Toledo vs. Toledo

A member of the Bar who abandons his lawful wife and cohabits with another woman by whom he has a child is disbarred for failure to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a lawyer.

Paz Arellano Toledo, a dentist by profession, married Jesus B. Toledo on 27 December 1946 in Camiling, Tarlac, while he was still a second-year law student. She supported him and spent for his studies through law school. After passing the bar examinations in August 1949 and being admitted to the practice of law on 16 May 1950, the respondent obtained employment with the Bureau of Lands and was stationed in Cagayan de Oro City, where complainant later learned he was cohabiting with another woman. The disbarment proceedings were initiated under Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, which governs the suspension or disbarment of attorneys.

Paz Arellano Toledo, a dentist, and Jesus B. Toledo, then a second-year law student, were married civilly on 27 December 1946 in Camiling, Tarlac. For two weeks after the wedding, they lived in the house of her parents. Thereafter, the respondent returned to Manila to resume his law studies at the Far Eastern University, later transferring to the MLQ School of Law, while the complainant remained in Camiling to practice her profession. During his studies, they visited each other regularly — he returned to Camiling once a week, or she traveled to Manila twice a week. Sometimes she slept at his boarding house or at the house on Economia Street where he lived with his brothers and cousin. They were on good terms until about three or four months before his graduation. On graduation day, the respondent showed her indifference, calling her a "provinciana" and telling her she was a nuisance. She continued to visit him while he reviewed for the bar examinations, last seeing him three days before the final examination and again a week after the examinations. Since then, they became actually separated, and she never saw him again until the hearing of the case.

Through Mrs. Esperanza Almonte, the complainant learned that the respondent was employed in the Bureau of Lands and stationed at Cagayan de Oro City. The respondent never wrote to ask her to join him at his place of work, and she did not seek him out. On 9 July 1956, she filed a sworn letter-complaint with the Supreme Court alleging that the respondent was cohabiting with another woman who had borne him three children, and praying for his disbarment.

At the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General, Marina Payot, an eighteen-year-old maid who had worked for the respondent from 28 February to 3 June 1955 in Malaybalay, Bukidnon, testified that the respondent and a woman named Corazon Toledo lived together as husband and wife and had a child named Angie, less than a year old. The couple slept in the same room with their daughter and ate their meals together. The respondent called Corazon "Honey" and Corazon called him "Jess." Corazon Toledo was not the same person as the complainant. Lino Domingo, an operator-mechanic with the Bureau of Public Highways in Malaybalay, corroborated this account. He had visited the respondent's residence and office at Moreno Street about ten times and observed that Corazon Toledo lived with the respondent as his wife. He saw a room where the respondent, Corazon, and a baby slept, with the respondent's clothing hung inside. He heard the respondent address Corazon as "Mama," and his friends Nieva and Abad addressed her as "Mrs. Toledo."

The respondent admitted that he was married to the complainant. He did not present evidence in his own behalf during the investigation, reserving the right to do so under Section 6, Rule 128. When the Solicitor General filed the formal complaint before the Supreme Court, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss rather than an answer, without stating any intention to present evidence. The Court found the testimony of Marina Payot and Lino Domingo credible — their sincerity having been tested through rigorous examination by the investigating Solicitor and cross-examination by the respondent himself — and unrebutted.

• Form of the Complaint: The complainant alleged that the respondent abandoned her after she supported him through law school, and that he was cohabiting with another woman who had borne him children, warranting disbarment.
• Immorality and Abandonment: The complainant maintained that the respondent's conduct — abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with another woman — constituted gross immorality unbecoming a member of the Bar, justifying disbarment.

• Defective Complaint: The respondent argued that the letter-complaint was not in due form because it did not set out distinctly, clearly, and concisely the legal causes for suspension or disbarment as required by the Rules of Court, rendering his answer incapable of being made in the logical sequence of a formal pleading.
• Irregularity in Filing: The respondent contended there was an irregularity in the filing of the complaint because the letter was dated 25 June 1956 and received at the Docket Section on 2 July 1956, but was not subscribed and sworn to before a notary public until 5 July 1956.
• Falsity of Charges: The respondent asserted that the information about his cohabitation was false, claiming that the three children referred to by the complainant were actually the children of Mr. and Mrs. Ruperto Ll. Jose, with whom he was boarding. He attached an affidavit from Leoncia D. Almonte to this effect.
• Motion to Dismiss: After the Solicitor General filed the formal complaint, the respondent moved to dismiss on the ground that the charges were not based on and supported by the facts and evidence adduced at the investigation, rather than filing an answer as required by Section 6, Rule 128.

• Procedural Compliance: Whether the respondent waived his right to present evidence by filing a motion to dismiss instead of an answer to the Solicitor General's complaint, as required by Section 6, Rule 128.
• Credibility of Evidence: Whether the testimony of the prosecution witnesses sufficiently established that the respondent cohabited with another woman by whom he had a child.
• Disbarment: Whether the respondent's abandonment of his lawful wife and cohabitation with another woman constituted grounds for disbarment.

• Procedural Compliance: Yes. The respondent waived his right to present evidence by filing a motion to dismiss instead of an answer, as Section 6, Rule 128 requires the respondent to file an answer and to state therein any intention to introduce additional evidence.
• Credibility of Evidence: Yes. The testimony of Marina Payot and Lino Domingo was found credible, sincere, and unrebutted, sufficiently establishing the respondent's cohabitation with Corazon Toledo and the existence of their child.
• Disbarment: Yes. By abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a child, the respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected of a member of the Bar, warranting disbarment.

• Procedural Compliance: Section 6, Rule 128 expressly requires the respondent in disbarment proceedings to file an answer to the complaint filed by the Solicitor General and, should he desire to present evidence, to state that intention in the answer. The respondent instead filed a motion to dismiss without indicating any intention to present evidence. The Court held that the reservation made at the close of the Solicitor General's investigation was insufficient; the correct manner and proper time to make known such an intention was by and in the answer seasonably filed in the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the respondent was deemed to have waived his right to present evidence.

• Credibility of Evidence: The Court assessed the testimony of Marina Payot, a simple eighteen-year-old maid who had not finished the sixth grade, and found her apparent inconsistencies attributable to her innocence, simple-mindedness, and difficulty understanding English, compounded by examination by three lawyers. Her straightforward answers to the investigating Solicitor's probing questions — including whether anyone coached her or promised her a reward, and whether she harbored ill-feeling toward the respondent — revealed no motive to fabricate. Lino Domingo's frank and ready answers likewise showed sincerity. The Court noted that even if Domingo's testimony were discarded, Payot's testimony would stand unrebutted. The annexes attached to the respondent's memorandum were not considered because they were not properly introduced in evidence during the investigation.

• Disbarment: The respondent admitted he was married to the complainant. The unrebutted testimony of two credible witnesses established that he cohabited with Corazon Toledo, who was not his wife, and had a child with her. The Court relied on prior disbarment decisions — Mortel vs. Aspiras and Sarmiento vs. Cui — as authority that abandonment of a lawful wife and cohabitation with another woman constitute failure to maintain the highest degree of morality required of a member of the Bar. The respondent's conduct fell below this standard, and disbarment was the appropriate sanction.

• Highest Degree of Morality Required of Lawyers — A member of the Bar is expected to maintain the highest degree of morality. Abandonment of a lawful wife and cohabitation with another woman by whom the lawyer has a child constitutes a failure to meet this standard and is a ground for disbarment. The Court applied this principle to the respondent, who was disbarred for the same conduct.

• Procedural Requirement Under Section 6, Rule 128 — In disbarment proceedings, the respondent must file an answer to the complaint filed by the Solicitor General after investigation, and must expressly state in that answer any intention to present additional evidence. A reservation made during the Solicitor General's investigation is not sufficient; the correct manner and time to declare such intention is in the answer seasonably filed with the Supreme Court. Failure to comply waives the right to present evidence.

• "The above-quoted rule in no uncertain terms requires the respondent in disbarment or suspension proceedings from the practice of law to file an answer to the complaint filed by the Solicitor General after investigation and, should he desire to present evidence in his behalf, to expressly say so in the answer." — This passage articulates the procedural requirement under Section 6, Rule 128 that a respondent must file an answer and state therein any intention to present evidence, establishing that a prior reservation during investigation is insufficient.

• "The respondent, by abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a child, has failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the Bar." — This is the ratio decidendi of the disbarment ruling, stating the controlling principle that abandonment and immoral cohabitation violate the standard of morality required of lawyers.

• Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, 28 December 1956 — Cited as controlling authority for the proposition that abandonment of a lawful wife and immoral cohabitation warrant disbarment. The Court relied on this case as direct support for the disbarment of the respondent.
• Sarmiento vs. Cui, Adm. Case No. 141, 29 March 1957 — Cited alongside Mortel vs. Aspiras as authority for disbarment based on abandonment and immorality, reinforcing the standard of morality required of members of the Bar.

• Section 6, Rule 128, Rules of Court — Provides that evidence produced before the Solicitor General in investigation may be considered by the Supreme Court if the respondent had an opportunity to object and cross-examine, and requires that if the respondent's answer does not state an intention to introduce additional evidence, the case shall be set down for hearing. The Court applied this provision to hold that the respondent waived his right to present evidence by filing a motion to dismiss instead of an answer.

Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concurred. Bengzon, C.J., took no part.