Tolosa vs. Employees' Compensation Commission

An employee disabled from earning wages in his usual or similar work by a work-connected sickness that accrued before P.D. 626 took effect is entitled to permanent total disability benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, his right having vested in 1967 when pulmonary tuberculosis was contracted and later aggravated into advanced tuberculosis and arachnoiditis causing paralysis and forced retirement.

Leopoldo Tolosa was a career employee of the Philippine National Railways, serving successively as crossing keeper, crane operator, crane driver, and crane machine operator-mechanic. His compensation claim straddled two statutory regimes: the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, in force when his sickness began, and the Employees' Compensation Law under P.D. 626, as amended, invoked by the Government Service Insurance System and Employees' Compensation Commission in denying total disability.

Leopoldo Tolosa started working at the Philippine National Railways on January 16, 1936 as a crossing keeper until the outbreak of World War II. He resumed employment on October 1, 1956 as a crane operator, later becoming a crane driver and then a crane machine operator-mechanic, which he held until retirement on May 15, 1975.

In the course of employment as crane operator-mechanic, Tolosa contracted pulmonary tuberculosis sometime in 1967, manifested by loss of appetite, loss of weight, fever and afternoon rise of temperature. On September 8, 1967, while doing rush overhauling work, he spat fresh blood and was immediately confined at the Quezon Institute for almost one month. Upon discharge, he resumed his duties.

On May 25, 1974, he was confined at the PNR Hospital for several days again on account of tuberculosis. Sometime in April 1975, he was hospitalized and found afflicted with advanced pulmonary tuberculosis and arachnoiditis. On April 21, 1975, then paralyzed due to arachnoiditis, he underwent an operation that proved unsuccessful. He was forced to retire on May 15, 1975 at age fifty-six. Thereafter his condition worsened; even urinating, eating and defecating required family assistance, he could hardly sit or walk, and for regular treatment and medications at the Philippine General Hospital he had to be literally carried by his family.

On account of his ailments, Tolosa filed a claim under P.D. 626, as amended. The Government Service Insurance System medical officer found pulmonary tuberculosis only minimal, not advanced, and arachnoiditis not amply corroborated, rating the ailment at 12% NSD as permanent partial disability. The Employees' Compensation Commission sustained denial of additional benefits, noting the July 30, 1980 chest X-ray showed no change. Tolosa died on February 14, 1984, attributed to peptic ulcer due to hypovolemic shock, and his widow Potenciana Tolosa was substituted as party.

• Entitlement to Permanent Total Disability: Petitioner maintained that his pulmonary tuberculosis and arachnoiditis, which paralyzed him and forced early retirement with total helplessness in daily necessities, entitled him to permanent total disability benefits rather than the permanent partial disability benefits of P1,274.42 awarded by respondent GSIS.
• Work Connection and Aggravation: Petitioner argued that his ailments were contracted and aggravated in the course of employment as crane operator-mechanic from 1967 through retirement in 1975, warranting modification of the ECC affirmance.

• Minimal Disability Rating: Respondent GSIS countered that petitioner's pulmonary tuberculosis was only minimal, not advanced, and his arachnoiditis was not amply corroborated, such that under the Medical Handbook on Workmen's Compensation and Principle of Disability Evaluation the ailment fell under 12% NSD as permanent partial disability only.
• No Basis for Additional Benefits: Respondent ECC countered that thorough examination of the records including the additional July 30, 1980 chest X-ray, which showed no change from previous X-rays, left no recourse but to deny additional benefits.

• Applicable Law: Whether petitioner's claim for tuberculosis contracted in 1967 and aggravated through 1975 is governed by the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, or by P.D. 626, as amended.
• Extent of Disability: Whether petitioner's pulmonary tuberculosis and arachnoiditis entitle him to permanent total disability benefits or only permanent partial disability benefits.
• Death Benefits: Whether the widow is entitled to additional death benefits where petitioner died on February 14, 1984, almost nine years after retirement on May 15, 1975.
• Attorney's Fees: Whether petitioner is entitled to recover attorney's fees where he personally signed his own pleadings without assistance of counsel.

• Applicable Law: Yes. The claim is governed by the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, petitioner's tuberculosis having incepted in 1967 with cause of action accruing and vesting before P.D. 626 applied.
• Extent of Disability: Permanent total disability. The ailments destroyed earning capacity for the usual physically straining work and left petitioner helpless, with forced early retirement proving total incapacity.
• Death Benefits: No. Death benefits are barred, death having occurred almost nine years after stoppage of work, beyond the two-year period under Section 8 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
• Attorney's Fees: No. Attorney's fees are not recoverable, petitioner having litigated without counsel as shown by his personal signing of pleadings.

• Applicable Law: The controlling law was identified as the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, pursuant to Poral vs. ECC. Because pulmonary tuberculosis incepted in 1967 and arachnoiditis discovered in April 1975 could have been caused by weakened resistance from advanced tuberculosis, the cause of action accrued as early as 1967 while the old Act was in effect, creating a vested right. Application of the New Labor Code criteria by GSIS and ECC was therefore clearly erroneous.
• Extent of Disability: Permanent total disability was found under the Gonzaga vs. ECC formulation: disablement to earn wages in the same, similar, or any work suited to mentality and attainment, not absolute helplessness but permanent incapacity for gainful work. The deteriorating condition impaired capability for the physically straining crane operator-mechanic task; after retirement petitioner could do no physical exertion to earn a living, needed family aid for urinating, eating and defecating, could hardly sit or walk, and had to be carried to Philippine General Hospital treatment. Early forced retirement at fifty-six further proved total disability to perform assigned tasks, with optional retirement authorized only for physical incapacity under C.A. 186 as amended and Memorandum Circular No. 133. Denial would subvert the social justice essence of the Act after more than 20 years of unblemished service.
• Death Benefits: Death benefits were denied under Section 8 of the Workmen's Compensation Act requiring death from work-connected disease within two years from such sickness. Under International Oil Factory vs. Doriz, Central Azucarera Don Pedro vs. De Leon, and reiterated in Vda. de los Santos vs. WCC, De Lara vs. WCC, and Unite vs. WCC, the period is counted from aggravation or stoppage of work or physical disablement. Counted from retirement on May 15, 1975 to death on February 14, 1984, nearly nine years elapsed.
• Attorney's Fees: Attorney's fees were denied on the factual ground that petitioner was not assisted by counsel, evidenced by his personal signing of pleadings.

• Vested Rights Under the Workmen's Compensation Act — Where the sickness incepted and the cause of action accrued while the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, was still in effect, the applicable law is that Act and not P.D. 626, as amended, the employee having already acquired a vested right. Applied here to hold the 1967 inception of pulmonary tuberculosis governed the claim despite later proceedings under the new law.
• Permanent Total Disability — Permanent total disability means disablement to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work a person of the employee's mentality and attainment could do; it does not mean absolute helplessness but incapacity to perform gainful work expected to be permanent. Total disability does not require absolute disablement or total paralysis, only inability to pursue usual work and earn therefrom; what is compensated is incapacity impairing earning capacity, whether shown medically or by de facto inability to earn wages. Applied to find total and permanent disability from paralysis, helplessness in personal necessities, and inability to do physical exertion for a living.
• Forced Early Retirement as Proof of Total Disability — Early retirement due to work-related ailments proves total disablement from assigned tasks, the fact of disability being placed beyond question by approval of optional retirement authorized only when the employee is physically incapable to render sound and efficient service. Applied to treat Tolosa's May 15, 1975 retirement at age fifty-six as confirmation that tuberculosis and arachnoiditis totally disabled him as crane operator-mechanic.
• Two-Year Limit for Death Benefits — Under Section 8 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, heirs are awarded death benefits only if death due to work-connected disease occurs within two years from such sickness, counted from aggravation or the time the employee was forced to stop working or became physically disabled. Applied to bar the widow's claim where death occurred almost nine years after retirement-disablement.

• "Permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of a similar nature that she was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of her mentality and attainment could do (Landicho v. WCC, et al., supra; Marcelino v. 7-Up Bottling Co. of the Philippines, et al., 47 SCRA 343 [1972])." — States the canonical definition of permanent total disability relied upon to classify petitioner's incapacity.
• "Total disability does not require that the employee be absolutely disabled, or totally paralyzed. What is necessary is that the injury must be such that she cannot pursue her usual work and earn therefrom (Tenasas v. WCC, 80 SCRA 464 [1977])." — Clarifies the threshold for totality, supporting a finding despite absence of absolute helplessness as a legal requirement.
• "It is not the injury which is compensated but the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity (Herrera v. Republic and WCC, 85 SCRA 713 [1978]; Natividad v. WCC and Republic, 85 SCRA 115 [19781)." — Defines the compensable element as loss of earning capacity, grounding the award on petitioner's inability to earn as crane operator-mechanic.
• "Furthermore, the fact of an employee's disability is placed beyond question with the approval of the employee's optional retirement for such is authorized only when the employee is 'physically incapable to render sound and efficient service' under C.A. 186, as amended by Republic Act 4968 in conjunction with Memorandum Circular No. 133 of the Office of the President on October 19, 1967 (Faicol v. WCC and Republic of the Philippines, 93 SCRA 811 [1979]; Roma v. WCC and Bureau of Public Schools, 80 SCRA 170 [1977]; Romero v. WCC and Bureau of Public Schools, 77 SCRA 842 [1977])." — Provides the doctrinal link between early retirement and conclusive disability applied to petitioner's 1975 retirement.

• Poral vs. ECC, 131 SCRA 602 [1984] — Followed as the latest authority that the Workmen's Compensation Act, not P.D. 626, governs claims where sickness incepted before the new law.
• Gonzaga vs. ECC, 127 SCRA 443 [1984] — Followed as controlling restatement of permanent total disability, incapacity to earn, and probative effect of forced early retirement.
• Landicho vs. WCC; Marcelino vs. 7-Up Bottling Co. of the Philippines, 47 SCRA 343 [1972]; Tenasas vs. WCC, 80 SCRA 464 [1977] — Cited for the definition that total disability is inability to pursue usual work and earn, not absolute helplessness.
• Herrera vs. Republic and WCC, 85 SCRA 713 [1978]; Natividad vs. WCC and Republic, 85 SCRA 115 [1978] — Cited for the rule that incapacity impairing earning capacity, not the injury itself, is compensated.
• International Oil Factory vs. Doriz, 109 Phil. 553 (1960); Central Azucarera Don Pedro vs. De Leon, L-9449, July 29, 1959; Vda. de los Santos vs. WCC, 88 SCRA 134 [1979]; De Lara vs. WCC, 83 SCRA 528 [1978]; Unite vs. WCC, 90 SCRA 289 [1979] — Followed for counting the two-year death-benefit period from aggravation or stoppage of work.

• Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended — Applied as governing law because petitioner's cause of action accrued in 1967, vesting rights thereunder; its total-disability and social-justice principles required awarding permanent total disability for loss of earning capacity and forced retirement.
• Section 8, Workmen's Compensation Act — Applied to deny the widow additional death benefits, requiring death from work-connected disease within two years from sickness, here exceeded where death in 1984 followed 1975 disablement by almost nine years.
• P.D. 626, as amended (Employees' Compensation Law) — Held inapplicable as basis for GSIS and ECC's permanent partial disability classification, its 12% NSD rating and new-law criteria being clearly erroneous for a vested old-law claim.
• C.A. 186, as amended by Republic Act 4968, in conjunction with Memorandum Circular No. 133, Office of the President, Oct. 19, 1967 — Cited to show optional retirement is authorized only for physical incapacity to render sound and efficient service, making early retirement proof of total disability.

Teehankee, Acting C.J., Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur. Fernando, C.J., and Concepcion Jr., J., are on leave. Aquino, J., took no part. Melencio-Herrera, J., concurring — except for funeral benefits, on the view that there is no entitlement to death benefits.