Tolosa, Jr. vs. Office of the Ombudsman and Tatel

A decision of the Ombudsman absolving a respondent of an administrative charge is final and unappealable, and the complainant's sole recourse is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion — not a petition for review under Rule 43, which is available only to a respondent found liable and penalized beyond public censure, reprimand, one-month suspension, or a fine equivalent to one month's salary.

Petitioner Napoleon C. Tolosa, Jr. and respondent Elizabeth B. Tatel were both officials of the Department of Education (DepEd), Regional Office IX in Zamboanga City. Respondent served as Chief Administrative Officer for Finance and Team Leader of the Automatic Payroll Deduction System (APDS) Task Force, which monitored and conducted spot-checking of accredited private lending institutions participating in the DepEd's salary-deduction scheme for teachers' loans. The dispute arose against a backdrop of mutual recrimination: respondent claimed the complaints were retaliatory, stemming from her 2008 letter to the DepEd Secretary disclosing anomalous transactions involving petitioner's wife and other officials.

Petitioner Napoleon C. Tolosa, Jr. filed an affidavit-complaint dated March 22, 2010 before the Ombudsman charging respondent Elizabeth B. Tatel with violation of Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713 and grave misconduct. Respondent was the Chief Administrative Officer for Finance of DepEd Regional Office IX and Team Leader of the APDS Task Force, which monitored and conducted spot-checking of accredited private lending institutions participating in the DepEd's automatic payroll deduction system. Petitioner alleged that on October 23, 2008, respondent obtained a ₱150,000 loan from One Network Bank (ONB), Zamboanga City, an institution accredited under the APDS. Petitioner claimed this was done in blatant disregard of DepEd rules, that respondent coursed her loan payments through ONB's Davao City branch instead of the usual salary deduction to hide the transaction, and that she created a conflict of interest by borrowing from a bank she was tasked to monitor.

In her counter-affidavit dated July 6, 2010, respondent admitted obtaining the loan but denied any violation. She explained that the APDS Task Force's function was limited to monitoring and spot-checking whether accredited lending institutions satisfied the requirements under their memorandum of agreement with DepEd — such as possessing business permits and office facilities — and that the task force neither recommended nor decided which institutions were accredited, nor determined the amounts deducted from borrowers' salaries. She stated she did not own shares in ONB or serve as an officer thereof, obtained the loan in her personal capacity without using her position to secure better terms, and that availing of such loans was encouraged under DepEd Memorandum No. 570, series of 2008. She further claimed the complaints were retaliatory, arising from her 2008 letter to the DepEd Secretary disclosing anomalous transactions involving petitioner's wife and other officials.

In his position paper dated February 19, 2011, petitioner additionally raised that respondent failed to disclose the ₱150,000 loan in her SALN dated April 29, 2009, constituting dishonesty. He maintained that the loan was solicited by respondent and bypassed the usual process applied to ordinary DepEd personnel.

The Ombudsman, in its Joint-Resolution dated November 20, 2013, found no apparent prohibition for respondent to obtain a loan from ONB and no evidence that she solicited the loan. It ruled that the evidence did not sustain probable cause for violation of Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713, and that no substantial evidence supported the allegation of dishonesty for failure to include the loan in her SALN. Both the criminal and administrative complaints were dismissed. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting him to file a petition for review under Rule 43 before the CA, which denied the petition on the ground that the wrong remedy was availed of, while also affirming the Ombudsman's findings on the merits. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration before the CA was likewise denied, leading to the present petition.

• Proper Remedy: Petitioner maintained that he availed of the correct remedy in filing a petition for review under Rule 43 before the CA, citing Cortes vs. Ombudsman for the proposition that in joint administrative and criminal cases, he had the option to either file a petition for review under Rule 43 with the CA or directly file a certiorari petition under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court.
• Finality of Exoneration: Petitioner insisted that the Ombudsman's decision exonerating respondent of the administrative charge was not final and unappealable, arguing that an acquittal becomes final, executory, and unappealable only when the decision imposes public censure, reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month's salary.
• Probable Cause: Petitioner argued that the Ombudsman erred in dismissing the criminal complaint, contending that had the Ombudsman properly weighed and appreciated the evidence, it would have found probable cause to indict respondent for violating Sections 7(d) and 8(a) of R.A. No. 6713.
• Substantial Evidence: Petitioner asserted that the CA erred in finding no substantial evidence to hold respondent administratively liable for grave misconduct and dishonesty, particularly pointing to the alleged discrepancy in respondent's SALN and the claim that the loan bypassed the usual process for ordinary DepEd personnel.

• No Conflict of Interest: Respondent countered that no conflict of interest existed because she did not own any shares of stock in ONB nor serve as an officer of the bank, and the APDS Task Force had no business relations with ONB.
• Personal Capacity: Respondent argued that she obtained the loan in her personal capacity and not in the course of her official duty, and that she did not take advantage of her position as team leader to secure better terms than other borrowers, as the interest rate on her loan was the same as everyone else's.
• No Violation of DepEd Rules: Respondent maintained that she did not violate DepEd Order No. 49, series of 2006, and that availing of the loan was in fact encouraged under DepEd Memorandum No. 570, series of 2008; when the regional task force was created, members were not disqualified from availing of such loans.
• Retaliatory Complaints: Respondent averred that the complaints were part of continuing acts of retaliation and harassment by petitioner, his wife, and other DepEd officials, following her 2008 letter to the DepEd Secretary disclosing anomalous transactions involving petitioner's wife and several officials.
• Counter-Charge: Respondent countered that petitioner should be charged for violation of R.A. No. 1405 and prayed that the complaints against her be dismissed.

• Proper Remedy: Whether the CA erred in ruling that the Ombudsman's decision is final and unappealable and that the proper remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
• Probable Cause: Whether the CA erred in finding no probable cause to indict respondent for violating Sections 7(d) and 8(a) of R.A. No. 6713.
• Administrative Liability: Whether the CA erred in finding no substantial evidence to hold respondent administratively liable for grave misconduct and dishonesty.

• Proper Remedy: No. The CA correctly ruled that petitioner availed of the wrong remedy; a decision of the Ombudsman absolving a respondent of an administrative charge is final and unappealable under Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules and Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770, and the complainant's sole recourse is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
• Probable Cause: No. The Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint, there being no apparent prohibition for respondent to obtain a loan from an accredited lending institution and no evidence that she solicited the loan or used her position to secure preferential terms.
• Administrative Liability: No. The Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of discretion in finding no substantial evidence for grave misconduct and dishonesty; moreover, the dismissal had already attained finality because petitioner failed to file a petition for certiorari before the CA.

• Proper Remedy: While the criminal and administrative cases were jointly decided by the Ombudsman, they remain separate cases with different modes of appeal. For criminal cases, the proper remedy to assail an Ombudsman decision alleged to have been rendered with grave abuse of discretion is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court. For administrative cases, appeals from Ombudsman decisions are elevated to the CA under Rule 43 — but only where the respondent is found liable and the penalty exceeds public censure, reprimand, one-month suspension, or a fine equivalent to one month's salary. Under Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules and Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770, a decision absolving the respondent of the administrative charge is final and unappealable; the complainant is not entitled to any corrective recourse by motion for reconsideration or appeal. The complainant's only remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 premised on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, pursuant to the Court's constitutional power under Section 1, Article VIII. Petitioner's reliance on Cortes vs. Ombudsman was misplaced; the CA correctly ruled that a petition for review under Rule 43 was unavailable and the petition should have been dismissed outright. Petitioner also failed to allege or demonstrate any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman.

• Probable Cause: The Ombudsman is endowed with wide latitude in its investigatory and prosecutory powers, and the determination of probable cause is a function that belongs to it. A finding of probable cause need only rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime was committed and that the accused probably committed it; it need not be based on clear and convincing evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt. Here, respondent proved that as head of the Regional APDS Task Force, she lacked authority to regulate, revoke, or recommend reactivation of accredited lending institutions. The Ombudsman found petitioner's evidence self-serving and uncorroborated, and correctly held that no DepEd order, policy, or issuance prohibited budget officers from obtaining loans from lending institutions merely because they were tasked with effecting salary deductions. No evidence showed respondent solicited the loan or that her designation as task force leader prompted ONB to grant it; the interest rate was the same as that of other borrowers, and the loan differed from others only in that payment was not through salary deduction. A finding of probable cause — or its absence — is a factual determination generally not reviewable by the Court via certiorari, and no grave abuse of discretion was shown. Petitioner's contention essentially questioned the correctness of the Ombudsman's appreciation of facts, which is not a proper ground for certiorari review.

• Administrative Liability: The Ombudsman found that petitioner failed to adduce substantial evidence to prove his allegations against respondent. More importantly, the dismissal of the administrative charges had already attained finality because petitioner did not file a petition for certiorari before the CA. Although final and unappealable at the administrative level, Ombudsman decisions remain subject to judicial review upon proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud, error of law, or gross misappreciation of evidence compelling a contrary conclusion. No such ground was demonstrated here, and the Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of discretion in rendering its rulings.

• Finality of Ombudsman Exoneration in Administrative Cases — A decision of the Ombudsman absolving a respondent of an administrative charge is final and unappealable under Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules and Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770. The complainant is not entitled to any corrective recourse, whether by motion for reconsideration or appeal; only the respondent may appeal, and only where the penalty imposed exceeds public censure, reprimand, one-month suspension, or a fine equivalent to one month's salary. The complainant's sole remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, rooted in the Court's constitutional power under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.

• Ombudsman's Discretion over Probable Cause — The Ombudsman is endowed with wide latitude in its investigatory and prosecutory powers, and the determination of whether probable cause exists is a function that belongs to the Ombudsman. A finding of probable cause need only rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and that there is enough reason to believe it was committed by the accused. Such factual determination is generally not reviewable by the Supreme Court via certiorari; the Court will interfere only upon a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. This standard governs judicial review of Ombudsman decisions via certiorari.

• "The clear import of Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules is to deny the complainant in an administrative complaint the right to appeal where the Ombudsman has exonerated the respondent of the administrative charge, as in this case. The complainant, therefore, is not entitled to any corrective recourse, whether by motion for reconsideration in the Office of the Ombudsman, or by appeal to the courts, to effect the reversal of the exoneration." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on the finality of Ombudsman exoneration and the complainant's lack of a statutory right to appeal, distinguishing the complainant's position from that of a respondent found liable.

• "The absence of any statutory right to appeal the exoneration of the respondent in an administrative case does not mean, however, that the complainant is left with absolutely no remedy. Over and above our statutes is the Constitution whose Section 1, Article VIII empowers the courts of justice to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." — This passage defines the constitutional basis for certiorari as the complainant's sole recourse against an Ombudsman exoneration, linking the procedural remedy to the Court's expanded judicial review power.

• "A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that there is enough reason to believe that is was committed by the accused. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, or on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt." — This is the canonical formulation of the probable cause standard as applied in Ombudsman proceedings, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on prosecutorial discretion.

• Cortes vs. Ombudsman, 710 Phil. 699 (2013) — Cited by petitioner to justify filing a petition for review under Rule 43 before the CA in joint administrative and criminal cases; the Court found petitioner's reliance misplaced, as the case did not support the proposition that Rule 43 is available where the respondent has been exonerated of the administrative charge.

• Reyes, Jr. vs. Belisario, 612 Phil. 937 (2009) — Followed for the principle that exoneration of a respondent in an administrative case is implicitly final and unappealable under Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770, since if a sentence of censure, reprimand, and one-month suspension is final and unappealable, so should exoneration be.

• Tolentino vs. Loyola, 670 Phil. 50 (2011) — Cited for the settled rule that a decision of the Ombudsman absolving the respondent of the administrative charge is final and unappealable.

• Joson vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 784 Phil. 172 (2016) — Cited for the propositions that the proper remedy to assail the Ombudsman's adjudication of criminal cases is certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court, and that the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman's determination of probable cause absent grave abuse of discretion.

• Navaja vs. De Castro, 161 Phil. 142 (2015) — Cited for the standard of probable cause: it need only rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and that the accused probably committed it.

• Section 7(d), Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) — Prohibits public officials and employees from soliciting or accepting, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan, or anything of monetary value from any person in the course of their official duties or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by, the functions of their office. The Ombudsman found no evidence that respondent solicited the loan or that it was connected with her official functions, and no apparent prohibition existed against her obtaining a loan from an accredited lending institution.

• Section 8(a), Republic Act No. 6713 — Requires public officials and employees to accomplish and submit under oath a Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN). Petitioner alleged respondent failed to disclose the ₱150,000 loan in her SALN, but the Ombudsman found no substantial evidence to sustain a charge of dishonesty on this ground.

• Section 7, Rule III, Ombudsman Administrative Order No. 7, Series of 1990 (as amended by Ombudsman Order No. 17, Series of 2003) — Provides that where the respondent is absolved of the charge, the decision shall be final and unappealable. Applied to hold that the Ombudsman's exoneration of respondent in the administrative case was final and not subject to appeal by the complainant.

• Section 27, Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) — Provides that findings of fact by the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive, and that decisions imposing public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month are final and unappealable. Relied upon as the statutory basis for the finality of the Ombudsman's exoneration of respondent.

• Section 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Empowers the courts of justice to determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Served as the constitutional basis for the complainant's recourse to certiorari under Rule 65 despite the absence of a statutory right to appeal.

Peralta, C.J. (Chairperson), Caguioa, Lazaro-Javier, and Lopez, JJ., concurred. No separate concurring opinions were written.