Tiu San vs. Republic

A conviction within the two-year waiting period for violating a municipal zoning ordinance enacted under the police power bars issuance of a naturalization certificate under Section 1, clause (3) of Republic Act No. 530; the ordinance is a “government promulgated rule,” the law applies despite the offense having been committed before its enactment, and “any offense” includes mala prohibita.

Tiu San alias Angel Gomez sought admission to Philippine citizenship, with the Republic of the Philippines appearing as oppositor. Republic Act No. 530 established a special procedure for naturalization cases: a decision granting naturalization does not become executory until two years after promulgation and until the naturalization court, after a hearing with the Solicitor General or his representative, finds that the applicant complied with the statutory conditions. The statute also provides that it applies to cases pending in court and to applicants who have not yet taken the oath of citizenship.

Tiu San alias Angel Gomez was the owner and proprietor of a lumber yard in Lucena, Quezon, and the applicant in naturalization proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Quezon Province. A complaint filed against him alleged that on or about the date comprising April 30, 1950 until the present time — referring to July 6, 1950, the date of the complaint — he, as owner and proprietor of a lumber yard located inside the prohibited zone of Lucena, with the deliberate intent of disobeying the permit given him by the local authority for a temporary lumber establishment in the restricted area and the provisions of Municipal Ordinance No. 14, series of 1946, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously failed to remove and transfer his lumber establishments within the time granted him to do so. Tiu San pleaded guilty to the complaint.

On July 13, 1950, the CFI rendered a decision authorizing his naturalization. An order issued in the criminal case against him, dated January 7, 1952, and marked as Exhibit 2, showed that as of that date his lumber yard was still in the prohibited zone. The offense was committed continuously from April 30, 1950 up to at least January 7, 1952, or within two years after the rendition of the July 13, 1950 decision granting naturalization. On April 25, 1952, Tiu San was convicted of violating Municipal Ordinance No. 14, series of 1946, of Lucena, Quezon, for failure to remove and transfer his lumber yard from the prohibited zone, and was sentenced to pay a fine of P50.00.

Over two years after the naturalization decision, on or about May 25, 1953, Tiu San filed a petition praying that, after due hearing and pursuant to Republic Act No. 530, the corresponding certificate of naturalization be issued in his favor. After the hearing, the CFI issued an order dated June 3, 1953 denying the petition because of the April 25, 1952 conviction.

Tiu San appealed the June 3, 1953 order to the SC.

• Municipal Ordinance Not a Government-Promulgated Rule: Petitioner maintained that a municipal ordinance is not a “government promulgated rule” as contemplated in Section 1, clause (3) of Republic Act No. 530.
• Retroactivity: Petitioner argued that clause (3) was inapplicable because the violation of the municipal ordinance took place before the enactment of Republic Act No. 530.
• Mala Prohibita: Petitioner contended that the offense in question was not malum in se but malum prohibitum.
• Good Faith: Petitioner claimed good faith in violating Municipal Ordinance No. 14, series of 1946, of Lucena, Quezon.

• Municipal Ordinance as Government-Promulgated Rule: Whether a municipal zoning ordinance enacted under the police power is a “government promulgated rule” within Section 1, clause (3) of Republic Act No. 530.
• Retroactive Application: Whether Section 1, clause (3) of Republic Act No. 530 applies where the violation of the municipal ordinance was committed before the enactment of the law.
• Mala Prohibita Offense: Whether a conviction for a malum prohibitum offense is covered by the phrase “convicted of any offense” in Section 1, clause (3) of Republic Act No. 530.
• Good Faith and Timing: Whether petitioner’s claim of good faith and the date of the offense prevent the denial of the certificate of naturalization.

• Municipal Ordinance as Government-Promulgated Rule: Yes. A municipal zoning ordinance enacted under the police power is a government-promulgated rule because the municipality acts as an agent of the national government in exercising governmental powers.
• Retroactive Application: Yes. Clause (3) applies because the law uses “convicted,” not “committed,” and Section 4 shows that Republic Act No. 530 was meant to operate retrospectively.
• Mala Prohibita Offense: Yes. “Any offense” includes mala prohibita; Republic Act No. 530 makes no distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita.
• Good Faith and Timing: No. Good faith was refuted by his plea of guilt and the allegation of deliberate intent, and the offense was continuous from April 30, 1950 to at least January 7, 1952, within the two-year period.

• Municipal Ordinance as Government-Promulgated Rule: The SC reasoned that municipal corporations perform dual functions: governmental and corporate. In the exercise of governmental powers and duties, municipal corporations are agencies of the national government; when engaged in corporate activities, they are on the same plane as private corporations. The ordinance violated by Tiu San was a zoning ordinance that sought to protect the people and their property and to promote their well-being. It was enacted in the exercise of the police power, which is essentially political and governmental in nature. It was therefore promulgated by the municipal government of Lucena acting as an agent of the national government. Hence, it partook of the nature of a “government promulgated rule,” although limited in application to the locality. The SC cited Vilas vs. City of Manila, Mendoza vs. De Leon, People vs. Cruz, and Seng Kee and Co. vs. Earnshaw.
• Retroactive Application: The SC held that the third clause applies whenever, within two years from the promulgation of the decision granting naturalization, the applicant is “convicted of any offense.” Its commission need not take place within that period. The word “convicted” has a well-settled meaning, clear and distinct from “committed.” Clause (4) uses “committed” for acts prejudicial to the national interest or contrary to Government announced policies, and the contrast leaves no doubt that the lawmaker intended the distinction. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 530 provides that the Act takes effect upon approval and applies to cases pending in court and to those where the applicant has not yet taken the oath of citizenship, with a proviso on publication. The SC concluded that, except as to the date of the hearing of the petition for naturalization, the Act was meant to have a retrospective operation. Thus, the clause governed Tiu San’s conviction even though the violation occurred before the enactment.
• Mala Prohibita Offense: The SC held that Republic Act No. 530 makes no distinction between acts mala in se and those which are mala prohibita. The expression “convicted of any offense” in clause (3) indicates clearly that both classes are included. The contention that the offense was malum prohibitum was therefore devoid of legal foundation.
• Good Faith and Timing: The SC held that Tiu San’s claim of good faith was refuted by his plea of guilt to the complaint. The complaint alleged that he had the deliberate intent of disobeying the permit given by the local authority for a temporary lumber establishment in the restricted area and the provisions of the municipal ordinance, and that he willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously failed to remove and transfer his lumber establishment within the time granted. The SC also found that the complaint charged the offense as committed “on or about the date comprising April 30, 1950, till the present time,” referring to July 6, 1950, the date of the complaint. Although the naturalization decision was promulgated on July 13, 1950, Exhibit 2, an order in the criminal case dated January 7, 1952, showed that as of that date the lumber yard was still in the prohibited zone. The offense was therefore committed continuously from April 30, 1950 up to at least January 7, 1952, or within two years after the rendition of the naturalization decision. The defense’s theory had no factual basis.

• Municipal corporations as agents of the national government — In exercising governmental powers and duties, municipal corporations are agencies of the national government; in corporate activities, they are on the same plane as private corporations. A zoning ordinance enacted under the police power is political and governmental in nature, so it partakes of a “government promulgated rule” although limited to the locality. The SC applied this to hold that Lucena’s Ordinance No. 14 fell under clause (3).
• “Convicted” versus “committed” — Clause (3) of Section 1, Republic Act No. 530 bars issuance when the applicant is “convicted” of any offense within two years from promulgation of the naturalization decision; the commission of the offense need not occur within that period. Clause (4) uses “committed” for acts prejudicial to the nation, and the contrast confirms the distinction. The SC applied this to Tiu San’s April 25, 1952 conviction.
• Retrospective operation of Republic Act No. 530 — Section 4 of Republic Act No. 530 provides that the Act takes effect upon approval and applies to cases pending in court and to applicants who have not yet taken the oath of citizenship, except as to the publication requirement. The SC held that, except for the date of the hearing, the Act was meant to have retrospective operation. It therefore governed the petition for issuance of the certificate.
• Mala in se and mala prohibita included — Republic Act No. 530 makes no distinction between acts mala in se and mala prohibita; the phrase “convicted of any offense” in clause (3) includes both classes. The SC applied this to the violation of the municipal ordinance.

• “The regulation violated by petitioner was a zoning ordinance, which seeks to protect the people and their property and to promote their well being. It was enacted in the exercise of the police power, which, essentially, is political and governmental in nature.” — The SC used this to characterize the municipal zoning ordinance as a governmental measure, supporting its holding that the ordinance was a “government promulgated rule.”
• “The word “convicted”, used in the law, has a well settled meaning, clear and distinct from that of “committed”.” — The SC drew this distinction to hold that clause (3) applies based on the date of conviction within the two-year period, not the date the offense was committed.
• “It is thus apparent that, except with reference to the date of the hearing of the petition for naturalization, said Act was meant to have a retrospective operation.” — The SC relied on this to apply Republic Act No. 530 to Tiu San’s case despite the earlier commission of the offense.
• “Republic Act No. 530 makes no distinction between acts mala in se, and those which are mala prohibita. What is more, the expression “convicted of any offense”, used in clause (3) of section 1, indicates clearly that both classes are included within the purview thereof.” — The SC used this to reject the argument that a malum prohibitum offense should not bar issuance of the certificate.

• Vilas vs. City of Manila, 42 Phil. 953, 220 U.S. 545 — Cited in support of the holding that municipal corporations exercising governmental powers act as agencies of the national government and that police power measures are governmental in nature.
• Mendoza vs. De Leon, 33 Phil. 508 — Cited with the other cases for the governmental character of municipal action under the police power.
• People vs. Cruz, 54 Phil. 24 — Cited with the other cases for the governmental character of municipal action under the police power.
• Seng Kee and Co. vs. Earnshaw, 56 Phil. 204 — Cited with the other cases for the governmental character of municipal action under the police power.

• Section 1, Republic Act No. 530 — Provides that no decision granting naturalization becomes executory until after two years from promulgation and after a hearing with the Solicitor General or his representative, the naturalization court must be satisfied that during the intervening time the applicant (1) has not left the Philippines, (2) has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession, (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of government-promulgated rules, and (4) has not committed any act prejudicial to the national interest or contrary to Government announced policies. The SC applied clause (3) to bar issuance because Tiu San was convicted of violating the Lucena zoning ordinance within the two-year period.
• Section 4, Republic Act No. 530 — Provides that the Act takes effect upon approval and applies to cases pending in court and to those where the applicant has not yet taken the oath of citizenship, with a proviso on publication. The SC relied on this to hold that Republic Act No. 530 operated retrospectively, except as to the date of the hearing.
• Municipal Ordinance No. 14, series of 1946, Municipality of Lucena — A zoning ordinance prohibiting lumber yards in a restricted zone; the violation was the basis of the conviction that the SC treated as a government-promulgated rule under clause (3).