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Ting vs. Heirs of Diego Lirio

The petition for review on certiorari was denied, and the dismissal of Rolando Ting's application for registration of Lot No. 18281 was affirmed on the ground of res judicata. The lot had already been adjudicated to the Spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza in LRC No. N-983 by a decision that became final and executory on January 29, 1977, and Ting's 1997 application for registration of the same lot was barred by that prior judgment. Ting's theory that the 1976 decision had become "extinct" because no decree of registration was issued and no action for revival was brought within the ten-year prescriptive period was rejected, Section 6, Rule 39 being inapplicable to land registration proceedings, which are special proceedings in rem. Because the judgment confirming title binds the whole world once final, no further proceeding to enforce the adjudicated ownership is necessary.

Primary Holding

A final judgment in a land registration proceeding constitutes res judicata against the whole world and is not subject to the periods for execution under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which governs ordinary civil actions and not special proceedings such as land registration. Once ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce that ownership is necessary, except where the adverse or losing party is in possession and the winning party seeks to oust him.

Background

The dispute concerns Lot No. 18281 of the Cebu Cadastral 12 Extension, covered by Plan Rs-07-000787, and the competing claims of Rolando Ting and the heirs of Diego Lirio. The respondents are the heirs of Diego Lirio, namely Flora A. Lirio, Amelia L. Roska, Aurora L. Abejo, Alicia L. Dunque, Adelaida L. David, Efren A. Lirio, and Jocelyn Anabelle L. Alcover, whose predecessors-in-interest, the Spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza, had obtained a registration decree over the lot. Land registration in the Philippines is governed by Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Property Registration Decree, under which a judgment in a land registration proceeding becomes final upon the expiration of thirty days from receipt of notice and the court is thereafter duty-bound to order the issuance of the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title.

History

1976 – 1997
  1. Dec 10, 1976

    CFI of Cebu, Branch 7

    Granted the application of the Spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza for registration of title to Lot No. 18281 in LRC No. N-983, then presided over by Judge Alfredo Marigomen.

  2. Dec 10, 1976

    Respondents, the heirs of Diego Lirio, were afforded the opportunity to oppose by Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC and filed an Answer invoking res judicata on the strength of the December 10, 1976 decision in LRC No. N-983.

  3. 50 days later
  4. Jan 29, 1977

    The decision in LRC No. N-983 became final and executory.

  5. 5 yrs 9 mos later
  6. Nov 10, 1982

    Judge Marigomen issued an order directing the Land Registration Commission to issue the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title in favor of the Spouses Lirio.

  7. 14 yrs 3 mos later
  8. Feb 12, 1997

    Rolando Ting filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu an application for registration of title to the same lot, docketed as LRC No. 1437-N.

  9. Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, on motion of respondents, dismissed petitioner's application on the ground of res judicata.

  10. Petition for review on certiorari filed with the Supreme Court, raising the sole issue of whether the decision in LRC No. N-983 constitutes res judicata in LRC No. 1437-N.

Facts

On December 10, 1976, in Land Registration Case No. N-983, Judge Alfredo Marigomen of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 7, granted the application filed by the Spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza for registration of title to Lot No. 18281 of the Cebu Cadastral 12 Extension, Plan Rs-07-000787. The decision became final and executory on January 29, 1977, no appeal having been taken within the reglementary period. Thereafter, on November 10, 1982, Judge Marigomen issued an order directing the Land Registration Commission to issue the corresponding decree of registration and the certificate of title in favor of the Spouses Lirio.

More than fifteen years after the registration decision attained finality, or on February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu an application for registration of title to the same Lot No. 18281, docketed as LRC No. 1437-N. Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC afforded the heirs of Diego Lirio — Flora A. Lirio, Amelia L. Roska, Aurora L. Abejo, Alicia L. Dunque, Adelaida L. David, Efren A. Lirio, and Jocelyn Anabelle L. Alcover — the opportunity to file an opposition. In their Answer, the heirs called attention to the December 10, 1976 decision in LRC No. N-983, which had become final and executory on January 29, 1977, and argued that it barred Ting's application on the ground of res judicata.

Ting maintained that the prior decision had become "extinct." He asserted that although the decision in LRC No. N-983 had long become final, no decree of registration had been issued by the Land Registration Authority; that it was only on July 26, 2003 that the "extinct" decision belatedly surfaced as the basis of respondents' motion to dismiss LRC No. 1437-N; and that because no action for revival of the judgment had been filed after the lapse of the ten-year prescriptive period, the cause of action in the dormant judgment had passed into extinction. He further claimed that a certain Engr. Rafaela Belleza, Chief of the Survey Assistance Section, Land Management Services, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region 7, Cebu City, had taken the position that the survey of the Cebu Cadastral Extension was erroneous and that any resurvey within it required prior approval by the Land Management Services of the DENR before it could be used in court, a requirement the Spouses Lirio allegedly failed to comply with when they submitted only a special work order.

After hearing both sides, Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, on motion of the respondents, dismissed Ting's application on the ground of res judicata. The trial court thus treated the final and executory decision in LRC No. N-983 as conclusive upon the same lot and as barring the subsequent application for its registration.

Arguments of the Petitioners

  • Extinction of the Judgment: Petitioner argued that although the decision in LRC No. N-983 had become final and executory on January 29, 1977, no decree of registration had been issued by the Land Registration Authority; that the "extinct" decision belatedly surfaced only on July 26, 2003 as the basis of respondents' motion to dismiss LRC No. 1437-N; and that, no action for revival having been filed after the lapse of the ten-year prescriptive period, the cause of action in the dormant judgment had passed into extinction, such that an "extinct" judgment cannot be the basis of res judicata.
  • Inapplicability of Res Judicata: Petitioner concluded that the December 10, 1976 decision, having become "extinct," could not serve as the basis for barring his 1997 application for registration of the same lot.
  • Erroneous Survey and Non-Compliance with DENR Requirement: Petitioner advanced that the LRA had not issued the decree of registration because Engr. Rafaela Belleza, Chief of the Survey Assistance Section, Land Management Services, DENR, Region 7, Cebu City, had claimed that the survey of the Cebu Cadastral Extension was erroneous and that all resurveys within the Cebu Cadastral Extension must first be approved by the Land Management Services of the DENR, Region 7, Cebu City before being used in court; and that the Spouses Lirio did not comply with this requirement, submitting instead a mere special work order.
  • Ministerial Duty of Land Registration Officials: Petitioner insisted that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the decree is purely ministerial, in the sense that they act under the orders of the court, the decree must conform to the court's decision and to the data in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter.

Arguments of the Respondents

  • Res Judicata: Respondent heirs of Diego Lirio, in their Answer, called attention to the December 10, 1976 decision in LRC No. N-983, which had become final and executory on January 29, 1977, and argued that it barred the filing of petitioner's application on the ground of res judicata.

Issues

  • Res Judicata: Whether the decision in LRC No. N-983 constitutes res judicata in LRC No. 1437-N.

Ruling

  • Res Judicata: Yes. The final and executory decision in LRC No. N-983 operates as res judicata against the whole world, the land registration proceeding being in rem, and bars petitioner's subsequent application for registration of the same lot.

Ruling Rationale

  • Res Judicata: Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides that a judgment rendered in a land registration proceeding becomes final upon the expiration of thirty days counted from the date of receipt of notice of the judgment, and that after judgment has become final and executory, it devolves upon the court to forthwith issue an order in accordance with Section 39 of the Decree to the Commissioner for the issuance of the decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title in favor of the person adjudged entitled to registration. In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land, with or without opposition, the judgment of the court confirming the title of the applicant or oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its registration in his name constitutes, when final, res judicata against the whole world; it becomes final when no appeal within the reglementary period is taken from a judgment of confirmation and registration. The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration court's approval in LRC No. N-983 of the Spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza's application for registration of the lot settled its ownership and is binding on the whole world, including petitioner. Petitioner's contention that the December 10, 1976 decision had become "extinct" because the LRA had not issued the decree of registration fails, there being no showing that the LRA credited the alleged claim of Engineer Belleza and that it reported such claim to the land registration court for appropriate action or reconsideration of the decision, which was its duty. While the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the decree is ministerial — in the sense that they act under the orders of the court, the decree must conform to the decision and to the data in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter — if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court; they act in this respect as officials of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. As for petitioner's reliance on Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which allows execution by motion within five years from entry of judgment and by action thereafter before the judgment is barred by the statute of limitations, the argument that the 1976 decision became "extinct" for failure to execute within the prescriptive period does not lie. Sta. Ana vs. Menla, et al. enunciates the raison d'être why Section 6, Rule 39 does not apply in land registration proceedings: the provision refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings such as a land registration case, because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment secured against the adverse party, and failure to act within a reasonable time renders the decision unenforceable against the losing party, whereas in special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact, and in land registration proceedings the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom. There is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Section 6, Rule 39 regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession; the decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further action upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.

Doctrines

  • Res Judicata in Land Registration Proceedings — A judgment of the court in a land registration proceeding confirming the title of the applicant or oppositor and ordering its registration in his name constitutes, when final, res judicata against the whole world. It becomes final upon the expiration of the reglementary period for appeal, counted from receipt of notice of the judgment, when no appeal is taken. Because land registration proceedings are in rem, the court's approval of an application for registration settles ownership of the lot and binds the whole world, including persons who subsequently file their own applications over the same land. In this case, the final and executory decision in LRC No. N-983 settled the ownership of Lot No. 18281 in favor of the Spouses Lirio and barred petitioner Ting's 1997 application for registration of the same lot.
  • Inapplicability of Section 6, Rule 39 to Special Proceedings — The rule allowing execution of a final and executory judgment by motion within five years from entry, and by independent action thereafter before the judgment is barred by the statute of limitations, refers to ordinary civil actions and does not apply to special proceedings such as a land registration case. In civil actions, the winning party must promptly enforce the judgment against the adverse party, and failure to do so within the periods fixed by the Rules renders the decision unenforceable; in special proceedings, the purpose is to establish a status, condition, or fact. In land registration, ownership of a parcel of land is sought to be established, and once ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce that ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party is in possession and the winning party desires to oust him. Accordingly, the failure to secure the issuance of the decree of registration or to revive the judgment within ten years did not render the 1976 decision "extinct" or incapable of supporting res judicata.
  • Ministerial Duty of Land Registration Officials and Duty to Refer Doubts to the Court — The duty of land registration officials to issue the decree of registration is ministerial: they act under the orders of the court, the decree must conform to the court's decision and to the data found in the record, and they exercise no discretion in the matter. If, however, they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. In so acting, they act as officials of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court; they are specifically called upon to extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings. Because there was no showing that the LRA credited the claim of an erroneous cadastral survey or reported it to the land registration court, the alleged non-issuance of the decree did not affect the finality or conclusiveness of the registration decision.

Key Excerpts

  • "In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land, with or without opposition, the judgment of the court confirming the title of the applicant or oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its registration in his name constitutes, when final, res judicata against the whole world." — This is the ratio decidendi of the decision; it supplies the canonical formulation of the res judicata effect of a final land registration judgment and is the rule on which the denial of the petition rests.
  • "The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration court's approval in LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza's application for registration of the lot settled its ownership, and is binding on the whole world including petitioner." — This passage applies the in rem character of land registration to the specific facts, explaining why petitioner Ting, though not a party to LRC No. N-983, was nevertheless bound by the judgment rendered therein.
  • "This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case." — Quoted from Sta. Ana vs. Menla, et al. and adopted by the Court, this passage is the controlling statement on why Section 6, Rule 39 cannot be invoked to render a final land registration judgment "extinct" for non-execution within the prescriptive period.
  • "After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom." — This passage explains the rationale for exempting land registration judgments from the execution periods of the Rules of Court and delimits the sole situation in which further proceedings to enforce the adjudicated ownership are required.

Precedents Cited

  • Sta. Ana vs. Menla, et al., 111 Phil. 947, 951 (1961) — The principal controlling precedent relied upon by the Court; it enunciates the raison d'être for the rule that Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court does not apply to land registration proceedings, and its reasoning is quoted at length in the decision.
  • Cacho vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123361, March 3, 1997, 269 SCRA 159, 170-171 — Cited in support of Sta. Ana vs. Menla, et al. on the inapplicability of the execution periods under the Rules of Court to land registration proceedings.
  • Gomez vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-77770, December 15, 1988, 168 SCRA 503, 510 — Cited for the rule that land registration officials act as officials of the court in issuing the decree of registration, that their duty is ministerial, and that they must refer any doubt to the court.
  • Ramos vs. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 94033, May 29, 1995, 244 SCRA 418 — Cited, together with Gomez vs. Court of Appeals and Section 6(2)(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, in support of the ministerial character of the land registration officials' duty and their obligation to extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings.

Provisions

  • Section 30, Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) — Provides that a judgment rendered in a land registration proceeding becomes final upon the expiration of thirty days counted from the date of receipt of notice of the judgment, and that after judgment has become final and executory, it devolves upon the court to forthwith issue an order in accordance with Section 39 of the Decree to the Commissioner for the issuance of the decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title in favor of the person adjudged entitled to registration. The Court applied this provision to establish that the December 10, 1976 decision in LRC No. N-983 became final and executory on January 29, 1977, and that the court was thereafter duty-bound to order the issuance of the decree and certificate of title.
  • Section 6, Rule 39, Rules of Court — Provides that a final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five years from the date of its entry and, after the lapse of such time and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, by independent action, with the revived judgment likewise enforceable by motion within five years from entry and thereafter by action. The Court held this provision inapplicable to land registration proceedings, which are special proceedings, and rejected petitioner's argument that the 1976 decision had become "extinct" for failure to execute it within the prescriptive period.
  • Section 39, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) — Cited in the decision's footnote as fixing the period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court at fifteen days counted from notice, with a special forty-eight-hour period in habeas corpus cases. This provision supplies the reckoning period referred to in Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 for the finality of a land registration judgment.
  • Section 6(2)(b), Presidential Decree No. 1529 — Cited in the decision's footnote, together with Gomez vs. Court of Appeals and Ramos vs. Rodriguez, in support of the rule that land registration officials act as officials of the court and are called upon to extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings.
  • Article VIII, Section 13, 1987 Constitution — Invoked in the Certification accompanying the decision, certifying that the conclusions in the Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

Notable Concurring Opinions

  • Leonardo A. Quisumbing (Associate Justice, Chairperson)
  • Antonio T. Carpio (Associate Justice)
  • Dante O. Tinga (Associate Justice)
  • Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Associate Justice)