Tirol vs. Tayengco-Lopingco

A court's reliance on inapplicable jurisprudence, contrary to controlling jurisprudence, constitutes grave abuse of discretion reviewable by certiorari; separate docket fees need not be paid for a motion to fix attorney's fees directed against an estate in a probate proceeding.

Petitioners Cesar T. Tirol and Arturo M. Alinio were lawyers of Tirol & Tirol Law Office, which represented the Heirs of Jose and Salvacion Tayengco in two special proceedings for the settlement of the spouses' estates: Special Proceeding No. 2186, the intestate estate of Salvacion Sydeco Tayengco, and Special Proceeding No. 2809, the petition to approve the will of Jose C. Tayengco. Elizabeth S. Tayengco acted as administratrix/executrix. The dispute concerns the payment of attorney's fees for legal services rendered in those probate proceedings and the procedural treatment of such a claim under the Rules of Court, particularly whether separate docket fees are required for a motion to fix attorney's fees directed against an estate.

Tirol & Tirol Law Office represented the Heirs of Jose and Salvacion Tayengco in two special proceedings before Branch 29, Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City: Special Proceeding No. 2186, "In Re: Intestate Estate of the Late Salvacion Sydeco Tayengco, Elizabeth S. Tayengco, Administratrix," and Special Proceeding No. 2809, "In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of the Deceased Jose C. Tayengco, Elizabeth S. Tayengco, Executrix." The Law Office alleged that it filed the petitions on November 11, 1969 and July 13, 1983, respectively. Elizabeth S. Tayengco served as administratrix/executrix of the estates.

On October 17, 1997, the Law Office withdrew as counsel because of conflict among the heirs; Atty. Cesar T. Tirol, a senior member of the Law Office, was the first cousin of the heirs, resulting in a conflict-in-interest situation. On April 30, 1999, the Law Office, through Atty. Arturo M. Alinio, filed a motion to fix attorney's fees and to direct the administratrix/executrix to pay them. The motion alleged that the project of partition disposing of the bulk of the estate properties had already been approved, the certificates of title had been transferred to the heirs, and the rest of the real properties had been sold by the administratrix/executrix.

The Law Office claimed that although it had no written contract on attorney's fees, it was entitled to fees on a quantum meruit basis. On March 30, 1998 and July 14, 1998, Atty. Alinio and Atty. Tirol sent a billing to Elizabeth for P13,463,500.00, equivalent to 7% of the fair market value of the estates. Elizabeth ignored the billing. The motion prayed that the RTC fix the attorney's fees and order the administratrix/executrix to pay; pending determination, it also prayed for payment of one-third of the bill, or P4,487,900.00.

Elizabeth and the other heirs opposed the motion on the ground that the fees demanded were unreasonable. Before the motion could be heard, Atty. Thomas S. Tayengco, one of the heirs, filed a Formal Entry of Appearance with Motions: To Set Aside Order to Hear Motion to Fix Attorney's Fees With Prayer to Deny/Dismiss the Same Instead and To Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum Addressed to Elizabeth S. Tayengco and Marilyn Tardagueda. Atty. Tayengco argued that the motion should be denied for nonpayment of docket fees and that the RTC could not validly act on it without jurisdiction.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioners averred that the RTC, relying on Lacson vs. Judge Reyes, erred in ordering them to pay docket fees; such error constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
• Violation of Jurisprudence: Petitioners asserted that the RTC Orders violate existing jurisprudence and are tantamount to overruling a judicial pronouncement of the Court, which in turn is grave abuse of discretion.
• Applicability of Pascual: Petitioners argued that the RTC should have applied Pascual vs. Court of Appeals, under which separate docket fees need not be paid for a motion to fix attorney's fees directed against an estate in a probate proceeding.
• Certiorari Proper: Petitioners maintained that the RTC issued the Orders without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and that certiorari was the proper remedy.

• No Grave Abuse: Yvonne Tayengco-Pacquing, Arthur S. Tayengco, and the Testate Estate of Louise Tayengco-Ponce countered that even if the RTC erred, the error was not an arbitrary, despotic, capricious, and whimsical exercise of judgment that is a ground for granting certiorari.
• Appeal as Proper Remedy: They contended that petitioners should have filed an ordinary appeal and not a petition for certiorari.
• Prescription: They submitted that petitioners' claim for attorney's fees had already prescribed under Section 2, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, which provides that claims against the estate shall not be filed more than 12 months after the date of first publication of the notice to creditors.
• Good Faith and Regularity: Gloria Tayengco-Lopingco, Francis S. Tayengco, Rose Marie S. Tayengco, and Anne Marie S. Tayengco echoed the foregoing arguments and insisted that petitioners had lost their right to avail themselves of the appropriate legal remedy of appeal; they emphasized that without alleging with particularity the facts of alleged arbitrariness, capriciousness, and whimsical conduct of the RTC Presiding Judge, all decisions, resolutions, or orders rendered in good faith and in a regular manner should be accorded respect.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the Orders of the RTC directing the payment of docket fees before it could take cognizance of petitioners' motion to fix their attorney's fees constitute grave abuse of discretion reviewable by a petition for certiorari before the CA.
• Availability of Appeal: Whether certiorari may be granted despite the availability of an appeal.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Yes. The RTC's reliance on Lacson despite controlling Pascual and Sheker was contrary to jurisprudence and constituted grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. Separate docket fees were not required for the motion because the claim was directed against the estates.
• Availability of Appeal: Yes. Certiorari may be granted even when appeal is available where the orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion, among other exceptions; the Court found this case covered by that exception.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The RTC relied on Lacson, where counsel for heirs filed a motion for attorney's fees in a probate proceeding and the Court required payment of docket fees because the motion was in the nature of an action by a lawyer against his client. The CA instead found Pascual applicable. In Pascual, the trial court awarded attorney's fees to counsel of the surviving spouse in a probate proceeding; the Court held Lacson inapplicable because the claim for attorney's fees was directed against the estate of the decedent, and separate docket fees were not necessary. The filing fees constitute a lien on the judgment under Section 2, Rule 141, or the court may order payment within a reasonable time; nonpayment is not a ground for dismissing a money claim against the estate. Sheker reiterated this. Thus, separate docket fees need not be paid by petitioners for their motion to fix attorney's fees. However, the only issue raised was whether the RTC's reliance on Lacson instead of Pascual constituted grave abuse. Under United Coconut Planters Bank vs. Looyuko, grave abuse means capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, arbitrary or despotic exercise by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform duty, or gross misapprehension of facts. Under Ocampo vs. Rear Admiral Enriquez, grave abuse exists when an act is done contrary to the Constitution, law, or jurisprudence, or executed whimsically, capriciously, or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will, or personal bias. The RTC adamantly relied on Lacson despite repeated submissions that Pascual should apply. That reliance was contrary to jurisprudence and therefore grave abuse of discretion. The CA thus committed grave abuse when it declared the error not correctible by certiorari.
• Availability of Appeal: Assuming respondents' argument that appeal was the proper remedy, the Court held that certiorari is still allowed even when appeal is available in several instances: (1) where appeal does not constitute a speedy and adequate remedy; (2) where the orders were issued either in excess of or without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; (3) for special considerations such as public welfare or public policy; (4) in criminal actions where the court rejects rebuttal evidence for the prosecution because acquittal would leave no remedy; (5) where the order is a patent nullity; and (6) where the decision in the certiorari case will avoid future litigations. This case fell under the exception because the RTC orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion. The Court also noted that the billing covered legal services rendered beginning 1969, spanning decades, and that petitioners should not be denied an opportunity to present their claim on a technicality.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; the abuse must be grave, as where power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law. It also exists when an act is done contrary to the Constitution, the law, or jurisprudence, or executed whimsically, capriciously, or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will, or personal bias. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the RTC's reliance on Lacson despite controlling Pascual and Sheker was an act contrary to jurisprudence amounting to grave abuse of discretion.
• Docket Fees for Attorney's Fees Against an Estate in Probate Proceedings — Separate docket fees need not be paid where a claim for attorney's fees is directed against the estate of the decedent in a probate proceeding; the filing fees constitute a lien on the judgment under Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order payment within a reasonable time. Nonpayment of filing fees for a money claim against the estate is not a ground for dismissing the claim. Lacson applies only where the lawyer's motion for attorney's fees is in the nature of an action commenced by a lawyer against his client. The Court applied this doctrine because petitioners' motion was directed against the estates, not merely against their client.
• Certiorari Despite Availability of Appeal — A writ of certiorari may be allowed even when an appeal is available: (1) where appeal does not constitute a speedy and adequate remedy; (2) where the orders were issued either in excess of or without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; (3) for special considerations such as public welfare or public policy; (4) in criminal actions where the court rejects rebuttal evidence for the prosecution because acquittal would leave no remedy; (5) where the order is a patent nullity; and (6) where the decision in the certiorari case will avoid future litigations. The Court applied the second exception because the RTC orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion.

• "By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law." — This passage states the canonical definition of grave abuse of discretion as a ground for certiorari, which the Court used to frame the central issue.
• "there is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias." — This formulation from Ocampo vs. Rear Admiral Enriquez supplied the decisive test: the RTC's reliance on Lacson despite controlling Pascual was an act contrary to jurisprudence.
• "Following the ruling of the Court in the case of Pascual, as reiterated in Sheker, it is clear that separate docket fees need not be paid by petitioners for their motion to fix the amount of attorney's fees." — This passage states the controlling rule on docket fees for a motion to fix attorney's fees directed against an estate in a probate proceeding.
• "In conclusion, the Court holds that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it declared that the error on the part of the RTC cannot be corrected by way of a petition for certiorari. As earlier stated, an act done contrary to jurisprudence constitutes grave abuse of discretion that warrants the grant of the extraordinary writ of certiorari." — This passage is the ratio decidendi: the CA erred in denying certiorari because the RTC's contrary-to-jurisprudence act was grave abuse of discretion.

• Lacson vs. Judge Reyes, 261 Phil. 876 (1990) — Relied upon by the RTC; held that docket fees should be paid for a motion for attorney's fees in a probate proceeding because the motion was in the nature of an action by a lawyer against his client. The Court found it inapplicable because petitioners' claim was directed against the estates.
• Pascual vs. Court of Appeals, 360 Phil. 403 (1998) — Controlling precedent; held that separate docket fees are not necessary where a claim for attorney's fees is directed against the estate of the decedent in a probate proceeding, and that filing fees constitute a lien on the judgment. The Court followed this ruling.
• Sheker vs. Estate of Alice O. Sheker, 564 Phil. 684-695 (2007) — Reiterated Pascual; held that nonpayment of filing fees for a money claim against an estate is not a ground for dismissing the claim. The Court followed this ruling.
• United Coconut Planters Bank vs. Looyuko, 560 Phil. 581 (2007) — Cited for the definition of grave abuse of discretion as capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
• Ocampo vs. Rear Admiral Enriquez, 798 Phil. 227 (2016) — Applied for the rule that grave abuse of discretion exists when an act is done contrary to the Constitution, law, or jurisprudence, or executed whimsically, capriciously, or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will, or personal bias.
• Arceta vs. Mangrobang, 176 Phil. 106 (2004) — Cited for the rule that the only issue in a special civil action for certiorari is whether the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
• Republic vs. Coalbrine International Philippines, Inc., 631 Phil. 487 (2010) — Cited for the exceptions allowing certiorari even when an appeal is available.

• Section 2, Rule 86, Rules of Court — Respondents invoked this provision to argue that petitioners' claim for attorney's fees had prescribed because claims against the estate shall not be filed more than 12 months after the date of first publication of the notice to creditors. The Court did not resolve this contention in its disposition.
• Section 2, Rule 141, Rules of Court — Cited in the Pascual and Sheker discussion; provides that additional filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment. Applied to support the rule that nonpayment of separate docket fees for a money claim against an estate is not a ground for dismissal.
• Rule 65, Rules of Court — Governs the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners before the CA; the Court held that grave abuse of discretion is a ground for the writ.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Governs the petition for review on certiorari filed before the Supreme Court.

Gesmundo, C.J. (Chairperson), Caguioa, Gaerlan, and Dimaampao, JJ., concur.