Tiongco vs. Aguilar

A lawyer who employs intemperate, scurrilous, and manifestly baseless language against courts and judicial officers, and who falsely insinuates that the Supreme Court did not read a petition, is liable for violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, notwithstanding the lawyer's assertion that such characterizations are truthful; the right to criticize courts, while guaranteed, must be exercised in bona fide manner and must not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.

Atty. Jose B. Tiongco served as counsel for his wife Leticia and himself in a case for recovery of possession and damages before the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 35, presided by Judge Severiano C. Aguilar. The Tiongco spouses were the prevailing party in the RTC decision but nonetheless filed a petition before the Supreme Court assailing the respondent judge's decision and subsequent order. The petition was dismissed for failure to sufficiently show grave abuse of discretion. Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Lawyer's Oath, Section 20(b) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and the First Canon of the Canons of Professional Ethics collectively impose upon lawyers the duty to observe and maintain respect due to the courts and judicial officers.

Atty. Jose B. Tiongco represented himself and his wife, Leticia M. Tiongco, as petitioners in a case for recovery of possession and damages before the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 35, presided by Judge Severiano C. Aguilar. The Tiongco spouses were the prevailing party in the RTC decision but were dissatisfied with certain aspects of the ruling, particularly what they perceived as a scheme to deprive them of possession and fruits of their property during the period of appeal. Rather than appealing the decision, they filed a petition before the Supreme Court assailing the respondent judge's ruling and his Order of May 30, 1994.

In the petition, Atty. Tiongco employed highly intemperate language, characterizing the respondent judge's decision as "crafted in order to fool the winning party," a "hypocritical judgment in plaintiffs' favor," one where "you could have sworn it was the Devil who dictated it," and one of "perfidious character." He charged the judge with being "a bit confused" and attributed this confusion to the judge's upbringing "amongst the crowded surroundings of the non-propertied class," noting that the judge had not owned any real property until March 5, 1974. He further accused the judge of having "joined the defendants and their counsel in a scheme to unlawfully deprive petitioners of the possession and fruits of their property for the duration of appeal." With respect to the Order of May 30, 1994, he described the judge as a "liar," "perjurer," or "blasphemer." He also insinuated that the Supreme Court had not read the petition before dismissing it, stating that it was "hard to imagine that this Honorable Court had read the petition and the annexes attached thereto."

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for failure to sufficiently show that the respondent court had committed grave abuse of discretion. On September 26, 1994, the Court issued a resolution requiring Atty. Tiongco to show cause why he should not be dealt with administratively for violation of Canon 11, citing both the unfounded insinuation that the Court did not read the petition and the enumerated intemperate words and phrases used against the respondent judge.

In his Compliance dated October 11, 1994, Atty. Tiongco did not show cause but instead justified his statements, alleging that if he called anyone a "liar," "thief," "perfidious," or "blasphemer," it was because the person was in fact such. He volunteered that he had also called the judge a "robber," "rotten manipulator," and "abettor" of graft and shady deals — words not enumerated in the show-cause resolution — and characterized the Code of Professional Responsibility as "lousy" for punishing lawyers who truthfully expose incompetent and corrupt judges. He prayed that the Court "forebear from turning the undersigned into a martyr to his principles" and concluded with "RESPECTFUL APOLOGIES — AND UNDYING LOVE (Constitution, Preamble, 66 word)." The Court found the Compliance unsatisfactory and entirely unacceptable, noting that Atty. Tiongco impliedly admitted the falsity of his insinuation that the Court did not read the petition, failed to address the other intemperate words enumerated in the resolution, did not indicate the circumstances supporting his defense of truth, and failed to show the relevance of the harsh words to his petition.

• Truth as Defense: Atty. Tiongco maintained that his characterizations of the respondent judge were truthful, arguing that if he called anyone a "liar," "thief," "perfidious," or "blasphemer," it was because the person was in fact such, and that he also called the judge a "robber," "rotten manipulator," and "abettor" of graft and shady deals.
• Invalidity of Canon 11 as Applied: He argued that the Code of Professional Responsibility was "lousy" and stood in dire need of amendment insofar as it punished lawyers who truthfully expose incompetent and corrupt judges before the Supreme Court.
• Martyrdom Claim: He prayed that the Court forebear from turning him into a martyr to his principles, implying that the administrative proceeding was an unjust persecution for his candor.

• Administrative Liability: Whether Atty. Tiongco violated Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by falsely insinuating that the Supreme Court did not read the petition and by using intemperate and scurrilous language against the respondent judge.
• Truth as Defense: Whether the defense of truth justifies the use of intemperate and scurrilous language against courts and judicial officers in pleadings.

• Administrative Liability: Yes. Atty. Tiongco was found guilty of gross violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for his false and malicious insinuation against the Court and his scurrilous characterizations of the respondent judge, which were uncalled for, entirely irrelevant to the petition, and glaringly false.
• Truth as Defense: No. The defense of truth was rejected because Atty. Tiongco failed to indicate the circumstances upon which it rested, failed to show the relevance of the harsh words to his petition, and impliedly admitted the falsity of his insinuation that the Court did not read the petition.

• Administrative Liability: The Court found that Atty. Tiongco's false and malicious insinuation that the Court did not read the petition exhibited gross disrespect and contempt for the Court, charged its members with violation of their solemn duty to render justice, and promoted distrust in judicial administration, which could encourage discontent and undermine the foundation of judicial power. His intemperate and scurrilous words against the respondent judge were obviously uncalled for and entirely irrelevant to the petition, and their glaring falsity was demonstrated by the fact that the respondent judge's decision was actually in favor of Atty. Tiongco and his wife, and by the dismissal of the petition for failure to show grave abuse of discretion. The Court emphasized that the duty to observe respect due to the courts is closely entwined with the lawyer's oath, Section 20(b) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and the First Canon of the Canons of Professional Ethics. While a lawyer has the right — and even the duty — to criticize courts as a citizen and officer of the court, such criticism must be bona fide and must not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Atty. Tiongco's conduct could only come from anger or hate after not getting what he wanted, and when coupled with haughtiness in volunteering additional intemperate words and seething sarcasm in his prayer and closing, nothing could extenuate his liability.

• Truth as Defense: The Court rejected Atty. Tiongco's defense of truth for four reasons: first, he impliedly admitted the falsity of his insinuation that the Court did not read the petition; second, except as to the words "liar," "thief," "perfidious," and "blasphemer," he failed to address the other intemperate words and phrases enumerated in the resolution, which failure amounted to an admission of their intemperateness; third, he did not indicate the circumstances upon which his defense of truth rests; and fourth, he failed to show the relevance of the harsh words and phrases to his petition. The Court further noted that the right to criticize, guaranteed by freedom of speech and expression, must be exercised responsibly, as freedom is not freedom from responsibility but freedom with responsibility. The use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration, or tends to undermine confidence in the integrity of the members of the Court is proscribed.

• Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. This duty is closely entwined with the lawyer's oath to conduct himself with all good fidelity to the courts, with Section 20(b) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and with the First Canon of the Canons of Professional Ethics. The Court applied this canon to hold Atty. Tiongco liable for his intemperate language and false insinuations, fining him P5,000 and warning him against future similar acts.

• Right to Criticize vs. Duty of Respect — A lawyer has the right, and even the duty, to criticize courts and judges as a citizen and officer of the court. However, such criticism must be bona fide and must not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts and subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. The Court applied this principle by finding that Atty. Tiongco's language exceeded the bounds of bona fide criticism, as his words were uncalled for, irrelevant to the petition, and glaringly false.

• Freedom of Expression and the Administration of Justice — The right to criticize, guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of expression in the Bill of Rights, must be exercised responsibly, for every right carries with it a corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. The use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration, or tends necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the integrity of the members of the Court and to degrade the administration of justice is proscribed. The Court relied on this principle to reject the contention that truthful exposure of corrupt judges should be exempt from disciplinary action.

• "But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action." — Quoted from In Re: Almacen, this passage defines the boundary between protected criticism and intemperate language warranting disciplinary action, and constitutes the controlling formulation applied to Atty. Tiongco's conduct.

• "Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility." — This formulation, drawn from Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, articulates the principle that the constitutional right to criticize courts carries a corresponding obligation to maintain the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice.

• "Anger or hate could only come from one who 'seems to be of that frame of mind whereby he considers as in accordance with law and justice whatever he believes to be right in his own opinion and as contrary to law and justice whatever does not accord with his views.'" — Quoted from Montecillo vs. Gica, this passage characterizes the psychological posture underlying Atty. Tiongco's intemperate conduct and explains why his compliance aggravated rather than mitigated his liability.

• Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441 (1967) — Followed for the principle that a lawyer's duty to the court can only be maintained by rendering no service involving disrespect to the judicial office, and that the use of unnecessary language jeopardizing high esteem in courts is proscribed.

• In Re: Almacen, 31 SCRA 562 (1970) — Controlling authority cited for the principle that while lawyers have the right and duty to criticize courts, such criticism must be bona fide and must not spill over the walls of decency and propriety; intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect subjecting a lawyer to disciplinary action.

• Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, 166 SCRA 316 (1988) — Followed for the principle that freedom of expression must be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of maintaining the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice, and that freedom is not freedom from responsibility but freedom with responsibility.

• Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1 (1970) — Followed for the principle that a lawyer as an officer of the court is an instrument to advance the ends of justice and must uphold the dignity and authority of the courts, not promote distrust in the administration of justice.

• Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724 (1953) — Cited for the principle that creating distrust in judicial administration encourages discontent, which is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation of judicial power.

• Canon 11, Code of Professional Responsibility — "A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others." Applied as the direct basis for finding Atty. Tiongco administratively liable and imposing the fine of P5,000.

• Section 20(b), Rule 138, Rules of Court — Requires lawyers to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers." Cited as a provision closely entwined with Canon 11, reinforcing the duty of respect owed by lawyers to the courts.

• First Canon, Canons of Professional Ethics — Requires lawyers to "maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." Cited as a corollary duty reinforcing Canon 11 and the lawyer's oath.

• Lawyer's Oath — Binds the lawyer to "conduct himself as a lawyer with all good fidelity to the courts." Cited as the foundational duty entwined with Canon 11, underscoring that respect for the courts is a solemn obligation assumed upon admission to the bar.

Padilla, Quiason, and Kapunan, JJ., concurred.