 March 2011.