TMPCWA vs. Court of Appeals

A writ of preliminary injunction cannot issue where the applicant’s legal right is doubtful and the issue of entitlement to the injunction is intertwined with the merits of the principal case, nor where the alleged emergency has been mooted by subsequent events.

Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation (TMPC) and Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Workers’ Association (TMPCWA) were the employer and labor union involved in a representation dispute over rank-and-file employees at TMPC’s Sta. Rosa and Bicutan Plants. A prior Supreme Court decision, Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation vs. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union, had ruled that employees occupying Level 5 positions under TMPC’s Single Salary Structure were supervisory employees; that decision became final and executory. TMPC thereafter implemented a Three-Function Salary Structure for its personnel. The ensuing certification election proceedings turned on whether the challenged voters were rank-and-file or supervisory employees under the applicable structure.

On February 4, 1999, TMPCWA filed a petition for certification election in an unorganized establishment for the rank-and-file employees at TMPC’s Sta. Rosa and Bicutan Plants before the Med-Arbitration Unit of the DOLE-NCR, docketed as NCR-OD-M-9907-017 and later redocketed as NCR-OD-M-9902-001. TMPC opposed the petition, asserting that a case was pending before the Supreme Court between it and the Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union, whose registration certificate had been cancelled, and that TMPCWA’s membership was the same as that of the TMPCLU, which sought to represent the same bargaining unit. TMPC further asserted that the petition was a rehash of an earlier petition dismissed on June 18, 1998. The Med-Arbiter initially dismissed the petition on March 29, 1999, but on appeal the DOLE, through Undersecretary Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz, reversed the dismissal on June 25, 1999 and ordered a certification election. After TMPC’s motion for reconsideration was denied and its certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals was likewise denied, the June 25, 1999 DOLE Decision became final, and the certification election was set for March 8, 2000.

During the inclusion and exclusion proceedings before the Med-Arbiter on February 15, 2000, TMPC submitted a list of 1,110 employees at its Bicutan and Sta. Rosa Plants included in the payroll. TMPCWA questioned the eligibility of 120 employees in the list, contending that they were not rank-and-file employees but supervisory employees of TMPC, based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Toyota Motor Phils. Corporation vs. Toyota Motor Phils. Corporation Labor Union. TMPC, for its part, asserted that its Three-Function Salary Structure had already superseded that decision, distinguishing real supervisors or managers from rank-and-file employees in terms of duties and functions. The certification election nonetheless proceeded as scheduled. During the election, 105 out of the 120 employees whose eligibility had been questioned cast their votes, but these votes were not opened and considered. The results were as follows: at the Bicutan Plant, 305 yes votes, 302 no votes, 91 challenged votes, 4 spoiled ballots, and 702 total votes cast; at the Sta. Rosa Plant, 198 yes votes, 138 no votes, 14 challenged votes, 11 spoiled ballots, and 361 total votes cast. In total, there were 503 yes votes, 440 no votes, 105 challenged votes, 15 spoiled ballots, and 1,063 total votes cast. With 503 affirmative votes and the exclusion of the 105 challenged votes, TMPCWA asserted that it garnered the majority of the 943 votes cast, less the challenged votes, and sought to be declared the certified bargaining agent. TMPC filed a handwritten manifestation on the face of the election results asserting that TMPCWA could not be certified because its 503 votes were 22 votes shy of the majority, and prayed for the opening of 91 of the 105 challenged votes at the Bicutan Plant so that the Med-Arbiter could rule on the qualifications of the voters and ascertain whether TMPCWA indeed won.

TMPC filed its position paper with the Med-Arbiter on April 25, 2000, alleging that the 105 challenged votes should have been opened and considered in the tabulation. It averred that if considered, the outcome would have been adverse to TMPCWA, and thus TMPCWA could not be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees at the Sta. Rosa and Bicutan Plants. TMPC further alleged that under its Three-Function Salary Structure, which became effective in December 1994 after the Supreme Court’s decision in the earlier Toyota case became final and executory, the rank-and-file employees were: the General Staff, Salary Levels 8 and below, for as long as they function as ordinary staff and have no subordinates; Line Employees, referring to factory workers assigned at the manufacturing plants, Salary Levels 1-4; and Office Staff, Salary Levels 1-6. TMPC asserted that out of the 105 challenged voters, at least 103 were members of the General Staff category of Levels 5 to 8 and were rank-and-file employees under its Three-Function Salary Structure. TMPC appended to its position paper the affidavit of Jose Ma. Aligada, First Vice-President of the General Administration Division, as well as the affidavits of 89 of the 105 challenged voters, and appended the list of the names of the challenged voters.

After the submission of the parties’ respective position papers, Med-Arbiter Zosima Lameyra issued an Order on May 12, 2000, finding the challenged voters to be supervisory employees under the Three-Function Salary Structure. The Med-Arbiter defined supervisory employees as those belonging to the General Staff, Salary Levels 9-10 (Supervisors), and Salary Levels 7-8 (Group Heads, if they function as such, i.e., they are staff with subordinates for whom they are responsible in terms of daily work supervision); and Line Employees, referring to factory workers assigned at the manufacturing plants, Salary Levels 9-10 (Foremen), Salary Levels 7-8 (Senior Group Chiefs), and Salary Levels 5-6 (Junior Group Chiefs, including Group Leaders and Team Leaders), with the note that Levels 5-10 are considered supervisors only when their actual functions dictate such categorization. Rank-and-file employees were defined as all other employees who do not fall under either the managerial or supervisory classes, specifically: the General Staff, Salary Levels 8 and below, for as long as they function as ordinary staff and have no subordinates; Line Employees, referring to factory workers assigned at the manufacturing plants, Salary Levels 1-4; and Office Staff, Salary Levels 1-6. The Med-Arbiter declared the challenged voters ineligible and excluded their votes from the totality of valid votes cast.

On June 21, 2000, the employees of TMPC whose votes were challenged filed a petition for declaratory relief with the Arbitration Board of the DOLE, docketed as NLRC-NCR-30-06-02556-00 against TMPCWA, praying that they be declared rank-and-file employees based on their employment contracts, job descriptions, actual duties and responsibilities, and affidavits. There was no appearance for TMPCWA. On August 4, 2000, Jimmy Sy and other employees of TMPC who were among the 105 challenged voters filed a motion to intervene in NCR-OD-M-9902-001, alleging that they had earlier filed the petition for declaratory relief. On August 7, 2000, Labor Arbiter Eduardo M. Madriaga rendered a decision granting the petition, stating that the Constitution mandates protection to labor and that the petition was granted solely for the purpose that petitioners may exercise all their rights and claim all legal benefits as rank-and-file workers, as found in the Constitution and the Labor Code. On August 28, 2000, the 105 challenged voters filed a motion in NCR-OD-M-9902-001 for the remand of the case to the Med-Arbiter for the opening of the ballots, appending a copy of the Labor Arbiter’s order.

On October 19, 2000, the DOLE, through Undersecretary Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz, issued a Resolution affirming the Med-Arbiter’s order. The Undersecretary held that since the challenged voters were ineligible to vote, there was no need to open their votes; that TMPC should have adduced its evidence on the status of the challenged voters during the inclusion-exclusion proceedings; that TMPC had no legal personality to move for the opening of the challenged voters’ votes and delay the proclamation of the winners in the certification election because the employer is merely a bystander; that TMPC failed to prove that the challenged voters were rank-and-file employees; that TMPCWA’s contention that the challenged voters were supervisory employees found support in the Supreme Court’s Toyota decision; and that the affidavits of the challenged voters were barren of probative weight because they were executed only after the certification election, and TMPC failed to adduce in evidence the job descriptions of the challenged voters for the year 2000. As to the petition for declaratory relief, the Undersecretary held that it was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Med-Arbiter and the Office of the Secretary in certification election proceedings to resolve the issue of whether the 105 challenged voters should be classified as rank-and-file or supervisory employees, and that the recourse taken by the movants with the NLRC amounted to circumvention of the public policy against forum shopping.

TMPC and the challenged voters filed a motion for reconsideration of the October 19, 2000 Resolution. While the motion was pending, TMPC received on October 27, 2000 a letter from TMPCWA, through its President Ed Cubelo and the members of its Board of Directors, appending a CBA proposal for TMPC’s consideration. On November 7, 2000, TMPC wrote TMPCWA that it could not as yet submit any counter-proposal because its motion for reconsideration of the Secretary’s resolution was still pending. On November 15, 2000, Ed Cubelo wrote TMPC demanding that it submit its counter-proposal to the proposed CBA. On November 28, 2000, TMPC reiterated its stand that until its motion for reconsideration was resolved, it would not negotiate with TMPCWA on its proposed CBA. On December 8, 2000, TMPC received another letter from TMPCWA giving TMPC a period of ten days within which to reply to its CBA proposal.

The hearing of TMPC’s motion for reconsideration was set on February 22, 2001. On February 21, 2001, TMPC received a letter from TMPCWA that its members would absent themselves from work to attend the hearing. TMPCWA informed TMPC that its members were willing to work on their rest day to make up for their absence on February 22, 2001. During the hearing, 22 of the challenged voters managed to testify on their duties and functions; the other challenged voters failed to testify because they had to take the place of the employees who attended the hearing. On March 1, 2001, TMPCWA voted to stage a strike at the Sta. Rosa and Bicutan Plants and filed a manifestation with the NCR-NCMB informing the latter of its intention to stage a strike from March 28, 2001 onwards. On March 16, 2001, TMPCWA filed a manifestation with the NCR-NCMB that TMPC had dismissed three hundred union members and officers, but nevertheless gave TMPC several days to “mend” its mind and cease and desist from committing unfair labor practice; TMPCWA further stated that the union members would stage a protest in front of the company premises.

On March 16, 2001, the DOLE, through Secretary Patricia Sto. Tomas, issued a Resolution denying with modification TMPC’s motion for reconsideration. The Secretary stated that her resolution would become final and executory within ten days from notice. She ruled that TMPC had the burden to prove that the challenged voters were rank-and-file employees, but that TMPC failed to discharge its burden; that TMPC failed to adduce in evidence the job descriptions of the challenged voters; that the affidavits of Jose Ma. Aligada and of the challenged voters were barren of probative weight because the affiants were not presented to the Med-Arbiter to attest to the truth of their affidavits; that the Three-Function Salary Structure adopted by TMPC in December 1994 did not change the tasks performed by its employees; that what is determinative of the classification of employees is their actual functions; and that only 18 of the challenged voters were rank-and-file employees, which number was insufficient to overturn the result of the election. The Secretary also ruled that the decision of Labor Arbiter Eduardo C. Madriaga in NLRC-NCR-30-06-02556-00 was irrelevant because the petition in that case was a case of forum shopping, filed by the challenged voters at the behest of TMPC. Entry of judgment was made of record on March 19, 2001.

On the same date, TMPCWA wrote TMPC suggesting that a conference be held on March 21, 2002 to settle all issues amicably, including their current labor dispute and CBA regulations. On March 27, 2001, TMPC filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals under Rule 65, seeking nullification of the October 19, 2000 and March 16, 2001 Resolutions of the Secretary, with a plea for the issuance of a preliminary injunction or at least a temporary restraining order. TMPC alleged that the Secretary gravely abused her discretion in declaring that the challenged voters, except for 18 of them, were supervisory employees and ineligible to vote, and in affirming the Med-Arbiter’s order certifying TMPCWA as the exclusive bargaining agent despite its failure to obtain a majority of the valid votes cast. TMPC asserted that TMPCWA bore the burden of proving that the 105 challenged voters were supervisory employees; that assuming TMPC had the burden, it adduced overwhelming evidence that the challenged voters were rank-and-file employees; that labor proceedings merely require position papers and supporting affidavits, making the affidavits of Jose Ma. Aligada and the challenged voters admissible; that the Secretary could not consider the affidavits defective for notarization because TMPCWA never challenged that matter before the Med-Arbiter; that the petition for declaratory relief had already been granted by the Labor Arbiter; and that the Supreme Court’s Toyota decision was not on all fours with the present case. Meanwhile, TMPCWA staged a strike on March 28, 2001.

In compliance with the Court of Appeals’ resolution, TMPCWA filed its comment on the petition, asserting that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and grave error of law in taking cognizance of the petition and issuing a temporary restraining order, because on its face the petition seeking to annul the certification election and the order certifying the union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent was illegal. TMPCWA further alleged that TMPC, as employer, was without locus standi to appeal from a decision certifying TMPCWA as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent; that the Court in the earlier Toyota case found that the categorization of Levels 5 and 6 was for positions occupied by employees, not merely for salary purposes; that the factual findings of the Secretary and the Med-Arbiter were binding upon the Court of Appeals, there being no showing of grave abuse of discretion and being duly supported by the evidence on record; that the Union was certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-and-file employees having obtained a majority of the valid votes cast; that the alleged decision of Labor Arbiter Madriaga had no bearing because the Med-Arbiter and the Secretary have original and exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for certification elections and over issues of who are qualified to vote as members of the bargaining unit; and that certain misrepresentations and false allegations must be exposed for what they are.

On April 3, 2001, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution granting a Temporary Restraining Order effective for sixty days and directing TMPCWA to file its Comment on the petition. In the meantime, the Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the notice to strike and issued an order to the members and officers of TMPCWA to return to work. The said members and officers complied with the order and ended their strike on April 11, 2001. During the hearing of TMPC’s plea for a writ of preliminary injunction on June 13, 2001, TMPCWA averred that TMPC was not the real party-in-interest as it is merely a bystander in a certification election; that since the Secretary had already assumed jurisdiction over the projected strike and the union members and officers had complied with the return-to-work order, there was no longer a need for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. After the hearing, the parties were ordered to submit their respective memoranda. On June 29, 2001, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution granting TMPC’s plea for a writ of preliminary injunction, ordering TMPCWA and all those acting for or through it to cease and desist from enforcing, implementing, or otherwise acting on and giving effect to the Secretary’s assailed Resolutions of October 19, 2000 and March 16, 2001 and allied processes issued in O-A-4-27-99 (NCR-OD-M-9902-001), pending the termination of the litigation, upon posting of a P500,000 injunction bond. Aggrieved, TMPCWA filed on July 27, 2001 the instant petition under Rule 65 with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in granting a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of respondent.
• Locus Standi and Bystander Rule: Petitioner maintained that respondent, as employer, is not a party in a certification election case and is a mere bystander; it is not the real party-in-interest to assail the results of the certification election and the proceedings therein, and has no right or interest in the results.
• No Clear Right to Injunctive Relief: Petitioner asserted that respondent failed to establish a clear right to injunctive relief.
• Correctness of the SOLE Ruling: Petitioner argued that the Secretary of Labor’s ruling that petitioner was the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-and-file employees of respondent, having obtained a majority of the valid votes cast, was correct and based on the evidence adduced by the parties.
• Binding Factual Findings: Petitioner alleged that the factual findings of the Secretary and the Med-Arbiter are binding upon the Court of Appeals, there being no showing of grave abuse of discretion and being duly supported by the evidence on record.
• Toyota Ruling: Petitioner alleged that the Court in the earlier Toyota case found that the categorization of Levels 5 and 6 was for positions occupied by employees, not merely for salary purposes.
• Jurisdiction and the Madriaga Decision: Petitioner alleged that the decision of Labor Arbiter Madriaga has no bearing in the instant case because the Med-Arbiter and the Secretary have original and exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for certification elections and over issues of who are qualified to vote as members of the bargaining unit.
• Misrepresentations: Petitioner alleged that certain misrepresentations and false allegations must be exposed for what they are.

• Scope of Certiorari: Respondent averred that petitioner’s contention that respondent lacks legal standing goes into the merits of its petition in the Court of Appeals; in resolving whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ, the Court is proscribed from resolving respondent’s petition on its merits.
• Clear Legal Right: Respondent asserted that it has a clear legal right to deal with a bona fide bargaining agent and sought injunctive relief from the Court of Appeals precisely to protect that right pending resolution of its petition on the merits.
• Invasion of Rights: Respondent claimed that petitioner committed, and is still committing, acts which materially and substantially invade its rights to collectively bargain with a bargaining agent properly certified in accordance with law.
• Damages and Coercive Actions: Respondent asserted that the writ of injunction issued by the Court of Appeals restrained the coercive actions of petitioner that resulted in serious damages to respondent.
• Discretion of the Court of Appeals: Respondent argued that the matter of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction rests entirely within the discretion of the Court of Appeals, and that petitioner failed to establish that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the writ.
• Burden and Evidence on Challenged Voters: In its petition before the Court of Appeals, respondent alleged that the Secretary gravely abused her discretion in declaring that the challenged voters, except for 18 of them, were supervisory employees and ineligible to vote; that petitioner bears the burden of proving that the 105 challenged voters are supervisory employees; and that, assuming respondent had the burden, it adduced overwhelming evidence that the challenged voters are rank-and-file employees.
• Admissibility of Affidavits: Respondent asserted that proceedings before labor agencies merely require the parties to submit their respective position papers and supporting affidavits, making the affidavits of Jose Ma. Aligada and the challenged voters admissible; the Secretary could not consider the affidavits defective for notarization because petitioner never challenged the matter before the Med-Arbiter.
• Declaratory Relief and Toyota: Respondent argued that the petition for declaratory relief of the challenged voters had already been granted by the Labor Arbiter and that the Supreme Court’s Toyota decision is not on all fours with the present case.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting respondent’s plea for a writ of preliminary injunction.
• Real Party-in-Interest and Bystander Rule: Whether respondent employer is the real party-in-interest, or merely a bystander, to assail the Secretary of Labor’s and Med-Arbiter’s resolutions in the certification election.
• Requisites for Preliminary Injunction: Whether respondent established a clear and unmistakable legal right and the urgent necessity required for a writ of preliminary injunction.
• Mootness and Urgency: Whether the alleged strike and coercive acts continued to pose an emergency after the Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction and the union returned to work.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Yes. The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in granting the writ of preliminary injunction.
• Real Party-in-Interest and Bystander Rule: Not resolved on the merits. The issue was intertwined with the principal case, and the Court of Appeals’ grant of injunctive relief effectively prejudged it.
• Requisites for Preliminary Injunction: No. Respondent failed to establish a clear and unmistakable legal right and the urgent necessity required for injunctive relief.
• Mootness and Urgency: No. The alleged emergency ceased after the Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction and the union returned to work, leaving no pressing necessity for the writ.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The writ of certiorari under Rule 65 issues to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. While the issuance of a preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, grave abuse of discretion exists when the power is exercised in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal aversion, amounting to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined. The Court of Appeals granted the injunction even though the issue of whether respondent was entitled to injunctive relief was interwoven with the principal issue on the merits: whether respondent was the real party-in-interest to assail the Secretary’s and Med-Arbiter’s resolutions. By granting the writ, the Court of Appeals in effect ruled that respondent was the real party-in-interest and not merely a bystander, thereby prejudging the principal issue before it. This constituted grave abuse of discretion.

• Real Party-in-Interest and Bystander Rule: The Court did not resolve the merits of whether respondent employer was a real party-in-interest or a mere bystander in the certification election. It held that the issue was central to the principal case and could not be prejudged through a preliminary injunction. Petitioner cited decisions that in certification elections the employer is a bystander with no right or material interest to assail the certification election, while respondent’s position that it had a clear legal right to deal only with a bona fide bargaining agent was not trivial or unsubstantial. Because the injunctive issue was intertwined with the merits, the Court of Appeals should not have issued the writ.

• Requisites for Preliminary Injunction: A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy to be used cautiously and only upon full conviction of its extreme necessity. It is designed to preserve or maintain the status quo and may be resorted to only by a litigant for the preservation or protection of rights or interests during the pendency of the principal action. The essential conditions are that the material averments in the complaint appear sufficient to constitute a cause of action for injunction and that the injunctive relief is reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of the plaintiff or petitioner pendente lite. The applicant must establish: (a) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. When the complainant’s right or title is doubtful, a preliminary injunction is not proper, and the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for injunction. Here, respondent’s right to injunctive relief was doubtful because its standing to assail the certification election was the very issue on the merits. Moreover, courts should avoid using a writ of preliminary injunction which in effect disposes of the main case without trial.

• Mootness and Urgency: Even assuming respondent had a clear right, the alleged emergency had ceased. During the hearing of the plea for injunctive relief, petitioner manifested that the Secretary of Labor had assumed jurisdiction over the strike and that all union members and officers who staged the strike had returned to work. The Secretary had determined that the industry engaged in by respondent is indispensable to the national interest. Petitioner assured the Court of Appeals and respondent that its members and officers would no longer stage a strike because of the certification election, and counsel stated that there was no danger if no injunction issued, that the union was not going to strike just because of the certification election, and that the strike had been based on union-busting demands and dismissal of union officers and members, not on the representation issue. These manifestations and guarantees were unrebutted by respondent. In light of them, there was no longer any emergency, urgency, or pressing necessity for the Court of Appeals to issue a writ of preliminary injunction, and there was no showing that petitioner was bent on staging a strike in defiance of the Secretary’s order.

• Preliminary Injunction — Requisites — A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy designed to preserve or maintain the status quo and may be resorted to only by a litigant for the preservation or protection of rights or interests during the pendency of the principal action. The applicant must establish: (a) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that respondent’s right was doubtful because its standing to assail the certification election was the very issue on the merits, and that the alleged emergency had ceased after the Secretary assumed jurisdiction and the union returned to work.

• (a) Material and substantial invasion of the right sought to be protected.

• (b) Clear and unmistakable right of the complainant.

• (c) Urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

• Doubtful Right Bars Injunctive Relief — When the complainant’s right or title is doubtful, a preliminary injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for injunction. The Court applied this rule because respondent’s legal standing to challenge the certification election was contested and intertwined with the merits.

• Injunction Cannot Dispose of the Main Case — Courts should avoid using a writ of preliminary injunction which in effect disposes of the main case without trial. The Court found that the Court of Appeals’ grant of the writ effectively prejudged the issue of whether respondent was the real party-in-interest.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion in Injunctive Relief — Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or an exercise of power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined. The Court held that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the writ despite the doubtful right and the mooted emergency.

• Certiorari under Rule 65 — The writ of certiorari issues for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It may issue only when the following requirements are alleged and established: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Court applied these requirements in granting the petition.

• Bystander Rule in Certification Elections — The Court did not resolve the merits of whether an employer is a mere bystander in a certification election. It held that the issue was intertwined with the principal case and could not be prejudged through a preliminary injunction.

• “First. The issue of whether or not the respondent is entitled to injunctive relief is interwoven with the principal issue on the merits of the petition, whether or not the respondent is the real party-in-interest to assail the resolution of the SOLE and the resolution of the Med-Arbiter.” — This passage states the first ground for finding grave abuse of discretion: the Court of Appeals could not grant injunctive relief without effectively deciding the merits of respondent’s standing.

• “When the complainant's right or title is doubtful, a preliminary injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for injunction.” — This passage articulates the controlling rule on the requisites of preliminary injunction, particularly the need for a clear and unmistakable legal right.

• “Moreover, the courts should avoid using a writ of preliminary injunction, which in effect disposes of the main case without trial.” — This passage explains why the Court of Appeals’ grant of the writ was improper: it prejudged the principal issue of respondent’s real party-in-interest status.

• “In light of the express manifestations and guarantee made by the petitioner, through counsel, which were unrebutted by the respondent, there was no longer any emergency, urgency or a pressing necessity for the CA to still issue a writ of preliminary injunction.” — This passage states the second ground for grave abuse of discretion: the alleged strike emergency had been mooted by the Secretary’s assumption of jurisdiction and the union’s return to work.

• Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129368, August 25, 2003 — Cited for the requirements of the writ of certiorari under Rule 65 and the distinction between excess of jurisdiction and absence of jurisdiction.
• Placido Urbanes, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 355 SCRA 537 (2001) — Cited for the rule that the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court unless grave abuse of discretion is committed, and for the definition of grave abuse of discretion.
• Cagayan de Oro City Landless Residents Association, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 220 (1996) — Cited for the principle that injunction is an extraordinary remedy designed to preserve or maintain the status quo and may be resorted to only by a litigant for the preservation or protection of rights or interests during the pendency of the principal action.
• Philippine National Bank vs. Ritratto Group, Inc., 362 SCRA 216 (2001) — Cited for the rule that injunction is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation.
• Lopez vs. Court of Appeals, 322 SCRA 686 (2000); Del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 152 (1996) — Cited for the rule that the resolution of an application for a writ of preliminary injunction rests upon the existence of an emergency or special recourse before the main case can be heard in due course.
• Heirs of Joaquin Asuncion vs. Hon. Gervacio, Jr., 304 SCRA 322 (1999) — Cited for the rule that the writ of preliminary injunction is issued to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to parties before the case can be resolved on its merits, and for the essential conditions for granting temporary injunctive relief.
• Dionisio vs. Ortiz, 204 SCRA 745 (1991) — Cited for the requisites of preliminary injunctive relief: material and substantial invasion of the right, clear and unmistakable right, and urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
• Sy vs. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 328 (1999) — Cited for the rule that courts should avoid using a writ of preliminary injunction which in effect disposes of the main case without trial.
• Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation vs. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union, 268 SCRA 573 (1997) — Cited as the prior Supreme Court decision holding that employees occupying Level 5 positions under TMPC’s Single Salary Structure were supervisory employees; the application of this ruling was central to the underlying certification election dispute.
• Dunlop Slazenger (Phils.) Inc. vs. Hon. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 300 SCRA 120 (1998) — Cited in connection with respondent’s submission that it can be compelled to negotiate and enter into a collective bargaining agreement only with the appropriate bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees, not with supervisory employees.

• Section 1, Rule 58, Rules of Court, as amended — Defines a preliminary injunction as an order granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, agency, or person to refrain from a particular act or acts. The Court applied this provision in holding that the Court of Appeals’ writ improperly restrained enforcement of the Secretary of Labor’s resolutions despite the absence of a clear right and urgent necessity.
• Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Governs the petition for certiorari, which issues to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Court applied this rule in granting TMPCWA’s petition and nullifying the Court of Appeals’ Resolution and writ of preliminary injunction.
• Article 213, Labor Code — Cited in the Secretary of Labor’s resolution for the proposition that the NLRC is an attached agency of the Department of Labor and Employment for program and policy coordination, and that the recourse taken by the challenged voters with the NLRC amounted to circumvention of the public policy against forum shopping.

Bellosillo (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concurred. Quisumbing, J., took no part due to prior DOLE action.