The United States vs. Eustasio Hernandez, et al.

Consent of the injured spouse to the commission of adultery is not a valid defense to a criminal prosecution for that offense, because Act No. 1773 made adultery a public crime and completely abrogated the right of condonation, pardon, and remission of penalty, except in specified instances.

The defendants were charged with adultery under the Penal Code, as modified by Act No. 1773 of the Philippine Commission. That Act materially changed the substantive criminal law relating to adultery by making it a public crime, to be prosecuted in the same manner as other public crimes, with certain exceptions. Under prior law, private crimes allowed the injured person to control the criminal liability of the offender through condonation, pardon, or remission; Act No. 1773 abolished this distinction.

Eustasio Hernandez and Catalina Mago were charged with adultery in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Ambos Camarines. Catalina Mago was the wife of Mariano del Pilar, who acted as the complainant in the action. The defendants were tried upon that charge and convicted, with Hernandez sentenced to four years and nine months of prision correccional and Mago to three years six months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, with the accessories mentioned in article 61 of the Penal Code, and each ordered to pay one-half the costs.

Hernandez admitted having had illicit relations with Catalina Mago but presented as a defense the alleged consent of the complainant, Mariano del Pilar, to the adulterous acts. The evidence relating to the alleged consent was conflicting, and upon such conflicting evidence, the court below found that the evidence adduced by the defendants was insufficient to sustain the allegation of consent. The Supreme Court carefully read the evidence in the record and found no reason for disturbing the conclusions reached by the court below, as the evidence fully supported them.

• Consent as Defense: The defendant Eustasio Hernandez admitted having had illicit relations with Catalina Mago but presented as a defense against criminality the consent of the complainant, Mariano del Pilar, husband of Catalina Mago.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The prosecution's evidence supported the conviction, and the trial court correctly found that the defendants' evidence of alleged spousal consent was insufficient to sustain that allegation.

• Consent as a Defense: Whether the consent of the injured spouse to the adulterous acts constitutes a valid defense to a criminal prosecution for adultery under Act No. 1773.

• Consent as a Defense: No. Even if the consent of the spouse had been obtained, such consent would not have been a defense because Act No. 1773 made adultery a public crime and completely abrogated the right of condonation, pardon, and remission of penalty, except in specified instances.

• Consent as a Defense: The Court reasoned that Act No. 1773 materially changed the substantive criminal law relating to adultery by making it a public crime, to be prosecuted in the same manner as other public crimes. The Act destroyed entirely the right of condonation, pardon, and remission of penalty, except in specified instances. Necessarily included in that result was the complete abrogation of the defense that the injured spouse had consented to the commission of the adulterous acts. Under prior law, condonation, pardon, and remission were the same in their legal nature and effect as the consent of the spouse to the commission of the adulterous acts — they all resulted in absolution from criminal responsibility. The vital and essential distinction between public and private crimes under the former law was the control which, in private crimes, the injured person had over the criminal liability of the offending person. The real intent and purpose of the Legislature in changing all private crimes into public crimes was to abolish this distinction and to take from every person injured by the criminal acts of another all control over the criminal liability of the offender — to prevent any person from remitting the criminal responsibility of another, regardless of whether that remission occurred before or after the commission of the crime. The fact that, in some cases, the institution of criminal proceedings under the Act rests wholly with the offended person does not affect the intention and purpose of the legislature as to the substantive law. Moreover, except in the presence of clear and express provisions of statute to the contrary, no person may produce any legal effect or work any legal result in the criminal law against the paramount interests of the public by consenting to the commission of a crime by other persons.

• Public vs. Private Crimes — Under prior law, the vital and essential distinction between public and private crimes was the control which, in private crimes, the injured person had over the criminal liability and responsibility of the offending person. Act No. 1773 abolished this distinction by changing all private crimes into public crimes, thereby taking from every injured person all control over the criminal liability of the offender.

• Abrogation of Condonation, Pardon, and Remission — Act No. 1773 destroyed entirely the right of condonation, pardon, and remission of penalty, except in specified instances. Necessarily included in that result was the complete abrogation of the defense that the injured spouse had consented to the commission of the adulterous acts, since condonation, pardon, and remission were the same in their legal nature and effect as consent — all resulting in absolution from criminal responsibility.

• Consent Cannot Work Against Public Interest — Except in the presence of clear and express provisions of statute to the contrary, no person may produce any legal effect or work any legal result whatever in the criminal law against the paramount interests of the public by consenting to the commission of a crime by other persons.

• "The substantive criminal law relating to adultery was changed materially by Act No. 1773 of the Philippine Commission. That Act made adultery a public crime, to be prosecuted, with the exceptions therein named, in the same manner as other public crimes. It destroyed entirely the right of condonation, pardon, and remission of penalty, except in specified instances." — This passage establishes the statutory basis for the Court's holding that spousal consent is no longer a defense to adultery.

• "The vital and essential distinction between public and private crimes, as they were known under the former law, was the control which in private crimes the injured person had over the criminal liability and responsibility of the offending person. Therefore, the real intent and purpose of the Legislature, in changing all private crimes into public crimes, was to abolish this distinction and thereby to take from every person injured by the criminal acts of another all control over the criminal liability and responsibility of the offending person." — This passage articulates the doctrinal rationale for why Act No. 1773 abrogated the defense of spousal consent.

• "Moreover except in the presence of clear and express provisions of statute to the contrary, it can not be permitted that any person produce any legal effect or work any legal result whatever in the criminal law against the paramount interests of the public by consenting to the commission of a crime by other persons." — This passage states the general principle that private consent cannot override the public interest in criminal prosecution.

• United States vs. Mariano del Pilar — The companion case decided the same date, involving the complainant in the present action upon the same statement of facts, in which the defendant was convicted.

• Act No. 1773, Philippine Commission — The statute that made adultery a public crime, to be prosecuted in the same manner as other public crimes, and destroyed the right of condonation, pardon, and remission of penalty except in specified instances. The Court applied this Act to hold that spousal consent was not a defense to adultery.

• Article 61, Penal Code — The provision defining the accessories to the penalty of prision correccional, which were imposed upon the defendants in addition to their principal sentences.

Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Elliott, JJ., concurred.