Torela vs. Torela

The presumption that all property of the spouses is conjugal applies only after the party invoking it proves that the property was acquired during the marriage; registration of land during the marriage in the name of one spouse, with civil status noted, is merely descriptive and does not constitute proof of acquisition during coverture.

Felimon Torela inherited a parcel of land (Lot No. 3770 of the Cauayan Cadastre) from his parents, Pedro Torela and Soperiana Magbanua, prior to his first marriage to Graciana Gallego in 1915. The land was the subject of a land registration decree issued on December 21, 1929, by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, and Original Certificate of Title No. 29257 was issued in Felimon's name. After Graciana's death, Felimon married Marciana Gepanago. The dispute arose when Felimon sold the land to spouses Marcos and Maria Luna Mahilum, prompting his children by the first marriage to claim a share as heirs of their mother.

Felimon Torela inherited a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 3770 of the Cadastral Survey of Cauayan from his parents, Pedro Torela and Soperiana Magbanua, before his marriage to Graciana Gallego in 1915. On December 21, 1929, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental issued Decree No. 440157 decreeing Felimon Torela as owner of the lot and ordering its registration under the Land Registration Act. Original Certificate of Title No. 29257 was issued in his name, describing him as "married to Graciana Gallego." The original certificate was lost or destroyed during the last world war, prompting Felimon to file a verified petition for reconstitution on December 28, 1953. On July 8, 1957, the court ordered the Register of Deeds to reconstitute the certificate on the basis of Decree No. 440157, and Original Certificate of Title No. RO-6898 (29257) was issued in lieu of the lost one.

On March 5, 1958, Felimon filed an ex-parte motion alleging that the land had been acquired by inheritance prior to his marriage to his first wife Graciana Gallego, that Graciana had died many years prior, and that he was now married to Marciana Gepanago. He prayed that the Register of Deeds change the civil status appearing on the certificate from "married to Graciana Gallego" to "married to Marciana Gepanago." The court granted the motion on March 10, 1958, noting no opposition and expressly recording the conformity of Clara Torela, Felimon's daughter by the first marriage. On March 4, 1958, Felimon executed a deed of sale over the lot in favor of Marcos P. Mahilum and Maria Luna Mahilum for ₱3,000.00, stating therein that he was a widower by his first marriage and that he had acquired the property by inheritance from his parents before his marriage to Graciana Gallego. Upon registration of the deed, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-23078 was issued to the Mahilum spouses.

Clara and Silveriana Torela, children of Felimon by his first marriage, filed a complaint asserting that the land was conjugal property of Felimon and Graciana Gallego, claiming they had seen their parents clear the forested lot while in their youth. They sought to recover the share appertaining to their mother from the property thus sold. The trial court, however, found that Silveriana was not yet born when Felimon and his father started living on the land in 1905, and that the other witness, Miguel Pedrosa, was only one year old at that time, making their testimonies unworthy of credence. Felimon testified that he was 27 years old in 1905, had already helped his father clean and till the land, and that by the time of his marriage in 1915, only a portion of the lot had been plowed by him. The Court of Appeals sustained these factual findings, concluding that the property was inherited and brought to the marriage, thus constituting Felimon's separate property under Article 1396 of the Old Civil Code.

• Presumption of Conjugality: Petitioners argued that under Article 1407 of the Spanish Civil Code (corresponding to Article 160 of the New Civil Code), all property of the spouses is deemed partnership property in the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or wife. Since the lot was registered in the name of Felimon Torela "married to Graciana Gallego," it must be presumed conjugal property, entitling them to one-half as their inheritance from their mother.
• Registration as Evidence of Acquisition: Petitioners implied that the registration of the land during the marriage, with Felimon's civil status as married to Graciana noted on the title, indicated that the property was acquired during coverture.

• Presumption of Conjugality: Whether the presumption that all property of the spouses is conjugal applies when the party invoking it has not proven that the property was acquired during the marriage.
• Evidentiary Effect of Registration: Whether the registration of land during the marriage in the name of one spouse, with the notation of civil status, constitutes proof that the property was acquired during coverture.

• Presumption of Conjugality: No. The presumption of conjugality does not apply absent proof that the property was acquired during the marriage; such proof is a condition sine qua non for invocation of the presumption.
• Evidentiary Effect of Registration: No. The description of Felimon as "married to Graciana Gallego" in the decree and certificate of title was merely descriptive of his civil status at the time and cannot be taken as proof that the land was acquired during their coverture. Land registration under Act No. 496 does not confer title but merely confirms a title already existing and registerable.

• Presumption of Conjugality: While it is true that all property of the marriage is presumed conjugal under Article 1407 of the Spanish Civil Code (now Article 160 of the New Civil Code), the party invoking the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. This proof is a condition sine qua non. In the instant case, nothing in the record shows the lot was acquired during the marriage of Felimon and Graciana Gallego. On the contrary, the Court of Appeals found as a fact that Felimon acquired the land through inheritance before the marriage, a conclusion bolstered by Clara Torela's own conformity to her father's ex-parte motion of March 5, 1958, which expressly recited that Felimon had acquired the property by inheritance prior to his marriage to Graciana. The property thus falls under Article 1396 of the Old Civil Code as separate property, having been inherited and brought to the marriage.

• Evidentiary Effect of Registration: The circumstance that Decree No. 440157 described Felimon as "married to Graciana Gallego" was merely descriptive of his civil status at the time of registration and cannot be taken as proof that the land was acquired during their coverture. Furthermore, the fact that the land was registered during the marriage cannot itself constitute proof of acquisition during the marriage, because land registration under Act No. 496, as amended, does not confer title; it merely confirms a title already existing and registerable. The testimonies of Silveriana Torela and Miguel Pedrosa that the land was jointly cleared by Felimon and Graciana were properly rejected, as Silveriana was not yet born and Miguel was only one year old when Felimon and his father moved to the land in 1905.

• Presumption of Conjugality — All property of the spouses is presumed conjugal in the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or wife (Article 1407, Spanish Civil Code; Article 160, New Civil Code). However, the party invoking the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage; this proof is a condition sine qua non for the application of the presumption. In this case, petitioners failed to prove acquisition during coverture, as the factual findings established that the land was inherited before marriage.

• Nature of Land Registration under Act No. 496 — Land registration under the Torrens system does not confer title but merely confirms and registers a title already existing. Registration of land during the marriage in the name of one spouse alone, with civil status noted, does not prove the property was acquired during the marriage.

• Descriptive Effect of Civil Status in Torrens Title — The notation "married to [spouse]" on a certificate of title is merely descriptive of the registered owner's civil status at the time of registration and does not constitute proof that the property was acquired during coverture.

• "While it is true that all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, as above stated, nonetheless the party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. This proof is a condition sine qua non for the application of the presumption." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi: the presumption of conjugality is conditional upon prior proof of acquisition during the marriage.

• "The circumstance that Decree No. 440157 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental which confirmed the ownership of Felimon Torela over the land in question described him as married to Graciana Gallego was merely descriptive of his civil status at that time and cannot be taken as proof that the land was acquired during their coverture." — This clarifies that the civil-status notation on a Torrens title is descriptive, not probative of the property regime.

• "The further circumstance that the land was registered during the marriage cannot in itself constitute proof that it was acquired during their marriage for land registration under Act No. 496, as amended, does not confer title; it merely confirms a title already existing and which is registerable." — This reinforces the principle that Torrens registration confirms rather than creates title, and registration during marriage does not establish acquisition during marriage.

• Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin, L-22320, May 22, 1968, 23 SCRA 637 — Cited as controlling authority for the proposition that the party invoking the presumption of conjugality must first prove the property was acquired during the marriage, as a condition sine qua non.
• Ponce de Leon vs. RFC, L-24571, December 18, 1970, 36 SCRA 289 — Cited alongside Cobb-Perez for the same proposition regarding the prerequisite proof for the presumption of conjugality.
• Stuart vs. Yatco, 114 Phil. 1083 — Cited in Justice Aquino's concurring opinion for the proposition that registration of land during the marriage in the husband's name alone is an indication that it was the husband's separate property.

• Article 1407, Spanish Civil Code (Old Civil Code) — Provides that all property of the spouses shall be deemed partnership property in the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or wife. Corresponds to Article 160 of the New Civil Code. Applied as the basis for the presumption of conjugality, but the Court held the presumption inapplicable absent proof of acquisition during marriage.
• Article 1401, Old Civil Code — Enumerates properties belonging to the conjugal partnership: (1) property acquired for valuable consideration during the marriage at the expense of the common fund; (2) property obtained by the industry, wages, or work of the spouses or either of them; (3) fruits, income, or interest collected or accrued during the marriage. The Court found the land in question did not fall under any of these categories.
• Article 1396, Old Civil Code — Provides that property inherited before marriage is the spouse's separate property. Applied to classify the land as Felimon's exclusive property, having been inherited from his parents prior to his marriage to Graciana Gallego.
• Republic Act No. 26, Section 13 — Governs reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of title. The court ordered reconstitution of OCT No. 29257 on the basis of Decree No. 440157 pursuant to this provision.
• Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act) — The Torrens registration law. The Court noted that registration under this Act does not confer title but merely confirms a title already existing and registerable.

• Justice Santos — concurred.
• Justice De Castro — concurred.
• Justice Barredo (Chairman) — concurred separately, stating: "Putting it otherwise, what appears in Torrens title is a presumption that can be rebutted by contrary proof which exerts in this case."
• Justice Aquino — concurred separately, reasoning that if the land had been conjugal property, it should have been indicated as such in the original certificate of title and the decree of registration, and registered in both spouses' names. The fact that it was registered during the marriage in the husband's name alone was an indication that it was the husband's separate property, citing Stuart vs. Yatco, 114 Phil. 1083.