The United States vs. Agripino Macasaet

A conviction for selling native wine at retail without the required license is sustained where credible witnesses establish the sale, and subsidiary imprisonment for nonpayment of a fine is illegal where not authorized by law; Act No. 1732 cannot retroactively authorize such imprisonment for a trial held before its effectivity.

Agripino Macasaet was prosecuted by the United States for selling native wine at retail without the license required by the Internal Revenue Law. The offense was governed by section 66, in relation with section 68, subsection 5, of that law, which prescribed fines and imprisonment as principal penalties. Act No. 1732, enacted later, provided for subsidiary imprisonment when a fine was imposed for offenses punishable by Acts of the Philippine Commission.

Agripino Macasaet was charged with selling native wine at retail without the license required by law. At trial, the prosecution presented two witnesses whom the Supreme Court considered worthy of credit: William Bigger, sergeant of the Ninth Cavalry, United States Army, and James B. Jelks, corporal of the same regiment.

Bigger testified that he bought wine from Macasaet on four different occasions. The last purchase occurred between September 1 and 5, 1907, when Macasaet gave him half a bottle of wine for which Bigger paid 35 or 40 centavos in Philippine currency. Jelks witnessed this last transaction and saw Bigger receive the bottle and pay the price.

Macasaet testified but said nothing to overcome Bigger's declarations regarding the earlier purchases, so that testimony remained competent on those sales. As to the September delivery, Macasaet admitted delivering wine to Bigger but claimed it was a mere gift without payment. He explained that the wine was the remainder of wine he had ordered that afternoon to entertain the doctor attending his sick daughter. The doctor, actually a medical student, confirmed that Macasaet sent for wine to entertain him, and the person who bought the wine by Macasaet's order also declared the same.

Even if that account were true, it did not conflict with the government witnesses, because Macasaet could have sold to Bigger the wine remaining after entertaining the doctor. The person who bought the wine for the doctor also stated that he saw Macasaet offer and deliver the wine to Bigger and that Bigger paid nothing, but the Supreme Court found Bigger's and his companion's contrary declarations more probable. Nothing in the record satisfactorily explained the alleged gift. Macasaet's explanation that he gave the bottle gratuitously because Bigger asked to buy a box of cigars on credit, which he refused, appeared artificial; the report that the wine was sold was more probable and credible, especially since Macasaet had already sold wine to Bigger on previous occasions without opposition. It was neither plausible nor logical that Macasaet would give half a bottle as a present simply because he did not want to sell cigars on credit.

The evidence at trial established that Macasaet had been selling native wine at retail without the necessary license.

• Gift, Not Sale: The accused claimed that the half-bottle of wine delivered to Sergeant Bigger in early September 1907 was a mere gift, without payment, and not a retail sale.
• Purpose of the Wine: The accused claimed that the wine was the remainder of wine he had ordered that afternoon to entertain the doctor attending his sick daughter.
• Explanation for the Gift: The accused claimed that he gave the bottle gratuitously because Bigger asked him to sell a box of cigars on credit, which he refused.

• Illegal Retail Sale Without License: Whether the accused sold native wine at retail without the license required by law, in violation of section 66, in relation with section 68, subsection 5, of the Internal Revenue Law.
• Gift Defense / Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the accused's claim that the September 1907 delivery was a gift, rather than a sale, overcame the prosecution's evidence.
• Subsidiary Imprisonment: Whether the trial court lawfully imposed five months' subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency for nonpayment of the fine and costs.

• Illegal Retail Sale Without License: Yes. The evidence of two credible witnesses established that the accused sold wine at retail without the required license, violating section 66, in relation with section 68, subsection 5, of the Internal Revenue Law.
• Gift Defense / Sufficiency of Evidence: No. The claim of gift was not credible; the prosecution's version that the wine was sold was more probable and consistent with prior sales.
• Subsidiary Imprisonment: No. The law did not authorize subsidiary imprisonment for the fine, and Act No. 1732 could not apply retroactively because it took effect after the September 1907 trial.

• Illegal Retail Sale Without License: The trial proved that the accused had been selling native wine at retail without the necessary license. Two witnesses worthy of credit testified for the prosecution. Bigger bought wine from Macasaet on four different occasions, the last between September 1 and 5, 1907, when he paid 35 or 40 centavos for half a bottle. Jelks saw the delivery and payment. The accused said nothing to overcome Bigger's declarations regarding the earlier purchases. This established a violation of section 66, in relation with section 68, subsection 5, of the Internal Revenue Law.
• Gift Defense / Sufficiency of Evidence: The accused admitted delivering wine to Bigger but claimed it was a gift. The doctor or medical student and the person who bought the wine for the doctor confirmed that Macasaet had ordered wine to entertain the doctor, but that did not conflict with the prosecution's version because Macasaet could have sold the remaining wine to Bigger. The witness who said the wine was a gift was less probable; nothing satisfactorily explained the alleged gift. Macasaet's explanation that he gave the bottle because Bigger asked to buy cigars on credit, which he refused, appeared artificial. Prior sales to Bigger made the sale of the wine more probable and credible, and it was not plausible or logical that Macasaet would give half a bottle as a present simply because he did not want to sell cigars on credit.
• Subsidiary Imprisonment: The judgment imposed five months' imprisonment in case of insolvency with respect to the fine and costs. This imprisonment was subsidiary because it was to be suffered only upon nonpayment. Section 66 of the Internal Revenue Law prescribed imprisonment as a principal penalty, not as a subsidiary penalty for nonpayment of a fine. When only a fine was imposed, subsidiary imprisonment could not be inflicted because the law did not so provide. Act No. 1732, section 1, provided for subsidiary imprisonment when a fine was imposed for an offense punishable by Acts of the Philippine Commission, but it took effect only on November 1, 1907, while the trial took place in September 1907. Penal statutes cannot be made retroactive except when favorable to the accused. Article 21 of the Penal Code provides that no crime or misdemeanor shall be punished by a penalty not established by law prior to its commission. Thus, the subsidiary imprisonment was illegal.

• Non-retroactivity of penal statutes — Penal statutes cannot be made retroactive except when favorable to the accused. Article 21 of the Penal Code provides that no crime or misdemeanor shall be punished by a penalty not established by law prior to its commission. The Court applied this doctrine to Act No. 1732, which took effect on November 1, 1907, after the September 1907 trial, and therefore could not authorize subsidiary imprisonment in this case.
• Subsidiary imprisonment requires statutory authority — Subsidiary imprisonment is imposed only when the law expressly provides for it. Section 66 of the Internal Revenue Law prescribed fine or imprisonment as principal penalties; imprisonment was not a subsidiary penalty for nonpayment of a fine. Because the law did not authorize subsidiary imprisonment when only a fine was imposed, the five-month subsidiary imprisonment was illegal.
• Credibility of witnesses and the defense of gift — A claim that a delivery was a gift rather than a sale may be rejected where it is contradicted by credible witnesses and rendered improbable by prior sales and the absence of a satisfactory explanation. The Court found the prosecution's version more probable and credible, especially because the accused had previously sold wine to the same witness.

• "The fact that the accused had been selling native wine at retail without the necessary license constitutes a violation of section 66, in relation with section 68, subsection 5, of the Internal Revenue Law, and the judgment appealed from, in so far as it sentences the said accused to the payment of a fine of P300 and the costs of the trial, and directing him to obtain the required license, is in accordance with the law, and should, therefore, be affirmed." — This states the ratio for affirming the conviction and the fine, costs, and license order.
• "In the case at bar, the law does not authorize such subsidiary imprisonment, which is therefore, illegal." — This states the core ruling on subsidiary imprisonment.
• "It is a well-settled doctrine that penal statutes can not be made retroactive, except in the case they are favorable to the accused." — This states the non-retroactivity doctrine applied to Act No. 1732.
• "This act can not be applied to the present case, inasmuch as it went into effect only on the 1st day of November 1907, and the trial only took place on September of the same year." — This applies the non-retroactivity doctrine to the facts.

• Section 66, Internal Revenue Law — Prohibited selling native wine at retail without the necessary license and prescribed penalties: paragraph 1, fine of not less than P200 nor more than P2,000, or imprisonment not exceeding six months; paragraph 2, fine of not more than P1,000, or imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both. The Court held that imprisonment was prescribed as a principal penalty and could not be imposed subsidiarily for nonpayment of a fine.
• Section 68, subsection 5, Internal Revenue Law — Cited in relation with section 66 as the provision violated by the accused's retail sale of native wine without a license.
• Act No. 1732, section 1 — Provided that when a fine is imposed as whole or part of punishment for a criminal offense punishable by Acts of the Philippine Commission, the court shall also sentence the guilty person to subsidiary imprisonment until the fine is satisfied. The Court held it could not apply because it took effect on November 1, 1907, after the September 1907 trial.
• Article 21, Penal Code — Provided that no crime or misdemeanor shall be punished by a penalty not established by law prior to its commission. The Court invoked it to support the non-retroactivity of Act No. 1732.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Willard and Tracey, JJ., concur.