The United States vs. Vicente Mendoza

An accessory after the fact cannot be convicted where the alleged principal has been acquitted or where no crime is proven, because the accessory's liability is subordinate to and dependent on that of the principal.

Vicente Mendoza was the lieutenant of the barrio of Apulid, Paniqui, Tarlac. Mateo del Rosario owned the house in that barrio that was damaged by fire, and Bernabe Mangunay was the person he accused of causing it. The Penal Code provisions invoked in the case included those on concealment of crime and accessory after the fact, and article 355 on prevaricacion for neglect of official duty.

At about 8:00 p.m. on August 1, 1910, Bernabe Mangunay, mounted on a carabao, approached the house of Mateo del Rosario in the barrio of Apulid, pueblo of Paniqui, Tarlac, to ask for something to eat. Mangunay was carrying a papaya firebrand and came too close to the house; the eaves caught fire and the nipa roof immediately began to burn, consuming a large part of it. Silveria Marcoleta, wife of the owner, called for help and immediately left the house with her two children and little brother. Mateo del Rosario and several neighbors arrived promptly and put out the fire before it burned the whole house.

The following day, Mateo del Rosario reported the occurrence to Vicente Mendoza, lieutenant of the barrio, and accused Bernabe Mangunay of starting the fire. Mendoza ordered the junior lieutenant, Candido Yabut, to summon the accused. When Mangunay appeared, Mendoza took no action, did not report the facts to higher authority, and allowed the alleged incendiary to return home.

After preliminary investigations by the justice of the peace of Paniqui, the provincial fiscal filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac on September 5, 1910, charging Mendoza as an accessory after the fact in the crime of arson. After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment on May 22, 1911, convicting Mendoza and sentencing him to two years four months and one day of presidio correccional, with allowance of one-half of the time of his detention, and to payment of the costs. Mendoza appealed.

In a separate case, Case No. 544, Bernabe Mangunay was prosecuted in the same Court of First Instance of Tarlac for the arson and was acquitted for lack of evidence. The record contained indications that the fire was accidental.

• Accessory Liability After Acquittal of Principal: Whether Vicente Mendoza may be convicted as an accessory after the fact to arson notwithstanding the acquittal of Bernabe Mangunay, the alleged principal, for lack of evidence.

• Accessory Liability After Acquittal of Principal: No. The conviction was reversed and Mendoza acquitted because the alleged principal, Bernabe Mangunay, had been acquitted for lack of evidence; the liability of an accessory after the fact is subordinate to that of the principal and cannot stand where no crime or guilty principal is established.

• Accessory Liability After Acquittal of Principal: The Court began by noting that if Mendoza incurred responsibility for neglect of official duty, the proper charge would have been prevaricacion under article 355 of the Penal Code for maliciously failing to move the prosecution and punishment of the delinquent. The information, however, charged concealment of crime as an accessory after the fact. The Court then addressed whether the complaint could be maintained despite the acquittal of Bernabe Mangunay in Case No. 544 for lack of evidence. The responsibility of an accessory after the fact is subordinate to that of the principal because the accessory's participation is subsequent to the commission of the crime and is directly related to the principal delinquent. If the facts alleged are not proven, or do not constitute a crime, there is no legal ground to convict a defendant as an accessory after the fact of a crime not perpetrated or of parties not guilty, citing United States vs. Abison, 3 Phil. Rep., 191. In this case, there were indications that the fire was accidental; if so, Mangunay's acquittal may have been due to lack of proof of guilt as an incendiary and because the acts charged did not constitute a crime. Because the alleged incendiary was acquitted, it was neither proper nor possible to convict Mendoza as an accessory after the fact. The judgment was reversed and Mendoza acquitted, with costs de oficio.

• Accessory after the fact — subordination to principal — An accessory after the fact is one who participates in a crime subsequent to its commission, and whose guilt is directly related to the principal delinquent. The accessory's liability is subordinate to that of the principal; if the facts alleged are not proven or do not constitute a crime, there is no legal ground to convict an accessory after the fact of a crime not perpetrated or of parties not guilty. The Court applied this doctrine by reversing Mendoza's conviction because Bernabe Mangunay, the alleged principal, had been acquitted for lack of evidence.
• Prevaricacion for neglect of official duty — Under article 355 of the Penal Code, a public officer who maliciously fails to move the prosecution and punishment of a delinquent may be charged with prevaricacion for neglect of the duties of his office. The Court noted that if Mendoza incurred responsibility for his conduct, this was the proper charge, but the information against him was for concealment of crime as an accessory after the fact.

• "The responsibility of the accessory after the fact is subordinate to that of the principal in a crime, because the accessory's participation therein is subsequent to its commission, and his guilt is very directly related to the principal delinquent in the punishable act; for if the facts alleged are not proven in the prosecution instituted, or do not constitute a crime, no legal grounds exists for convicting a defendant as an accessory after the fact of a crime not perpetrated or of parties not guilty." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the derivative liability of an accessory after the fact cannot exist without a proven crime and a guilty principal.
• "Had the accused barrio-lieutenant incurred responsibility by his conduct, he should have been charged with the crime of 'prevaricacion' under article 355 of the Penal Code, for neglect of the duties of his office maliciously failing to move the prosecution and punishment of the delinquent." — This passage identifies the proper charge for a public officer's malicious failure to prosecute an alleged offender, distinguishing it from the concealment-of-crime charge actually filed.
• "Therefore, upon this hypothesis, and because the alleged incendiary was acquitted, it is neither proper nor possible to convict the defendant, Mendoza, as accessory after the fact, of Bernabe Mangunay, who was acquitted of the said crime of arson." — This passage applies the subordinate-liability rule to the facts and explains why Mendoza's conviction could not stand.
• "For the foregoing reasons, with reversal of the judgment appealed from, it is proper to acquit, as we do hereby, Vicente Mendoza, the lieutenant of the barrio of Apulid, Paniqui, with the costs of both instances de oficio." — This is the dispositive portion, recording the reversal and acquittal.

• United States vs. Abison, 3 Phil. Rep., 191 — Cited by the Court for the rule that the responsibility of an accessory after the fact is subordinate to that of the principal and that no conviction can stand where the facts alleged are not proven or do not constitute a crime, or where the parties are not guilty.

• Article 355, Penal Code — Cited as the provision under which a barrio lieutenant who maliciously fails to move the prosecution and punishment of a delinquent should be charged for neglect of official duty. The Court noted that Mendoza's alleged conduct, if culpable, fell under this provision rather than the concealment-of-crime charge actually filed.

Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson, Carson, and Trent, JJ., concurred.