Tol-Noquera vs. Villamor

A petition for appointment as administrator of an absentee's estate is not a collateral attack on a Torrens title merely because it alleges fraudulent issuance of title to a third person, where the petitioner expressly declares that any remedy against the title would be pursued in a separate and distinct proceeding. The purpose of the rules on absence is the protection of the interests and property of the absentee, not of the administrator; thus, the question of whether the administrator may inherit the property to be administered is not controlling.

The case involves Special Proceedings No. P-056 filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch XVI, 8th Judicial Region, Naval, Leyte. The petitioner, Daya Maria Tol-Noquera, sought appointment as administratrix of the property of Remigio Tol, who had been missing since 1984. The relevant statutory framework is found in Articles 381 to 386 of the Civil Code, which govern the appointment of representatives for absentees and the declaration of absence.

Daya Maria Tol-Noquera filed Special Proceedings No. P-056 in December 1986 before the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Leyte, alleging that she was the acknowledged natural child of Remigio Tol, who had been missing since 1984. She claimed that a certain Diosdado Tol had fraudulently secured a free patent over Remigio's property and had obtained title thereto in his name. She sought the administration of the absentee's estate in order that she could recover the said property.

The petition was opposed by Diosdado Tol, who argued that Daya Maria Tol was not an acknowledged natural child of the absentee and that the property sought to be administered was covered by an original certificate of title issued in his name. On March 31, 1987, the trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it was a collateral attack on a Torrens title. The court also declared in effect that it was useless to appoint an administrator in view of the claim of a third person that he was the owner of the absentee's property.

The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, and she filed a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court on June 4, 1987. However, inasmuch as only questions of law were involved, the Supreme Court resolved to require the petitioner to seek review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court within 15 days from notice. The petitioner filed the petition for review on August 5, 1987.

In the petition before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that the original petition in the trial court was not intended as a collateral attack on a Torrens title; hence, Art. 389 of the Civil Code was not applicable. The private respondent contended that since the petitioner claims she is an illegitimate child of Remigio Tol, she is prohibited under Art. 992 of the Civil Code from inheriting ab intestato from the relatives of her father. The private respondent likewise questioned the necessity of her appointment for the purpose only of having the title annulled, and argued that in view of her allegations of fraud, she should have sued for the annulment of the title within a period of one year, which had already expired. Lastly, the private respondent argued that the decision of the trial court had already become final and executory because 76 days had already elapsed from the date of receipt of the said decision on May 21, 1987, to the date the petition was filed before the Supreme Court on August 5, 1987.

• Collateral Attack: Petitioner argued that the original petition in the trial court was not intended as a collateral attack on a Torrens title; hence, Art. 389 of the Civil Code was not applicable.
• Separate Remedy: Petitioner declared that whatever remedy she might choose would be pursued in another venue, in a proceeding entirely distinct and separate from her petition for appointment as administratrix.

• Prohibition on Inheritance: Private respondent contended that since the petitioner claims she is an illegitimate child of Remigio Tol, she is prohibited under Art. 992 of the Civil Code from inheriting ab intestato from the relatives of her father.
• Necessity of Appointment: Private respondent questioned the necessity of her appointment for the purpose only of having the title annulled.
• Prescription of Action: Private respondent argued that in view of her allegations of fraud, she should have sued for the annulment of the title within a period of one year, which had already expired.
• Finality of Judgment: Private respondent argued that the decision of the trial court had already become final and executory because 76 days had already elapsed from the date of receipt of the said decision on May 21, 1987, to the date the petition was filed before the Supreme Court on August 5, 1987.

• Collateral Attack on Torrens Title: Whether the petition for appointment as administratrix constituted a collateral attack on a Torrens title.
• Disqualification as Heir: Whether the petitioner's alleged disqualification to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate parents of the absentee bars her from petitioning for declaration of absence or being appointed as administratrix.
• Timeliness of Appeal: Whether the appeal was perfected seasonably.

• Collateral Attack on Torrens Title: No. The petition was not a collateral attack on a Torrens title. The alleged fraudulent issuance of title was mentioned only as a justification for her appointment as administrator, and the petitioner expressly declared that any remedy against the title would be pursued in a separate and distinct proceeding.
• Disqualification as Heir: No. The petitioner's disqualification as an heir to her supposed grandparents does not inhibit her from petitioning for a declaration of absence or to be appointed as an administratrix of the absentee's estate. What is material is whether she is one of those allowed by law to seek the declaration of absence and whether she is competent to be appointed as administratrix.
• Timeliness of Appeal: Yes. The appeal was perfected seasonably, as the notice of appeal was filed on June 4, 1987, within the 15-day extension of the period to appeal as granted by the Supreme Court in its resolution dated July 8, 1987.

• Collateral Attack on Torrens Title: The Court found that the lower court was rather hasty in dismissing the petition. The petitioner did say there was a need to appoint an administrator to prevent the property from being usurped, but this did not amount to a collateral attack on the title. There was nothing in the petition to indicate that the petitioner would attack the title issued to Diosdado in the same proceeding. The Court also noted that the trial court's position was rather ambivalent, for while relying on the Torrens title to justify the dismissal of the petition, it suggested at the same time that it could be attacked as long as this was not done in the proceeding before it. The issue of whether or not the property titled to Diosdado Tol is really owned by him should be resolved in another proceeding. The right of Daya Maria Tol to be appointed administratrix cannot be denied outright by reason alone of such issue. Even if it be assumed that the title obtained by Diosdado Tol is already indefeasible because of the lapse of the one-year period for attacking it on the ground of fraud, there are still other remedies available to one who is unjustly deprived of his property, such as a claim for reconveyance or a complaint for damages.

• Disqualification as Heir: The Court held that the private respondent's arguments that the petitioner cannot inherit ab intestato from the legitimate parents of the absentee is immaterial to this case. The purpose of the cited rules is the protection of the interests and property of the absentee, not of the administrator. Thus, the question of whether the administrator may inherit the property to be administered is not controlling. What is material is whether she is one of those allowed by law to seek the declaration of absence of Remigio Tol and whether she is competent to be appointed as administratrix of his estate. The Court cited Articles 381 to 386 of the Civil Code, which allow an interested party, a relative, or a friend to petition for the appointment of a representative for an absentee, and which allow relatives who may succeed by the law of intestacy to ask for the declaration of absence. The Court also noted that it is not necessary that a declaration of absence be made in a proceeding separate from and prior to a petition for administration, citing Reyes vs. Alejandro and Pejer vs. Martinez.

• Timeliness of Appeal: The Court found that the appeal was perfected seasonably. The notice of appeal was filed on June 4, 1987, within the 15-day extension of the period to appeal as granted by the Supreme Court in its resolution dated July 8, 1987.

• Collateral Attack on Torrens Title — A petition for appointment as administrator of an absentee's estate is not a collateral attack on a Torrens title where the petitioner merely mentions the alleged fraudulent issuance of title as a justification for her appointment and expressly declares that any remedy against the title would be pursued in a separate and distinct proceeding. The Court applied this doctrine to reverse the trial court's dismissal of the petition.

• Purpose of Rules on Absence — The purpose of the rules on absence is the protection of the interests and property of the absentee, not of the administrator. Thus, the question of whether the administrator may inherit the property to be administered is not controlling. What is material is whether the petitioner is one of those allowed by law to seek the declaration of absence and whether she is competent to be appointed as administratrix. The Court applied this doctrine to reject the private respondent's argument based on the petitioner's alleged disqualification as an heir.

• Combined Proceeding for Declaration of Absence and Administration — It is not necessary that a declaration of absence be made in a proceeding separate from and prior to a petition for administration. The petition to declare the husband an absentee and the petition to place the management of the conjugal properties in the hands of the wife could be combined and adjudicated in the same proceeding. The Court relied on this doctrine in Pejer vs. Martinez and Reyes vs. Alejandro to support the petitioner's right to seek appointment as administratrix.

• "As we see it, the petition was not a collateral attack on a Torrens title. The petitioner did say there was a need to appoint an administrator to prevent the property from being usurped, but this did not amount to a collateral attack on the title." — This passage articulates the Court's core reasoning on the first issue, distinguishing a petition for administration from a collateral attack on a Torrens title.

• "The purpose of the cited rules is the protection of the interests and property of the absentee, not of the administrator. Thus, the question of whether the administrator may inherit the property to be administered is not controlling." — This passage defines the controlling principle for determining who may be appointed as administrator of an absentee's estate, rejecting the relevance of the administrator's potential inheritance rights.

• "The issue of whether or not the property titled to Diosdado Tol is really owned by him should be resolved in another proceeding. The right of Daya Maria Tol to be appointed administratrix cannot be denied outright by reason alone of such issue." — This passage establishes that the question of ownership of the property is separate from the question of appointment as administratrix, and must be resolved in a distinct proceeding.

• Reyes vs. Alejandro, 141 SCRA 65 — Cited as controlling precedent for the ruling that it is not necessary that a declaration of absence be made in a proceeding separate from and prior to a petition for administration.

• Pejer vs. Martinez, 88 Phil. 72 — Cited as controlling precedent, reiterating that the petition to declare the husband an absentee and the petition to place the management of the conjugal properties in the hands of the wife could be combined and adjudicated in the same proceeding.

• Quiniano vs. Court of Appeals, 39 SCRA 221 — Cited to support the proposition that there are remedies other than annulment of title available to one who is unjustly deprived of property, such as a claim for reconveyance.

• Cabanos vs. Register of Deeds of Laguna, 40 Phil. 620 — Cited to support the proposition that there are remedies other than annulment of title available to one who is unjustly deprived of property, such as a complaint for damages.

• Art. 381, Civil Code — Provides that when a person disappears from his domicile, his whereabouts being unknown, and without leaving an agent to administer his property, the judge, at the instance of an interested party, a relative, or a friend, may appoint a person to represent him in all that may be necessary. The Court applied this provision to support the petitioner's right to seek appointment as administratrix.

• Art. 382, Civil Code — Provides that after the appointment is made, the judge shall take the necessary measures to safeguard the rights and interest of the absentee and shall specify the powers, obligations and remuneration of his representatives. The Court cited this provision as part of the relevant laws on the matter.

• Art. 383, Civil Code — Provides that in the appointment of a representative, the spouse present shall be preferred when there is no legal separation, and if the absentee left no spouse, or if the spouse present is a minor, any competent person may be appointed by the court. The Court cited this provision as part of the relevant laws on the matter.

• Art. 384, Civil Code — Provides that two years having elapsed without any news about the absentee or since the receipt of the last news, and five years in case the absentee has left a person in charge of the administration of his property, his absence may be declared. The Court cited this provision as part of the relevant laws on the matter.

• Art. 385, Civil Code — Lists who may ask for the declaration of absence: the spouse present; the heirs instituted in a will; the relatives who may succeed by the law of intestacy; and those who may have over the property of the absentee some right subordinated to the condition of his death. The Court applied this provision to determine who is allowed by law to seek the declaration of absence.

• Art. 386, Civil Code — Provides that the judicial declaration of absence shall not take effect until six months after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. The Court cited this provision as part of the relevant laws on the matter.

• Art. 389, Civil Code — Provides the cases when administration shall cease, including when a third person appears showing by a proper document that he has acquired the absentee's property by purchase or other title. The Court noted that the petitioner argued this provision was not applicable.

• Art. 992, Civil Code — Provides that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. The Court held that this provision was immaterial to the case, as the petitioner's disqualification as an heir does not inhibit her from petitioning for a declaration of absence or being appointed as administratrix.

Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and Bellosillo, JJ., concurred.