Tolentino vs. Villanueva

No judgment annulling a marriage may be rendered where the defendant fails to appear unless the prosecuting attorney has been directed to inquire into collusion and, if none exists, to intervene for the State to prevent fabrication of evidence, and a plaintiff who refuses to submit to such inquiry is properly nonsuited.

Romulo Tolentino and Helen Villanueva are spouses whose marriage is the subject of an annulment suit. Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines prohibit judgment annulling a marriage or decreeing legal separation upon stipulation of facts or confession of judgment and require, upon non-appearance of the defendant, inquiry by the prosecuting attorney into collusion and intervention for the State if no collusion exists. The 1940 Rules of Court and the 1964 Revised Rules similarly require proof of the material facts alleged in annulment and legal separation cases.

Romulo Tolentino and Helen Villanueva were married on September 28, 1959 in a ceremony solemnized by Quezon City Judge Mariano R. Virtucio. On April 26, 1962, Tolentino filed a suit for annulment of the marriage in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 43347. He alleged that his consent was obtained through fraud because immediately after the marriage celebration he discovered that Villanueva was pregnant although he had no sexual relations with her before the ceremony, and that they never lived as husband and wife because Villanueva left his house immediately after the celebration and her whereabouts remained unknown to him until January 1962, when he discovered her residing in San Francisco, Cebu.

Although served with summons and a copy of the complaint, Villanueva failed to file a responsive pleading. Tolentino therefore filed on June 13, 1962 a motion to declare her in default and to set a date for presentation of his evidence. In an order dated June 28, 1962, the respondent Judge declared Villanueva in default but, pursuant to Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code, referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila to investigate whether collusion existed between the parties, to submit a report within sixty days, and, upon a negative finding, to represent the State at trial to prevent fabrication of evidence. Tolentino was likewise directed to furnish the City Fiscal with copies of the complaint and other necessary documents.

On July 3, 1962, through counsel, Tolentino submitted to the City Fiscal only a copy of his complaint. Assistant City Fiscal Rafael A. Jose thereafter issued a subpoena requiring petitioner's counsel to bring Tolentino and copies of other documents in connection with the annulment case on August 27, 1962. In a letter dated August 24, 1962, counsel informed the Assistant City Fiscal that he could not comply because it would unnecessarily expose his evidence. In a motion dated and filed October 29, 1962, Tolentino prayed that the respondent Judge set a date for reception of his evidence on the ground that the City Fiscal had not submitted findings despite the lapse of sixty days from July 10, 1962, when the complaint copy was submitted. On November 6, 1962, the respondent Judge denied the motion unless Tolentino submitted himself for interrogation by the City Fiscal to enable a report on collusion. In an order dated July 29, 1963, the complaint was dismissed in view of Tolentino's unwillingness to submit to such interrogation pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 101 of the New Civil Code.

• Premature Exposure of Evidence: Petitioner maintained that he could not comply with the Fiscal's subpoena to bring himself and other documents because it would unnecessarily expose his evidence.
• Lapse of the Sixty-Day Period: Petitioner argued that the date for reception of his evidence should be set because the City Fiscal had not submitted a report of findings despite the lapse of sixty days from July 10, 1962, when a copy of the complaint was furnished.

• Duty to Submit to Collusion Investigation: Whether dismissal of the annulment complaint was proper where the plaintiff refused to submit himself for interrogation by the City Fiscal to determine collusion under Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code.
• Effect of Fiscal's Failure to Report Within Sixty Days: Whether the City Fiscal's failure to submit a collusion report within sixty days entitled plaintiff to proceed to reception of evidence without submitting to interrogation.

• Duty to Submit to Collusion Investigation: Yes. Dismissal was proper because refusal to submit to interrogation frustrated the mandatory inquiry into collusion and State intervention required upon defendant's non-appearance.
• Effect of Fiscal's Failure to Report Within Sixty Days: No. The lapse of sixty days did not excuse compliance, plaintiff having furnished only the complaint and having refused the interrogation needed for the Fiscal's report.

• Duty to Submit to Collusion Investigation: Articles 88 and 101 expressly prohibit judgment annulling a marriage upon stipulation of facts or confession of judgment and require, upon non-appearance of the defendant, that the prosecuting attorney inquire into collusion and, if none exists, intervene for the State to prevent fabrication of plaintiff's evidence. The prohibition is predicated on marriage and family as sacred institutions in which the State and public have a vital interest in preservation against desecration by collusion or fabricated evidence, marriage being more than a mere contract. Applied here, Villanueva's failure to plead triggered the mandatory referral to the City Fiscal, and Tolentino's refusal to submit to interrogation prevented the Fiscal from determining collusion and representing the State; dismissal therefore enforced the statutory safeguard for the integrity and sanctity of marital bonds.
• Effect of Fiscal's Failure to Report Within Sixty Days: The sixty-day directive for the Fiscal's report presupposed plaintiff's cooperation, including furnishing the complaint and other necessary documents and submitting to interrogation. Tolentino submitted only a copy of the complaint on July 3, 1962 and expressly refused to comply with the August 27, 1962 subpoena. His October 29, 1962 invocation of the lapse from July 10, 1962 could not justify reception of evidence because his own non-cooperation caused the absence of a report, and the November 6, 1962 order conditioning further proceedings on interrogation correctly implemented Article 101.

• Prohibition against annulment or legal separation by stipulation, confession, or default without State intervention — No judgment annulling a marriage and no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon stipulation of facts or confession of judgment; upon non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire into collusion and, if none exists, to intervene for the State to ensure plaintiff's evidence is not fabricated. The rule was applied to sustain referral to the City Fiscal, the requirement of interrogation, and dismissal for refusal to cooperate.
• Marriage as more than contract; State interest in its sanctity — Marriage and family are sacred institutions that concern the State as much as the spouses, giving the State and public a vital interest in maintaining and preserving them against desecration by collusion or fabricated evidence. This principle justified strict enforcement of Articles 88 and 101 and the requirement of proof of material facts before any annulment judgment.
• Requirement of proof of material facts in annulment and legal separation — Actions for annulment of marriage and legal separation shall not be decided unless the material facts alleged in the complaint are proved. The requirement, carried from the 1940 Rules of Court into the 1964 Revised Rules, reinforced the need for State participation and barred proceeding to ex parte reception of evidence without completion of the collusion inquiry.

• "No judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment." — States the Article 88 prohibition that bars annulment by agreement or concession and underlies the mandatory collusion inquiry.
• "In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated." — States the Article 101, paragraph 2 procedure that Tolentino's refusal to undergo interrogation frustrated.
• "the institutions of marriage and of the family are sacred and therefore are as much the concern of the State as of the spouses; because the State and the public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against desecration by collusion between the parties or by fabricated evidence." — Articulates the policy basis for prohibiting collusive or fabricated annulment and for requiring State intervention.

• De Ocampo vs. Florenciano, 107 Phil. 35, 38-40 — Cited as authority that marriage is more than a mere contract and that the court must direct State intervention upon defendant's non-appearance to preserve marital bonds.
• Brown vs. Yambao, 102 Phil. 168, 172 — Cited to support the State's concern in the sanctity of marriage and the prohibition against deciding annulment upon stipulation, confession, or unguarded default.
• Bigornia de Cardenas vs. Cardenas, et al., 98 Phil. 73, 78-79 — Cited for the same proposition that the law enjoins prosecutorial intervention to protect the integrity of marriage against collusion and fabrication.
• Roque vs. Encarnacion, et al., 95 Phil. 643, 646 — Cited as further authority for the State's vital interest and the mandatory safeguards before annulment or separation relief.

• Article 88, Civil Code of the Philippines — Prohibits judgment annulling a marriage upon stipulation of facts or confession of judgment and, upon non-appearance of defendant, requires observance of Article 101, paragraph 2; applied to require Fiscal investigation before reception of plaintiff's evidence.
• Article 101, paragraph 2, Civil Code of the Philippines — Requires the court, upon non-appearance of defendant in legal separation (applied to annulment through Article 88), to order the prosecuting attorney to inquire into collusion and, if none, to intervene for the State against fabricated evidence; applied to condition further proceedings on plaintiff's submission to interrogation and to justify dismissal for refusal.
• Section 10, Rule 35, 1940 Rules of Court — Directed that annulment or divorce actions shall not be decided unless material facts alleged are proved; cited as the procedural antecedent of the Civil Code safeguards.
• Section 1, Rule 19, 1964 Revised Rules of Court — Reiterates the proof requirement with legal separation substituted for divorce; cited to confirm the continuing bar against deciding annulment without proven material facts.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee, Esguerra and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.